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ABSTRACT 
 
This study analyzes the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogues (S&ED) 
to uncover the organizational and rhetorical mechanisms by which U.S. and Chinese 
officials attempt to forge cooperative relations while managing issues of conflict. I argue 
for a communication centered approach for understanding geopolitical relations and the 
socialization process by which norms and values take root amongst U.S. and Chinese 
officials. To do so, I draw upon organizational institutionalism to uncover competing 
organizational logics guiding and constraining the S&ED through an organizational 
rhetorical lens while also providing a new theoretical conception of public diplomacy as 
a means to legitimize the S&ED as a mechanism for managing the complex bilateral 
relationship. Texts under analysis include the press releases, speeches, memos of 
understanding, and agreements published following each of the eight annual S&ED 
meetings from 2009-2016, totaling over 160 documents.  
 Findings suggest that the S&ED defines both the dialogue mechanism and 
bilateral relationship as founded upon a central logic of “positive, cooperative, and 
comprehensive” relations between the two countries. Resulting from this logic, both the 
economic and strategic tracks of the S&ED focus on producing ever increasing, tangible 
outcomes encompassing wider areas of cooperation each year. These outcomes occur 
most significantly within the economic track discussions as well cooperation on climate 
change and exchange programs. Not until the later years of the S&ED, with the 
incorporation of a “new model of major country relations” are more security related 
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issues addressed, with criticism of diverging view points on sensitive issues naturalized 
as expected given the S&ED’s value of dialogue and attention redirected from these 
issues to focus on the positive outcomes reached in other areas.   
Success of the S&ED relies upon self-reflexive praise by participants of the 
S&ED regarding its effectiveness in order to justify to domestic constituencies in both 
nations the continuance and support of the dialogue mechanism. This suggests that even 
after eight years of meeting, the dialogue mechanism is a fragile one, predicated on 
producing continuous success. Nonetheless, the breadth and number of agreements, 
exchanges, and growth of coordination between the bureaucracies of each country 
demonstrates that cooperation is possible.  
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
The fortunes of the twenty-first century will largely be written by how China and 
the U.S. cooperate or compete with each other. As Shambaugh (2013a) states, the U.S.-
China bilateral relationship has “rightly been described by officials and experts in both 
countries as the most important relationship in world affairs” (p. 3). The past four 
decades have witnessed China’s growth from a poor and internationally isolated nation 
to one of global prominence. While today, the U.S. is still the most influential and 
powerful country, China finds itself as the world’s most significant rising power with the 
pace of its presence on the global stage ever accelerating. Indeed, Shambaugh (2013b) 
explains: 
“wherever one turns, China is in the news—gobbling up resources, soaking up 
investment, expanding its overseas footprint, asserting itself in the Asian 
neighborhood, being sought-after suitor in global governance and diplomacy, 
sailing its navy into new waters, broadening its global media express and cultural 
presence, and managing a mega-economy that is the engine of global growth.” 
(Shambaugh, 2013b, P. 4-5). 
Thus, whether it is trade, diplomacy, or military might, the U.S. and China find 
themselves rubbing up against each other in new and ever increasing ways. As the two 
countries exerting the greatest impact on international relations today, it is of “vital 
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importance to understand the complexities and dynamics that underlie and drive this 
relationship” (Shambaugh, 2013a, p. 3).  
Since 2009, the primary means by which the two countries have managed their 
relationship has been through the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED). As the 
name suggests, this decision reflects the U.S. and Chinese leaderships’ confidence that 
open and direct communication is the best way to advance their relations. No other 
major powers have made such a decision; indeed, it highlights the belief that through 
communication the U.S. and China can align their interests. This unique strategy of 
diplomatic engagement calls scholars to examine then the communicative strategies by 
which these two important nations advance their personal and mutual interests and the 
symbolic and organizational means by which they do so. As such, it pushes scholars and 
policy makers alike to re-conceptualize geopolitical relations as one constituted in 
communication power. 
The Establishment of the S&ED 
On April 1st, 2009, President Barack Obama and Hu Jintao met on the sidelines 
of the G20 Financial Summit in London. The two leaders privately exchanged views on 
a range of bilateral and global issues, to which they concluded their discussion by 
publicly issuing a joint statement agreeing to establish the Strategic and Economic 
Dialogues (S&ED). According to their joint statement, President Obama and Hu Jintao 
had determined that: 
“continued close cooperation between the United States and China was critical at 
this time to maintain the health of the world economy and would remain so in the 
 3 
 
future…To this end, the two sides will exchange views and intensify 
coordination and cooperation on global economic and financial issues, climate 
change and energy, and other important issues through the Strategic and 
Economic Dialogue that the two countries have decided to establish.” (2009 js).  
In this statement and through the establishment of the S&ED, the two presidents 
presiding over the largest economies and military budgets in the world committed to the 
largest ongoing bilateral dialogue incorporating a range of issues reaching beyond the 
immediate consequences of the current financial crisis. While this crisis served in part as 
an impetus for greater coordination on macroeconomic policies, the decision to establish 
the S&ED went beyond economic considerations to include a range of both economic 
and security related concerns. As their statement explains, “The two sides agreed to 
further deepen mutually beneficial cooperation in a wide range of areas, including the 
economy and trade, counterterrorism, law enforcement, science and technology, 
education, culture and health” while also agreeing to “resume and expand consultations 
on non-proliferation and other international security topics…welcome[ing] further 
exchanges between the national legislatures, local authorities, academics, young people 
and other sectors.” (2009, js).  
While not altogether an entirely new creation, the establishment of the S&ED 
under the Hu-Obama administration was nonetheless a pioneering effort in U.S.-China 
relations. It marked a radical shift in U.S. diplomatic practice as no other countries meet 
as frequently and discuss such a broad range of issues as the United States and China. 
Even Great Britain, the country that enjoys a “special relationship” with the U.S. doesn’t 
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share the amount of attention from the U.S. government as China does. The S&ED’s 
Herculean undertaking mirrors its monumental task, avoiding the tragedy of great power 
politics plaguing geopolitical relations for at least two millennia. This statement is no 
hyperbole.  Historians, political scientists, and policy makers alike have published a 
litany of policy papers and academic manuscripts detailing the difficulties a rising 
power, like China, poses for status quo powers, such as the United States. The S&ED, 
designed as a platform to foster dialogue in pursuit of enhancing understanding and 
expanding common ground, reflects a unique moment in U.S.-China relations. In the 
words of U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry at the 2016 S&ED meeting, the “U.S.-China 
relationship is absolutely vital, that it may well be the most consequential bilateral 
relationship of nations on the world…and that the S&ED itself is an essential mechanism 
for both managing our differences and also expanding our areas of cooperation.” 
Despite the S&ED’s importance, researchers have yet to examine its efficacy in 
bringing about closer U.S.-China ties. This dissertation aims to do so, by scrutinizing the 
publicly released documents, statements, and institutional arrangements made 
throughout the eight years of the dialogue’s current existence to theorize the 
organizational and rhetorical mechanisms through which it functions. This approach 
bridges the international relations (IR) literature with studies in public diplomacy and 
communication in a few important ways.  
First, while IR theories provide detailed accounts of how state actors socialize 
others they do so by focusing on the relationship between state actions and the 
international system. While the neo-realist camp views this process of socialization as 
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occurring through state’s emulation of competitive behaviors imposed by an anarchic 
international system (Resende-santos, 2007), the English School emphasizes the 
importance of shared norms through the construction of an international society in which 
states, through intense interaction, bound themselves to common values and institutions 
for the purpose of ensuring the benefit of future rewards (Bull, 1977). For 
constructivists, socialization is the process by which norms are diffused and internalized 
(Wendt, 1999) through shared ideas, perceptions, and beliefs, all of which “are what give 
the world structure, order, and stability (Finnemore & Sikkin, 1998). While helpful in 
showcasing how states structure their relations, the problem with these perspectives lies 
in their placing of states as the primary unit of analysis. This leads to their overemphasis 
on how state actions undergird the international system as a whole and not the means by 
which individual organizations, governments, or global and local publics engage in 
communicative efforts shaping bilateral relations in nuanced and important ways. While 
the structure of international relations certainly matters, so too does the mechanisms by 
which individual efforts of politicians and diplomats in forging cooperative relations, 
and the organizational apparatuses in which they do so.  
Second, political actors draw support for their policies from domestic and 
international publics. Whereas diplomacy is typically concerned with government-to-
government interaction, public diplomacy focuses on how governments engage global 
publics to meet their own political ends. While various perspectives on public diplomacy 
have emerged, common concerns have coalesced around how changes in communication 
technologies and the advent of networked societies have brought global citizens and 
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governments closer together shifting the field from its historical monologic orientation to 
focus on means by which actors can engage with publics in new dialogic ways. As 
Proedrou and Frangonkolopoulos (2012) state, “the main reason behind renewed 
emphasis on public diplomacy is the increasing power of citizens and civil society 
actors” (p. 729). While the body of literature on public diplomacy showcases the 
importance of building support amongst foreign and local publics, Gilboa (2008) has 
argued that researchers have not sufficiently pursued a systematic theoretical approach to 
examining public diplomacy efforts. Gilboa (2008) states, “while scholars have applied 
communication models and theories to issues of foreign policy and international 
relations only a few researchers have applied them to public diplomacy” (p. 64). The 
value in public diplomacy is the recognition that states are not homogenous actors, but 
require the constant constitution of support from local and public audiences both within 
and outside of government agencies. Whereas IR theories employ a top-down approach, 
searching for how the international system structures state relations, public diplomacy 
takes more of a bottom-up and middle-out perspective, examining how local and 
international publics effect international policies. And yet, outside of explaining public 
diplomacy efforts as a tool for an individual nation to enhance its “soft power,” public 
diplomacy scholars haven’t sufficiently theorized how governments or other political 
actors engage in public diplomacy efforts to justify and legitimate larger strategies and 
policies of engagement between two countries.  
Finally, in between these two perspectives is communication. Communication 
studies, specifically the fields of organizational communication and rhetoric further our 
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understanding of geopolitical relations in that it conceptualizes the practice as 
fundamentally communicative. Outside of the realist perspective of IR studies, both the 
English School and the constructivists recognize the role of organizational institutions 
and language as central to the socialization process. Likewise, the study of public 
diplomacy looks at how political communities use communication to establish networks 
in which individuals develop shared meanings through genuine collaboration (Zaharna, 
Arsenault, and Fisher, 2014) or engage in deliberation on issues most pressing to the 
globe (Proedrou and Frangonkolopoulos, 2012). And yet, both of these fields tend to see 
communication as a means to some other specific end, rather than viewing 
communication as the site in which change occurs. Communication scholars are in part 
to blame, mainly because of their apparent disinterest in studying geopolitical relations. 
Despite this, organizational studies including institutional organizational communication 
and organizational rhetoric can help elucidate the intersectionality of individual rhetors 
making statements on behalf of their organizations, or state governments, to both their 
governmental counterparts as well as their domestic and global audiences. Taking a 
communication centric approach to geopolitical relations thus merges state interactions 
with public diplomacy efforts to understand how individuals persuade their manifold 
audiences in artful and purposeful ways. 
To understand the issues complicating U.S.-China relations, and thus the means 
by which the S&ED attempts to address them, scholars need to combine these three 
approaches as challenges to the U.S.-China relationship stems from multiple sources. 
First, structural issues as described by IR scholars such as shifts in material power and 
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military force as well as the desire to rewrite international norms and institutions 
shadows any long term strategic considerations by both countries.  
Second, and contributing to this, are each country’s domestic constituents 
scapegoating the other country as the source of their own woes. We see this from 
nationalist movements within China claiming U.S. double standards and hypocrisy via 
its human rights policies, belief in American media and politicians perpetuating a China 
threat theory, to even perceived foreign meddling in internal affairs regarding state 
sovereignty to name a few. Likewise, in the U.S., the American people cry of unfair 
trade policies from China threatening U.S. jobs as well as fears of U.S. decline and 
appeasement of China with criticism of U.S. officials leaving behind its allies in the Asia 
Pacific. Any long-term engagement between the two countries’ governments will need 
the support of their domestic constituencies.  
Finally, on an interpersonal and organizational level, U.S. and Chinese officials 
and policymakers view their counterparts in untrusting ways, questioning the true intent 
of their interlocutors. This sentiment of “strategic distrust” has been labeled a 
dangerously corrosive element preventing real cooperation from taking place. 
Contributing to this problem is the lack of coordination among the countries’ respective 
international affairs bureaucracies (Sutter, 2013), complicating the development of a 
comprehensive and consistent approach to U.S.-China policy. To manage these tensions, 
U.S. and Chinese leaders created the S&ED as the primary platform to address these 
issues.  
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Design and Structure of the S&ED 
In his testimony to the U.S. Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and the Global 
Environment, Fred Bergsten (2009), director of the Peterson Institute for International 
Economics explained to Congress the conceptual framework behind the S&ED. Bergsten 
(2009) called for an effective G-2 (group of two countries) between the U.S. and China 
in order to “carry on a wide-ranging and continuing conversation on their respective 
views of the world economy and global economic system” (p. 2). According to Bergsten, 
this effort should reflect the discussions that had taken place back during the Nixon and 
Kissinger era where the these two U.S. leaders engaged their Chinese counterparts, Mao 
Zedong and Zhou Enlai, in wide ranging discussions regarding their global geopolitical 
concepts and worldviews. Bergsten (2009) notes that exchanges such as these are even 
more important today than back in the 1970s as “China asks why it should conform to a 
set of rules and institutional arrangements that it had no role in creating” as well as citing 
the “historical problem of the powerful newcomer crashing (sometimes cozy) club of 
incumbent systemic leaders, which has had disastrous effects on some occasions—
Germany in the late 19th century” (p. 2). 
However, Bergsten (2009) notes that serious discussions, like the one he 
purposed, and which the S&ED is intended to facilitate, are difficult to come by for two 
reasons. First, it is difficult for dozens of people sitting at the table in formal discussions 
to candidly express their views. Thus, the S&ED should “provide maximum scope for 
smaller subgroups, particularly for the top officials, to carry on more informal and 
candid conversations” (p. 3). These discussions might also take place during bilateral 
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events or on the sidelines of multilateral meetings, but the S&ED would help facilitate 
these discussion by providing “a full day or two of intensive interaction between key 
ministers of the two governments” (p. 3). Second, Bergsten (2009) warns that officials 
become impatient with lengthy meetings if they neglect concerns and fail to deliver 
results that attract support from their domestic constituencies. The S&ED would thus 
need to tackle issues that are immediately salient as well as setting broad policy 
directions capable of resolving them. Specifically, he noted three areas at that time in 
which the U.S. and China could discuss: a) recovery from the global economic and 
financial crisis; b) reform of the international economic architecture; c) creation of a new 
international regime to save the planet from global warming. 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary David Shear similarly explains in his testimony to 
Congress how the inaugural 2009 S&ED would address the concerns and vision laid out 
by Bergsten (2009). Shear (2009) lists three goals creating the mechanisms by which the 
S&ED could do so. He stated that the first S&ED would help a) serve as an opportunity 
for U.S. and Chinese officials to get to know their Chinese counterparts; b) mobilize the 
whole government on each side by incorporating the full range of economic, regional 
global, and environmental challenges that require action by both countries in order to 
attain progress; and c) set the agenda for future engagement with China by giving U.S. 
senior officials the opportunity to voice the priorities of the new Administration (Shear, 
2009). Finally, as the joint statement establishing the S&ED made by Presidents Hu and 
Obama noted, the S&ED would include two primary tracks of dialogue among senior 
U.S. and Chinese officials: U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Chinese State 
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Councilor Dai Bingguo were to chair the “Strategic Track” while U.S. Secretary of 
Treasury Timothy Geithner and Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan were to chair the 
“Economic Track”. These four members were to stand in as “special representatives of 
their respective presidents” and to lead the S&ED discussions on an annual basis with 
each country alternating as host, as well as coordinating a number of sub dialogues and 
planning sessions throughout the year. Together under the auspices of the S&ED, these 
discussions and policy coordination would provide a mechanism through which the two 
sides could “build a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship 
for the 21st century and to maintain and strengthen exchanges at all levels.”  
Results from the Strategic and Economic Dialogues have grown nearly every 
year. According to Sutter (2013) the outward manifestations of the S&ED from 2009-
2012 have been hailed by both sides as positive and productive, with “26 specific 
outcomes” ranging from economic, strategic, and other bilateral, regional, and global 
issues announced in 2010, 48 outcomes from the strategic track in 2011, and 50 from the 
2012 S&ED.  As Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi noted, “we can hardly find an 
area where US-China cooperation is not needed” (Yang, 2009).  
Despite the ostensible “success” of the annual S&ED listing numerous “specific 
outcomes,” as time has gone on concerns regarding the effectiveness of the dialogues 
have been raised by U.S. officials and academics. Heilmann and Schmidt (2014) note 
that “time and again, carefully planned and organized meetings between top U.S. and 
Chinese officials falls victim to small and not-so-small crises in bilateral relations (p. 
162). David Shambaugh (2013b) argues that attempts by both governments to cooperate 
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and coordinate policies bilaterally through mechanisms such as the S&ED are 
increasingly ephemeral with deeper competitive forces threatening to overwhelm the 
efforts for cooperation. Specifically, he argues that the bilateral meetings appear to have 
changed from their original purpose of forging cooperation to forums discussing 
differences and managing competition with substantive friction evident. He goes on to 
explain that rather than forging real cooperation, the intergovernmental dialogues are 
mounting to mere consultation where each side informs the other of its differing 
preferences and policies. Thus, “it seems that both sides are attempting to present a 
façade of cooperation and harmony in official exchanges, but under the surface of these 
dialogues—indeed, through the entire relationship—there exists deepening distrust” (p. 
75). To understand why this is so and before explicating how the S&ED functions, one 
must understand the context in which U.S.-China relations have grown, the previous use 
of dialogue mechanisms in managing the relationship, and the antecedent institution in 
which the S&ED grew out of. 
China’s Rise and the Institutionalization of U.S.-China Dialogues 
Creating sustained cooperation between the United States and China has 
historically proven difficult. U.S.-China relations tend to ebb and flow between 
cooperation and competition depending on each country’s cultural orientations and 
national interests (Lu, 2011) in addition to the changing political and international 
circumstances (Wang, 1999). In this sense, today’s bilateral relationship reflects the past. 
Shambaugh (2013a) concludes that the current U.S.-China relationship is a mixed 
picture of cooperation and competition, labeling this “coopetition,” and suggesting this 
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term to capture the “new normal” of U.S.-China relations (p. 4). However, while 
competitive and cooperative elements continue, Tucker (2013) argues that today there is 
a qualitative difference in the bilateral relationship: 
“In the many decades of relations between the U.S. and China there has not been 
an occasion until the eve of the twenty-first century when both countries could 
simultaneously claim to be strong, prosperous and influential. There has also 
never been a moment when the two have been so interdependent and rarely a 
time when China has posed even an incipient challenge to U.S. power and 
primacy” (p. 45). 
For Tucker (2013) it is unclear whether the two countries can find common 
ground. Shambaugh (2013b) and Kissinger (2011) both believe that cooperation is 
possible, albeit difficult. For Shambaugh (2013b) the “key future challenge in U.S.-
China relations is to manage competition” while “expand[ing] the zone of genuine 
cooperation” and minimizing conflict (p. 22). However, for Kissinger (2011) managing 
competition is not enough. Kissinger (2011) states that the two countries can coevolve, 
but must do so by moving away from crisis management to a definition of common 
goals. Failure to do so portends a rocky relationship. As Kissinger (2011) states, “absent 
common goals coupled with agreed rules of restraint, institutionalized rivalry is likely to 
escalate beyond the calculations and intentions of its advocates” (p. 543). This section 
details the exigency that brought forth the S&ED and the historical use of dialogues 
between the United States and China in addressing issues of concern within the bilateral 
relationship. 
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China’s Rise 
China’s growth in international influence today creates a strategic and rhetorical 
constraint on the relationship. Historically, rising powers pose a serious threat to the 
existing world order. For scholars of international relations, this problem is known as the 
“Thucydides trap” or the tendency of great power conflict arising from emergent great 
powers challenging the existing world order represented by the status quo great power 
(Gilpin, 1981; Chouchri & North, 1975; Wight, 1978; Mearsheimer, 2001; Tammen, 
2008). China’s rise is no different, sparking considerable academic debate on whether 
China is a revisionist state seeking to alter the current U.S. led international order 
(Tammen & Kugler, 2006; Johnston, 2003; Beckley, 2011; Ross, 2006; Friedberg, 2005; 
Kirshner, 2008; Huiyun, 2009). 
When potential power transitions occur, existing powers are faced with a serious 
dilemma. As Goddard (in press) explains, rising powers may challenge existing 
territorial boundaries or advocate for revising current economic orders to change the 
terms of trade or spheres of influence. Thus, existing great powers have to decide 
whether to engage or contain rising powers depending on their perceptions of the rising 
powers as a threat to the existing world order or as a country capable of being 
accommodated and integrated into the existing political order.  
Goddard (in press) states that the decision to confront, contain, or accommodate 
a rising power falls on the issue of intentions, which she argues depends on how a rising 
power legitimates its expansionist aims. She defines legitimization as “an appeal to 
public, recognized norms and rules to justify demands to an observing audience” (p. 42). 
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This process includes explaining a country’s aims and motives and referencing existing 
norms and rules of the international system. The effectiveness of emerging powers in 
legitimizing their rise depends not on its material costs, but on its resonance with the 
target group. However, Goddard (in press) notes that legitimization strategies are not the 
only means by which rising powers use language to shape how countries respond to their 
expansionist aims. Rising powers can also provide public commitments to act peacefully 
and responsibly, threaten serious repercussions if others fail to recognize their status as a 
world power, or employ narratives explaining why their state is destined to rise. 
For rhetoricians, this process of legitimization is not new, indeed it reflects core 
elements of rhetoric’s epidictic and deliberative genres. Aristotle (2007) defines the 
deliberative genre of rhetoric as what a political community ought to do, focusing on 
policy actions that are expected to benefit the political community. However, in deciding 
upon what future actions to undertake a community must have shared values upon which 
to judge the efficacy of such actions. As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) explain, 
epideictic discourse “shapes perceptions of shared values and commitments serviceable 
to future deliberative agendas.” Murphy (2003) states that epideictic rhetoric involves 
the “collaborative creation of speaker and audience establishing appropriate relationships 
between each in a new world. Each judges the other as a partner in the enterprise, 
reflecting on the tactics used to create a world and the world itself” (p. 610). As such, 
epideictic rhetoric brings particular values to life when epideictic audiences reflect on 
the issues of “unity or disunity, community or chaos” (p. 610). As Yang (2011) 
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concludes, “diplomatic rhetoric resides in the intersection between epidictic and 
deliberative rhetoric” (p. 5).  
Organizational rhetoricians and public relations scholars have likewise studied 
the importance of appealing to common norms and values. As Conrad (2011) explains 
contemporary models of organizational identity, image, and crisis management assume 
their audiences to be active, thinking beings whose responses to organizational rhetoric 
are influenced by their individual beliefs, values, and ways of making sense of their 
experiences and the rhetoric to which they are exposed. Thus, organizations craft 
persuasive appeals intimately tied to taken-for-granted assumptions of the cultures 
within which the organization operates. Tying this elements to the epideictic genre of 
rhetoric, Bostdorff and Vibbert (1994) argue that organizations routinely engage in 
persuasive campaigns resting upon tenets of epideictic rhetoric in which they create a 
“context of shared values that informs the basis for judgement which audiences bring to 
bear in evaluating organizational messages” (p. 142). Therefore, the process of rising 
powers legitimating their aims is fundamentally rhetorical.  
If legitimization strategies are dependent upon the messages resonating with 
target audiences, then who are those audiences? Goddard (in press) states that leaders 
must use multivocal language which contains content that appeals to multiple, even 
contradictory principles simultaneously. Multivocal legitimation is dependent upon the 
speaker and audience’s institutional position. She argues that “the key variable is...the 
extent to which a great power is tied to the existing norms and rules of international 
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politics” (p. 68). The more embedded in institutions, the more likely its multivocal 
claims will resonate.  
While institutions are important, so are domestic publics. As Robert Putnam 
(1988) has argued, domestic and international relations are entangled. He states that “it is 
fruitless to debate whether domestic politics really determine international relations or 
the reverse. The answer to that question is clearly “both, sometimes.” (p. 427). He 
suggests scholars use the metaphor of a “two-level game” to understand how these 
processes work. For instance, at the national level domestic groups pursue their interests 
by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies while politicians seek power 
by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national 
governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures while 
minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. This creates an 
additional strategic and rhetorical problem for leaders in their conduct of international 
affairs. Thus, Robert Putnam (1988) concludes, “the complexities for the players in this 
two-level game are staggering” (p. 434). 
Here again the importance of organizational rhetoric comes into play as it seeks 
to understand how organizations craft messages to appeal to domestic audiences. 
Putnam’s (1988) perspective, while informative, in nonetheless limited in that focuses 
too strongly on coalitional politics and their implications in foreign policy formulation. 
As the public diplomacy literature has demonstrated, global publics are now able to 
directly monitor, appraise, and engage in debates of foreign policy, albeit primarily in 
the construction of public opinion or coordination of civil society. Organizations’ 
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messaging strategies are likewise complicated by this element of external versus internal 
audiences. As the literature on marketing and auto-communication has argued, the 
organizational culture and identities of its members are impacted by the externally 
driven strategies attempting to explain the organization’s identity and values 
(Christensen, 1997; Morsing, 2006). If the externally oriented strategies diverge from the 
internally circulated messages defining the organization, the organizational members’ 
identities are challenged. 
Thus, from the perspective of organizational rhetoric, one can conceive of 
government organizations as utilizing rhetoric towards the persuasive inducement of 
coordination for the organization’s interests. According to Hoffman and Ford (2010), 
“organizational rhetoric is the strategic use of symbols by organizations to influence the 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of audiences important to the operation of the 
organization” (p. 7). Organizations employ rhetoric in order to engage its organizational 
members, relevant stakeholders, and manage the organizations reputations and interests, 
uncovering how these interests and identities become united and sustained. These 
reputations create important discursive effects as they limit policy options undertaken by 
officials. As Goh (2005) found, U.S. policy towards China from the 1960s-1970s was 
constrained at first by China’s image as a “red menace,” inhibiting those within the U.S. 
policy establishment from winning support for a policy of engagement. It wasn’t until 
the public began viewing China as a “tacit ally” that U.S. officials, such as Kissinger and 
Nixon were able to sell rapprochement. 
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Indeed, U.S.-China cooperation has consistently fallen victim to the complexities 
of competing interests between domestic and international audiences. President Nixon 
decided to secretly send his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger to begin 
negotiations to open up relations with China due to concerns regarding domestic and 
international stakeholders demanding consultations which could have “mortgaged” the 
prospects of their meetings (Kissinger, 2011, p. 236). President George H. W. Bush 
similarly had to send his national security advisor Brent Scowcroft to help mollify 
tension between the U.S. and China following the Tiananmen Square incident (Harding, 
2000; Kluver, 2010). More recently, as Sutter (2013) notes, U.S. domestic politics 
continue to hold back progress in developing U.S.-China relations today. Thus, the U.S.-
China relationship requires deft diplomacy in convincing its domestic and international 
constituents that the two countries can work together without disrupting domestic 
interests at home. This process requires consideration of how organizations engage in 
ongoing advocacy establishing common values upon which deliberative policy agendas 
can be sustained. 
How then is the United States and China to manage their relations today? While 
U.S.-China cooperation has historically ebbed and flowed, the difference between the 
relationship today comes from the extent to which China’s rise significantly impacts 
U.S. national interests globally, even challenging the current U.S. led international 
organizations that undergird today’s global world order. Shambaugh (2013a) argues that 
the United States and China are tangled strategically, diplomatically, economically, 
socially, culturally, environmentally, regionally, internationally, educationally, and in 
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many other domains. The extent to which the two countries are forced to rub up against 
each other’s global interests today poses a unique constraint on how the two countries 
interact both materially and symbolically. To understand how the two countries deal 
with these issues I first turn to the decision to engage China in institutionalized dialogues 
beginning in the second Bush administration before reviewing how dialogues have been 
historically used as a tool in managing U.S.-China relations more broadly. 
Antecedents of the S&ED 
The Strategic and Economic Dialogue established by the Obama and Hu 
administrations grew from two high-level dialogue mechanisms set up during the Bush 
administration (Wilder, 2009). These efforts were led on the Chinese side by President 
Hu Jintao, Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo, and Vice Premier Wang Qishan, and on 
the U.S. side by Secretary of Treasury Hank Paulson and Deputy Secretary of State 
Robert Zoellick. Within the Bush administration, the decision to engage China in earnest 
emerged around 2003 resulting from a desire to actively seek stable, cooperative 
relations (Sutter, 2013). Following a 2004 meeting with President Bush, President Hu 
first suggested the U.S. and China set up a Senior Dialogue (SD), and in August 2005, 
the first SD took place in the Chinese capitol Beijing, chaired by Deputy Secretary of 
State Robert Zoellick and PRC Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo (Daumbaugh, 2009). 
According to Wilder (2009) the SD’s purpose was to create a forum for high-ranking 
officials to discuss larger geopolitical issues within the relationship. For the U.S., it was 
to embody Zoellick’s aspirations for China to become a “responsible stakeholder” within 
the international system; for the Chinese, it was an opportunity to explain in depth 
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concerns over issues like Taiwan. Wilder (2009) credits the SD as helping Zoellick, and 
later his successor John Negroponte, engage Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo in the 
resolution of key global issues such as Chinese tightening of weapon sales to Iran and 
PLA support for UNPKO in Darfur as well helping State Councilor Dai share Chinese 
concerns over the actions of then Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian 
Shortly following the establishment of the SD, President Bush and Hu agreed to 
establish a second high-level dialogue mechanism. The Strategic Economic Dialogue 
(SED) which was announced during U.S. Secretary of Treasury Paulson’s first trip to 
China in September 2006 and was to advance economic relations between the two 
countries by encouraging China to continue its economic transition to become a more 
responsible global player (Paulson, 2006). The SED was co-hosted by U.S. Treasury 
Secretary Paulson and PRC Vice Premier Wang Qishan (Daumbaugh, 2009). Wilder 
(2009) explains the context in which the SED took place, namely the contentious issue 
of U.S.-China trade relations. Wilder (2009) explains that during this time, the U.S. 
Congress was seriously discussing whether to punish China for its increasingly large 
trade surpluses and currency pegging to the U.S. dollar by enacting tariffs on Chinese 
imports. Wilder (2009) credits the joint efforts of Secretary Paulson and Vice Premier 
Wang Qishan through the SED as helping to ease Congressional concerns on this issue 
by helping convince the Chinese to appreciate their currency by an “impressive 20 
percent against the U.S. dollar,” and thus avoiding a trade war between the U.S. and 
China, as Congress decided not to enact punitive legislation towards Chinese trade 
policies.  
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Under the Bush Administration both the SD and the SED met twice annually so 
that Cabinet-level officials from both countries could hold regular talks on key issues 
(Daumbaugh, 2009). While Wilder (2009) describes both dialogue mechanisms as 
achieving some success, the SED was viewed as both the more prominent and 
productive dialogue thanks to the activism of Treasury Secretary Paulson. The 2009 
establishment of the S&ED under the Obama administration sought to bolster the 
strategic level discussions by having the State Department play a more active leadership 
role (Daumbaugh, 2009). Secretary of State Clinton affirmed this new direction during 
her first trip to China in February 2009 where she stated that both countries had agreed 
in principle on a “broad structure of a high-level strategic and economic dialogue with 
two tracks” (Clinton, 2009). Secretary Paulson’s advocacy for a policy of engaging 
China and his instrumental and activist role in promoting the SED, the dialogue 
mechanism in which the S&ED grew out of, merits further consideration as regarding 
how he envisioned the dialogue mechanism to function as well as his success in 
promoting and utilizing it.  
The Decision to Engage, Not Contain, China 
The decision to establish the Strategic and Economic Dialogues reflects U.S. 
policymakers’ belief that China can, and should be incorporated into the existing world 
order, although not without turbulence along the way. A driving force behind the 
establishment of these dialogues was U.S. Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson. Paulson 
helped win over support from Congressional leaders, U.S. academic and policy makers, 
as well as the Chinese leadership. 
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Within the U.S., Paulson (2008) argued that while some suggest that China is a 
threat needing to be contained, others believe its growth can be an opportunity for the 
U.S. economy; he made his position clear, by stating, “I believe that engagement is the 
only path to success” (p. 59). In his 2007 testimony before the House Committee on 
Financial Services, Paulson explained how “Since becoming Secretary, I have 
emphasized the United States' economic relationship with China. Rapid growth in China 
has helped power the global economy. And, as a major global economic participant, 
China must address the need for structural reform.” As part of this engagement, Paulson 
described the U.S.-China relationship as “multifaceted” with the U.S.  “welcome[ing] 
China's growth and integration into the world economy.” He argued for a U.S. policy 
towards China as both welcoming China’s rise as well as advancing U.S. economic 
interests. In his testimony, he explained that the U.S. supported “a stable and prosperous 
China” which “will be a growing market for U.S. goods and services, even if it will be 
an economic competitor at times.” While noting that “As our relationship with China 
matures, tensions will naturally emerge,” Paulson optimistically expressed that “It is in 
our interest to support China's continuing efforts to reform and open its economy. Our 
policy disagreements are not about the direction of change, but about the pace of 
change” (Paulson, 2007). His testimony served an important role in winning support for 
Executive’s policy among Congressional leaders, and yet his advocacy did not end there. 
Paulson also made sure to articulate his policy positions to the academic and policy 
making communities as well. 
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Paulson’s (2008) policy position was that Washington needed to understand 
Beijing’s interests and the challenges it faced, primarily in the economic realm where 
“The Chinese see economic growth as essential to their stability” (p.59-60). He argued 
that cooperation between the U.S. and China was possible because of existence of 
overlapping interests. He contended that China’s cooperation with the United States 
could be a means by which China could resolve vital issues to Chinese growth. For 
instance, he noted that China’s economic growth model, while producing awe-inspiring 
results over the past three decades, was becoming an obstacle to China’s sustained 
growth and social stability. It created a rapid rise of energy consumption, unequal 
economic development between the coast and the mainland, and financial imbalance due 
to its large current account surplus and limited domestic consumption. To improve 
China’s economic situation, Paulson suggested China continue financial reform and 
establish a more flexible exchange rate, issues that he cited were successfully addressed 
in the dialogues he led with China. The purpose being to lend further credence to 
continued support of dialogue mechanism. He makes this point explicit by stating how 
these issues demonstrates that “the progress to date is an example of how strategic 
dialogue can yield results” (Paulson, 2008, p. 67). 
Paulson (2008) claimed the United States and China were also natural allies 
when it came to energy security and environmental policy. The explosion of China’s 
energy use created rising international energy prices resulting in China facing gasoline 
and diesel shortages. More worrisome to China was the problem resource scarcity posed 
with regards to China’s ability to maintain social stability through increases in quality of 
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life. The consequences of China’s staggering energy use also spilled over into the 
environmental realm. The environmental degradation resulting from its economic 
growth became such a problem that “approximately 1,000 disputes over environmental 
protection occur each week in China” (Paulson, 2008, p. 69). Supporting his position, a 
year later a 2009 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies entitled 
“Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations,” argued for not only an “aggressive engagement 
agenda” between the two nations, but also identified energy and climate as a major topic 
for U.S.-Chinese collaboration (Cohen & Greenberg, 2009).  
Paulson’s advocacy extended beyond U.S. audiences to include the Chinese 
leadership. In his 2015 memoir, Paulson explains how he utilized his experience as an 
investment banker to establish and leverage ties with Chinese officials in support for 
establishing the SED. He explained his goals and role in establishing the SED: 
“In my first days as Treasury secretary, we had drawn up plans for the SED with 
three overarching goals: to advance the economic relationship between the U.S. 
and China, to helping bring about market reforms in China, and to encourage its 
emergence as a responsible global citizen.” (p. 262). 
In pursuit of these goals he cites his persistence in slowly winning over Chinese support 
on key economic issues. He explains that,  
“I learned something else as a young investment banker: never take no for an 
answer. You almost never got what you asked for the first time around, 
especially with new clients…With enough time and effort, the answer might just 
change to yes. I certainly employed that approach with China. How many times 
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did I hear “no” or “not yet” or “not so fast” in response to my requests for the 
Chinese to open their markets or move their currency? Even when we didn’t get 
the answer we wanted, we managed to wedge the door open a little further, and 
the next time we’d push a little more. In a country where so many people 
weighed in on so many issues, we were, at a minimum, helping them build a 
consensus for change.” (p. 263)  
The SED created a continued forum through which he could continuously push the 
Chinese on these issues. This increased facetime with Chinese leadership provided him 
not only with time required to push the Chinese to say yes, but also enabled him to 
understand the issues relevant to the Chinese leadership and thus reframe his proposals 
in more persuasive ways. Paulson explains this process, stating, “You had to work hard 
to understand their needs and frame your proposals to appeal to their best interests. Then 
you had to push and push, and keep asking for the same thing.” (p. 263). 
 In addition to persistence, Paulson cites the importance of building relationships, 
to which he viewed the SED as playing a vital part in creating close, personal, and more 
importantly, enduring ties between the two countries. In his memoirs he explains, “As a 
young investment banker, I learned that the key to success was building relationships, 
between you and your client, between your firm and his or hers.” Thus, in his new role, 
“As Treasury secretary, I had worked to build lasting relationships, this time between 
countries.” With regards to his view on the SED, he notes, “Personalities came and 
went—I wouldn’t be Treasury secretary much longer, and the Chinese leadership would 
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also change. But with the SED we had created a forum for relations between our 
countries that would carry on after us.” (p. 262).  
 From his persistence and through his views on the importance of creating 
personal ties, he sums up how the SED enabled the U.S. and China to come to agreement 
on issues they otherwise wouldn’t have. While some of these issues were small, Paulson 
argues that they established an enduring means for fostering continued U.S.-China 
cooperation. Again, from his memoirs he states: 
“To critics of the SED, some of these achievements—from increasing and 
expediting the number of Chinese tourists visiting the U.S. to agreeing to work 
together to combat illegal logging—might have seemed less than spectacular. But 
there were hundreds of them, they added up to a lot of progress, and they would 
not have achieved without the SED. I saw each one as a brick in the strong 
structure that we were building—a structure that would withstand the winds of 
future tensions and crises.” (p. 261). 
Paulson’s advocacy for the establishment of greater engagement with China 
cannot be understated. In fact, when his Treasury Department established the first formal 
invocation of the Strategic Economic Dialogue in 2006, it was hailed as “the first of its 
kind” and set the stage for further collaboration. In his 2007 testimony before the House 
Committee on Financial Services, Paulson explained how this dialogue mechanism was 
indispensable in that the SED allowed “us to speak to senior Chinese officials with one 
voice, avoiding the stove-piping that had sometimes characterized past discussions.” The 
SED thus proved that “we can work to strengthen the U.S. – China economic 
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relationship. It is very important to both of our countries that we get this right” (Paulson, 
2007). While this is certainly true, marking the first institutionalization of dialogues 
between the United States and China, dialogues have long been a policy tool used by 
U.S. and Chinese officials in managing their bilateral relationship and assuaging 
domestic constituencies. In order to understand how dialogues function as a mechanism 
to manage U.S.-China relations, I now provide an overview of their historical use.  
The Use of Dialogues in U.S.-China Relations 
The establishment of the Strategic and Economic Dialogues reflects a pattern of 
dialogues established to promote understanding and cooperation throughout U.S.-China 
relations common in purpose, but more sporadic and considerably less institutionalized. 
Sutter (2013) states that “Dialogue has been a central feature of Sino-American relations 
since the United States and China opened relations beginning under President Richard 
Nixon and Chairman Mao Zedong in the early 1970s” (p. 3). These dialogues have taken 
numerous forms, including Presidential visits, broader interchanges between elites in 
each country’s administrations, legislative exchanges, and interactions among influential 
government and non-government groups. The overall record of dialogues shows that 
they are important instruments in the policy “tool kit” of each side to deal with salient 
areas of common interests and disagreement that have broaden in scope as a result of 
China’s rising international importance and the increasing salience of an ever-wider 
range of issues in U.S.-Chinese relations in the twenty-first century.  
Despite the importance of dialogues, there is a dearth of academic research on 
how dialogues have been used to manage U.S.-China relations, or even relations with 
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other nations. Indeed, only one academic article (Sutter, 2013) has reviewed their 
historical use and the specific motivations by each party in participating in the dialogues. 
One reason for this could be the bias towards realist perspectives on theorizing U.S.-
China relations (Goh, 2005). The S&ED in particular is usually given one or two pages 
of treatment in books or articles reflecting on U.S.-Chinese relations, viewing the 
dialogues as the manifestations of the larger U.S.-China strategy of engagement. And 
yet, the public documents released following each round of the S&ED are frequently 
cited as one of the primary sources detailing U.S.-Chinese progress in cooperation.  
In the only academic article discussing the use of dialogues between the U.S. and 
China, Sutter (2013) explains that recent dialogues over the past two decades reflect 
similar rationales as previous dialogues; the rationale being dialogues can serve as a 
means to help deal with and reduce differences in interests and perceptions that divide 
the two countries. U.S. leaders in particular believe that American persuasiveness would 
help induce Chinese leaders to follow policies in line with U.S. norms, while Chinese 
leaders were more circumspect with their motives, but believed dialogues were effective 
vehicles to manage problems with relations with the United States. U.S. officials such as 
Thomas Christensen (2009) and Dennis Wilder (2009) believed they were effective for 
the United States in eliciting cooperation from China resulting in beneficial effects. On 
the U.S. side, Jean Garrison (2007) stated the various dialogues have helped force the, at 
times, divided U.S. government bureaucracies to deal with China in a more uniform and 
coherent manner consistent with the positive direction favored by the president. 
Likewise, Sutter (2013) states that “The Americans also saw the channels as means to 
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compel the often poorly coordinated Chinese international affairs apparatus to involve 
all relevant stake holders in the Chinese administration, thereby smoothing the way to 
effective implementation of the agreements made during the dialogues” (p. 3). U.S. 
officials also found the dialogues a useful way to identify senior officers on the Chinese 
possessing the authority to solve problems and as a resource to seek out “go to” officials 
during crises.  
Another purpose of U.S.-China dialogues is to create informally binding ties 
between the U.S. and China as part of a larger strategy of engagement. The increasing 
use of dialogues is seen as a mechanism to build growing webs of interrelationships 
between the U.S. and China that would persuade the Chinese government to perceive its 
interests better served by cooperation rather than confrontation (Shinn, 1996). 
Additionally, these ties function to constrain one side from taking actions detrimental to 
the interests of the other. Taken together, both sides view these dialogues positively. 
They often serve as shock absorbers in periods of difficulty, provide the basis of actual 
or potential channels of informal communication in times of crisis, and promote efforts 
to broaden common ground in U.S.-Chinese relations (Sutter, 2013). Ultimately, 
dialogues were viewed instrumentally by the two powers to manage their competition 
while pragmatically building ties amid adverse circumstances. 
Importantly, dialogues serve a symbolic purpose. Sutter (2013) explains that 
even without meaningful progress, U.S.-China dialogues were useful in fostering 
publicity that showed one side or the other taking action on issues of importance to their 
respective domestic constituencies. Supporting Putnam’s (1988) metaphor of a two-level 
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game, dialogues were used by the U.S. and Chinese governments to mollify, at least 
temporarily, the pressure of their domestic constituencies calling for much more 
confrontational approaches—such as human rights and trade issues. This symbolic 
cooperation helped avoid harsher U.S. legislation in particular that threatened to 
jeopardize broader interests held by both Chinese and U.S. presidential administrations 
(Harding, 2000; Tucker, 2009; Sutter, 2013b). 
Despite the frequent use of dialogues and the belief from both sides that they are 
productive, frictions abound. Sutter (2013) explains how Chinese leaders tend to view 
U.S. representatives as “demanders”, using the dialogues to solve problems perceived 
solely by the United States. On the other hand, U.S. officials viewed the Chinese side 
negatively, as utilizing the dialogues as a channel to manage sensitive issues, but without 
committing to decisions needed to solve difficult problems between the two countries. 
Specifically, under the Obama administration, U.S. officials came to see China’s leaders 
offering limited cooperation. Whereas the Obama administration tried to appeal for 
Chinese cooperation on global issues, especially climate change, requiring China to take 
actions to fulfill its global responsibility arising from its augmented international 
influence, the U.S. side felt Chinese leaders focused more on their own narrow interests. 
In addition to complaints regarding U.S. and Chinese participation in the S&ED, 
frictions arouse as a result of China’s aggressive posturing. During this period of 
engagement under the Obama administration, the U.S. saw Chinese actions becoming 
more truculent. During Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s tenure in 2011, she referred 
to this new Chinese aggression as “tests” or manifestations of a newly assertive China.  
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According to Sutter (2013), in 2012, U.S. and Chinese leaders saw growing divergence 
and competition in Asia challenging and testing the abilities of U.S. and Chinese leaders 
to manage their differences in pursuance of positive engagement. These challenges led 
Shambaugh (2013b) to conclude that the relationship became more strained and 
distrustful with the S&ED becoming more pro-forma rather than creating workable 
solutions to U.S.-China issues. Likewise, in a joint authored Brookings report, Wang Jisi 
and Kenneth Lieberthal (2013) noted that while the U.S. and China understand each 
other’s’ positions on all major issues with high level leaders meeting relatively 
frequently, these extensive activities have not produced long-term trust on either side. 
They argue that this lack of trust is becoming more serious, producing attitudes and 
actions that contribute to greater distrust which makes it difficult for leaders on each side 
to feel confident that they understand the deep thinking among leaders regarding the 
future of U.S.-China relations. 
 However, even during these strained times between the United States and China, 
U.S.-China engagement and cooperation continued. Sutter (2013) argues that while 
competitive aspects grew in 2012, the overall trend of resilient and positive U.S. China 
engagement continued, with over 70 bilateral dialogues meeting and making significant 
progress in several areas. Thus, the S&ED in particular, and dialogues between U.S. and 
Chinese officials in general, provided the mechanism for dealing with contentious issues 
and advancing common ground. Despite differences, specialists on both the American 
and Chinese sides seemed to agree that effectively managing differences through a 
process of constructive engagement remains in the interests of both countries. Sutter 
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(2013) concluded that by 2013, the deepening exchanges and array of dialogues between 
Chinese and U.S. officials appear to enhance realistic and predicable relations that 
reduce confrontation that, in the end, are not in the interests of either side. However, he 
argues that while dialogues can be useful instruments in improving relations, he cautions 
that they in and of themselves cannot compel greater agreement and coordination. 
Ultimately, that must be decided by policy elites in Beijing and Washington.  
Argument and Overview of Chapters 
At this point, the literature demonstrates that while the U.S.-China relationship is 
immensely important and dialogues are one of the primary means by which the U.S. and 
Chinese governments attempt to build common ground, at times they are effective while 
at other times they fail to provide lasting identifications of common cause and trust. 
Strikingly, we have no theoretical basis that explains how or why this is so. On one 
hand, we have the idealistic view of dialogue as romantically heroic in the sense that if 
only officials from both sides are in the same room they would come to understand each 
other’s views and find common ground. This perspective appears to overly attribute 
explanatory power resting in individual diplomats and their persuasive skills to win over 
their counterparts. And yet, on the other hand is the conflicting perspective that material 
changes and differences are moving the two sides into conflict, especially as China 
becomes more influential in a variety of economic and security contexts. This more 
pessimistic perspective seems to be overly deterministic in that material considerations 
outside of individual leaders are necessarily driving the countries to conflict, reflective 
of the realist paradigm within the international relations literature. Both perspectives fail 
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to take into account the institutional structure of the S&ED as it organizes what topics 
are discussed, how these issues are then talked about, and its consequences regarding 
how the two nations engage each other. Furthermore, it ignores alternative efforts by 
which the two countries garner support for their policies from domestic audiences and 
key stakeholders. Organizational scholars have similarly grappled with questions of 
structure and agency (Conrad & Haynes, 2002) and have developed theories for how 
institutions both enable and constrain organizational behavior.  
My argument is that the S&ED is a fragile institutional mechanism through 
which U.S. and Chinese officials define and enact rules guiding their relations while 
constantly requiring leaders from both sides to legitimize the dialogue mechanism to 
themselves and their domestic constituencies as the primary forum for managing 
relations. As a new institutional forum, the S&ED competes with other bilateral and 
multilateral fora as the primary mechanism to handle affairs between the two countries. 
The S&ED creates the institutional architecture and organizing logics delivered from 
senior leaders in both administrations, especially each country’s presidents, signaling to 
each country’s state bureaucracies and domestic publics what policy actions to pursue. 
The agreements made and principles stated both enable and constrain what actions are to 
be taken. However, in order for these principles, or institutional logics, to be compelling 
organizational actors are needing to constantly define and enact these principles. This 
suggests that the S&ED creates weak organizational ties among the two countries and 
functions more so in creating the capacity for cooperation, without guaranteeing it. 
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This project uncovers how the S&ED functions to manage tensions within the 
U.S.-China bilateral relationship, the mechanisms by which it does so, and the areas of 
success and failure. Current academic and policy discussions surrounding the S&ED are 
problematic as they tend to focus on the interpersonal communication among diplomats. 
From this perspective, the S&ED is viewed as a socializing force whereby leaders from 
both sides exchange ideas and engage in dialogue—the back and forth discussion of each 
country’s views to achieve mutual understanding and thus common ground for policy. 
This view is not only methodologically difficult to demonstrate the S&ED’s 
effectiveness because the actual conversations are either classified or take place in 
informal conversations, but also overemphasizes the agency of individual leaders and 
thereby ignores the institutional elements and design of the S&ED itself. This results in 
an undertheorized process of how the S&ED achieves its purpose. Therefore, I argue that 
the S&ED can best be understood in two ways: first, as a process of institutionalization, 
specifically the convergence and divergence of competing institutional logics by 
organizational rhetors; second, as an instance of public diplomacy whereby the S&ED’s 
organizational identity, image, and reputation management rhetoric, value advocacy 
rhetoric, and relational network building serves to build domestic support and a 
consistent frame of reference by which stakeholders can identify with the S&ED’s 
purpose. 
I draw upon organizational institutional theory, which is explained in chapter 2, 
to explicate the process, outcomes, and role of rhetoric in creating and sustaining 
institutional change between the U.S. and China. From this perspective, the S&ED can 
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be understood as an attempt to define and constrain policy actions from both sides 
through the structure provided by the S&ED, its competing and shared institutional 
logics, and the institutional work of its members in sustaining the S&ED’s structure. I 
also draw upon and merge theories of organizational rhetoric, specifically identity 
management and value advocacy with theories of discursive public diplomacy and 
relational network diplomacy to highlight how the S&ED engages external audiences in 
the managing of their expectations of the S&ED as well as serving as a means to support 
its underlying values and induce cooperation towards its mission. These perspectives 
underscore the importance of communication as the means by which actors socialize 
each other regarding proper international behavior and win support from internal and 
external members in pursuit of the organization’s goals. 
This study contributes to the body of literature on institutional theory by 
theorizing the process of institutionalization and change as a primarily rhetorical 
process. Furthermore, it pushes institutional theory into the realm of international 
diplomacy and integrates the literatures on institutional legitimacy with the literature on 
public diplomacy. As such, I create a new theoretical framework for understanding 
public diplomacy, a field recognized as lacking a strong theoretical foundation (Gilboa, 
2008). Finally, I uncover a range of rhetorical strategies used by diplomats intended to 
promote cooperation while avoiding conflict in pursuance of their individual political 
goals.  
In this chapter, I reviewed the historical context leading to the decision to engage 
China and the previous use and theory of engaging in dialogue as means to manage 
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relations between the two countries. To analyze the S&ED, in chapter two, I review and 
justify the use of institutional theory, public diplomacy, and diplomatic rhetoric as a 
means to understand the communicative mechanisms in which the S&ED functions to 
promote cooperative relations, primarily as an alternative to international relations 
theories of state socialization. In chapter three I develop a lens in which to analyze the 
S&ED through an organizational rhetorical perspective.  
To demonstrate how the S&ED functions to manage tensions within the U.S.-China 
bilateral relationship I first examine the converging and contradictory institutional logics 
guiding U.S. and Chinese interactions in chapters four and five. I then turn to public 
diplomatic practices in which the S&ED attempts to constitute a clear organizational 
identity, value advocacy, and relational network building in chapters six and seven. 
Finally, I tie these findings together in chapter eight. 
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CHAPTER II  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
International relations scholars have long studied how states interact on the 
global stage, but only recently are they beginning to seriously unpack how identity and 
communication influence state relations. This chapter begins by charting these 
developments and argues for a new perspective to understand geopolitical relations from 
a communication centric view. In this sense, it follows the academic current exploring 
the impact of language, socialization, and identity construction on state relations, but 
does so by foregrounding perspectives on organizational communication and rhetorical 
studies as the means by which government officials, global publics, and organizational 
apparatuses are tied together in bringing about cooperative relations. It reestablishes 
rhetorical studies to questions of diplomatic speech as well as introducing elements of 
organizational rhetoric as a clearer theoretical means to conceptualize the role of public 
diplomacy in sustaining cooperation among state officials and stakeholder publics. I 
argue that these perspectives come together to help us understand the overlapping 
communicative strategies and institutional arrangements that the Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue puts forth in its attempts to foster cooperative relations among the U.S. and 
China. 
Setting the Stage: Advances and Constraints within International Relations Theory 
The field of International Relations (IR) sets the stage upon which we make 
sense of the unfolding drama among geopolitical relations. Within the IR field three 
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major theoretical camps exist. First, realism, or as it is known more colloquially, “power 
politics,” is the oldest and most frequently adopted perspective (Donnelly, 2013). Core 
premises include rationality and state-centrism. Realists believe that humans are 
egotistical and operate under an anarchic international system requiring states to acquire 
power in the pursuit of security, thus shifting attention away from human nature to 
considerations of larger political structures. With regards to U.S.-China relations, realist 
perspectives focus their lens on how China’s material wealth, both economic and 
military, breeds uncertainty and anxiety regarding its rise (Fravel, 2008). It leaves us 
with little recourse, predicting with historical determination that conflict between the 
U.S. and China is inevitable unless the U.S. relinquish its influence in the Asia Pacific 
(Mearshimer, 2005).    
Second, liberal-internationalists, including the English School, contend that 
through international institutions and with the existence of an international society states 
can temper their conflictual predilections by offering greater pay offs through 
cooperative efforts and institutional arrangements. This perspective took root in the 
1970s and grew more prominently in the 1990s with the fall of the Soviet Union 
(Burchill, 2013; Linklater, 2013). Friedberg (2005) lays out three causal mechanisms 
underpinning liberal IR thought: a) economic interdependence as a means to ameliorate 
conflict among states by demonstrating added benefits for cooperation; b) international 
institutions leading to “improve[d] communication between states, reducing uncertainty 
about intentions and increasing the capacity of governments to make credible, binding 
commitments to one another” (p. 13); and c) democratic values, specifically the belief 
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that democratic countries are less likely to engage each other in military conflict. With 
regards to U.S.-China relations, the liberal internationalist approach suggests 
cooperation can be possible through greater economic ties and inclusion of China in the 
building of international institutions. However, the potential for conflict arises if China 
perceives its interests as best suited by remaking, and thus challenging these institutions 
in which the U.S. has vested interests. Conflict can also arise from the two nations’ 
political systems, especially if the U.S. remains determined to press China to 
democratize or even if the Chinese leadership perceive this as the U.S.’s inevitable goal 
(Lieberthal & Wang, 2012).  
Finally, the third strand, constructivism, was popularized in the 1990s 
(Shambuagh, 2013a) and established itself as a major challenger to realists and liberal 
institutionalists in the 2000s (Checkels, 2004). Constructivism emphasizes the 
importance of norms and material structures, the role identity in shaping political 
actions, and on the mutually constitutive relationships between agents and structures 
(Reus-Smit, 1999). For constructivists, norms and social order come from “shared ideas, 
perceptions, and beliefs are what give the world structure, order, and stability 
(Finnemore & Sikkin, 1998). Studies from this perspective have significantly 
contributed to understanding how states are socialized (Zurn & Checkel, 2005). For the 
constructivists, conflict between the U.S. and China is not inevitable, but depends on 
how the two socialize each other in constituting common values and mutually acceptable 
identities. 
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 These three perspectives on international relations all provide clear, although 
different, casual pathways in which the international system structures state-to-state 
relations. However, they are also limited in that they place states as the primary unit of 
analysis, and thus overemphasize how state actions undergird the international system as 
a whole and not the means by which individual organizations, governments, or global 
and local publics engage in communicative efforts shaping bilateral relations. Each 
perspective can be seen as overly deterministic and ignoring human agency, albeit to 
different extents. The clearest culprit is the realist tradition with its historical 
determinism, while liberal institutionalists are guilty as well, viewing institutions as the 
means by which our actions are constrained. While constructivists provide the largest 
room for state agency, their perspectives can be further enriched by going beyond state 
identity formation and social scientific definitions of persuasion. Although the realist 
tradition might be incorrigible in these matters, greater attention to the symbolic means 
in which humans are induced to coordinate and cooperate their activities can help 
strengthen the liberal institutionalist and constructivist camp’s theorization of state 
relations. Indeed, both perspectives share areas of common concern with communication 
studies especially in their descriptions of how states socialize others, which the next 
section will show. 
Socializing States 
Liberal institutionalists and constructivist theories of socialization seek to 
understand how change occurs within the international system absent of material 
conflict. In doing so, these perspectives draw upon noncoercive means by which state 
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actors change their conceptualization of what actions are in their best interest. Part of 
this process is the role of communication and more specifically persuasion, despite its 
secondary treatment within these theories of socialization. In this section I define how 
these two camps conceptualize socialization and the mechanism in which these 
processes take place as well as some of their shortcomings, which, in later sections, I 
argue can be strengthen by focusing organizational and rhetorical perspectives. 
Consideration of theories on socialization is warranted given that the S&ED is designed 
to promote converging view points and values on issues of mutual concern between U.S. 
and Chinese officials. Shear and Bergsten’s 2009 testimonies to Congress make this goal 
explicit; Shear stated that the goal of the S&ED was to enable officials across 
government bureaucracies to exchange viewpoints, get to know their counterparts on the 
other side, and set the agenda for future discussion. Bergsten explained that the U.S. 
needed to answer Chinese questions as to “why it should conform to a set of rules and 
institutional arrangements that it had no role in creating” (p. 2). In this sense, the 
S&ED’s intended purpose is to serve this socialization function, to which theories of 
state socialization attempt to explain.   
Checkel (2005) defines socialization as “a process inducing actors into the norms 
and rule of a given society” (p. 804). Thus, socialization stems from the notion of the 
existence of an international community with specific norms guiding appropriate state 
behavior. As Buzan (1993) argues, international society is a synonymy for order, ranging 
from norms to networks of agreed regimes and institutions. Studies from the English 
School in particular base their work on the premise of an international society, 
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particularly as it is tied together by institutional arrangements. As Bull explains an 
international society exists when “a group of states, conscious of certain common 
interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves 
to be bound by a common set of rules in relations with one another, and share in the 
working of common institutions” (Bull, 1977, p. 13).  
However, for constructivists, state interaction is not determined solely by the 
structure of the international system or institutions. Constructivists conceptualize 
socialization as a process of the diffusion and internalization of norms (Wendt, 1999) 
arising from shared ideas, perceptions, and beliefs which in turn come to provide our 
social world structure, order, and stability (Finnemore & Sikkin, 1998). As Adler-Nissan 
(2014) notes, constructivists perspectives have contributed greatly toward our 
understanding of how states are socialized, particularly the conditions in which norm 
diffusion takes place (Zurn & Checkel, 2005). To understand how this socialization 
process plays out, I briefly review and critique three different models. 
Johnston (2008) provides a model of socialization based on convergent group 
values or norms. He identifies three micro-processes: mimicking, social influence, and 
persuasion. First, mimicking, focuses on how novice states copy behavioral patterns of 
significant others in a group operating on the basis of formal and informal rules. Novice 
states engage in mimicry in order to find survival mechanisms in an uncertain 
environment. He uses the example of China's behavior within the UN Conference on 
Disarmament which Chinese leaders joined in 1980 despite being familiar with the ideas 
 44 
 
and language of arms control and disarmament. Eventually Chinese experts were trained 
up on these issues through their participation and supporting the movement. 
Second, social influence, is the process involving a desire to attract approval and 
reduce disapproval from a group with whom one identifies. States engage in social 
influence activities out of concern for their international image and status. Thus, they 
change their behavior in order to attain valued status positions. Johnston (2008) uses 
China's signature of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in late 1996 to illustrate how 
social influence operates. In this case, Chinese leaders were willing to constrain their 
power by signing the treaty to avoid sharper criticism of their nuclear program. 
The third process is persuasion. Johnston uses Perloff’s (1994) definition of 
persuasion as an “activity or process in which a communicator attempts to induce a 
change in the belief attitude or behavior of another person through the transmission of a 
message in a context in which the persuade has come degree of free choice” (p. 14). 
Johnston (2008) explains that this process is the hardest and includes the internalization 
of new ideas to the extent that it leads an individual or group to argue for the rightness of 
a particular norm or value. To showcase this process, he uses China's behavior in the 
ASEAN Regional Forum. He argues that within China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
officials began arguing that multilateralism was beneficial for China’s regional security 
leading to China's embracement of concepts such as mutual and common security 
expressed in its New Security Concept. 
While useful, Johnston’s (2008) model reflects the growing number of critiques 
by IR scholars as examining socialization as one-sided processes of teaching and 
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persuasion (Gheciu, 2005; Pu, 2012). In this case, China, as a newcomer is the recipient 
of socialization practices, but not conceived as an agent itself. While this might have 
largely been true given the time period Johnston (2008) examined, 1980-2000, today 
China as well as the rise of the BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South 
America) are able to exert their own influence on international norms (Pu, 2012). 
Furthermore, Johnston’s (2008) description of persuasion is relatively thin in that his 
analysis doesn’t showcase how individuals go about convincing their foreign 
counterparts to change, rather it showcases how Chinese leaders’ exposure to regional 
multilateral institutions led to increased discussion within the policy debates taking place 
in Chinese circles.  
In response to critiques of one-way socialization theories, Pu (2012) 
conceptualizes norms as a two-way process of interaction among nation-states and the 
existing international society. He argues that rising powers are socialized into the 
existing international order, while reshaping the order when they enter. Pu (2012) uses 
Kranser’s (1983) definition of norms as standards of behavior defined in terms of rights 
and obligations. These form collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors 
with a given identity. In international politics, norms have both regulative and 
constitutive effects on nations states, and key to normative basis of political order is 
legitimacy. Pu (2012) argues that legitimacy is the recognition of authority in a 
community. As such legitimacy is a social relational phenomenon existing in a particular 
social context (Finnemore, 2009) and for there to be legitimacy, there must be a 
community/society (Clark, 2003). 
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From this conceptualization of norms, including their connection to legitimacy, 
Pu (2012) outlines four ways in which emerging powers refuse and attempt to rewrite 
the rules of international society without directly confronting the hegemon which 
established them. He argues that emerging powers are a) challenging the notion of 
Western ideas and culture as superior to those of the rest of the world; b) emphasizing 
their state sovereignty and independence and resisting participation in humanitarian 
interventions typically initiated by the West; c) using multilateral forums to influence the 
evolution of international norms; and d) engaging in definitional battles as to what kind 
of norms should be regard as legitimate in international society. Taken together these 
instances showcase how emerging powers influence the constitution of global norms. 
 While emerging powers are definitely influencing international norms, Pu’s 
(2012) perspective does little more than establishes that fact. He leaves out how or under 
what circumstances emerging powers are able to more or less successfully influence 
these norms. Furthermore, as the BRICS association demonstrates, the extent to which 
these emerging powers can coordinate their own actions in the face of domestic 
difficulties and a general lack of resources compared to their larger, more developed 
counterpart raises questions regarding how they maintain support for such challenges. 
His perspective reflects the importance of international organizations as a means for 
coming together and debating, challenging, and constituting norms albeit without 
satisfactory explanations as to how, outside of contending claims to legitimacy. 
One final perspective on how states socialize others to adopt certain norms 
comes from Acharya (2004). Acharya (2004) also provides a model of norm 
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convergence, but focuses on the part of local agents in the successful diffusion of norms. 
His argument is that IR scholars must be attuned to whose ideas matter in the diffusion 
of norms and critiques constructivists’ focus on hard cases of moral transformation in 
which “good” global norms prevail over “bad” local beliefs and practices. He labels this 
approach the “moral cosmopolitanism” perspective which assumes that a) these norms 
are universal; b) that it is through transnational agents that such norms are spread; and c) 
resigns the role of persuasion in the form of “moral proselytism” as the means of norm 
diffusion. Acharya (2004) critiques this perspective as ignoring the appeal of norms 
deeply rooted in other types of regional, national, and subnational entities as well as 
downplaying the agency of local actors. Instead, he builds upon a second model of norm 
congruence where domestic political, organizational, and cultural variables condition the 
reception of new global norms (Price, 1998; Florini, 1996). 
Examining two transnational norms discussed and agreed upon within the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Acharya (2004) shows how the differential 
ability of local agents to reconstruct norms to better fit with prior local norms enhanced 
the appeal of some prior beliefs and institutions. Thus, the process of socialization with 
regards to the diffusion of norms requires understanding of how specific organizational 
and political actors help reframe international norms in acceptable ways.  
This approach showcases the diversity of actors and their roles in aiding or 
constraining norm diffusion. However, in doing so we find the outcomes ostensibly 
shaped by effective communication strategies, but without consideration as to what those 
strategies specifically are outside of appealing to one’s audience. Indeed, all three of the 
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perspectives of socialization reviewed above demonstrate that the adoption and diffusion 
of norms is fundamentally a rhetorical process whereby states as well as organizational 
actors make claims to questions of legitimacy and efficacy regarding international 
norms. These processes take place on the discursive plane among state governments, 
within the organizational institutions in which officials meet, and the domestic level 
where governments must win support from their constituents. Thus, to more clearly see 
how these state and individual actors are able to more or less effectively advocate for 
certain norms to be adopted one should turn to communication studies explicating these 
processes across these varying levels of discussion.  
As the next sections will demonstrate, we can better understand the specific 
communication mechanisms in which they do so, as well as the artful means by which 
political actors persuasively make the case. I begin by first demonstrating how 
organizational communication scholars have developed institutional theory as a means to 
explain how both individual agents and institutions concurrently affect their individual 
and organizational values, identities, and outcomes. I then move to discussions of public 
diplomacy and argue both for its use and limitations in helping explain how political 
actors garner support for policy positions, before turning to studies in diplomatic and 
foreign policy rhetoric.  
Institutional Theory: Key Concepts and Theoretical Concerns 
Institutional theory attempts to understand where new organizational forms come 
from and how established, taken for-for-granted patterns and practices of communication 
affect organizational activity. As such, application of institutional theory to the S&ED is 
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not only appropriate due to the S&ED representing a new form of diplomatic organizing 
between the U.S. and China, but also because the dialogue mechanism was originally 
intended as a means to socialize individual behavior between U.S. and Chinese 
diplomats and bureaucrats. Institutional theory helps uncover how organizational 
structures guide organizational and individual activities as well as how individual actors 
in turn affect those structures. This process occurs through communication as 
organizational messages inform individuals how to act while individual actors both 
sustain these structures by enacting and passing on these decrees as well as transforming 
these structures through competing institutional logics. In this section I will briefly 
define institutional theory as well as the key concepts that help to understand this 
process. 
Key Concepts 
IR and political scientists recognize that ideas matter in explaining political 
behavior on the international stage. As Drezner (2000) notes while there are several 
mechanisms by which ideas influence state preferences and outcomes, the most 
important is how they are implanted into institutions. Likewise, Schmidt (2008) argues 
that taking a discursive institutional approach provides insight into the how ideas and 
discourse affect politics in dynamic ways. He explains that interests are subjective ideas 
and that norms remain dynamic constructs rather that than static structures. To 
understand how institutions change or persist as well as the specific means in which 
ideas are contested, converge, and transform, I argue we turn to communication scholars 
conceptualization of institutional theory. 
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Institutions can be defined and understood as “constellations of established 
practices guided by enduring, formalized, rational beliefs that transcend particular 
organizations and situations” (Lammers & Barbour, 2006, p. 357). As such, agencies, 
practices, or organizations can all become institutionalized once they become an 
established, taken-for-granted pattern of practices and communication (Lammers & 
Barbour, 2013). The extent to which something is an “institution” can be influx, as 
institutions are not purely static entities. Institutions often change, become established, 
and even disappear through processes of institutionalization, deinstitutionalization, 
institutional entrepreneurship, and institutional work.  
In their review of institutional theory, Lammers and Barbour (2013) delineate 
four interrelated constructs upon which institutional theory is based: functionalism and 
limited rationality, external environments, the symbolic life of organizations, and 
attenuated consciousness. First, functional analysis assumes that institutions come about 
and persist because they promote stability and integration and, thus, serve as a collective 
means to meet individual, organizational, and social needs. As Tolbert and Zucker 
(1996) explain, “components of a system must be integrated for the system to survive” 
(p. 176).  
Second, external environments significantly impact the development of 
institutions both shaping and even thwarting their development. Organizations and 
patterns of organizing do not exist in a vacuum, but are transcended by institutionalized 
ideas, beliefs, rules, and messages found within their external environments (Lammers, 
2011; Lammers & Garcia, 2009; Lammers & Barbour, 2006). Institutions thus require 
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affirmation from their external environment regarding their legitimacy. Lammers and 
Garcia (2013) note that institutional research focuses on the boundary between authority 
in the organization and external legitimacy granted by the institutional environment 
(Selznick, 1949; Meyer & Rowan, 1983). As Pu (2012) noted, one means by which 
emerging powers influence global norms is through this very challenging of legitimacy 
advocated by global hegemons. As Gronau (2016) argues, international institutions such 
as the G8 and G20 likewise have to engage in processes of public self-legitimation to 
maintain their relevance. In this sense, we should likewise expect the S&ED as engaging 
in practices of self-legitimation and in doing so, see a contestation of bilateral and 
international claims to what values are appropriate in guiding the U.S.-China 
relationship and proper state behavior in the international community.   
Following this need for external legitimacy, the third construct is the symbolic 
life of organizations. According to Lammers and Garcia (2013) organizational structures 
not only communicate symbolically with their environments, signaling their conformity 
to externally established norms and values, but they also absorb and incorporate 
information from their environments affecting the institution’s own values, beliefs, and 
structures. Thus, as Powell and DiMaggio (1991) argue, institutional theory contrasts the 
symbolic role of formal organizational structures with the informal interactions and 
specific, local or technical interests (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). This process charts 
well upon Johnston’s (2008) argument whereby states engage in mimicry to promote a 
desirable image conforming to global values. 
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The fourth construct, attenuated consciousness, highlights the degree to which 
actors are conscious of institutional conditions and the influences of institutional 
structures on individual actor’s behaviors (Lammers & Garcia, 2013). In this sense, 
while individual behavior reifies institutional structures, these structures also guide and 
constrain individual’s actions through taken-for-granted practices. From these four 
foundational concepts, scholars have studied the processes of institutionalization and 
deinstitutionalization, institutional logics, strategies of legitimation, institutional 
entrepreneurship and institutional work, and institutional rhetoric. 
Institutionalization and institutional logics. Institutionalization is the process 
by which “social processes, obligations, or actualities come to take on a rule-like status 
in social thought and action” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 342). Expressing institutional 
theory as a process of convergent change, Tolbert and Zucker (1996) argued that 
organizational practices become institutionalized first in a pre-institutionalized period 
through habitualization where emergent behaviors specific to a problem are appraised 
for their pragmatic functionality. Second, semi-institutionalization occurs through 
objectification whereby a social consensus emerges over the value of the particular 
social arrangement, and then organizations mimic those arrangements as they are 
perceived as successful. Third, institutionalization or sedimentation follows as the 
arrangement adopted takes on a more normative base, becomes regarded as an 
appropriate response, and is enacted over time.  
Another way of conceptualizing “arrangements” is the idea of institutional logics 
and their institutionalization and deinstitutionalization. Rather than just serving 
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functional requirements, the idea of institutional logics focuses on how individuals make 
sense of their organizational environments and thus constrain and enable their work 
actions. Institutional logics are sets “of material practices and symbolic constructions—
which constitute organizing principles and which [are] available to organizations and 
individuals” (Friedland & Alford, 1991, p. 248). Thornton and Ocasio (2008) state that 
“interests, identities, values, and assumptions of individuals and organizations are 
embedded in institutional logics” (p. 103). These logics make certain ways of thinking 
and communicating possible or unlikely and “provide individuals with vocabularies of 
motives and with a sense of self” (Friedland & Alford, 1991, p. 251). Thus, these logics, 
or guiding principles, can “constrain and enable the potential agency of actors” (Suddaby 
and Greenwood, 2005, p. 37). Lammers (2011) argues that actors know institutional 
logics via institutional messages. Institutional logics are thus a key mechanism by which 
we can understand how states as well as individual agents become socialized within the 
international environment.  
The focus on institutional logics can thus help further IR theories of socialization 
as these logics would serve as a key mechanism through which individual identities 
become constituted by participating in the organization. Taking a communication 
perspective in understanding how these logics take root and affect actors’ identities 
requires researchers to examine the institutional messages to reveal these underlying 
logics and the ways that actors transmit and eventually take up these logics, rather than 
simply showcasing changes in policy outcomes, which IR studies tend to do. In this vein, 
the process of institutionalization and deinstitutionalization can be understood as 
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involving the alterations in underlying ways of doing business or making sense of work 
which is tied to changes in institutional logics. A communicative approach to 
understanding institutionalization and organizational logics explores the rhetorical 
strategies employed by organizations and organizational actors as they attempt to 
establish certain views or suggest how organizations should respond to external 
pressures. 
Institutions and their underlying institutional logics are not decided within a 
vacuum. External forces drive the process on institutionalization and 
deinstitutionalization as much as functional requirements, internal organizational 
rationality, and sense-making. Alternative arrangements or logics are presented as well 
as new problems and information from the institution’s environment. Institutions end up 
absorbing these policies and structures. However, to maintain support for their internal 
arrangements, institutions must signal to their environments that they are legitimate. This 
perception of legitimacy can be defined as “the extent to which the array of established 
cultural accounts provide explanations for [an organization’s] existence, function, and 
jurisdiction, and lack or deny alternatives” (Meyer & Scott, 1983, p. 201). Thus, 
according to Meyer and Rowan (1977) appearance of legitimacy is an important 
resource for organizations because the structure of organizations are derived not only 
from functional requirements of production but also external symbolic pressures 
perceived as legitimate. And again, as Pu (2012) argued, notions of legitimacy are one 
important means by which emerging powers challenge and influence the existing world 
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order. Institutional theory posits that one arena where these challenges over legitimacy 
occur are within an institution’s organizational field.    
Organizational fields. Organizational fields consist of organizations that, in 
aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Organizations that make up a field are similar in structural and symbolic ways and share 
similar motivations for gaining legitimacy. DiMaggio & Powell (1983) list four parts to 
the constitution of organizational fields: a) an increase in the extent of interaction among 
organizations in the field; b) the emergence of sharply defined interorganizational 
structures of domination and patterns of coalition; c) an increase in the information load 
with which organizations in a field must contend; and d) the development of mutual 
awareness among participants in a set of organizations that they are involved in a 
common enterprise (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 148). When these fields develop, 
they create an isomorphic pressure that constrains process and force one unit in a 
population to resemble other units facing a similar set of environmental conditions. As 
such, institutional fields tend to have coercive, mimetic, and normative pressures 
resulting in institutional isomorphic changes. 
The notion of an “international community” and the multilateral institutions that 
constitute it can be conceived as an organizational field. Countries come together and are 
symbolically recognized as sovereign nations in these institutional arrangements. 
However, their sovereignty is tied to their standards of appropriate, or legitimate 
international behavior. Coalitional politics exist, especially in multilateral fora such as 
the UN, and alternative regional, security, and economic institutions arise, but still 
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conform to normative values of an imagined international society. Isomorphic pressures 
thus structure and shape international institutions, and as Johnston’s (2008) study 
demonstrated Chinese leaders felt these pressures as their global footprint rose and led 
them to begin participating in these international institutions.  
Institutional change: Institutional entrepreneurship and work. Institutions 
are not static entities. When faced with challenges to an institution’s legitimacy or 
significant changes in the institution’s environment, institutional change can occur. The 
literature on institutional theory conceptualizes the process as institutional 
entrepreneurship. As DiMaggio (1988) explains “new institutions arise…when 
organized actors with sufficient resources see in them an opportunity to realize interests 
that they value highly (p. 14). Maguire, Hardy, and Lawrence (2004) define institutional 
entrepreneurship as the “activities of actors who have an interest in particular 
institutional arrangements and who leverage resources to create new institutions or to 
transform existing ones” (p. 657).  
Institutional entrepreneurs can be individuals, organizations, professions, or 
networks (Hardy & Maguire, 2008). These actors or groups create institutional change 
by first, dislodging existing practices, second, introducing new ones, and finally ensuring 
that the new practices become widely adopted and eventually taken for granted thereby 
re-institutionalizing the new institutional logics. Rhetoric plays a primary role in this 
process, as organizational actors attempt to persuade others as to what policies to pursue, 
what value criterion to judge these processes by, and what issues are at stake. As 
Battilana, Leca, and Boxenbaum (2009) argue, institutional entrepreneurs create 
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rhetorical arguments that embody institutional logics and align themselves with the “the 
values and interests of potential allies” (p. 82) while Seo and Creed (2002) identify 
“institutional contradictions and human praxis as the key mechanism linking institutional 
embeddedness and institutional change” (p. 223). Finally, as Lammers and Garcia 
(2013) note, the notion of institutional entrepreneurship helps explain embedded agency 
while balancing how actors can change institutions despite institutions limiting their 
actions and rationality. In this case, institutional entrepreneurship draws upon 
Aristotelian definitions of rhetoric as “the faculty of observing in any given case the 
available means of persuasion” in that institutional entrepreneurs must have the 
knowledge and capacity to transform institutional logics. 
While institutional entrepreneurship helps understand how and why institutions 
change, an alternative perspective is that of institutional work. Institutional work 
suggests that institutions are constructed, reconstructed, and changed in an ongoing way 
rather than just in times of flux and through more individualized rhetors. For instance, 
Lawrence and Suddaby (2009) critique the institutional entrepreneurship perspective by 
stating that it oversimplifies “the rational and ‘heroic’ dimension…while ignoring the 
fact that all actors, even entrepreneurs, are embedded in (an) situationally defined 
context” (p. 5). Thus, the idea of institutional work accounts for the “awareness, skill, 
and reflexivity of individual and collective actors” (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006, p. 
219). As Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca (2009) state, “institutional work highlights the 
more reflexive forms of action that are aimed at intentionally affecting institutions” (p. 
191). The creation and dissemination of texts, narratives, definitions and other forms of 
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discourse can also be seen as institutional work as actors engage in defining or 
constructing “rule systems that confer status or identity, define boundaries of 
membership or create status hierarchies within a filed” (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006, p. 
222). Here, institutional work follows more of a constitutive definition of rhetoric, 
whereby language and symbols serve to create a collective identity. This discourse 
demands action to be taken which reinforces the identity and beliefs of that identity, thus 
constituting an audience’s character, community, and culture through language (White, 
1985). While institutional work is presented as an alternative to institutional 
entrepreneurship the two perspectives are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
Institutional work can describe times of minor institutional change or support whereas in 
times of significant environmental upheaval or fissures within the institution institutional 
entrepreneurship might occur. 
In summary, institutional theory seeks to understand how both structures and 
agents embedded in those structures are affected. Institutional logics impact how 
individuals come to make sense and understand their roles and identities within the 
organization constraining and enabling what actions they are to take. However, 
individual actors have their own agency and use it to both significantly change or shift 
institutional logics through the process of institutional entrepreneurship while also 
supporting the institutional structure through their institutional work. This approach can 
add greater richness in the explaining of the specific means by which states, including 
individual leaders, bureaucrats, and agencies attempt to socialize others as well as 
themselves, shifting the norms, identities, and logics of their relations. However, to do 
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so, greater attention needs to be placed on the role of rhetoric as the primary means by 
which these actions unfold and take root. 
Institutional Rhetoric. Communication plays the foundational role in 
understanding not only how individuals are socialized or come to adopt these 
institutional roles but also as the means by which they persuasively advocate for changes 
in these underlying logics. Understanding this process thus requires serious study in the 
role of rhetoric as the strategic means to persuade others to adopt or sustain these 
changes. Thus, I conclude this section by briefly explaining the role of institutional 
rhetoric within institutional theory. 
According to Lammers and Garcia (2013), not only do rhetorical scholars have 
much to offer institutional studies, but reframing the existing scholarship on 
organizational rhetoric as explicitly institutional can offer rich avenues and new 
directions for future studies of institutional rhetoric in particular. Taking a rhetorical 
approach to institutional theory helps to account for both the structural elements of 
institutions and the discursive actions of individual and organizational interactions.  
A rhetorical approach functions as both a theoretical lens and framework for 
understanding how institutional messages create narratives as well as the rational 
organizational discourse (Hartelius & Browning, 2008). This approach reveals the 
“embeddedness of organizations” and the reciprocal influences of organizations and 
their environments. Thus, examining institutional rhetoric allows scholars to explore the 
strategic collective expressions of organizations as they seek legitimacy in their 
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institutional environments (Lammers & Garcia, 2013) and create change within the 
organizations in advocating for competing institutional logics. 
Numerous studies have employed the idea of institutional rhetoric (Cheney, 
1991; Finet, 2001; Ford, 2003; Hartelius & Browning, 2008; Hoffman and Ford, 2010; 
Jablonski, 1989; Keranen, 2007; Lynch, 2005; Schwarze, 2003). In the rhetorical 
approach, the institution is an entity that speaks for itself and by proxy for its members. 
For instance, Finet (2001) defines institutional rhetoric as involving the “collective 
expression [of organizations] intended to influence the larger social normative climate” 
(p. 274). Similarly, Green, Babb, and Alpaslan (2008) in their discussion of the role of 
rhetoric in influencing the adoption of institutional logics argue that rhetoric “shapes the 
institutional logics of control and thus legitimizes the dominant stakeholder group in the 
institutional field” (p. 41). Finally, Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) suggest that 
“rhetorical strategy is a significant tool by which shifts in a dominant logic can be 
achieved” (p. 41) while Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) employed a rhetorical 
perspective by creating a typology of institutional work that focuses on advocacy within 
institutions. In summary, rhetoric is a tool used by organizational actors to influence 
logics and its analysis can account for institutionalization or institutional change 
(Lammers & Garcia, 2013). 
 When considering the Strategic and Economic Dialogues from an institutional 
theory perspective, we can understand the degree to which the S&ED creates strong or 
weak institutional ties among its members through the extent that norms and practices 
appear to become taken-for-granted, the convergence of divergence of competing 
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institutional logics and their implications in guiding cooperative policy definitions and 
outcomes, as well instances of significant institutional change and institutional work to 
sustain the S&ED. While these considerations all focus on how the institutional structure 
influences its members, a rhetorical perspective to institutional theory balances this 
organizational determinism by granting significant agency to organizational rhetors and 
their persuasive messages advocating for certain policies, behaviors, and values.  
Furthermore, the need for external legitimacy helps to incorporate the impact of 
how diplomats must respond to the material changes or balance of power between the 
two nations as well as other geopolitical events, expectations from their domestic 
audience and key stakeholders, and justification for the S&ED itself as there are multiple 
alternative fora for discussing the issues salient to the U.S. and China (for instance, trade 
issues could be dealt with within the WTO, questions of international financial 
institutions could take place within the IMF, World Bank, or G20, considerations of 
national security policies like Iran or North Korea’s nuclear programs could be dealt 
with through the UN and ad-hoc multilateral negotiations). In the next section I advocate 
for the incorporation of public diplomacy as a means to understand how the S&ED 
legitimizes itself to both its members and domestic constituencies. 
Public Diplomacy: Construction and Management of Identity, Image, and 
Reputation in Search of Institutional Legitimacy 
Governments, NGOs, and other international actors increasingly recognize the 
importance of public diplomacy in winning over support of global audiences, especially 
with the flourishing of international communication technologies. Seib (2009) explains 
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that today’s “proliferation of satellite television and the Internet means that people know 
more and know it faster than at any previous time” (p. viii). Social media exacerbates 
this situation and the conduct of foreign affairs shifting the power and politics of 
diplomacy in the social media era (Seib, 2012). Whereas diplomacy is typically 
concerned with government-to-government interaction, public diplomacy focuses on 
governments engaging global publics, both state and non-state actors’ building of 
transnational networks, and increasing recognition that non-state actors in particular 
employ public diplomacy tactics to meet their own political ends. While this is not 
entirely new, with U.S. policy during the Cold War engaging in propaganda battles with 
the Soviet Union, today’s public diplomacy scholars have called for a “new public 
diplomacy,” and indeed, as Gregory (2008) notes, public diplomacy has come into its 
own as a field of intellectual inquiry. In this section, I argue that public diplomacy 
becomes an important means to understand how bilateral relations become defined and 
seek legitimacy from its domestic and international environments in supporting and 
laying the groundwork for socializing state behavior. 
While various perspectives on public diplomacy have emerged, common 
concerns regarding the changes in communication technologies and the advent of 
networked societies have brought global citizens and governments closer together 
shifting the field from its historical monologic orientation to focus on means by which 
actors can engage with publics in new dialogic ways. As Proedrou and 
Frangonkolopoulos (2012) state, “the main reason behind renewed emphasis on public 
diplomacy is the increasing power of citizens and civil society actors” (p. 729). 
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However, despite the vibrant scholarly interest in public diplomacy, Gilboa (2008) has 
argued that researchers have not sufficiently pursued a systematic theoretical approach to 
examining public diplomacy efforts. Furthermore, Gilboa (2008) contends that “while 
scholars have applied communication models and theories to issues of foreign policy and 
international relations only a few researchers have applied them to public diplomacy” (p. 
64).  
Public Diplomacy: Moving from Network Building to Discourse 
Renewed interest in public diplomacy has resulted in vibrant discussion 
regarding questions over definitions, approaches, and time scales. Within this debate 
common themes have emerged such as the move from monologic to dialogic 
communication (Cowen & Arsenault, 2008), international communication networks and 
global governance creating a new public sphere (Castells, 2008), the connection of soft 
power to public diplomacy (Nye, 2008; Hayden, 2014), branding (van Ham, 2008; 
Wang, 2006), international exchanges (Snow, 2008), and discursive public diplomacy 
(Proedrou & Frangonkolopoulos, 2012). All of these approaches have helped advance 
the significance of political actors and their influences on their respective audiences.  
Many of these issues are brought together in Zaharna, Arsenault, and Fisher’s 
(2014) book emphasizing relational networks. The authors argue that communities 
communicate through a range of networks and through these networks individuals 
develop their shared meanings through genuine collaboration. Thus, relational strategies 
make up a core imperative for public diplomacy practice. These relational networks can 
take many forms and aid in cultural, educational, and professional exchanges. However, 
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while these networked relations are important, they exist within discourses shaped by 
disciplines and institutions. These discourses create networks of knowledge and power 
dictating certain kinds of knowledge as intelligible thereby providing justifications for 
certain forms of knowledge and reasoning (Foucault, 1984). While networks are 
important in understanding how people come together, the organizations and culture 
from which they arise play important roles in advocating certain ideas as more accessible 
than others.  
To understand how certain meanings come into being we must attune to the 
discursive aspect of communication and the organizations that advocate for them. 
According to Proedrou and Frangonkolopoulos (2012) “The goal of public diplomacy 
should be to explain fully one’s policies and show how they contribute to the delivery of 
global public goods” (734). This requires the building of mutually beneficial 
relationships with internal and foreign publics with regards to issues ranging from peace 
and security to human rights, international law, and sustainable development. As such, 
Proedrou and Frangonkolopoulos (2012) call for a strategic shift in public diplomacy by 
reorienting the thematic focus of public diplomacy away from predominant issues of 
culture, education, and identity to larger, global threats common and relevant for all 
parts of the global population. 
This perspective maps well to liberal institutionalists within the IR field, 
specifically as it relates to the emphasis they place upon liberal values such as human 
rights, limited state sovereignty, and democratic governance and their assumption of an 
international society which shares these goals. However, instead of placing the unit of 
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analysis on how states create institutions with these values embedded within them, 
discursive public diplomacy shifts our focus to how political actors specifically advocate 
for them. Thus, discursive public diplomacy helps unveil the communicative practices 
that come to constitute and define a political community and the policies and issues they 
should work towards as a primarily rhetorical process. 
 While one major approach to public diplomacy has been cultural and educational 
exchanges, Proedrou and Frangonkolopoulos (2012) argue that this not only narrows the 
role of public diplomacy but also have frequently been ineffectual. This emphasis on 
making foreign individuals carriers of ideas, worldviews, and norms that are friendly to 
the campaigning state, although important, is “both limiting as well as misleading.” (p. 
732). For instance, educational exchanges and cultural promotion have not succeeded in 
creating a friendly global environment by selling images through commercials 
(Melissen, 2005) or dealing with larger issues such as winning nations over in support of 
international trade policies, or promotion of a common rule-based international order 
(Proedrou & Frangonkolopoulos, 2012). While these are limitations of exchange 
programs, Proedrou and Frangonkolopoulos note that this is “not to downgrade the 
benefits stemming from cultural activities, nor to advocate their termination. The point is 
that those efforts alone are inadequate and there is urgent need for public diplomacy to 
work on a broadened thematic agenda that does not leave out any of the paramount 
global issues” (p. 733).  
 Other public diplomacy attempts related to PR efforts to sell brands or coin 
mottos to move foreign audiences are also problematic as they fail to leave space for 
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discursive interaction creating lasting relationships. While the new public diplomacy 
claims to be moving away from monological communication, mass audiences are 
undeniably moved by images, slogans, and mottos (Sproule, 1988). And yet, PR 
campaigns designed to address short term policy support fails to engage audiences in 
developing lasting relationships and thus lacks this discursive process (Leanard, Stead, 
& Smewing, 2002) by which people are persuaded in the longer term to share and 
identify with the values and benefits of such policies. Thus, according to Proedrou and 
Frangonkolopoulos (2012) “The aim here is to contest the orthodoxy of organizing 
public diplomacy campaigns around specific, powerful messages that allow little space 
for dialogue, or raise the paramount importance of dialogue, and to examine how public 
diplomacy can become substantially discursive” (734). 
 What does a discursive public diplomacy look like? Proedrou and 
Frangonkolopoulos (2012) suggest we look at the sphere of knowledge, ideas and 
discourse. This sphere is the global realm of the mind, where information and power are 
increasingly intertwined. State and non-state actors then advance and debate ideas, 
values, norms, and arguments taking into account the interests and preferences of the 
wider society. This process includes attempts by governments to persuade foreign 
audiences as well as aligning their policies to internal publics by identifying, analyzing, 
and synthesizing public opinion and then disseminating polices and their critiques in 
order to formulate convincing arguments through persuasive counter-arguments. Thus, 
“public diplomacy then can create hubs for discussion, argumentation, counter-
argumentation, and feedback” (p. 737). Finally, this process results in public diplomacy 
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becoming reflexive in understanding the shortcomings and deficiencies of one’s own 
policies. 
 While elevating public diplomacy to operate on the discursive level supports the 
ideals of the new public diplomacy in its efforts to become truly dialogic, issues of 
power and access challenge the extent to which only issues of the largest, global 
concerns are shared and debated by all. Proedrou and Frangonkolopoulos’ (2012) 
perspective rests on the extent to which we have a global civil society. Norris and 
Inglehart (2009) have challenged this perspective by demonstrating how firewalls exist, 
including technology, culture, and educational levels, inhibiting and complicating the 
influence of globalization and international communication to changes in societal and 
political values. Issues of power and questions of international agenda setting similarly 
push back against the idea of freely debated and equally participated global public 
sphere. Furthermore, Proedrou and Frangonkolopoulos (2012) while trying to broaden 
the focus of public diplomacy by engaging in larger debates of global significance 
paradoxically limits public diplomacy to only issues of global concern thereby ignoring 
attempts to debate or resolve local issues or regional relationship development between 
global publics. Rhetorical approaches to public diplomacy alleviate this shortcoming by 
focusing more on context specific means by which actors attempt to shape global and 
local discourses. 
Rhetorical Approaches to Public Diplomacy 
A small body of rhetoricians have recently begun to focus their attention to the 
rise of public diplomacy. Within this body of research, rhetorical public diplomacy 
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studies have focused on nations defending their foreign policy actions (Mor, 2009, 
2014), argument formations in foreign policy discourse justifying public diplomacy 
policies (Hayden 2007, 2012, 2013), and public diplomacy as a rhetorical genre (Gerber, 
2008). Mor (2009) argues that public diplomacy has become a critical component in 
countries’ grand strategy, most notably Israel. Mor (2009, 2014) focuses on how Israeli 
public diplomacy uses rhetorical strategies to defend and justify its foreign policy 
actions in the 2006 Lebanon war and the 2010 Turkish flotilla incident. The prevalence 
and importance of public diplomacy has resulted in Gerber (2008) calling public 
diplomacy its own genre of rhetoric due to its open nature, management of national 
reputation, focus on government-to-public nature, and use for critics in charting changes 
in the trajectory of diplomatic rhetoric over time. Gerber (2008) believes that 
rhetoricians can take a generic approach to analyze public diplomacy communication by 
helping to understand the ways in which public diplomacy is deployed discursively and 
strategically. He states that “viewing public diplomacy as a rhetorical genre provides a 
critical tool to isolate and explicate the factors that are a permanent part of the discourse, 
and the ones that change over time” (p. 129). He concludes that “rhetorical approaches 
to the study of public diplomacy are the most appropriate” (p. 130) due to the common 
suasive elements of public diplomacy efforts.  
From Mor and Gerber’s perspectives we can better understand how states both 
resist international pressures to conform as well as shape the standards by which their 
actions should be judged. As Johnston’s (2008) theory of socialization posited, desires to 
maintain a positive global image was one of the factors leading to China’s adoption of 
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the Nuclear Disarmament Treaty and Pu’s (2012) theory of two-way socialization drew 
upon public debates over the legitimacy of global norms. Both of these instances appear 
to be cases of public diplomacy argumentation whereby states attempted to shape state 
behavior. Thus, further consideration within the IR literature on socialization should 
draw upon these perspectives regarding how political actors use rhetorical argumentation 
to influence and persuade others. 
A third approach to rhetorical studies on public diplomacy comes from Craig 
Hayden. Hayden (2012) both supports and challenges Gerber’s perspective that public 
diplomacy rhetoric contains consistent rhetorical elements. Hayden (2007, 2012, 2013) 
takes a more domestic perspective in his rhetorical analysis of public diplomacy by 
analyzing governments’ argument formation in domestic politics to justify allocation of 
resources for the development of soft power through public diplomacy efforts. Hayden’s 
research program is interested in how symbolic realities become connected to material 
realities. He views rhetoric as the instructive selection of policy discussion and public 
arguments from which we can derive the reasoning that shape how foreign policy 
programs are imagined and what constitutes necessary international political action 
through communication. His analysis raises questions regarding how countries articulate 
their foreign policy expectations and goals, how these policies reveal the role global 
communication plays in mediating these political goals, and countries’ assumptions 
about influence and effects of communication policies as expressed in public diplomacy.  
While communication scholars can apply Hayden’s method across countries’ 
public diplomacy policies, Hayden’s (2012) book highlights the very different 
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approaches and argumentative justifications various countries take in supporting their 
allocations for public diplomacy resources. Hayden (2012) examines the cultural and 
political differences among governments’ understanding of how communication 
persuades audiences. At the same time, his study argues that the rise of the concept “soft 
power,” although understood differently by various governments, provides a similar 
ground for policy justifications to invest in public diplomacy efforts. His perspective is 
most useful in tying symbolic realities to material, demonstrating that the terms and 
arguments made within domestic policy debates create the terministic screens that guide 
and constrain continued policy action. This perspective can be extended to instances of 
bilateral and multilateral policy formation to likewise provide a stronger account of how 
countries come together and develop similar terminologies that carry force into their 
material policy positions carried out. 
Thus, public diplomacy as a whole can contribute to our understanding of states 
socializing others as well as international institutions by directing our attention to the 
public oriented messages designed to bolster the institutions or government’s legitimacy, 
build common ties amongst countries’ publics, and create the conditions in which 
common values and norms will more likely be taken up. This process is crucial in 
understanding the specific communicative means by which states more or less 
successfully socialize and build ties between and amongst each other. Looking at the 
S&ED, we can understand public diplomacy as supporting the institutional work of its 
members in justifying the S&ED’s effectiveness, normalizing positive U.S.-China 
relations, as well gaining support from networked organizations. Furthermore, rhetorical 
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conceptions of public diplomacy specifically highlight the world defining and 
symbolically inducing elements in which language in particular constrains and enables 
state actions.  
While the perspectives on the role of rhetoric and public diplomacy help 
communication scholars begin to understand how governments engage global publics, it 
doesn’t address how political leaders first work with other governments to then present 
their relationship to global publics. For instance, while the U.S. military frequently 
engages with the Chinese military to build greater cooperation and understanding 
between the two, it also presents this relationship to domestic constituencies. Here the 
line between normal diplomacy, conducted between government to government, and 
public diplomacy, the public, ceremonial press conferences that follow the closed-door 
meetings work together in the function of international diplomacy. As Yang (2011) 
concludes, diplomatic rhetoric lies in the intersection of both deliberative and epideictic 
rhetoric, and thus consideration of how states present themselves publicly requires an 
understanding of how they do so diplomatically. The next section argues that rhetorical 
studies examining the rhetoric of foreign policy, diplomacy, and symbolic conflict can 
help strengthen our understanding of how diplomatic talk achieves its aims. 
The Rhetoric of Diplomacy 
Rhetoric is a central component of diplomacy. As Oliver (1951) argued, while 
diplomacy incorporates a multitude of means in its successful use, fundamental to its 
application is speech. Furthermore, studies of diplomatic rhetoric frequently cite 
diplomat Ben Limb (1957) who wrote that diplomacy is “above all a profession of 
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words—written and spoken” (p. 57). And yet, despite the prominence of speech in 
diplomacy, communication studies have yet to significantly dive into how words 
persuade foreign governments and publics. The primary entry point in which 
rhetoricians have done so is more narrowly through presidential rhetoric. 
Presidential Rhetoric and Summitry 
Rhetorical scholars have tended to treat diplomatic rhetoric from the perspective 
of presidential rhetoric. Scholars ground their Presidential rhetoric approach by 
contending that the president, at least in the U.S., functions as the “interpreter in chief” 
(Stuckey, 1991). As the primary articulator of U.S. foreign policy, the President has 
likewise been deemed the “diplomat in chief” (Plischke, 1986). Zarefsky (2002) argues 
that presidents taking a rhetorical approach to foreign policy involve the United States 
on the rhetorical plane in international affairs as well as in the affairs of other nations. 
Howell (2006) argues that a president’s power and resources are limited in foreign 
affairs by the sovereignty of other nations and world opinion, requiring effective 
rhetorical addresses to combat competing interpretations of international affairs and U.S. 
foreign policies.  
Likewise, Walker’s (2014) analysis of foreign policy rhetoric centers around 
presidential rhetoric. Walker (2014) argues that rhetorical studies on foreign policy tend 
to take two forms: rhetoric as persuasion and rhetoric as constitutive in a foreign policy 
context. In both of these contexts, rhetoricians focus on how Presidential speech 
functions to gain support for their policies. Within the rhetoric as persuasion category, 
presidents make arguments to justify and defend their foreign policies in order to bolster 
 73 
 
support from public opinion. From the rhetoric as constitutive approach, rhetorical critics 
examine the construction and influence of world views as a means for achieving 
consensus on foreign policy. This second approach draws upon external events 
demanding reification or revisions of U.S. grand strategy, forming world views that 
provide both the substance and motivation for action in international affairs.  
Thus, a key component of presidential foreign policy rhetoric is its use to garner 
support from their constituencies. This again highlights the importance of public 
diplomacy efforts, as it too considers how governments engage global audiences for 
strategic purposes, and suggests world leaders are influential in shaping the discourse of 
international affairs. Like Hayden’s (2012) analysis of public diplomacy and soft power, 
argumentation formation plays a vital role in not just justifying what actions should be 
taken, but also constituting larger visions, worldviews, and narratives in which political 
actors come to make sense of their environments, and constructivist perspectives in IR 
are beginning to tune into the role of narratives as defining the structure of the world 
affairs (e.g. Miskimmon et al., 2013). 
While presidents participate in a plethora of foreign policy speech occasions, the 
primary means by which U.S. presidents engage the world on the rhetorical plane is 
through summitry. Presidents have found summits as a strategic means of advocating 
foreign policy objectives to foreign publics. James (1973) notes that presidents since 
Eisenhower have used summitry and ceremonial visits as an opportunity to focus world 
attention on important problems and become personally acquainted with other chiefs-of-
state. More recently, Melissen (2003) examines the explosion of summit diplomacy. She 
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argues that serial summits are well suited for negotiations, provide politicians the 
advantage of personal contact with their foreign peers, create illusions of familiarity and 
mutual understanding between nations, provide symbolic resources for signaling, among 
other benefits. However, she notes that recent use of summits provides more than simply 
personal contact among political leaders.  
Today’s summits utilize media and public opinion aiding in leaders becoming 
more visible before their constituencies (Melissan, 2003). Modern summits reflect the 
changing face of diplomacy composed of wide-ranging and multifaceted agendas. 
Whereas previous summits served the purpose of elites, taking a top down approach, 
today’s summits are more reflective of a bottom up approach. Thus, when taking into 
consideration the politics of modern summitry, analyzing diplomatic rhetoric from the 
perspective of Presidential rhetoric ignores the increasing complexities and 
interconnection of today’s global environment where numerous stakeholders are present 
in foreign policy affairs. The case of the S&ED provides one examples of this, where 
U.S. and Chinese politicians felt that issues facing the two could not simply be resolved 
by presidential meetings, but required the meeting of both bureaucracies to better 
understand and solve issues of mutual concern.  
In addition to the changing nature of summitry calling into question the sole role 
of the president in conducting complex foreign relations, the presidential rhetoric 
perspective is limited in its U.S.-centric approach to rhetorical studies. Again, taking the 
example of China, Chinese presidential leaders derive their authority in vastly different 
ways than U.S. presidents. The complex nature of Chinese politics incorporating a single 
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party system in conjunction with formal state positions places the importance of Chinese 
political power not in elected offices, but the personal power of individual Chinese 
leaders and their respective power bases. 
 Rhetorician’s narrow focus on foreign policy issues through the lens of 
presidential rhetorical studies is unfortunate. It both limits the topics of study to only 
individual rhetors and ignores powerful means in which rhetoric shapes society at large 
to strategies relevant only to U.S. presidents in particular. It thus leaves out greater 
theoretical development on how language impacts world affairs, a development 
unnecessary given the broader agenda laid out by one of its pioneering scholars, Robert 
Oliver, in the 1950s. In the next section I review the agenda set forth by Oliver and the 
scant studies recently building off him as a means to introduce other ways in which 
communication can impact international affairs. 
Oliver and the Emergence of Diplomatic Rhetoric 
In her overview of communication and conflict studies, Putnam (2006) notes that 
communication scholars originally aligned their research on conflict with rhetorical 
scholarship focused on diplomacy in the 1950s (Oliver, 1950, 1951, 1952, 1954). 
Writing in the 1950s, Robert Oliver authored multiple articles in speech journals calling 
on rhetorical scholars to research diplomatic speech to “determine how speech operates 
in international relations” (Oliver, 1950, p. 24). He stated that, “On this shrinking globe, 
neither in peace nor in war will diplomatic speech falter in accelerating pace of its 
increasingly vital significance to human survival” (Oliver, 1950, p. 24). Since then a few 
rhetoricians heeded Oliver’s call, studying the public discourse of international conflict 
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(Heisey, 1970; Schuetz, 1978) and diplomatic rhetoric and argumentation at the UN 
(Donohue & Prosser, 1997; Renz, 1987). And yet, despite these handful of studies, 
Howell (2006) argues that “more than half a century later, however, the rhetoric of 
diplomacy remains nearly as ‘undefined and unsurveyed’ as it was when Oliver 
originally advocated that ‘the research task should be undertaken’” (p. 14). 
According to Howell (2006) Oliver’s work focuses “on describing the 
characteristics of the speech of diplomacy, the nature of audiences to whom that speech 
is directed, and the contexts in which the speech of diplomacy is employed” (p. 15). 
These characteristics may be seen as rhetorical strategies, of which the diplomat needs 
many given the constraints and sensitivity of diplomatic rhetoric. As Oliver explains, in 
international diplomacy, “The problem is complex: what sounds like appeasement to one 
segment of the world audience sounds like war-mongering to others.” (Oliver, 1952, p. 
176). Thus, Oliver calls on rhetoricians: “A profession devoted to solving problems in 
speech should not avoid the challenge to help.” (Oliver, 1952, p. 176). Clearly for 
Oliver, the unique characteristics of diplomatic speech necessitates communication 
scholars to examine the kind of speech problems involved with international diplomacy. 
For Oliver, one of the unique aspects of diplomatic rhetoric falls within the 
complex audiences it attempts to address and the importance of context. First, with 
regards to audiences, Oliver identifies the neutral, oppositional, and amendable 
audiences. Further consideration arises from whether the audience is domestic versus 
international. With regards to context, he states that the most important factors in a 
diplomatic communicative context are geographic location, physical setting, audiences, 
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and communication techniques. The diplomat must take into account all of these aspects, 
as diplomatic “speech is effective solely in terms of its total context” (Oliver, 1951, p. 
212) and effective diplomatic rhetoric must create clear objectives tied to its particular 
context (Oliver, 1951). Thus, the difficulties facing diplomatic speech are manifold. 
Failure to properly analyze one’s context and balance demands from competing 
audiences can cause serious repercussions. As Oliver (1950) states, “Every diplomatic 
speech must be carefully tailored to its particular context, with the acute realization that 
in many subsidiary contexts it may have unfortunate and unforeseeable effects” (p. 25).  
Oliver’s research program seeks to identify these unique constraints and 
rhetorical strategies that make diplomatic speech so different from typical political 
discourse, however in doing so he just provides typologies of these differences. 
Moreover, these “unique” aspects while still holding largely true today, do not reflect the 
extent to which our communication and geopolitical environment has evolved. While 
Oliver (1952) might have predicted the rise of public diplomacy as a field, explaining 
that the incorporation of mass media in diplomatic activities resulted in a “new 
diplomacy” whereby diplomats are no longer communicating just with heads of states, 
but with world audiences, this “difference in kind” from the previous century of 
diplomacy is also witnessed today, especially with the Internet and rise of social media.  
Nonetheless, Oliver’s perspective is useful in reminding us that diplomatic 
rhetoric remains anchored within the role of power in international affairs. He provides 
us with an unabashedly realist perspective to diplomatic rhetoric, stating that it is “Not 
possible to substitute a rhetoric of inquiry for the present rhetoric of power in 
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international negotiations” (Oliver, 1954, p. 297). He argues against idealists notions of 
diplomacy searching for more effective means of international arbitration that reach 
“beyond practical realities” in advocating for formal incorporation of parliamentary 
procedures over a state’s interests. The problem lies in “How can representatives of 
sovereign nations be persuaded to relinquish their inherent sovereignty and render 
themselves amenable to reasoned rules of parliamentary debate” (Oliver, 1954, p. 287). 
When considering how states socialize others, this notion of power is key. In the context 
of the S&ED, it directs our attention to unveiling larger strategies of persuasion in which 
both the U.S. and China are induced to cooperate. 
Furthermore, with regards to the diplomatic rhetoric taking place at international 
conferences, Oliver argues that critics of international diplomacy come to see 
international conferences as “designed more as propaganda sounding boards than as 
media for the settlement of disputes” (Oliver, 1952, p. 176). Thus, “Diplomacy has been 
converted largely into a struggle for dominance over the minds of men” (Oliver, 1952, p. 
176). He concludes that “any practical approach to the improvement of diplomatic 
speaking must be based upon what is, rather than upon what ought to be” (1954, p. 289) 
and that “The rhetoric of power is firmly entrenched in international negotiation” (1954, 
p. 288). Here again, Oliver provides an entry point for discussing how institutions such 
as the S&ED are tied to public diplomacy efforts in attempt to win over and define the 
nature of U.S.-China relations. Oliver himself doesn’t provide us with overarching 
rhetorical strategies to do so, but more recent studies in rhetoric provide some 
suggestions, to which I turn to in the next section. 
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Rhetorical Strategies of Diplomacy Post-Oliver 
Oliver’s early work has laid the foundation for the analysis of diplomatic speech. 
While the majority of recent communication scholarship examining diplomatic rhetoric 
often pays lip service to Oliver’s work, three studies in particular have advanced our 
understanding of it. First, Yang (2011) explores how President Nixon’s toasts with 
Chinese leaders reflects both deliberative and epideictic rhetoric. She defined diplomatic 
rhetoric as the “art of balancing the needs of these audiences while meeting the 
deliberative demands of the diplomatic mission” (p. 4). As such, she argues that the 
diplomat is often required to address these multiple audiences through epideictic 
discourse as the work of diplomacy is punctuated by ceremonial occasions and 
obligations. While Yang’s (2011) analysis advances our understanding with regards to 
how diplomats use epideictic form to convey deliberative aims, it ignores the highly 
mediated context of public diplomatic rhetoric whereby diplomats are further 
constrained by world public opinion.   
A second study by Zhang and Han (2013) builds on Oliver and Yang’s (2011) 
work by looking at the rhetoric of China’s soft power campaign and use of strategic 
ambiguity in the Six Party talks over North Korea’s nuclear program. They argue that 
few studies on China’s soft power campaign examined its rhetoric, instead focusing on 
institutional arrangements for soft power. They state that a key component of soft power 
includes the rhetorical skills leaders use. Chinese leaders are cognizant of the importance 
of eloquent diplomatic speech, as Zhao Qizheng (2009) argued that China should 
“improve its capacity of state rhetoric” to gain the “power of discourse” in the 
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international arena. In their study they find that Chinese officials had to balance 
rhetorical tensions between their familiar domestic rhetorical realm and the foreign 
affairs realm (p. 192).  
Following Oliver’s identification of the importance of ambiguity in diplomatic 
rhetoric, Zhang and Han’s (2013) analysis centers around the use of strategic ambiguity 
in China’s diplomatic rhetoric. Drawing on organizational scholarship, they define 
strategic ambiguity as the purposeful use of ambiguity to accomplish goals by 
individuals and organizations (Eisenberg, 1984; Jarzaboeski et al., 2010). Zhang and 
Han (2013) explain that strategic ambiguity can be useful when stakeholders are not 
compliant and achievement of the organization’s goal require creative engagement 
between the organization and its stakeholders (Davenport & Leitch, 2005). Furthermore, 
they suggest that ambiguity can play an important role in diplomatic rhetoric because it 
can provide a sense of continuity while allowing for the gradual change in interpretations 
over time (Sellnow & Ulmer, 1995). Thus, ambiguity can be used to create room for 
multiple stakeholders to interpret messages and provide responses (Davenport & Leitch, 
2005) and serve as a resource lending itself to the political nature of collective action 
(Jarzabkowski et al., 2010).  
Zhang and Han’s (2013) analysis highlights the role of ideologically driven 
rhetoric and the difficulties it posed for Chinese diplomats when balancing domestic and 
international audience expectations. They found that China’s rhetoric was more 
professional and less ideologically driven and that strategic ambiguity helped show 
China was acting as a responsible stakeholder; however, ultimately, China’s ambiguous 
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rhetoric was ineffectual because its use of ambiguity made other countries suspect that it 
was merely going through the motions and not committed to denuclearizing North 
Korea. The effectiveness of China’s rhetoric was also limited due to its differing 
audiences. Zhang and Han (2013) argue that Party ideology and rhetoric still held a 
strong influence on the rhetoric of international affairs, and domestic political rhetoric 
had insinuated itself into international rhetoric, resulting in Chinese officials failing to 
differentiate between the domestic and international political context making their 
rhetoric culturally maladaptive. While their research builds on Oliver’s (1952) analysis 
on the rhetoric of diplomatic conferences, Zhang and Han (2013) note that their study is 
limited in its focus, being too narrow, and that future studies could take a broader 
approach to find overall patterns underlying the dynamics and restraints of China’s 
transitioning diplomatic rhetoric. 
Finally, Heisey (1999) looks at China’s diplomatic rhetoric at the United Nations 
following the Tiananmen Square incident. His approach uses Burke’s (1952) notion of 
identification as the process of linking the speaker’s interests with those of the intended 
audience. The purpose of this process is to bring interests together in the context of 
division, disagreement, or separation of interests. According to Heisey (1999), faced 
with the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square incident and the subsequent alienation by 
the international community, Chinese leaders began engaging the world community 
through speeches advocating for peaceful coexistence. Heisey (1999) argues that the 
Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 created a problem for China in the international 
community with the government’s crackdown on protestors challenging the accepted 
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norms shared by the international community regarding peaceful protest and democratic 
self-determination. Thus, following the lead up to the first Gulf War, Chinese leaders 
spoke at the UN advocating the five principles of peaceful coexistence in an attempt to 
renew their image and position in the international community.  
Heisey (1999) argues that Chinese leaders employed their concept of the five 
peaceful principles of coexistence in an attempt to socialize foreign nations, affirm 
China’s commitment to the interests held by the United States, and the West more 
broadly, while also creating space for China’s own development path following its idea 
of peaceful development with Chinese characteristics. Thus, Chinese leaders used 
subsequent speeches at world events to confirm their commitment to the five principals 
of peaceful coexistence in their language of socialization. In doing so, Heisey (1999) 
argues that China affirmed the interests held by the U.S. and the West while 
simultaneously establishing a critical awareness of alternative explanations on 
international issues. Therefore, China both demonstrated that it was a partner in the 
international community while also creating space for its development path along the 
lines of Chinese characteristics. Heisey (1999) argues that this rhetorical move is 
important for both China’s domestic and foreign audiences by creating greater social 
cohesion. 
Heisey’s move is a positive first step into looking specifically at the function and 
purpose of Chinese foreign policy discourse and the importance of diplomatic rhetoric in 
general, but places too much emphasis on the impact of consistent messaging creating 
meaningful identification of common interests and values. Whereas Heisey (1999) 
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extends Oliver’s work by looking at how diplomats engage governments on the 
discursive plane by appealing to the world community through the idea of civic 
discourse, the extent to which other nations were truly “socialized” by China’s 
reimaging was most likely minimal, as few western countries adopted China’s five 
principles of peaceful coexistence concept. Furthermore, little was at stake for China’s 
intended audience in listening to Chinese promotion of the five peaceful of principles 
coexistence. Thus, more emphasis is needed to explain how China’s rhetoric was 
strategically employed to truly influence, or move foreign governments or publics to 
identify with Chinese interests. 
 Taken together, these three studies highlight the importance of Oliver’s research 
agenda in analyzing diplomatic speech and its use. Unfortunately, within communication 
scholarship these three studies are the exception. However, an additional perspective 
within rhetorical studies analyzing international relations exist focusing its analysis on 
the more symbolic dimensions of international conflict.  
Rhetoric of Symbolic Conflict 
An alternative view within rhetorical studies exists examining the symbolic 
nature of conflict among competing political groups on international affairs. For 
instance, Rowland and Frank (2002, 2011) employ rhetoric to help understand the 
symbolic dimensions of conflict between Israelis and Palestinians drawing on the role of 
rhetoric, ideology, and myth. They argue that rhetoric provides us with epistemic 
knowledge about our world. Because symbols shape human understanding, we come to 
see the real world through our symbols which, drawing on Burke, are both a reflection 
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and deflection of reality. Ideology plays an important role as it provides us with an 
ontological grounding both personally and societally through our self-definitions. 
Whereas rhetorical terms make up an ideology, ideology is what ultimately binds us 
together. Ideology thus provides us with our worldviews for understanding and ordering 
the world as it is and can be, filling the void of uncertainty. Finally, myth is important in 
that it is related to transcendence, providing an axiology and teleology for us. We find 
meaning through myth, and are even willing to die for our myths. Thus, myth provides 
humans with the ultimate ground for just or right action. 
From this perspective, Rowland and Frank (2002, 2011) analyze the divide 
between Israeli and Palestinians arising from what they argue comes from two 
competing and mutually exclusive systems of myth. Within these mythic systems, 
rhetoric is important in that it can bring people together to confront images of 
demonization or support them. They contend that the limits of military responses to 
terrorism emphasizes the importance of rhetoric especially when people embrace 
entelechial and fundamentalist mythic systems tied to their identities and physical 
existence. Military overreaction makes mythic rectification more likely to fail as it seems 
to threaten our ordering of things. 
Heisey and Trebing (1983) similarly compares rhetorical visions in international 
affairs by looking at the strategies of the Iranian Shah’s White Revolution and the 
Ayatollah’s Islamic Revolution. Their interest in doing so is to “enlarge our 
understanding of these revolutions by examining selected rhetorical documents from 
each leader in order to identify and compare their rhetorical visions and strategies” (p. 
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160). Heisey and Trebing look at the composite dramas which form groups’ symbolic 
realities. They argue that Iranian leaders were attempting to build a social reality by 
means of a rhetorical reality. While the Shah was trying to create a distinctly “Persian” 
identity for Iranians, the Ayatollah attempted to make a uniquely “Islamic” identity. 
Their perspective relied on Burke’s concept of identification as a means to bring human 
division into oneness and act together to understand how the two camps created their 
rhetorical identities. Heisey and Trebing (1983) argue that the social movements evolved 
following Burke’s dramatistic sequence returning to hierarchy from scapegoating, 
sacrifice, redemption, and salvation. 
Kluver (2010) also employs Burke in understanding the rhetorical trajectories of 
China’s Tiananmen Square crisis. In his essay, he argues that the protestors, the Chinese 
government, and the Bush White House acted within their own narrative that defined the 
movement and implied policy options for each to carry out. In doing so, he states that 
“by clearly identifying the vision each of the groups had of the movement, it is easier to 
see how collective political action followed in the subsequent events” (Kluver, 2010, p. 
73). Kluver’s (2010) perspective of rhetoric follows Burke’s notions that language is 
implied action. As such, our terminologies contain implications that, when combined 
with humans ‘perfectionist’ tendencies to carry out those understandings, what Burke 
calls our “terministic compulsion,” we can understand how the Tiananmen massacre 
become “almost inevitable due to the positions staked out by the various personalities 
from both the government and the student movement within the context of Chinese 
political culture” (2010, p. 73).  
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Kluver’s (2010) analysis provides scholars a much clearer explication of how 
rhetorical visions become closely tied to political positions and more importantly, 
political action with international consequence. Furthermore, its emphasis on the cultural 
aspect of political rhetoric is encouraging for rhetoricians exploring diplomatic rhetoric. 
However, Kluver’s (2010) article focuses on how the visions implicit in the rhetoric of 
the Tiananmen movement precluded a peaceful resolution of the crisis, and does not 
provide insight into how political leaders might use similar processes to build 
international cooperation. Major conflict is more of the exception, not the rule in 
international affairs. How cooperation is created and sustained, and the role of our 
symbol systems in supporting this peace remains unanswered. 
These three approaches constitute what I call a “symbolic approach” to 
international conflict. While they push the boundaries of what one might consider 
“diplomatic rhetoric”, nonetheless they highlight the importance of symbols systems in 
international conflict. They represent a strong view of rhetoric in compelling audiences 
to act in a certain way and focus their analysis on instances of stark conflict and 
contestation among political actors. Despite the emphasis on conflict, this approach to 
diplomatic rhetoric holds that our symbol systems, while resilient, are nonetheless 
malleable too. Humans can eschew conflict, although not completely eliminate it. At the 
very least, rhetorical scholarship critiquing the symbolic nature of conflict helps provide 
us with a reflective corrective to help us understand the potential to transcend differences 
in international politics. This approach offers one means by which scholars can 
understand the potential difficulties between the United States and China through their 
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participation in the Strategic and Economic Dialogue while also strengthening theories 
of public diplomacy by highlighting the terministic force in which our symbol systems 
unite and divide us. In the next section I briefly examine both the benefits and limits 
provided by the scholarship of diplomatic rhetoric in understanding the dynamics of the 
S&ED. 
The Strategic and Economic Dialogue as Diplomatic Rhetoric? 
The U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogues are clearly an instance of 
diplomatic rhetoric. Leaders from both nations come together to discuss issues of joint 
international concern: The commencement of the S&ED begins ceremoniously with 
pomp and circumstance, followed by numerous joint statements congratulating both 
sides on the progress made at the conclusion of the event. Furthermore, leaders engage 
in diplomatic discourse leading up to the event in setting the agenda, playing up or down 
expectations, and setting the public stage by which the event takes place all before 
engaging each country’s respective officials in discussion over the substantive issues of 
the dialogue. Finally, the two countries make public the conclusions drawn from such 
discussions. Taking a rhetorical perspective to studying the S&ED reflects how rhetoric 
is as much process as it is an artifact.  
 Oliver’s research demonstrates the unique qualities diplomatic rhetoric enjoys in 
its mission to advance state interests. These qualities include the nature of complex 
audiences, the impact of the mass media in both constraining diplomats’ positions on 
issues while enabling diplomats to appeal directly to international publics. Diplomats are 
not the typical rhetor. As Oliver argued, diplomats function more as rhetorical 
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instruments rather than rhetors in the traditional sense. In fulfilling their function as 
vessels for state policy, their statements contain its own unique vocabulary including the 
use of ambiguity, rationalization, and contradictory statements in its pursuance of state 
power, not rational inquiry. And yet, Oliver still focused on the speech actions of 
individual rhetors, rather than iterative, interactive construction of geopolitical meaning.  
Diplomatic speech espouses both deliberative and epideictic rhetorical aims, attempts to 
socialize international actors or at least legitimize its country’s policies, while at the 
same time constrained by ideological, cultural, and domestic expectations arising from 
the respective nations cultural and political history. Thus, it is no surprise that diplomatic 
speech appears sanitized, even vacuous to the uninitiated diplomat or typical domestic 
citizen. 
Recent perspectives in diplomatic communication focus their attention not on the 
interactions among diplomats, but more so on the implications of international 
communication technologies. These technologies bring together and create greater 
access for state and nonstate actors to address an increasingly large number of global 
publics in promoting their own agenda by addressing these foreign publics directly with 
the goal of enhancing one’s image and in defense one’s policies. Presidents and other 
international leaders are key sources for diplomatic rhetoric with summits a major 
medium through which they propagate their rhetoric. However, the advent of cheap 
global communication technologies coupled with the interconnected nature of our world 
today, provides actors with a plethora of new policy instruments to connect their 
messages with target audiences. Thus, political deliberation within state bureaucracies 
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are advancing new justifications for these policies linking the symbolic to material 
realities in decisions regarding investment in international communication instruments 
towards the augmentation of state power. Finally, our symbol systems create political 
actors’ reality, sometimes leading to conflict, but also providing us with the possibility 
of transcending differences by altering our terminologies to describe who we are, what 
we stand for, and what the world looks like. 
 From the literature on diplomatic speech we can begin to understand the 
rhetorical purposes and constraints underlying the Strategic and Economic Dialogues. 
Oliver’s work cautioned us not to view the S&ED as a means by which the United States 
and China debate policies, but advance arguments in the interest of each state. When 
looking at the publicly released documents rhetorical critics should be attuned to appeals 
to universal audiences, as diplomats tend to talk “over” the heads of diplomats to global 
publics, and couch their policy positions within the established values of the world 
community. This “talking over” can be viewed as an attempt to engage in public 
diplomacy efforts as it is designed to communicate the government’s view to the larger 
public. When analyzing speeches made during the S&ED, we should expect leaders to 
insert familiar ideological formulations in order to justify their domestic rhetoric on the 
international stage. Critics should be unfazed by the ambiguous language of official 
documents and instead seek to understand how these statements provide for the widest 
possible acceptance of policy positions by diverse stakeholders both abroad and at home. 
Justifications of policies will likely reflect overly simplistic and dramatized notions on 
the threats of conflict or the promise of peace, while miscommunication or 
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misunderstanding of such positions will be present. These characteristics combine both 
epideictic elements celebrating the U.S.-China relationship and its importance and 
deliberative efforts in pursuance of promoting cooperation and identification of the key 
policy issues and their solutions shared by U.S.-Chinese officials. 
 The recent perspectives on diplomatic communication similarly help us 
understand some of the components of the Strategic and Economic Dialogues. For 
instance, it is no surprise that high ranking U.S. and Chinese officials, sometimes even 
the presidents themselves, come to discuss the issues facing U.S.-China relations. The 
presidents lead their respective foreign affairs bureaucracies, and as such, adds weight to 
conclusions drawn from the dialogues in addition to signaling to their government 
bureaus what issues are important. The use of the S&ED as an institutionalized summit 
adds additional commitment to the importance of the relationship and the issues 
discussed and creates a mechanism for continued rhetorical force to addressing the 
issues of mutual concern. These issues will have been vetted and debated first by each 
state’s domestic government. The conclusions drawn from the dialogues must also be 
made public due to the ubiquitous nature of communication technologies connecting 
world citizens together. This raises the expectations by making public the relationship. 
In doing so, citizens and experts alike scrutinize the documents, searching for signs of 
diverging or converging interests. These interests can be examined by looking at the 
different terminologies employed by U.S. and Chinese officials, allowing rhetorical 
scholars to understand the implications of such terminologies. Rhetorical scholars are 
not left devoid of what to expect from the diplomatic rhetoric surrounding the S&ED, 
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and yet, as I argue next, these perspectives fail to provide a nuanced understanding of the 
organizational rhetorical mechanisms the S&ED creates in its goal of influencing the 
perceptions and creating cooperation between the two nations.  
 The Strategic and Economic Dialogues is not a typical example of diplomatic 
engagement. As the U.S. Treasury Department stated these dialogues are “the first of its 
kind” (Treasury, 2006). The goal is to bring together not just the presidents of each 
nation, but hundreds of high-level government officials on each side. As Deputy 
Assistant Secretary David B. Shear explained, U.S. and Chinese officials were to come 
together and get to know their counterparts. The purpose in doing so was to increase 
mutual understanding and mobilize the whole government bureaucracies. The range of 
topics to be discussed are supposed to be larger than normal, including “the full range of 
economic, regional global, and environmental challenges that require action by both 
countries in order to attain progress” (Shear, 2009p. 11). The number of officials 
suggests the S&ED is bringing together the bureaucrats of each nation, not just their 
diplomats, and as such requires the addition of an organizational perspective to 
understanding the outcomes of the S&ED.  
The typical focus of the president as the major rhetor of a country’s foreign 
policy in diplomatic rhetoric is problematized by the Strategic and Economic Dialogues. 
As stated previously, Garrison’s (2007) study on U.S.-China relations highlighted the 
limits of Presidential rhetoric whereby U.S. government bureaucracies with their own 
stakes in policy issues between the United States and China often act in inconsistent 
ways as the President intends. As Sutter (2013) noted, one problem the U.S. and Chinese 
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governments faced was the lack of coordination among their respective international 
affairs bureaucracies. On the U.S. side, the inclusion of both the Treasury and State 
Departments in the S&ED suggests that these departments may have differing goals in 
pursing cooperation with China. What becomes more important, concerns over human 
rights, North Korean denuclearization or economic issues such as trade and intellectual 
property rights? These issues might not be mutually exclusive but highlight nonetheless 
conflicting departmental mandates in U.S. foreign policy. 
What is ultimately missing from the literature on diplomatic rhetoric is how 
specifically governments engage governments in identification of common ground and 
mutual interests in ongoing institutional settings. These questions become evident when 
one considers the purpose of the S&ED. For instance, why do U.S. and Chinese officials 
need to know their counterparts if diplomacy is primarily conducted by high level 
diplomats or presidents? How do dialogues mobilize “the whole government” on each 
side? How does the meeting of both bureaucracies lead to co-identification and 
acceptance of the agenda? Is it enough to simply symbolically meet, is it enough to 
simply share dissenting opinions, or does success of the S&ED necessitate the 
persuasion of each country to accept the same definitions and identification of mutual 
problems as Kissinger (2011) argued. Furthermore, the organizational dynamics of the 
S&ED questions the extent to which this development of common ground arises through 
the individual rhetor or diplomat. Instead, the institutional logics themselves become a 
source of common values and expectations in that both guide state action as well as a 
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resource upon which rhetors can draw upon to justify changes or resist those changes in 
state interaction. 
Research Questions 
This dissertation seeks to understand how the S&ED creates cooperative 
relations while managing conflict between the U.S. and China by identifying the 
institutional and rhetorical dynamics that drive it. In chapter 1, I introduced the S&ED, 
reviewed the context for its emergence, the antecedents of the S&ED, and the historical 
use of dialogues in managing U.S.-China relations. In chapter 2, I reviewed IR theories 
examining the processes in which states socialize others through their interactions in 
international organizations and the shaping of state identities and norms which in turn 
influence their interests and behavior. However, I argued that these perspectives fall 
short in describing the specific communicative process in which these transformations 
take place. By approaching the S&ED through institutional theory we can view the 
process as chiefly communicative as organizational rhetors are both constrained and 
enabled through institutional structures while at the same time capable of transforming 
these structures through rhetoric. By incorporating aspects of public diplomacy and 
diplomatic rhetoric we can further understand how the U.S. and China build support for 
the S&ED and define the bilateral relationship in service towards their goal of greater 
cooperative relations. In chapter 3, I will define the texts studied as well as develop an 
organizational rhetorical lens upon which to examine them. In chapters four through 
seven I present my findings based upon the following research questions. 
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The stated purpose of the S&ED is to help socialize and mobilize the U.S. and 
Chinese bureaucracies towards cooperation on a wide range of issues affecting the two 
nations. To understand the extent to which the S&ED has become institutionalized, that 
it is the extent to which is has created taken-for-granted constellations of established 
practices guided by enduring, formalized, rational beliefs I focus on the institutional 
logics present. Institutional logics help guide and constrain organizational behavior by 
embedding the interests, identities, values, and assumptions of individuals and the 
organizations. Thus, in chapter four I ask the following research question: 
RQ1: How do U.S. and Chinese officials define the S&ED’s dominant institutional logic 
to which both sides conform and legitimate their activities? 
Organizational actors can hold multiple identities and institutional logics. 
Because the S&ED is bringing together two separate countries as well as a variety of 
different government agencies, competing logics are likely to be contested or change. 
The literature on institutional entrepreneurship and work suggests that organizational 
members containing both knowledge and resources are able to transform institutional 
logics through rhetoric, as well as external changes in the institution’s environment 
making these shifts more likely. Thus in chapter five I ask the following research 
question: 
RQ2: What shifts are present in the S&ED’s dominant institutional logic to which both 
sides conform and legitimate their activities? 
Whereas chapters four and five focus on the institutional logics guiding U.S. and 
Chinese officials’ activities, in chapters five and six I focus on the external 
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organizational rhetoric employed to both justify and define U.S.-Chinese relations as 
well as build network ties in support of these activities. As the IR literature argued, state 
interests are tied to identities and require legitimization of these values for norms to 
become taken up and adopted. The literature on public diplomacy lists a variety of tools 
by which these values are contested and the means by which states persuade publics as 
make sense of them. Thus, to understand how the S&ED creates an organizational 
identity conducive to cooperative U.S.-China relations, in chapter six I ask the following 
research question: 
RQ3: What strategies of public diplomacy does the S&ED utilize and how do these 
strategies implicate the S&ED’s stated goals? 
Finally, the public diplomacy literature suggests that relational public diplomacy 
strategies can help establish communities of interests and networked relations as a means 
to build support on cooperation on policy issues. Furthermore, Acharya’s (2004) theory 
of norm diffusion contends that the extent to which regional, subnational, and local 
political actors frame and reframe larger international norms in ways that aligned to local 
values and norms is tied to how quickly and deeply these norms take hold. Thus, in 
chapter seven I ask the following research question: 
RQ4: To what extent does the S&ED create communication power through the 
constitution of relational networks? 
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CHAPTER III  
ORGANIZATIONAL RHETORIC AND METHODOLOGICAL LENS 
 
I have argued thus far that, the creation of the U.S.-China Strategic and 
Economic Dialogues represents a new form of diplomatic communication. It 
incorporates not just elite-level diplomats, but brings together mid-level government 
bureaucrats with their international counterparts to find solutions to international issues, 
as well through its summitry rhetoric engaging global and local publics. As such, 
analysis of the S&ED requires an organizational rhetorical perspective to understand the 
specific mechanisms by which the two state bureaucracies discuss and work towards 
common identification of issues of concern and paths forward to solving these issues. In 
this chapter I first define what organizational rhetoric is and some of the means by which 
it helps elucidate the communicative functions of the S&ED; second, I justify an 
organizational rhetorical approach as suitable for applying institutional theory to the 
S&ED; third, I briefly describe how organizational rhetorical analyses are conducted; 
and finally, I will review the texts under analysis. 
Organizational Rhetoric as a Method of Inquiry 
Broadly defined, organizational rhetoric is concerned with how organizations use 
rhetoric towards the persuasive inducement of coordination for the organization’s 
interests. More specifically, organizational rhetoric is interested in uncovering the means 
by which interests and identities become united and sustained through coordinated 
efforts. Analysis of organizational rhetoric reveals questions of voice—who is speaking 
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on behalf of the organization when one of its members speak, and questions of self-
interest, legitimacy, and ambiguity. Organizations employ rhetoric in order to engage its 
organizational members, relevant stakeholders, and manage the organizations 
reputations and interests; as such, organizational rhetoric is closely tied to the field of 
public relations, indeed the act of public relations is viewed as a practice of rhetoric, but 
adds greater theoretical richness to public relations by drawing up the two millennia of 
rhetorical study. Nonetheless, organizational rhetoric, because of corporate rhetors, faces 
unique constraints distinct, albeit similar from the typical rhetorical situations facing 
individual rhetors. 
According to Hoffman and Ford (2010), “organizational rhetoric is the strategic 
use of symbols by organizations to influence the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of 
audiences important to the operation of the organization” (p. 7). Within this definition, 
three parts are of special importance: organizational rhetoric’s strategic focus, its goals, 
and the audience. First, organizational rhetoric’s strategic nature means it is concerned 
with how messages are fashioned to meet specific goals. Being strategic is to consider 
the impact of a certain selection and arrangement of symbols in a message. Second, 
organizational rhetoric is goal driven. It achieves its goals by influencing the thoughts, 
feelings, and behaviors of an intended audience. Third, organizational rhetoric is 
generated for one or more audiences. Indeed, organizations produce rhetoric to influence 
a multitude of audiences, even sometimes divergent audiences. Hoffman and Ford 
(2010) note that in today’s interconnected world managing multiple audiences through 
organizational communication is particularly difficult, but increasingly important. 
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In pursuance of organizational goals, studies in organizational rhetoric have 
looked into strategies and tactics of identification in organizational messages (e.g. 
Cheney, 1983), the use of metaphor in aiding an organization in presenting a consistent 
identity to multiple and overlapping publics (Boyd, 2003), the use of memorable 
messages in socializing organizational members in how to behave (Stohl, 1986), critical 
interruptions in environmental justice movements (Pezzullo, 2001), problems of 
transparency and the abuse of transparency by corporations to protect their interests 
(Christensen & Langer, 2009), the use of ideographs in sustaining organizational 
interests (Boyd & Waymer, 2011), public relations strategies and issue management by 
international organizations (de Brooks & Waymer, 2009), the use of rhetorical strategies 
in competing and creating institutional logics and organizational change (Green, Babb, 
& Alpaslan, 2008; Meyer and Hammerschmid, 2006), and organizational legitimacy 
(Coombs, 1992; Boyd, 2000; Cheney & Christensen, 2001). This list of topics studied by 
organizational rhetoricians is not exhaustive, but points to the plethora of 
communication strategies that organizations have been found to use.  
While interest and application of organizational rhetorical studies has grown, 
these perspectives grew out of Cheney and McMillan’s (1990) foundational article 
describing the advent of organizational rhetoric as a field of study. Cheney and 
McMillan (1990) synthesize studies from the 1980s on organizational rhetoric. Important 
tenets of organizational rhetoric include the rise of the corporate person, the complexities 
of who exactly is “speaking” when an organization produces its messages or symbols, 
the importance of communication in sustaining organizations—drawing upon Bernard’s 
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definition of formal organizations, and the effects of hierarchy and control in 
organizations persuading their members to coordinate and voluntarily act towards the 
organization’s goal or mission. These questions reflect Oliver’s research reviewed in 
chapter 2, likewise noting the depersonalization of diplomats as “hired attorneys” and his 
argument that diplomatic speech is a “struggle over the minds of men” whereby 
governments jockey for positioning and wording of international agenda. 
According to Cheney and McMillan (1990), the importance of our organizational 
associations implicates us in multiple rhetorical situations where we must solve specific 
exigencies through persuasion. Organizational rhetoric therefore looks at both the 
individual and collective perspective. Organizational rhetoric can be seen as either the 
totality of symbolic efforts or special instances of suasory communication for the 
organization or within it. From this, organizational rhetoric has been conceptualized, and 
bracketed, as either internal or external organizational rhetoric. Cheney and McMillan 
(1990) call on organizational rhetorical scholars to scrutinize the range of messages that 
constitute contemporary organizations, including fields of institutionalized discourses 
legitimating and expressing organizations’ goals, values, issues, images, and identities, 
in addition to self-justifying arguments praising the organization’s success while 
absconding organizations of their failures.  
Another parallel between organizational rhetoric and Oliver’s work on 
diplomatic speech can be found in his recognition of diplomatic speech serving states’ 
interests through rationalization. Furthermore, the bracketing of internal and external 
constituencies can similarly be applied to government-to-government negotiations and 
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government-to-public communication. Organizational rhetoric provides a means linking 
the two while recognizing the impact of multiple channels of communication through the 
concept of auto-communication. Cheney and Christensen (2001) argue that given the 
nature of multiple, overlapping publics with access to information through multiple 
channels, organizational messages directed externally may end up influencing internal 
audiences as well. 
Lastly, Cheney and McMillan (1990) examine the scope of organizational 
rhetoric. They explain that organizational rhetoric considers the features of 
organizational life dealing with or implicating persuasion. This occurs with the 
collective presentation of verbal, visual, and symbolic expression which function to unite 
and mobilize organizational members in addition to promoting an organizational image 
in the minds of consumers—or with regards to in international affairs, the minds of 
global publics and foreign governments.  
Taken together, organizational rhetoric can be seen as the discourse of 
organizations presented through organizational beings (Crable, 1990), persuasion and/or 
discourse collectively created (Cheney & McMillan, 1990), and focusing on messages 
within and/or on behalf of organizations purposefully creating identifications, soliciting 
cooperation, and/or persuading (Meisenbach & McMillan, 2006). More recently in the 
2011 special issue on organizational rhetoric in Management Communication Quarterly, 
Palenchar (2011) summarizes the concerns of organizational rhetoric as the following:  
a) external organizational rhetoric weigh self-interest against others’ enlightened 
interests and choices; b) organizations as modern rhetors engage in discourse that 
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is context relevant and judged by the quality of engagement and the ends 
achieved; c) external organizational rhetoric weighs the relationship between 
language that is never neutral and the power advanced for narrow or shared 
interests.  
Thus, according to Palenchar (2011) organizational rhetoric focuses on strategic 
communication that at its best fosters collaborative decisions and co-created meaning 
that align stakeholder interests, a finding similarly shared with the literature on public 
diplomacy. As such, an organizational rhetorical perspective helps address the 
shortcomings of Oliver’s perspective on diplomatic speech by focusing on how the U.S. 
and Chinese governments engage each other through organizational messages to manage 
issues of mutual concern with regards to their respective government bureaucracies 
identified as important stakeholders.  
Organizational rhetorical studies have also began studying the unique role of 
government rhetoric. Boyd and Waymer (2011) coined the term the “Paradox of 
governmental rhetoric” whereby governments are supposed to represent the “people” but 
tend to do so by representing and misrepresenting certain stakeholders over disdained 
publics. Government rhetoric places unique tensions on different levels of government 
and their representation of different publics. They argue that the nature of organizational 
rhetoric opens this type of discourse up to sharper criticism from disdained publics and 
calls for scholars to critically examine who the government represents and/or 
misrepresents.  
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We can see these processes taking effect in international affairs where 
governments similarly make claims to represent their state’s interests, although questions 
regarding who exactly those interests are might remain unclear. For instance, on the U.S. 
side, Garrison (2007) and Goh (2005) both traced the impact of domestic interest groups 
in pushing for the adoption of certain policies or policy labeling with regards to U.S. 
positions on China. Claims of representation are also made to universal audiences. 
International leaders frequently make claims to represent the “global community” or 
“humankind” in pursuance of their policies. Indeed, as the literature reviewed on 
international relations theory in chapter 2 demonstrated, liberal internationalists and 
constructivist IR scholars draw upon how an international society becomes defined and 
implicates state behavior. 
The question of representation requires an understanding of whose interests 
organizations, or governments, are supposed to serve. Heath (2006, 2011) argues that 
organizations should strive to be fully functioning members of society embodying two-
way dialogic approaches to organizational rhetoric in addition to spontaneity, openness, 
inquiry, advocacy, and reflection. However, Boyd and Waymer (2011) question whether 
this is possible if these practices are not in the interest of the organization. They suggest 
we accept the idea that the very nature of the corporation is to be self-interested. 
Palenchar (2011) worries that in doing so, we would be lowering our expectations 
regarding the responsibilities organizations have towards their societies. Likewise, 
Cheney and McMillan (1990) state that “organizations that advance their own interests 
however narrowly or broadly conceived, cannot be seen as representing or presenting the 
 103 
 
interests of all (p. 105). This highlights the criticisms made by U.S. officials in their 
experience with Chinese diplomats who they claim were narrow minded in only 
addressing issues deemed important to Chinese interests over global concerns. However, 
as Oliver noted, states engage in diplomacy to augment their own power and pursue their 
own interests. Regardless, diplomats must still appeal to the larger values accepted and 
shared by the world community to legitimize their interests (Goddard, in press). 
Whether organizations should act in their interests assumes that the organization 
itself holds these interests. Boyd and Waymer (2011) argue for more research into 
understanding whose interests organizational voices are made to serve. They suggest 
three such interests exist: members of the organization speaking, organization’s own 
self-interest, and hidden interests. This is complicated because of the organization’s 
decentered self where multiple messages are attached to the same actor, while obscuring 
individual reasonability and agency. Boyd and Waymer (2011) suggest ideographs are 
one rhetorical means by which organizations are able to keep ambiguous and effective 
messages in support of hidden interests by distorting and marginalizing stakeholders. 
The focus on the use of ideographs requires research looking into how organizational 
rhetoric is tied up in our cultural consciousness and how symbols create detrimentally 
abstract meanings preventing critical examination.  
The recognition of hidden interests helps us further understand the competing 
elements in diplomatic rhetoric in general, but also with the S&ED in particular due to 
competing interests held by different departments within each country’s foreign affairs 
bureaucracies, as well as bureaucracies representing other interests (energy, trade, 
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treasury, defense). Indeed, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger consciously kept 
his meetings with Chinese officials secret from the U.S.’s Department of State due to the 
perception of these competing interests. Thus, we might expect that ideographs, or other 
argumentative warrants and goals will be different within the rhetoric at the S&ED, 
especially as diplomats maintain ambiguity in purpose to ensure domestic constituencies 
are happy by hearing their representatives espouse their familiar ideological orientations 
and values used to justify international policies. 
From the research reviewed above, we can see that research done in 
organizational rhetoric shares similar assumptions as those laid out by Oliver with 
regards to diplomatic rhetoric. Organizational rhetoric can thus aid scholars in their 
analysis of diplomatic rhetoric, including at the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. 
Before concluding this section on organizational rhetoric and its applicability to the 
Strategic and Economic Dialogues, two perspectives of organizational rhetoric and its 
ties to classical rhetorical theory are worth further investigation, especially as they speak 
to public diplomacy efforts. 
First, Conrad (2011) draws two major implications from classical rhetorical 
studies to situate his perspective on organizational rhetoric. He begins by explaining that 
rhetoric is inherently tied up in issues of power and social control. Second, he notes that 
rhetoric deals with issues of truth and claims to knowledge. Rhetoric is therefore a tool 
to inculcate particular sets of beliefs, values, and frames of reference in addition to 
creating and managing claims to truth. Therefore, rhetoric’s power resides in its ability 
to attach claims to particular position of social, political, and organizational issues. 
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Rhetoric functions somewhat paradoxically to manage these tensions by facilitating 
change while sustaining stability and draws upon larger cultural myths to do so.  
Conrad’s (2011) approach is more of a macro-level one by which organizations 
influence public policies for their benefit. Through organizational rhetoric, organizations 
shape popular attitudes and beliefs through our taken for granted assumptions guiding 
and constraining our interpretations of reality, and therefore our actions. For Conrad 
(2011), the link between rhetoric and organizations comes from the rise of the corporate 
person replacing the individual as the dominant rhetor in society. Applying Conrad’s 
(2011) perspective on organizational rhetoric requires looking at government rhetoric as 
a corporate rhetor which represents its domestic constituencies in foreign affairs. While 
Conrad (2011) is concerned with the ideologies and structures of U.S. organizational 
rhetoric and the topoi from which they draw upon in employing their strategic rhetoric, 
rhetoricians looking at a government’s foreign policy rhetoric could similarly draw upon 
the political-cultural topoi governments utilized in advocating for a certain perspective 
on international issues and global governing structures. In fact, like Rowland and Frank 
(2002, 2011), Conrad (2011) identifies the persuasive nature of societal mythologies in 
justifying organizational actions.    
 A second perspective on organizational rhetoric comes from Heath (2009) that 
focuses on organizational rhetoric as public relations. Heath (2009) draws on Roman 
classical rhetoric, specifically Quintilian’s notion of the good person who can speak 
well, or in this case, the good organization that speaks well. His definition of 
organizational rhetoric emphasizes the character of the organization as the essential 
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aspect influencing the impact of an organization’s message and the role the 
communicator plays in society. This coincides with Heath’s (2006) idea of organizations 
as fully functioning members of society in ensuring mutually beneficial relations that 
organizations foster with their stakeholders and society in order to achieve the 
organization’s mission and vision.  
While public relations serve a management function to appropriately 
communicate an organization’s goals and actions with its stakeholders, the rhetorical 
perspective features the role of information and facts in shaping the knowledge, 
opinions, and motivations behind an organization’s actions. Heath (2009) draws on 
Burke’s view of rhetoric embodying the barnyard scrambles of contesting opinions and 
wisdom of particular policies, identities, and reputations. This perspective recognizes 
that people interpret information by advocating contestable propositions regarding 
accuracy of truth claims. Therefore rhetoric offers an epistemic, advisory, and 
invitational rationale for public relations where there is difference of opinion, doubt, 
uncertainty, or even wrongly held opinions. As such, rhetoric plays an important role 
because data in and of itself is meaningless until interpreted, and interpretations require 
advocacy through propositional language and counter persuasion. From Heath’s (2009) 
perspective, analysis of organizational rhetoric helps us understand the process of 
decision making, collective efforts, and the give and take of conversation, debate, 
accommodation, and negotiation. Therefore, organizational rhetoric is a study of what is 
persuasive (Campbell, 1996), how ideas win out in the marketplace of fact, values, and 
policies (Burke, 1969), and anchored idealistically in better ideas defeating inferior ones. 
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Advancing Heath’s (2009) perspective to foreign policy rhetoric suggests rhetors 
look at how governments present their respective interests in support of a fully 
functioning international community. A key component to judging diplomatic rhetoric 
would include analysis of how countries claim cooperation can manage our global 
commons or prevent major conflict. Additionally, Heath (2009) helps tie in the public 
diplomacy function of diplomatic rhetoric whereby organizations, or in this case 
governments, present their image and reputations to international publics in garnering 
support for their policies. Those familiar with the current discourse between the United 
States and China can see Heath’s (2009) ideas playing an important role in U.S. attempts 
to persuade China to become a “responsible stakeholder” in world affairs.  
 Moving forward, Palenchar (2011) suggest organizational rhetoric examines the 
following:  
1) A movement away from agentic/agency focus on a singular rhetor to one that 
addresses a more complex, constantly evolving cultural, social, and political 
complexity as dialogue; 2) Critical scholarship that questions the assumption that 
organizations act as fair-minded rhetors but does not allow frustration to disown 
rhetoric as being beyond remediation; 3) Analysis on context and engagement as 
dialogue over long-term issues rather than short-term gain; 4) Research that 
examines the shortcomings of poor communication strategies and tactics in 
relationship to power as compared to the ideal of organizations being committed 
to ways (process and meaning) that bring more voices and interests together in 
the public sphere as a means for making society more fully functioning. 
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Applying an organizational rhetorical perspective to the Strategic and Economic 
Dialogues can answer this call although within the larger context of diplomatic rhetoric. 
Specifically, the S&ED is fundamentally tied up in larger questions of voice. While 
presidents and cabinet level officials are engaging in complex dialogue, they officially 
do so on behalf of the United States of America or the People’s Republic of China, but 
in fact, even those might be contested within their nation. Furthermore, officials often 
justify their policy positions, claiming to be acting towards the betterment of “mankind”. 
Voice is also complicated and intermixed as a result of the S&ED including each 
country’s bureaucrats in the dialogues. As a site for analysis, the S&ED has taken place 
over eight years allowing examination of how issues are discussed over the long term, 
while still having to balance the expectation for short term progress. Finally, the S&ED 
deals with questions of power, where the United States is able to argue from a position 
of primacy within global norms, largely established and reinforced militarily and 
economically by the U.S. and its allies, whereas China seeks to legitimize is role as a 
global power, while often sitting outside the established order, which is many ways has 
been crafted to contain China. Chinese efforts in establishing the Asian Infrastructure 
and Investment Bank and its “one belt one road” policy are but some of the examples 
whereby the Chinese are setting up their own institutions outside of the U.S. led 
international order. 
Organizational Rhetoric as a Lens for Institutional Theory 
According to Lammers and Garcia (HB), rhetorical scholars have much to offer 
institutional studies. Specifically, a rhetorical approach allows scholars to account for 
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both the structural elements of institutions and the discursive actions of individual and 
organizational interactions. This approach reveals the “embeddedness of organizations” 
and the reciprocal influences of organizations and their environments. Thus, as Hartelius 
and Browning (2008) note, rhetoric can serve as a theoretical lens and framework for 
understanding narrative and rational organizational discourse. Examining institutional 
rhetoric allows scholars to explore the strategic collective expressions of organizations 
as they seek legitimacy in their institutional environments 
Numerous studies have employed the idea of institutional rhetoric (Cheney, 
1991; Finet, 2002; Ford, 2003; Hartelius & Browning, 2008; Hoffman and Ford, 2010; 
Jablonski, 1989; Keranen, 2007; Lynch, 2005; Schwarze, 2003). In the rhetorical 
approach, the institution is an entity that speaks for itself and by proxy for its members. 
Institutional rhetoric plays an important role in explaining shifts in institutional logics. 
For instance, Green, Babb, and Alpaslan (2008) argue that rhetoric “shapes the 
institutional logics of control and thus legitimizes the dominant stakeholder group in the 
institutional field” (p. 41). Likewise, Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) suggest that 
“rhetorical strategy is a significant tool by which shifts in a dominant logic can be 
achieved” (p. 41). Lawrence and Suddaby’s (2006) typology of institutional work 
includes advocacy and theorizing which are specifically communicative in nature and 
could be further unpacked from a rhetorical perspective. Furthermore, institutional 
rhetoric can be understood as not only affecting organizations internally, but also as 
“collective expression intended to influence the larger social normative climate” (Finet, 
2002, p. 274). Taken together, Lammers and Garcia (HB) state that rhetoric is a tool 
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used by organizational actors to influence logics and its analysis can account for 
institutionalization or institutional change. Thus, reframing existing scholarship on 
organizational rhetoric as explicitly institutional offers rich avenues and new directions 
for future studies of institutional rhetoric. 
 Within the literature of institutional studies and institutional rhetoric, an 
important distinction must be made between organizational discourse and rhetoric. 
Lammers and Garcia (HB) note that rhetoric and discourse has been sometimes used 
interchangeably. However, it is useful to distinguish them for conducting institutional 
analysis. Castello and Lozano (2011) explain that rhetorical analysis “focuses on 
persuasive texts fostering a specific response to social change” whereas discourse 
analysis “examines tests without supposing how recipients of their messages will be 
influenced” (p. 4). Similarly, Cheney, Christensen, Conrad, and Lair (2004) argue that a 
rhetorical approach is concerned primarily with the strategic dimensions of discourse. 
In their overview of institutional theory, Lammers and Garcia (HB) note that 
while institutional theory does not privilege a particular methodology, the task of 
examining institutions calls for diachronic methods because institutions cannot be 
captured effectively with single-point observations. Additionally, an institutional 
perspective emphasizes external influences on organizations, suggesting that 
institutionally-informed studies should include external sources of information and 
influence. My analysis of the S&ED takes this into consideration, and thus looks at the 
organizational rhetoric of each of the eight meetings from 2009-2016 of the S&ED to 
understand how its messages and structure change over time. 
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Organizational Rhetoric as Method 
 Analyzing the Strategic and Economic Dialogues from an organizational 
rhetorical perspective helps to understand the institutional dynamics of the S&ED as 
well as addressing the shortcomings of traditional diplomatic studies while adding 
theoretical specificity to the goals and constraints facing diplomatic rhetors. Applying 
this perspective requires researchers to find relevant texts, or rhetorical artifacts to 
systemically study. Hoffman and Ford (2010) explain what texts organizational 
rhetorical critics can study and provide a method for doing so.  
Organizational rhetoric is concerned with the messages produced by 
organizations in short because “organizations have replaced individuals as the key 
figures of society (Heath, 2009, p. 18). Likewise, Hoffman and Ford (2010) state that 
“organizations are the largest producers of rhetoric in contemporary society” (p. 17). As 
such, rhetorical critics can examine traditional rhetorical texts such as speeches, 
editorials, newsletters, and advertisements in addition to physical décor, transcripts, and 
interviews of small group meetings and discussion by organizational members. In the 
case of the S&ED, a variety of organizational messages are present, including public 
addresses by U.S. and Chinese officials at the summit meetings, editorial pieces in major 
newspapers leading up the S&ED meetings, and Joint Fact Sheets of both the strategic 
track and economic track. To make sense of the variety of texts, Hoffman and Ford 
(2010) argue critics look at a typology of messages across five different classifications 
from formal to informal, impersonal to personal, public to private, universal to 
particular, and external to internal (Cheney and McMillan, 1990). Other aspects to 
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consider are an organization’s speaker and image, in addition to the rhetorical situation 
calling forth the organizational rhetoric (Bitzer, 1968) or organizational rhetoric’s 
creation of its situation through rhetoric (Vatz, 1973). For Hoffman and Ford (2010) the 
goals for studying organizational rhetoric are to evaluate its effectiveness, understand 
and judge an organization’s presentation of itself including its values, the role and power 
of organizations in society, and to improve our understanding of organizational 
rhetorical theory. 
 After identifying the texts for analysis, Hoffman and Ford (2010) lay out a five 
part process for systematically analyze rhetorical texts (see figure 1). First, rhetorical 
critics should begin their analysis with a descriptive process identifying the rhetorical 
strategies made within their texts. To help identify these strategies, critics can look at 
commonly identified rhetorical strategies from previous studies of rhetoric. Second, after 
the descriptive analysis critics should examine the situation that the rhetoric takes place 
within. When considering the situational constraints, organizational critics can take two 
perspectives: examining the rhetorical situation calling forth the organizational rhetoric 
(Bitzer, 1968) or organizational rhetoric’s creation of its situation through rhetoric (Vatz, 
1973). The third step is to consider the patterns of strategies used within their texts and 
determine whether these strategies are of similar type that scholars have recognized as 
occurring in previous rhetorical analyses. If so, the critic must review theories regarding 
those situations and strategies to inform his/her readings of the texts. Fourth, the 
rhetorical critic must decide what type of question to ask about the rhetoric, whether they 
are to take an evaluative approach or a critical approach. Evaluative readings seek to 
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compare strategies with the elements of the situation to determine how effective the 
rhetor was at achieving his/her aims. A critical approach focuses on issues of power and 
voice in the organization’s rhetoric and how much choice the audience has in 
understanding and influencing the organization. Finally critics must make conclusions 
from their evaluative and critical readings. Hoffman and Ford (2010) suggests rhetors 
apply their conclusions by creating a list of strategies to remember for future situations 
facing the rhetor. This dissertation will largely follow Hoffman and Ford’s (2010) five 
part process in examining the texts produced by the SED, of which I will identify and 
justify next. 
Texts Under Analysis 
With each meeting of the Strategic and Economic Dialogues, U.S. and Chinese 
officials release a corpus of public statements detailing its outcomes, opinion articles 
penned by high ranking leaders touching on issues of concern, and broadcast clips of 
various signing ceremonies and meetings. This dissertation will analyze these texts from 
each year of the eight Strategic and Economic Dialogues: July 2009 in the United States; 
May 2010 in China; May 2011 in the United States; May 2012 in China; July 2013 in the 
United States; July 2014 in China; June 2015 in the United States; and June 2016 in 
China. For consistency, I chose to only include the texts emerging from the Strategic and 
Economic Dialogues, and thus excluding those from the Senior Economic Dialogues 
started by Hank Paulson during the Bush administration and the parallel Strategic 
Dialogue created later. These early manifestations of senior level economic and strategic 
dialogues during the Bush administration met more ad hoc, lacking the institutionalized 
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nature of the SED established in 2009 by the Obama administration. While analysis of 
the SD and SED texts would provide clearer instances of comparison between the 
organizational rhetoric of the two separate economic and security dialogues as they 
occurred a part from each other, as well as highlight the emerging support and 
development of the dialogues leading to the Obama administration’s decision to double 
down on them through the creation of the S&ED, it would obscure the institutional 
richness and variety of messages that take place throughout the formal 
institutionalization of the S&ED which brought together both dialogues under the same 
roof and coordination. 
While much of the work signed at the S&ED is negotiated throughout the year 
leading up to the annual meeting within various government agencies and plenary 
sessions, my data will include only officially released documents. This is done largely in 
part because the U.S. and China do not make available or circulate these texts, and in the 
course of finding any leaked or individual documents that are released, I would fail to 
have a representative sample or complete picture upon which to examine any significant 
shifts in changes in the rhetoric of the S&ED. In some instances, the officially released 
documents do provide links to the organizations involved in some of the outcomes 
reached at the S&ED, however because these organizations have additional mandates 
and functions it is difficult to determine what actions they are individually taking as part 
of their normal organizational mandate and which ones are directly related to the S&ED. 
While the focus on only those documents officially released is a limitation to the study, 
the number of texts officially released by themselves provides ample room for analysis. 
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Indeed, each year hundreds of pages are released detailing the joint statements, 
individual speeches, outcomes, and memos of understanding (MOU) reached at the 
S&ED. Moreover, the advantage of  analyzing the official documents provides focus on 
the diplomatic and organizational messages specifically agreed upon and produced by 
the U.S. and Chinese governments. These documents are also most likely to be 
translated and propagated to each country’s attentive publics. These documents can be 
found on the U.S. Department of State and the Treasury Department’s website, and to a 
lesser extent, China’s U.S. Embassy website and Chinese Xinhua News Agency. While 
it would be ideal to include texts produced internally during the negotiations, these are 
classified, preventing consistent collection and analysis.   
I define official documents as those published on the respective government 
websites. This includes news articles written by officials leading up to the S&ED that are 
then posted on the government’s website alongside the other S&ED press releases. My 
primary sources for these documents will be the U.S. Treasury and State Department’s 
websites because their department heads lead the U.S. efforts in the Economic and 
Strategic track of these dialogues. While other U.S. agencies will likely have statements 
or report on the impact of the S&ED on their own areas of concern due to the range of 
issues covered by the S&ED, it would be both impractical to search through each 
government department’s website and unnecessary. For instance, while the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency posts updates regarding the implications of 
agreements made during the SED on environmental issues, these posts are just that, 
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updates. For details on the agreements made, the EPA website links its readers to the 
press releases provided on the U.S. Department of State website.  
Both the State Department and the Treasury Secretary’s website provide their 
own page for each of the annual Strategic and Economic Dialogues, making 
identification and collection of official documents both practical and consistent. While 
some of the content is the same, much of it details the separate track outcomes 
coordinative by the respective agency heads. On the Chinese side, this is not quite the 
same case. While some of the S&ED documents are posted on China’s embassy to the 
United States, others are posted on the Chinese news agency Xinhuanet. Regardless, 
most of the S&ED press releases and outcome statements published on the State and 
Treasury Department websites are joint statements of U.S. and Chinese officials.  
Each year the number of press releases and documents posted on the Treasury 
and State department websites varies from a low of five to a high of 24. However, some 
consistency exists. For instance, at the conclusion of each of the Strategic and Economic 
Dialogues U.S. and Chinese officials issue a joint statement laying out the specific 
outcomes of the dialogues and future agenda items. These documents are the primary 
indicator signaling the state of U.S.-Chinese cooperate. For a list of the documents under 
analysis see appendix A where I list all the documents and press releases published by 
the State Department and Treasury Department for each year of the SED. 
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Figure 1. Hoffman and Ford’s Process for Analyzing Organizational Rhetoric 
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CHAPTER IV  
THE S&ED’S PRIMARY INSTITUTIONAL LOGIC 
 
International relations theories of socialization posit that state identities and 
norms can be shaped through non-coercive means such as teaching, persuasion, 
mimicking, and social influence (Gheciu, 2005; Johsonton, 2008), contestation to claims 
of legitimacy (Pu, 2012), and norm convergence through local actors’ framing of 
international norms to coincide with local values (Acharya, 2004). These processes are 
theorized as occurring primarily through state interaction and participation in 
international institutions, although Acharya’s (2004) model usefully includes a more 
diverse set of regional and subnational agents. Taken together, these perspectives are 
limited in their explanations regarding the creation and sustaining of such identities, 
norms, and values, specifically the communicative means by which they take hold and 
grow. Constructivist research in this area appears more to demonstrate to realists that 
considerations of material power do not drive these decisions, and as such, search for 
specific instances whereby countries adopt policies at certain times based on these 
processes of socialization listed above. However, in doing so they ignore the follow up 
and sustaining of these identities, treating them as more monolithic and enduring once 
established. Finally, approaching their analysis from a state-centric viewpoint, IR 
theories of socialization ignores the work done by individual diplomats to sustain those 
values.  
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To resolve these issues, this chapter makes two arguments: first, I contend that 
approaching the Strategic and Economic Dialogue from the perspective of institutional 
theory can demonstrate how officials come to adopt and internalize shared values aiding 
in their pursuit of cooperative relations. Second, I argue for a more rhetorically focused 
perspective on institutional theory to demonstrate how U.S. and Chinese officials 
continuous engage in mindful acts of persuasion. In the case of the S&ED, the ongoing 
institutional rhetoric from the two countries’ presidents and special representatives 
function to define the S&ED’s primary institutional logic, that of “positive, cooperative, 
and comprehensive relations” which provides the values upon which individuals, and 
thus the two governments, internalize and socialize each other. 
First, institutional theory provides scholars a more nuanced entry point into 
understanding how identities, values, and norms are taken up by U.S. and Chinese 
officials. It does so by focusing on the institutional messages that come to define an 
institution’s logic for operating. Friedland and Alford (1991) define institutional logics 
as sets “of material practices and symbolic constructions—which constitute organizing 
principles and which [are] available to organizations and individuals” (p. 248). These 
logics serve as mechanisms for socializing organizational members by providing them 
the means to make sense of their organizational environments, and in turn both enable 
and constrain their work actions. As Thornton and Ocasio (2008) state “interests, 
identities, values, and assumptions of individuals and organizations are embedded in 
institutional logics” (p. 103). Thus, IR conceptualizations of how states socialize others 
can be strengthened by turning to analysis of institutional logics.  
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For institutional logics to exist, an organizational arrangement must be 
institutionalized. Tolbert and Zucker (1996) describe this process as one of convergent 
change based on “habitualization” where emergent behaviors specific to a problem are 
appraised for their pragmatic functionality, objectification whereby a social consensus 
emerges over the value of the particular social arrangement, and sedimentation as the 
arrangement adopted takes on a more normative base regarded as an appropriate 
response enacted over time. While a useful starting point to understanding the extent to 
which the S&ED is an institutionalized mechanism for discussing U.S.-China relations, 
Tolbert and Zucker’s (1996) perspective is more of a functional approach to 
understanding the process of institutionalization, ignoring the rhetorical contestation in 
which these processes occur, as well as the symbolic life of organizations. 
Second, to better understand how institutional logics are created and sustained, I 
argue for a more rhetorical perspective on institutional theory. Lawrence and Suddaby 
(2006) and Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) examine the process of institutionalization 
by focusing their attention to the discursive and rhetorical dynamics in which 
institutional logics are established through institutional entrepreneurship and institutional 
work. In doing so, these authors take a narrow approach in understanding the rhetorical 
dynamics that underlay the taking up of these logics by defining rhetoric as a subset of 
discourse analysis, defined as "'the use of symbols to persuade others to change their 
attitudes, beliefs, values or actions' (Cheney, et al., 2004: 79), restricting rhetorical 
analysis to “its focus to explicitly political or interest laden discourse and seeks to 
identify recurrent patterns of interests, goals and shared assumptions that become 
 121 
 
embedded in persuasive texts” (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005, p. 8). In these cases, ideas 
and identities become wrapped up in discourse, as non-conscious or non-goal oriented, 
leading actors and organizations to less mindfully enact these identities whereas rhetoric 
is merely the strategic messages functioning in short-term pursuit of perceived interests. 
Suddaby and Greenwood’s (2005) model of institutional change is based on three 
elements: a) legitimacy which explains why alternatives are rejected in spite of their 
potential superiority or accepted in spite of their inferiority; which leads to b) 
institutional change from shifts in institutional logics or actors' frameworks for reason 
and belief; with these shifts arising from c) strategic use of persuasive language, or 
rhetoric. Thus, they only view the third step as a rhetorical process, ignoring how rhetors 
establish and debate claims to legitimacy as well as the role of rhetoric in creating the 
world views that shape one’s reasons and beliefs. As the analysis in this chapter 
demonstrates, U.S. and Chinese officials are very conscious of their identities and values 
and repeatedly define the S&ED in congruent ways to maintain their cooperative 
relations through it. 
 Thus, I examine the extent to which the S&ED has been institutionalized and the 
primary institutional logic that drives its promotion of U.S.-China cooperation, which in 
turn affect how the two are socializing each other regarding appropriate state behavior. I 
conceptualize this process as primarily rhetorical, whereby both institutional 
entrepreneurs, with the sufficient knowledge and resources to change the logic of U.S.-
China relations, as well as organizational members through their institutional work come 
to develop an institutional logic that guides and constrains U.S.-China relations. In turn, 
 122 
 
these logics help explain the identities and values the two nations hold as well the 
outcomes the S&ED pursues. In doing so, this chapter answers the following research 
question: 
RQ1: How do U.S. and Chinese officials define the S&ED’s dominant institutional logic 
to which both sides conform and legitimate their activities? 
Institutional Rhetoric of the S&ED 
Without interviewing the participants of the S&ED it is difficult to ascertain the 
extent to which individual participants have changed their beliefs or internalized these 
values; however, it is possible to examine the publicly released documents, joint 
statements, speeches made by high-ranking participants, as well as the MOUs and 
specific outcomes reached and identify the institutional logics and rhetorical practices 
made in support or against the S&ED’s principles. These statements represent a public 
commitment made by officials and can be used to justify future policies as falling within 
or outside the boundary of agreed upon values for engagement. Ultimately, these 
statements reflect the feelings and norms of those involved in the discussions and 
function as institutional messages designed to signal and guide each country’s 
bureaucrats and state apparatuses regarding what actions to pursue themselves. 
Through their meetings at the S&ED, U.S. and Chinese officials engaged in a 
dual process of institutionalizing the values expressed through the S&ED meetings while 
simultaneously deinstitutionalizing previous patterns of U.S.-China interactions and 
great power politics. The process of institutional change occurs through both 
institutional entrepreneurs and institutional work. As DiMaggio (1988) explains “new 
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institutions arise…when organized actors with sufficient resources see in them an 
opportunity to realize interests that they value highly” (p. 14). In the case of the S&ED, 
only the U.S. and Chinese presidents possess the resources and authority to set in motion 
a new mode of interaction between the countries bringing together the vast bureaucracies 
of their respective nations.  
Analysis of the institutional rhetoric of the S&ED suggests that the dialogue 
mechanism serves to coordinate the U.S. and Chinese president’s policies/vision for 
U.S.-China relations to their respective government bureaucracies as well as their 
domestic publics and the world community. The S&ED’s central institutional logic is an 
ambiguous defining of the S&ED’s purpose in particular and U.S.-China relations in 
general. The S&ED’s primary logic is first introduced following President Obama and 
Hu’s April 2009 joint statement establishing the S&ED, that being building “a positive, 
cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship for the 21st century.” This logic 
guides the interactions that take place during the annual S&ED as well what work is to 
be done throughout the year leading up to the next S&ED meeting. It implicates and 
coordinates both the economic and strategic track discussions as well as the additional 
plenary sessions the emerge throughout the eight years of the S&ED. This ambiguous 
and far reaching institutional logic pushes participants to find increasing instances, 
regardless of quality, of areas where members from both countries can participate. 
Furthermore, this logic requires S&ED participants to widen the arena of policy 
discussion to include issues ranging from more serious issues of diplomatic concern such 
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as key security issues and economic cooperation to more minor issues of people-to-
people exchanges, local partnerships, and other grass roots style of interaction.  
Finally, the search for “positive” relations results in a conflict-avoidant style of 
negotiations where fundamental issues to the U.S.-China relationship, such as territorial 
integrity in the South China Sea or issues of human rights, take a backseat to lower 
hanging areas of engagement. Taken together, the vague and ambiguous principle of 
building “positive, cooperative, and comprehensive” relations provides significant 
leeway for establishing a network of ties among both numerous and various actors 
wanting to participate in U.S.-China cooperation.  
The Common Story: Stability in the Institutional Rhetoric of the S&ED 
One of the unique aspects of the S&ED is its incorporation of a wide variety of 
U.S. and Chinese officials across a range of government bureaucracies. In doing so, it is 
very much a new tool of diplomatic engagement. While the U.S. and China have 
engaged in dialogue throughout the past 30 years, including setting up a Senior 
Economic Dialogue mechanism during the later years of the George W. Bush 
administration, these nascent and ad hoc dialogue mechanisms were designed to meet 
more specific and pressing problems faced by the two nations at that time. While the 
S&ED was also set up to address a specific problem, that of preventing the historical 
tragedy of great power politics (Bergsten, 2009), its answer to this looming, destructive 
potentiality was to institutionalize relations between the U.S. and China in an effort to 
reorient those on both sides to the possibility of cooperative relations. Institutional 
theory can help explain two ways in which institutionalizing U.S.-China relations 
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produces this shift in perspective: the notion of institutional logics and the process of 
institutionalization. 
First, institutions orient their organizational members through institutional logics. 
Friedland and Alford (1991) define institutional logics as sets “of material practices and 
symbolic constructions—which constitute organizing principles and which [are] 
available to organizations and individuals” (p. 248). Institutional logics provide their 
organizational members with a means to make sense of their organizational 
environments, enabling and constraining their work actions. Thornton and Ocasio (2008) 
state that “interests, identities, values, and assumptions of individuals and organizations 
are embedded in institutional logics” (p. 103). These logics make certain ways of 
thinking and communicating possible or unlikely and “provide individuals with 
vocabularies of motives and with a sense of self” (Friedland & Alford, 1991, p. 251). 
Thus, these logics, or guiding principles, can “constrain and enable the potential agency 
of actors” (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005, p. 37). Organizational actors come to know 
and internalize these logics via institutional messages (Lammers, 2011).  
Second, institutions come into being through a process of convergent change. 
Tolbert and Zucker (1996) explain institutionalization as occurring in three phases: first, 
organizational practices become institutionalized in a pre-institutionalized period 
through habitualization where emergent behaviors specific to a problem are appraised 
for their pragmatic functionality. Second, semi-institutionalization occurs through 
objectification whereby a social consensus emerges over the value of the particular 
social arrangement; organizations mimic those arrangements as they are perceived as 
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successful. Third, institutionalization or sedimentation follows as the arrangement 
adopted takes on a more normative base, becomes regarded as an appropriate response, 
and is enacted over time.  
Through their public addresses during the opening and closing sessions of each 
S&ED, U.S. and Chinese officials define, enact, and praise a consistent organizational 
logic of “positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relations.” Each sides’ special 
representatives ensure the institutional continuity of the dialogue mechanism in four 
ways: first, they cite the U.S. and Chinese presidents’ commitment to developing 
“positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relations”; second, they engaged in problem 
and solution definition; third, they confirm the success of the S&ED and call for greater 
coordination and communication; fourth, they naturalize differences as part of the 
function of the S&ED.  
Affirming the Presidents’ Call for “Positive, Cooperative, and Comprehensive 
Relations” 
 In the first four years of the S&ED both the U.S. and Chinese special 
representatives explicitly affirm President Obama and Hu’s 2009 call for developing 
“positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relations” between the United States and 
China. This phrase establishes the institutional logic underlaying the S&ED and comes 
to symbolize the U.S.-China relationship at large, deriving its legitimacy from the ethos 
of the two presidents. These terms provide a vocabulary by which both sides describe the 
purpose, outcomes, and success of the S&ED throughout the eight years of dialogue, and 
they ritualistically repeat their commitments to it. 
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For instance, in U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner’s statement at the 
2009 Opening Ceremony Statement, he makes clear why the officials present have come 
together. He states that “In London, President Obama and President Hu called on us to 
build a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive bilateral relationship. This, dialogue, 
which our presidents initiated, is a testament to the importance of that relationship and 
our commitment to it.” Likewise, both Vice Chinese Premier Wang Qishan and State 
Councilor Dai Bingguo explicitly affirm the stated principle of the S&ED in their 2009 
statements. In his 2009 closing statement, after listing the range of issues the two sides 
should work together on, Vice Premier Wang Qishan concludes by stating: “The success 
of the economic dialogue has lent fresh impetus to the development of the positive, 
cooperative, and comprehensive China-U.S. relationship for the 21st century.” State 
Councilor Dai Bingguo reiterates the same sentiment, stating:  
“In the past year since the inauguration of the new [Obama] Administration, the 
China-U.S. relations have set off to a good start and it has enjoyed a sound 
momentum of growth. China is ready to work together with the U.S. to stay 
firmly committed to building a China-U.S. positive, cooperative, and 
comprehensive relations for the 21st century so that we can bring benefits to our 
two people and our two countries and also the whole world, and to our children 
and children’s children.” 
As Rowland and Frank (2011) argued, rhetoric provides an epistemic function 
whereby we come to see our world. In the case of the S&ED, the pursuit of “positive, 
cooperative, and comprehensive relations” helps to describe the purpose of the S&ED as 
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well as provide a shared justification for its success, thus creating a common worldview 
of U.S.-Chinese cooperation based on these principles. The quotations listed above 
showcases the level of commitment by U.S. and Chinese officials through their citing of 
the two presidents’ pledge to pursue relations in this manner as well as their own 
internalization of these values with themselves describing the reason for their successful 
collaboration as coming from these principles. 
Turning to the 2010 S&ED, we can see this process continuing. For instance, in 
2010 U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton cites the S&ED’s purpose of pursuing 
“positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relations,” continues to connect it to the 
Presidents’ pledge to do so, and explains how under this arrangement relations have 
continued to grow and advance. She states that, “Over the past 16 months, we have 
worked together to lay the foundation for that positive, cooperative, and comprehensive 
relationship that President Obama and President Hu have committed our nations to 
pursuing.” From this foundation, Secretary Clinton explains the centrality of these 
discussions to the U.S.-China relationship and how the S&ED has grown and succeeded 
in doing so: “We launched the strategic and economic dialogue last year in Washington, 
as the premier convening mechanism in our relationship. And this year we have 
assembled an even broader and deeper team, here in China, to address our growing 
agenda. We have built avenues of cooperation and identified areas of mutual interest.” 
At the 2010 S&ED, Chinese officials similarly argue for the continuation of 
U.S.-China relations along the lines stated by President Obama and Hu. Chinese Premier 
Wang Qishan in his 2010 opening statement notes, in building “positive, cooperative, 
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and comprehensive China-U.S. relationship for the 21st century it is important agreement 
is reached between our two presidents that represents the common desire by our two 
peoples and constitutes the core objectives of the S&ED.” Wang’s statements thus define 
the pursuit of “positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relations” as not just the core 
objective of the S&ED, but also servicing the desires of both countries’ people. In his 
2010 statements, Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo provides a clear narrative of the 
S&ED’s success through its adherence to these values in dealing with the global 
financial crisis. He states: 
 “I recall that last year, when the world was haunted by the international financial 
crisis, President Hu Jintao and President Obama (inaudible) of the prospects of 
the 21st century, agreed to build a positive, cooperative, and a comprehensive 
China-U.S. relationship for the 21st century, and the partnership to cope with 
common challenges. They decided to take a major step by setting up the 
mechanisms of the China-U.S. strategic and economic dialogues. In doing so, 
they sent a (inaudible) signal to the world that China and the United States would 
join hands to (inaudible) difficulties and work together for better future of China-
U.S. relations and the world at large.” 
Dai’s statement describes a world beset by international challenges to which cooperation 
between the U.S. and China is needed, and granted thanks to the presidents’ decisions to 
“take a major step” in partnering up to cope with these common challenges. He suggests 
that this cooperative decision was not inevitable, but rather in doubt, as it provided a 
“signal to the world” that the two the nations would work together, thus assuming a 
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signal was needed to be sent, and he credits the principles of “positive, cooperative, and 
comprehensive relations” as enabling this partnership. Finally, we see Dai’s statements 
mythologize the importance of U.S.-China relations as their cooperation on global issues 
itself is enough to better the future of the “world at large.” 
The affirmation of the S&ED’s purpose in building “positive, cooperative, and 
comprehensive relations” continues at the 2011, 2012, and 2014 S&EDs. Vice President 
Biden gave a key note address during the 2011 opening session states: “We’ve already 
done much to make our relationship positive, cooperative, and comprehensive. And I’m 
absolutely confident that we can do more for ourselves and for generations of Americans 
and Chinese as well.” U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton likewise in 2012 states: 
“And I am grateful that we’ve had such cooperation and diligent work by the large teams 
on both sides who are committed to furthering the positive, cooperative, comprehensive 
relationship that our two presidents have set forth.” And U.S. Secretary of Treasury Jack 
Lew during his opening session at the 2014 S&ED, states “And I would particularly like 
to thank Vice Premier Wang. He champions China's interests while working (inaudible) 
to build a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive bilateral economic relationship with 
the United States.” Secretary Clinton and Lew’s statements both demonstrate how the 
S&ED’s institutional logic is not only used in structuring the issues and processes in 
which they are discussed, but also in judging how individual officials’ behavior 
measures up to these values.  
Taken together, officials present a consistent and enduring description of the 
S&ED’s central purpose as the pursuit of “positive, cooperative, and comprehensive 
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relations.” This institutional logic is thus further adopted and internalized as officials 
engage in defining the problems and solution the two countries’ face. As such, these 
terms provide both sides with a vocabulary in which they can describe the S&ED’s 
purpose, outcomes, and successes, as the next section will showcase. 
Problem and Solution Definition: The Uniqueness of the S&ED 
 Following their respective presidents’ call for positive, cooperative, and 
comprehensive relations, the special representatives from the U.S. and Chinese side 
habitualize these principles by identifying the unique problems facing U.S.-China 
relations. These problems arise broadly from their external environment which they 
characterize as qualities incorporated in 21st century international politics, such as the 
interconnected and complex nature of issues. From this, they suggest the solution is 
greater communication and coordination between the U.S. and China by deepening 
relations and dialogue in areas where they can cooperate, comprehensively addressing 
these problems by discussing a wide range of issues, and maintaining positive relations 
as an impetus for greater cooperation and the maintenance of momentum going forward. 
The two sides’ consensus on the joint problems they face and their shared call for its 
solution, that is greater engagement of dialogue through the S&ED, marks the first stage 
of convergent institutionalization of the dialogue mechanism through objectification. 
Officials at the S&ED similarly describe the problems facing U.S.-China 
relations as emerging from the complex, overlapping nature of 21st century international 
relations. At the very first S&ED in 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
identifies these problem by stating:  
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“Climate change and energy security, for example, is an economic issue, a 
diplomatic issue, a development issue, and energy issue, an environmental issue, 
and agricultural issue, and a national security issue all rolled into one. And so it 
must be addressed in its full complexity.” 
Secretary Clinton explains how the S&ED is to address these issues, namely by 
its ability to bring together officials from across government bureaucracies to discuss a 
range of topics. She states that at the S&ED “We’ve not been limited to just the usual 
topic or two. We’ve enlisted partners from across our government to work across 
departments and bureaus and agencies to tackle these difficult challenges that we are 
facing together.” Thus, her statement echoes the S&ED’s pursuit of “comprehensive” 
relations in that it deals with multiple issues and engages officials across government 
agencies as well as “cooperative” relations in that the topics are challenges the two 
countries face together. She more explicitly ties the topics the S&ED addresses to its 
principle logic by stating: “The range of issues covered was unparalleled. And the result 
is that we have laid the foundation for a positive, cooperative and comprehensive 
relationship for the 21st century.” Finally, she legitimizes the S&ED by crediting how, 
“This dialogue [the S&ED] has established a new pattern of cooperation between our 
governments and a forum for discussion.”  
 At the 2010 S&ED we see Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo and President 
Hu Jintao continuing to define the problems the U.S. and China face as well as 
connecting them to the S&ED’s institutional logic. Chinese State Councilor Dai defines 
the twenty-first century as producing new difficulties in international relations. He 
 133 
 
explains, “What sets this century apart from the previous one is that countries are 
becoming increasingly inter-dependent and their interests are, more than ever, inter-
connected.” He argues that “Like it or not, we residents of earth have, in fact, becomes 
in separable form one another. Be it in good times or bad times, we are bound together 
by common interests and have a common destiny to share.” His statement suggests that 
the U.S. and China have no choice but to cooperate. Dai continues to portray a 
worldview in which global problems are so large that cooperation is a necessity, stating, 
“We are faced in such a world with a rising multitude of global issues, with common 
challenges that no individual country or handful of countries can tackle alone.”  
Chinese President Hu at the 2010 S&ED echoes Dai’s sentiments and goes 
further by suggesting that the solution to the problems described by Dai is greater 
communication and coordination between the U.S. and China. Hu first describes the 
international environment’s challenges which states are facing: “the world is in the midst 
of major developments, major changes, and major adjustments. The trend toward 
(inaudible) and economic globalization is gathering momentum…Global issues are 
becoming more pronounced, and regional and international hot spot issues keep 
cropping up.” To address these challenges, President Hu argues that the U.S. and China 
should adhere to the principle logic set forth by the S&ED: 
“We need to stick to the right direction of China-U.S. relations. No matter how 
the international situation may evolve, and what difficulties and interferences we 
may encounter, we should always follow the strategic and long-term perspective, 
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and speak to and safeguard the goal of working together to build a positive, 
cooperative, and comprehensive China-U.S. relationship for the 21st century.” 
The means to do this, in addition to working through the S&ED, is to encourage more 
communication between the U.S. and China. Again, President Hu explains: “We should 
maintain close interaction at the top and other levels. Full communication is an 
important basis for enhanced cooperation…We should also step up strategic dialogues 
and consultations to deepen understanding, expand common ground, and promote 
cooperation.” From Hu’s statement we are provided with greater insight into how 
“positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relations” are to be enacted, that is, through 
communication. 
Like President Hu’s comments, the common recognition of the complex nature 
of 21st century geopolitics leads both U.S. and Chinese officials to continually identify 
the need for increased coordination on a multitude of issues through dialogue. This 
emphasis on dialogue and enhanced communication is one of the distinguishing factors 
of the S&ED, as argued by U.S. and Chinese officials. For instance, State Councilor Dai 
Bingguo at the 2010 S&ED explains how communication leads to closer U.S.-China ties, 
by stating: “I believe that the strategic and economic dialogue should be an important 
and effective bridge promoting communication, understanding, and trust between China 
and the United States.” He continues by noting how this communicative function of the 
S&ED will “contribute to the beauty of a positive, cooperative, and a comprehensive 
China-U.S. partnership.” Dai concludes this statement by both legitimizing the dialogue 
mechanism and exhorting his counterparts to live up to these principles, stating, “This 
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should be the unique function and value of our dialogue mechanism. And it is what our 
leaders and people expect of us.” Thus, to execute the logic of the S&ED officials must 
frankly communicate with their counterparts in order to create mutual understanding 
which will lead to greater trust. Because no other forum for managing U.S.-China 
relations provides such an opportunity for officials to meet and discuss with counterparts 
to the extent that the S&ED does, the S&ED as an institution proves unique and thus 
legitimatizes its existences.  
Secretary Clinton at the 2011 S&ED similarly describes the dialogue 
mechanism’s unique communicative function as creating greater trust and commonality 
between the two countries. She provides further articulation as to how it does so, stating: 
 “Through these meetings and the conversations that take place within them, both 
the informal conversations like the ones we had last night over dinner at the Blair 
House and the formal meetings, we seek to build a stronger foundation of mutual 
trust and respect. This is an opportunity for each of us to form habits of 
cooperation that will help us work together more effectively to meet our shared 
regional and global challenges and also to weather disagreements when they 
arise. It is a chance to expand the areas where we cooperate and to narrow the 
areas where we diverge, while both of us holding firm to our values and 
interests.” 
Secretary Clinton’s statement demonstrates that S&ED’s communicative function 
extends beyond stale, formal meetings and provides greater leeway for members to more 
freely communicate in informal settings, such as dinners. Furthermore, she offers a few 
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more means by which personal ties and frank discussions leads to better U.S.-China 
relations: their habit-forming potential and a cushioning effect whereby the two sides 
can better “weather” conflict. 
This pattern of problem-solution definition continues each year at the S&ED. For 
instance, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden during the 2012 S&ED again emphasizes the 
need for cooperative relations: “Many of the most pressing challenges will be very 
difficult to solve unless we are willing to continue to work together.” Again, the solution 
is greater communication through dialogue, which benefits not only the U.S. and China, 
but also the world. Biden explains: 
“mechanisms like the Strategic and Economic Dialogue play an important role in 
managing our complex relationship. If together we get it right, we can leave 
behind a much better future for our children and for their children, and quite 
frankly, for the world.” 
Another example comes from Secretary Kerry’s statements at the 2014 S&ED. 
He continues to notes the interconnected nature of U.S.-China relations stating: “As the 
world’s two largest economies, our futures are inextricably entwined. No politician, no 
leader, could possibly put the genie of globalization back into the bottle.” And in 2015 
State Councilor Yang Jiechi explains: “We live in a complex and fast-changing world 
with new opportunities and new challenges emerging all the time.” Because of these 
changing and complex issues, the U.S. and China must “as the world’s biggest 
developing country and the biggest developed country, need to stand high and look far 
under the changing circumstances, stay committed to China-U.S. relations, and work 
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together for world peace and development of all countries.” The examples provided 
above demonstrate the social consensus among U.S. and Chinese leaders about their 
shared, complex problems as well as their suggested solution of deepening and 
expanding areas of cooperation.  
The number and range of topics listed by both sides throughout the annual 
meetings of the S&ED leads further credence to the idea that the dialogue mechanism is 
at least a semi-institutionalized organization, as they begin to mimic the arrangement 
through establishing numerous other dialogues as under the auspices of the S&ED. For 
instance, whereas in the inaugural 2009 S&ED there were only two tracks of dialogue, 
the Strategic track and the Economic track, the 2016 S&ED outcomes explicitly list 17 
different dialogues, not to mention other high-level exchanges. These range from the 
more substantial Strategic and Economic Dialogue, People-to-People Exchange, and 
Security Dialogue to the narrower issue specific dialogues like the Civil Space Dialogue, 
Data Security and User’s Personal Information Protection Dialogue, Supplier 
Management and Airworthiness Management Dialogue, Dialogue on Forestry, APEC 
Chemical Dialogue and Global PFC Group, Counterterrorism Dialogue, High-level 
Dialogue on Cybercrime Related Issues, etc. The titles of these various dialogue 
mechanisms demonstrate the guiding power of the S&ED’s institutional logic and its 
drive to comprehensively find areas of positive cooperation, regardless of how large or 
small. While the very spread of dialogue mechanisms itself suggests the usefulness of 
the S&ED, a second sign of an organization taking upon semi-institutional status is the 
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perception of its success, to which U.S. and Chinese officials make clear in their 
addresses each year, as the next section demonstrates. 
Demonstrating the Success of the S&ED 
 Throughout the annual meetings of the S&ED, officials from both sides reaffirm 
the success of the dialogue mechanism in producing tangible benefits. According to 
Zolbert and Tucker (1996), a sign that an organizational arrangement has been semi-
institutionalized is the objectification of that arrangement, or institutional logic, whereby 
a social consensus emerges over its value. In addition to serving this functional 
requirement, institutional theory posits a second reason for an institution to state its 
success. Because external forces drive the process of institutionalization as much as 
functional requirements, institutions must signal to their environments that they are 
legitimate. This perception of legitimacy can be defined as “the extent to which the array 
of established cultural accounts provide explanations for [an organization’s] existence, 
function, and jurisdiction, and lack or deny alternatives” (Meyer & Scott, 1983, p. 201). 
According to Meyer and Rowan (1977) appearance of legitimacy is an important 
resource for organizations because the structure of organizations are derived in part from 
the external symbolic pressures perception that the organization is legitimate.  
 In this case of the S&ED, pressures arise both internationally as well as from 
domestic constituencies. Internationally the S&ED must combat alternative fora for 
addressing the complex economic and security related issues salient to U.S.-China 
cooperation. For instance, when discussing economic or financial issues, multilateral 
institutions such as the WTO, IMF, or G20 provide alternative areas for U.S. and 
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Chinese officials to meet. On security related issues the nations could work together at 
the UN or other regional security fora. Domestically, U.S. and Chinese officials have 
their own constituencies with vested interests in U.S.-China relations. Officials must 
make sure that they do not appear to be giving in on important issues like trade, human 
rights, or sovereignty, and yet at the same time demonstrate that the areas the two 
countries do agree on help advance their domestic publics. Thus, the S&ED must appear 
to be working to solve key issues or at least in managing them to ensure its continued 
support. 
 In their annual addresses at the S&ED, U.S. and Chinese officials demonstrate 
the legitimacy of the dialogue mechanism in a variety of ways. First, as the previous 
section explained, the S&ED is necessary due to the complexity of issues vital to U.S.-
China cooperation and the S&ED’s unique ability to bring together officials from across 
government bureaucracies to address these issues. This consistent problem and solution 
definition demonstrates why other fora for discussion are inadequate. Second, officials 
explicitly declare that the meetings achieved success. Indeed, nearly every year U.S. and 
Chinese officials ceremoniously declare in their closing statements that the S&ED has 
achieved success. Third, officials demonstrate the continuity of outcomes from previous 
S&ED meetings while also listing a range of issues that the two have agreed upon at the 
current S&ED. Fourth, officials provide specific examples of where progress was 
achieved due to the S&ED, the assumption being that progress would have been made 
otherwise without the dialogue mechanism. This appraisal of the S&ED’s success is both 
shared and articulated by U.S. and Chinese officials suggesting they to some extent 
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internalized these values as they themselves each use them as warrants to justify the 
value of the S&ED. We can see these arguments upholding the S&ED’s success most 
clearly in the economic track, but also with regards to climate change and strategic 
issues, as well as officials defining the S&ED’s purpose as its achieving of those goals.  
Success and continuity within the economic track. During the 2010 S&ED 
Chinese Vice Premier Wang explains how the S&ED has enabled the U.S. and China to 
successfully address their major concern in 2009, that of the global financial crisis. He 
explains that the first “S&ED was successfully held in Washington, D.C. last year. It has 
played a positive role in enhancing our cooperation in various fields, facilitating our 
joint response to the international financial crisis, and promoting world economic 
recovery.” His description reflects the terminology of the S&ED’s institutional logic like 
the “positive role” in promoting “cooperation” as well as the “various fields” 
representing the S&ED’s comprehensive nature.  
U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner similarly affirms the progress made 
on the economic front in his final year as Treasury Secretary at the 2012 S&ED. After 
listing numerous areas where the two have countries have worked together, he ties this 
progress back to the 2009 meeting and argues that it has enhanced cooperation between 
the U.S. and China: 
 “In 2009, at the outset of our first S&ED, President Obama said: ‘I have no 
illusion that the United States and China will agree on every issue, nor see the 
world the same way…but that only makes dialogue more important—so that we 
can know each other better, and communicate our concerns with candor.’ 
 141 
 
President Obama and President Hu have made a very substantial and important 
investment over these past three years in strengthening our economic relationship 
and our cooperation on global economic issues. The specific areas of progress I 
have just reviewed are the result of that investment, they reflect our commitment 
to continue to work closely with China.” 
Secretary Geithner’s statement ties the specific material manifestations of U.S.-China 
cooperation to that of the less tangible functions of the S&ED, the communicative role 
of sharing concerns with “candor.” His statement suggests that without being able to 
share these concerns and invest the time in meeting with one another these tangible 
outcomes would not have come about. Furthermore, Geithner’s citing of the role played 
by President Obama and Hu signals their desire for both governments’ agencies and 
bureaucracies to support the efforts of the S&ED.   
The reporting of success on the economic and financial front continues 
throughout the years. Jumping to the 2015 S&ED, U.S. Treasury Secretary Jack Lew 
positively comments of the communication between officials, sharing that the round of 
dialogues were “informative, insightful and frank, reflecting the full range of issues that 
we face in our bilateral relationship.” He makes sure to tie S&ED’s mission as one 
benefiting the domestic constituencies by both nations, stating: “The mission of the 
United States-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue is to make concrete progress on 
the issues that matter to the citizens of both of our countries, cooperating where we can 
and directly addressing the issues on which we differ.” He then provides specific 
evidence as to how the S&ED has helped pursue this goal, stating: “Through the S&EDs 
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we have strengthened our bilateral economic ties and built a mechanism that allows us to 
constructively address challenges as they arise. And we’ve delivered concrete results.” 
These concrete results include U.S. exports to China doubling since 2009, China’s RMB 
appreciation, and the decline of China’s current account surplus. 
Turning to the issues at the 2015 S&ED in particular, Treasury Secretary Lew 
provides a lengthy example whereby U.S. and Chinese officials are helping their 
domestic constituencies. He notes that: 
“our economic discussions over the past two days have focused on a few 
concrete areas: creating benefits for both our citizens by expanding opportunities 
for trade and investment; implementing China’s economic reforms to ensure 
sustained, balanced growth in China and a more rapidly growing Chinese market 
for the goods and services of the United States and the rest of the world; 
cooperating to support and strengthen the international financial system including 
by upholding the highest standards; and coming together to tackle the most 
pressing global issues of our day including climate change.” 
These issues represent those of importance to both countries, demonstrating that the 
S&ED is not a forum whereby one country is merely “teaching” or “persuading” the 
other, like critiques made against IR theories of socialization (Gheciu, 2005; Pu, 2012). 
These shared issues can be seen in Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang’s 2015 statements 
as well. 
 We see a convergence in the description of the S&ED’s successes with Chinese 
Vice Premier Wang Yang also at the 2015 S&ED echoing Lew’s comments. Vice 
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Premier Wang Yang, like Lew, celebrates the achievements made over the past seven 
years of S&ED meetings, stating that over the past seven years, the “S&ED has grown 
broader and stronger, acquiring a richer agenda and better format, and producing more 
fruitful results. The two rounds of economic dialogue have been held by the current 
governments, yielding over 170 outcomes in various fields.” He lists some of these 
outcomes, stating how “Substantive progress has been made on major issues, including 
BIT negotiation, climate change, and ITA expansion, injecting positive energy to China-
U.S. relations and common development of the world.” Wang Yang continues to note 
that even the outcomes regarded as less substantive are nonetheless important, stating 
“Some outcomes may seem insignificant at this stage, but once nurtured by the fountain 
of opportunity, these seedlings will grow into large fields.” 
 The processional of the S&ED’s economic track successes serve not just to 
legitimize the S&ED, but also to symbolize the larger bilateral relationship. As Chinese 
vice Premier Wang Yang at the 2015 S&ED explained, these previous successes mark 
“not just an expectation for the future, but also a summary of the past.” From the past he 
argues that the S&ED proves that the U.S. and China can cooperate: “More importantly, 
the dialogue mechanism itself shows the commitment of both governments to work 
together for win-win results.” Wang Yang continues to argue how the S&ED functions 
to produce better relations, stating: “it [S&ED] is conducive to boosting the confidence 
of people and companies of the two countries in developing closer cooperation and 
exchanges.” He then provides examples of this primarily by noting the 
interconnectedness of U.S.-China relations including how, “Today more than 10,000 
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Chinese and Americans travel across the Pacific every day,” two-way trade exceeding 
$550 billion, and China’s becoming “one of the fastest-growing export markets for the 
United States.” He makes sure to demonstrate the value of greater U.S.-China integration 
noting how “U.S. exports to China have helped to create nearly 1 million jobs in the 
U.S.” and how “Chinese businesses have so far made investment in 44 states of 
America, with total investment reaching U.S. $46 billion and creating 80,000 jobs for 
America.” Wang Yang’s statement is thus taking the outcomes of U.S.-China relations 
and stringing them together as a narrative of closer ties, supporting the purpose of the 
S&ED in developing positive and comprehensive relations, and demonstrating how these 
ties benefit the U.S. domestic populace. 
 In addition to listing the tangible outcomes of the S&ED, Wang Yang also 
affirms the intangibles of the dialogue mechanism, that of promoting continue dialogue 
in the pursuit of “cooperative relations.” He explains that, 
“With such convergence of the two countries’ interests, which has gone beyond 
many people’s imagination, neither of us could afford the cost of noncooperation 
or even all-out confrontation. Our high-level, multidimensional dialogue is a 
testament to the greater maturity of relations between our two nations. Dialogue 
helps us understand each other’s thinking and get to the crux of how to make 
cooperation work and better handle differences.” 
Thus, from these statements we can see a clear social consensus shared by the economic 
track officials participating in the S&ED with regards to the S&ED’s pursuit of 
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“positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relations” as well as the means to enact this 
purpose, that being dialogue.  
Climate change cooperation and success. In addition to economic successes, 
the S&ED is explicitly affirmed in helping promote cooperation on climate change. This 
issue is one of two topics that the U.S. and China have worked on since the inaugural 
2009 S&ED; the other being cooperation on the global financial crisis. Reflecting on the 
progress the two nations had made over the eight years of the S&ED, U.S. Secretary 
John Kerry at the 2016 S&ED argues that the S&ED was vital in helping the two 
countries coordinate their efforts in combating climate change. Before describing how 
the two were able to cooperate and eventually sign the Paris Treaty on climate change, 
he begins by affirming the common values and process by which they were to do so 
through their efforts at the S&EDs.  
First, he signals the social conformity shared by U.S. and Chinese official 
regarding the importance of U.S.-China cooperation. He states that “Our discussions 
underscore – and everybody agreed on this – that the U.S.-China relationship is 
absolutely vital, that it may well be the most consequential bilateral relationship of 
nations on the world.” Because of this, he argues that “and S&ED itself is an essential 
mechanism for both managing our differences and also expanding our areas of 
cooperation.” He then provides a personal anecdote demonstrating his belief in this 
process, explaining how after four years working with the S&ED, “I can tell you that I 
am very respectful of the degree to which we have expanded multiple areas of 
cooperation across the entire span of a bilateral relationship – health, science, education, 
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security, and many other sectors.” He then notes that this belief is held not just by 
himself, but others involved in the S&ED as well, stating “we agree that our 
collaboration – our constructive, positive collaboration – is central to addressing issues 
of global reach and significance.” Finally, after this set up he provides a “prime 
example” of this work using the continued cooperation on climate change. Secretary 
Kerry explains that: 
“a prime example of this is the work that we have done together and continue to 
do on climate change. Previous S&ED sessions helped to set the stage for our 
countries to be able to work together in the lead-up to the global agreement 
reached last December in Paris. Now we are coordinating our diplomatic efforts 
with the goal of fully implementing the Paris agreement this year. At the same 
time, we are focused on the conservation and protection of our oceans, our ocean 
resources, and I invited Foreign Minister Wang to join me at our oceans – at the 
Our Oceans Conference in Washington this September.” 
Secretary Kerry’s statement provides a narrative of the S&ED’s success, connecting the 
institutional logic of the S&ED to the personal beliefs and values held by its members, 
showcases how continual progress on the issue of climate change was made throughout 
the S&ED meetings, and then explains how this work will continue and has expanded 
beyond consideration of carbon emissions to include ocean conservation and protection. 
Strategic issues success. The S&ED is also cited as helping the two countries 
manage their differences, particularly within the strategic track discussions. Following a 
more truculent year in U.S.-China relations where U.S. officials criticized China’s 
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assertive actions in the South China Sea and on military-to-military relations, Secretary 
Clinton makes a positive assessment regarding how the S&ED helped mitigate these 
tensions. At the 2010 S&ED, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described how the 
bilateral relationship hit a low point. She states, “Earlier this year, our relationship faced 
uncertainty, and many questioned the direction we were heading.” She then explains 
how prior to the establishment of the S&ED, this would have created a setback in 
relations: “Now, in an earlier era, we might have experienced a lasting set-back.” 
However, she then argues that the because of the S&ED this setback was avoided: “But 
this dialogue mechanism, and the habits of cooperation it has helped create, along with 
the confidence it has built, helped put us rapidly back on a positive track.” She continues 
to praise the S&ED and argues that it represents more than just an institution, it also 
represents the strength of the bilateral relationship itself:  “This strategic and economic 
dialogue…reflects the maturity, durability, and strength of our relationship.” 
 Another instance where the S&ED was praised as helping mitigate strategic 
differences within U.S.-China policy occurs at the 2014 S&ED. Here Chinese Vice 
Premier Wang Yang notes how the two sides were able to continue cooperating even 
after the scandals that plagued the previous, 2013 S&ED meeting, such as China’s 
allowing Edward Snowden to fly out of Hong Kong and accusations of Chinese cyber 
attacks. He states: 
“The success of this round of Strategic and Economic Dialogue once again 
proves that the two countries have the capability and the wisdom to properly deal 
with the differences and disagreements of the two sides, overcome various 
 148 
 
hardships and difficulties, and ensure the giant ship of China-U.S. relationship 
will continue to brave winds and waves and sail along the right course.” 
Vice Premier Wang Yang’s remarks reflects the stability the S&ED created through its 
institutionalized relations between the U.S. and China. Like Secretary Clinton’s remarks, 
the argument is made that without the S&ED’s continual meetings, instilling of common 
values, and subsequent momentum of agreed upon outcomes, the U.S.-China 
relationship would easily become derailed and fall into more conflictive relations.  
Standards by which to judge the S&ED’s success. Finally, U.S. and Chinese 
officials consistently define how people should judge the success of the S&ED, affirm 
that they have met that test, and call for continued dialogue in pursuit of reaching more 
outcomes. Here we can see how the logic of “positive, cooperative, and comprehensive 
relations” compels U.S. and Chinese officials to produce tangible, material outcomes 
benefiting their constituencies, with the institutional logic demanding that these values 
result in areas of agreement increasing in breadth and depth. As Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton explains at the 2010 S&ED, “Our job, moving forward, is to translate 
that common interest into common action and, in turn, to translate that action into results 
that improve the lives of our people, and contribute to global progress.” Her repeated use 
of “translated” specifically signals how the S&ED’s intangible values become 
transformed into material ones, and becomes a standard by which U.S. and Chinese 
officials argue we should judge the S&ED’s effectiveness. 
This standard is commonly defined and employed throughout the S&ED. For 
instance, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry in 2013 states: “Our job, in this forum of the 
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S&ED, is to turn the important agreement between the two presidents into tangible 
outcomes,” and Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi at the 2014 S&ED says the same, 
“The mission of this round of dialogue is …to facilitate as many outcomes as possible so 
as to provide positive energy and a new impetus to our bilateral relations.” From a 
Burkean standpoint, we see the vocabulary of “positive, cooperative, and comprehensive 
relations” enthelichaly driving the participants to find more and more areas to cooperate. 
After reiterating this measure by which to judge the S&ED, U.S. Treasury 
Secretary Lew at the 2016 S&ED reflects back on the eight years of dialogue, clearly 
arguing how the two countries have met that test. He starts by stating, “the test by which 
we should judge the value of the S&ED” is whether we have created “conditions that 
help people achieve their aspirations, including by expanding economic opportunities 
through our bilateral relationship.” He proceeds to congratulate the work of the S&ED, 
stating “In eight years of this dialogue, we’ve worked hard and I’m confident that we’ve 
passed the test. The S&ED has produced significant results over these past eight years.” 
However, the drive for ever more cooperation continues, with Lew stating “our work 
does not end here. We move on to new challenges.” In pursuing these new challenges, 
he demonstrates his belief in the S&ED, stating “I’m confident that our two governments 
will continue to make concrete progress on issues that are important to the people in both 
of our countries, cooperating when we can and directly addressing our differences when 
we cannot.” 
Secretary Lew praises the Chinese leadership and their participation in the 
S&ED, showcasing how the U.S. is recognizing the work done by the Chinese. He 
 150 
 
praises the Chinese leadership in stating: “It’s clear from our discussions that China’s 
leaders recognize the need to reform China’s economy and its growth model.” He 
provides examples of the progress they have made at 2016 S&ED, such as China’s 
commitment to reform its exchange rate as well as “For the first time at the S&ED, 
China agreed to better align the incentives of all levels of government to support 
household consumption.” Additionally, Lew explains that the Chinese leadership has 
promised to “actively and appropriately wind down zombie enterprises through a range 
of efforts, including restructuring and bankruptcy,” as well as China’s commitment “to 
participate in the international community’s efforts to address excess capacity at the 
OECD and to engage with the United States on a potential global steel forum,” China’s 
pledge to expand access to U.S. financial service firms, their working together to fight 
climate change within the Paris Club, China’s “enhancing the effectiveness of the 
International Working Group on Export Credits,” and “China’s commitments to reform 
its biotechnology review process to make it timely and transparent and science-based.” 
This public recognition of China’s progress and continued determination to cooperate 
with the U.S. on bilateral and international issues showcases the social influence 
dynamics whereby the U.S. affirms China’s image as well demonstrating that the S&ED 
has succeeding in promoting U.S.-China cooperation on these issues.  
The comments made by U.S. and Chinese officials clearly demonstrate the extent 
to which the S&ED is helping to produce results, and thus legitimize the dialogue 
mechanism. We can see that the S&ED’s institutional logic of “positive, cooperative, 
and comprehensive relations for the 21st century” is institutionalized in that a social 
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consensus emerges regarding the common problems faced by the U.S. and China as well 
as the its solution, that being the enactment of the S&ED’s institutional logic fulfilled by 
increased dialogue and enhanced communication and coordination between the two 
nations. Participants both praise and exhort their counterparts to continue their 
fulfillment of these ideals. And through their rhetoric translate these intangible values 
into material objectives which the two have signed or at least agreed upon to pursue. 
However, while there are many ways the two are cooperating and coordinating their 
efforts, differences remain, especially on sensitive issues such as human rights and 
sovereignty. As the next section will show, those areas of divergence are naturalized, 
even inevitable, given the nature of international politics.  
Naturalization of Continued Differences 
 The S&ED has not solved all the issues in U.S.-China relations. Academics and 
policy makers alike have criticized whether the S&ED is even useful, often citing major 
events such as human rights abuses, military actions in the South China Sea, and cyber 
espionage as evidence that significant friction remains. This questioning challenges the 
legitimacy of the S&ED’s efficacy, and in a sense, demands some action or defense by 
those involved in the dialogue mechanism. As such, in their annual addresses at the 
S&ED, nearly every year officials explicitly recognize this and in turn naturalize these 
disagreements as normal, even turning this argument doubting the S&ED as example for 
greater dialogue and greater cooperation. Four general strategies in which U.S. and 
Chinese officials naturalizing this disagreement are by emphasizing outcomes over 
differences, differences as inevitable arising from their socio-cultural histories, pursuit of 
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dialogue as transcending differences by identifying greater areas of cooperation, and the 
lack of alternatives. 
 First, officials argue that despite differences, the S&ED continues to promote 
cooperative relations evidence by its production of outcomes. For instance, after labeling 
the 2010 S&ED as a success, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in her 2010 remarks 
notes that differences still remain, but turns this potential counterargument against the 
S&ED’s effectiveness as one further showcasing the importance of the dialogue 
mechanism. Secretary Clinton starts by explaining, “Now, as we have said many times, 
we do not agree on every issue. We don’t agree even sometimes on the perception of the 
issue.” This statement at first appears at odds with the S&ED’s promotion of cooperative 
relations through its identification of areas where they two countries can work together. 
However, as Secretary Clinton’s remarks unfold, she uses this as a justification of the 
S&ED’s importance. She continues by stating, “But that is partly what this dialogue is 
about. It is a place where we can discuss everything, as State Councilor Dai said, from 
Taiwan to universal human rights.” Thus, citing the value of dialogue and the S&ED’s 
creation of a forum to enact it, these issues can be brought up and discussed, hopefully 
leading to greater mutual understanding between the two. Secretary Clinton makes this 
clear by explicitly referencing the S&ED’s institutional logic, stating how “in the 
course” of discussing these issues, “we are developing that positive, cooperative, and 
comprehensive understanding that leads to the relationship for the 21st century that both 
President Obama and President Hu Jintao put into motion when they agreed to do this 
dialogue.” Finally, she further minimizes the impact of these disagreements by noting 
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how that round of dialogue “did not solve all of our shared problems, but it did produce 
a number of concrete results, some of which you saw as Chinese and American official 
came forward to sign a memoranda of understanding.” Thus, despite these differences 
the S&ED still enabled U.S.-China cooperation evidence by producing other concrete 
results. 
This strategy of highlighting outcomes over continued differences is also used by 
Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo at the 2010 S&ED. Dai echoes Clinton’s 
statement, by first noting that at the 2010 S&ED “We signed a number of agreements, 
and the dialogues produced many results.” He then notes that differences remain, but 
that through adherence to the S&ED’s institutional logic, cooperative relations will 
endure: “Although we haven’t agreed on each and every major issue, the dialogues, I 
believe are conducive to the further advancement of the positive, cooperative, and 
comprehensive relations in the 21st century.” 
 Another strategy in which the two sides naturalize disagreement is by 
highlighting their varying level of economic development and differences in their socio-
cultural history. For instance, in his 2010 address, Chinese President Hu Jintao explains 
that disagreements are natural because of the two nations differing national condition; 
this rationale is proffered primarily by the Chinese side, especially as it relates to 
economic reforms, human rights, and actions to combat climate change. As President Hu 
explains, “admittedly, China and the United States differ in national condition, and it is 
only natural that the two sides may disagree on some issues.” Instead of focusing on 
these differences, Hu suggest that “What is important is to respect and accommodate 
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each others’ core interests and major concerns, appropriately handle the sensitive issues 
and strengthen the foundation of mutual trust.” This respect of the other’s differing 
background is a principle of dialogue, one of the values the S&ED purports to uphold. 
 We see this strategy again at the 2013 and 2014 S&ED. In his remarks, Chinese 
State Councilor Yang Jiechi at the 2013 S&ED first affirms the S&ED as useful 
mechanism in managing differences, stating: “The two sides praised the important role 
of the S&ED in expanding cooperation and managing differences between China and the 
United States.” He then notes why this is important because “As two major countries 
different in history, culture, social system, and development stage, China and the United 
States naturally do not always see eye-to-eye on every issue.” He then explains that 
given China’s level of development, “China has made important progress in its human 
rights. People in various regions in China, including Shenzhen and Tibet are enjoying 
happier lives, and they’re enjoying unprecedented freedoms and human rights.” 
Likewise at the 2014 S&ED, Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang first describes the 
differences between the U.S. and China’s economic and social systems, stating, “China 
is the largest developing country in the world. The United States is -- our two countries, 
[differ] in terms of national conditions and systems. This means our interests may 
diverge.” He then explains how despite these differences the very fact that the two 
countries continued to meet at the S&ED symbolizes their ability to overcome them: 
“We may look at things with our own perspectives, and sometimes we even have 
differences or disagreements. However, each year our two big countries, our two sides, 
get together and discuss the cross-cutting long-term and strategic issues.” 
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 Even with these differences, Chinese officials remain committed to the S&ED. 
State Councilor Dai Bingguo argues at the 2011 S&ED that the countries can overcome 
these difficulties namely by following the S&ED’s institutional logic as stated by the 
two countries’ presidents. He explains that, “Admittedly, it is no easy task to make this 
decision a living reality and turn commitment into real actions, as we may face all sorts 
of difficulties, obstacles, and interference on the way ahead.” However, he then shows 
her personal belief in the S&ED by stating, “I’m confident, however, that so long as both 
sides grasp the right trend of the world and of China-U.S. relations in the 21st century, 
stick to the directions set by our presidents with resolution, and never waver in our 
determination [we can] overcome whatever difficulty is coming our way.”  
 A third strategy in which U.S. and Chinese officials attempt to assuage concerns 
regarding remaining differences is the belief in the S&ED’s ability to create common 
ground and identification of common interests to overcome these differences. In this 
sense, more dialogue and continued commitment to the S&ED is the path for narrowing 
and transcending differences. As Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan explains in his 
2010 address, “I am confident that, through common ground of the S&ED, we will 
expand common ground, narrow differences, and work to push forward the sound and 
steady growth of China-U.S. relations.” Likewise, at the 2011 S&ED, U.S. Vice 
President Joe Biden explains: “Our goal -- our goal, in part, is to enhance the 
communication and understanding that we believe, and I believe you believe, will build 
trust and confidence.” In enhancing this understanding Biden states “We have to be 
honest with each other” because “We are not going to agree on everything; we will 
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clearly find areas where there will still be disagreement.” Therefore, the solution is 
finding common ground by comprehensively discussing the issues where the two 
countries can cooperate. As Biden explains: 
“as we work to advance our respective national interest, we have to move on 
what we seek in common, find the common ground, and I would argue much of 
our mutual national interest will find common ground.  But only by discussing a 
diverse range of topics, including sensitive ones, can we help mitigate the risk of 
misperception and miscalculation.” 
Likewise, at the 2012 S&ED, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry orients us to not ignore 
differences, but come to see how the S&ED allows the two sides to confront them. In 
doing so, the S&ED promotes common ground through communication. He explains: 
“my friends, while this dialogue is about cooperating on our shared interests…it is also 
about addressing our differences, speaking candidly about them, and trying to find ways 
to manage them. We will never agree on everything.” According to Secretary Kerry, at 
the S&ED we should expect differences to emerge in part because that is what the 
S&ED provides a forum for doing. He shares how “we will have candid conversation on 
those issues where we don’t see eye-to-eye, because that is absolutely the best way to 
constructively manage our differences and increase understanding.” Thus, the S&ED is 
the solution to managing differences to which Secretary Kerry concludes, “So the 
importance of this dialogue really couldn’t be clearer. I’m confident that the next two 
days are going to be productive and that we will be able to build on what tis dialogue has 
achieved in the last four years.” 
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 While the search for common ground and the belief in dialogue in addressing 
differences provides a more optimistic reason for the belief in the S&ED, a final 
argument made for remaining committed to the dialogue mechanism comes from 
considering the alternative, that of conflict. As Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang at the 
2015 S&ED explains, despite “On some issues, perhaps, consensus still eludes us. 
However, talking to each other could help pave the way to finding a solution, or at least 
help keep our differences under control.” He argues that this approach, despite its flaws 
is still better than the alternative. Wang Yang states, “Although dialogue may fall short 
of expectation, and sometimes nothing much is achieved, leaving everybody unhappy, 
yet it would always be more preferable than confrontation.” Wang continues to make 
this point at the 2015 S&ED, recognizing that dialogue doesn’t succeed all the time, 
stating: 
“Talking to each other does not create win-win all the time, but both sides will 
lose in a case of confrontation. Our dialogue mechanism may not be perfect, but 
it is an indispensable platform for the two countries to increase mutual trust, 
deepen cooperation, and manage differences.” 
Vice President Biden likewise recognizes that conflict is inevitable in 
international politics at the 2015 S&ED. He explains that “There will be intense 
competition. We will have intense disagreements. That’s the nature of international 
relations…there are important issues where we don’t see eye to eye.” However, in 
recognizing these differences, he argues that “it doesn’t mean we should stop working 
hand in hand because we don’t see eye to eye” and instead calls for the building of 
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personal relations. He explains “I believe that all politics, especially international 
politics, is personal. It’s all personal. And – because only by building a personal 
relationship – that’s the only vehicle by which you can build trust.” Biden remains 
realistic in his expectations, stating that in developing these personal ties, it “Doesn’t 
mean you have to even like the other person, but it has to be a personal relationship 
where you understand what the other guy needs, the other woman needs, and what you 
need, and work through it. That’s the only way to build trust.” 
 Thus, both U.S. and Chinese officials from the economic and strategic track 
reframe the shortcomings of their meetings as a justification for continued cooperation. 
Instead of highlighting these differences as areas where the two need to more seriously 
work on and compromise their positions, officials instead decide to naturalize the 
differences as inevitable given their different political desires, avert attention to the 
positive areas where they have reached agreement, and argue that there is no other 
alternative than to pursue positive relations by avoiding these contentious issues. 
Conclusion 
 The examples provided above demonstrate a clear consensus by which both 
parties at the S&ED describe its primary purpose as pursuing their presidents’ desire for 
“positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relations for the 21st century.” This directive 
in turn functions as the S&ED’s primary institutional logic, guiding the behavior of its 
members, as well as providing the values upon which the two socialize each other. Part 
of this socialization process occurs as U.S. and Chinese officials argumentatively 
legitimate the S&ED’s purpose as serving a unique function in helping address the 
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complicated issues that come to define 21st century geopolitical relations. These 
overlapping problems require that the two parties engage in dialogue, enhance 
communication and coordination, seek out greater common ground, and translate those 
common interests into tangible outcomes.  
 In the process of doing so, in their addresses the special representatives 
consistently engage in formulating rhetorical narratives making sense of their work 
through the S&ED, clear arguments justifying the S&ED’s need, and epideictically 
creating a common world view that forms the basis for their collaboration. From an 
institutional theory standpoint, the special representatives’ rhetorical messages, while 
drawing upon the larger discourse of cooperation embedded in the S&ED, nonetheless 
are active rhetorical agents feeling the need to state the case as to what the S&ED is 
about and why it is succeeding. From their messages, the S&ED’s success comes to be 
defined in part with its ability to create tangible outcomes, thus implicating future 
S&EDs to produce a greater number of outcomes, and failure to do so risks undermining 
the S&ED’s legitimacy. Thus, taken together with the S&ED’s institutional logic 
describing its purpose as developing “positive, cooperative, and comprehensive 
relations” the members of the S&ED are faced with finding ever increasing areas to 
work together on. As Figure 2 shows, they have been extremely successful in enlarging 
these areas of cooperative relations, with outcomes increasing nearly every year and the 
range of issues continuing to expand. However, by pursuing “positive” relations, the 
S&ED becomes a conflict-avoidant forum. Conflict on sensitive issues is assumed to be 
expected, and in turn deemphasizes its importance by stressing new areas where the two 
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might begin to cooperate. While the U.S. brings up issues such as human rights, with 
China’s leadership bringing up the issues like U.S. arms sale to Taiwan, and joint 
discussions regarding cyber security and activity in the South China Sea, major 
breakthroughs on how the two come to view these issues, like Kissinger (2011) calls for, 
take back seat to producing more and more outcomes and dialogues. 
Figure 2. Outcomes of the Strategic Track Discussions 
 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Addressing Regional 
and Global 
Challenges
- 2 3 15 14 16 17
Enhancing U.S.-China Bilateral 
Cooperation
8 11 9
Bilateral Dialogues and Consultations 11 16 15
Promoting High-Level Exchanges - 1 1
Cooperation on Climate Change and 
Energy
17 32 30 28
Cooperation on Environmental Protection 8 7 14 12
Cooperation on Science, Technology, and 
Agriculture
- - 6 8 6
Cooperation on Health - - - 5 7 6
Bilateral Dialogues on Energy, 
Environment, Science, and Technology  
- - - 13 21 17 11
Sub-National Cooperation - - - 5 6 4 4
Maritime Cooperation - - - - - 12 7
Cooperation on Transportation - - - - - - 5
Documents to be Signed and/or Renewed 5 4 - - - - -
Breakout Sessions and Other Meetings - - 1 - - - -
Total 26 47 50 91 116 127 120
Year
Cooperation Other: 
(Later Period)
Other (Early Period) 
14
222221
21
13
22
2
Bilateral Cooperation
Cooperation on 
Climate Change, 
Energy, Environment, 
Science, Health, and 
Technology
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With regards to IR theories of socialization, the analysis in this chapter 
demonstrates the dynamic communicative means by which the two sides discuss and 
internalize the values which they desire will define not only how the U.S.-China 
relationship as a whole will unfold by, but also the individual values and patterns by 
which they discuss them. From Johnston’s (2008) perspective on socialization, 
specifically his description on “persuasion” as the internalization of new ideas by which 
individual or group’s argue for the rightness of a particular norm or value, the officials’ rhetoric 
at the S&ED, specifically their convergence on the recurrent problem-solution definition, 
demonstrates the S&ED’s effectiveness on socializing the two countries’ officials. The 
inclusion of the two countries’ presidents as well as high-level diplomats engaged in the 
S&ED helps provide the ethos needed to support their constant and consistent problem-
solution definition and behavioral, value descriptions through which positive relations 
will become the norm. The S&ED appears successful in normalizing this type of 
cooperative interaction as not only do we see a convergence in the language used to 
define it, but also as individual members from both sides claim to hold personal trust or 
belief in the S&ED’s ability to do so. Thus, we see both sides converge and consistently 
explain the principles of the S&ED, the problems and solutions it is designed to solve, 
confirm its success, and naturalize any disagreements as part of the dialogue process. 
Their shared and repeated statements demonstrate that the S&ED has taken on at least a 
semi-institutionalized status by habitualizing the process of dialogue as a means to solve 
the issues unique to 21st century geopolitics, objectifying that arrangement through 
consensus that the S&ED solves those problems, and demonstrating the sedimentation of 
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that arrangement as an appropriate response by specifically labeling it as so as well as 
tying previous successful S&EDs and specific agreements as worth emulating, thus 
providing a normative basis regarding appropriate bilateral relations. While there is 
much continuity in the institutional rhetoric of the S&ED, as the next section will show 
there is significant shifts as new problems or issues arise to which the S&ED must adapt. 
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CHAPTER V  
SHIFTS IN THE INSTUTIONAL RHETORIC 
 
In chapter four, I showcased the continuity of the Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue, arguing that its principle institutional logic of seeking “positive, cooperative, 
and comprehensive relations for the 21st century” helped institutionalize cooperative 
patterns of behavior amongst U.S. and Chinese officials. However, institutions are not 
static, nor are institutional logics decided within a vacuum. Indeed, as new problems 
arise from an institutions environment, organizations must meet these new challenges 
and adapt to them by offering new solutions. Thus, in this chapter I turn to the changes 
and ruptures present in the institutional rhetoric of the S&ED. 
As Acharya (2004) argued, the IR literature on socialization problematically 
tends to focus on hard cases of moral transformation in which “good” global norms 
prevail over “bad” local beliefs and practices. This “moral cosmopolitanism” or 
“proselytism” ignores positively held local or regional norms. The U.S.’s rhetoric is 
definitely somewhat guilty of this during discussions with Chinese officials at the 
S&ED, specifically on economic issues and human rights, and the Chinese make sure to 
introduce their own norms, or standards of international behavior. However, instead of 
viewing either of these as “right” or “wrong,” or viewing this norm diffusion from 
Acharya’s (2004) perspective, which would lead us to examine only how Chinese or 
U.S. actors frame these values in ways intelligible to their own internal audiences, we 
can instead better understand how these values are wielded strategically to form a shared 
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definition of appropriate U.S.-China behavior arising. In doing so, it showcases how 
context-specific, bilateral norms can form and change as both countries come to agree 
upon what issues are most pressing and what solutions to pursue.  
In the case of the S&ED, during its eight years of existence the focus on what 
problems to address as well as new linguistic formulations designed to meet these 
challenges arise. Reflective of these changes are shifts in the institutional rhetoric during 
the addresses at the S&EDs. Thus, in this chapter I first continue my argument on the 
primary role rhetoric plays within institutional theory’s conceptualization of institutional 
change, but also make a second argument that the socialization process of countries is a 
flexible one where these norms are continually affirmed, but also transformed to meet 
new challenges. Reflective of these shifts are changes in the rhetorical emphasis and 
description of the issues the S&ED is supposed to address. While much of the 
“diplomatic speech” evident in the previous chapter crops up again in this one, almost to 
the point of banal repetition, it nonetheless provides the discursive resources and values 
upon which officials at the S&ED are able to reframe the nature of their relationship. 
Institutional theory can help explain how these shifts affect the ways in which the S&ED 
continues to socialize U.S. and Chinese officials as well as offering a means by which 
they can pivot the issues they attempt to tackle through its conceptualization of 
institutional entrepreneurship and institutional work. 
In this case, we see further evidence of the S&ED’s effectiveness in creating 
more mature and cooperative relations between the U.S. and China as these shifts occur. 
Drawing upon the concepts of institutional entrepreneurship as well as institutional work 
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helps explicate the changes in the rhetoric of the S&ED as the dialogue mechanism 
matures and faces new problems arising from deepening of relations as well as changes 
in the external environment and problems defining U.S.-China relations. These changes 
arguably occur in three phases: first, a honeymoon phase praising the successful 
cooperation between the two countries in addressing the challenges posed by the 
2008/2009 financial crisis and a continued affirmation of the S&ED’s pursuit of positive, 
cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-China relations; second, a shift away from labeling 
the S&ED interactions from “positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relations” to a 
“new model of major country relations” as well as a focus on combating distrust; finally, 
maturation and reflection phase of S&ED. Thus, in this chapter I ask the following 
research question: 
RQ1: What shifts are present in the S&ED’s dominant institutional logic to which both 
sides conform and legitimate their activities? 
Institutional Entrepreneurs and Work 
Institutional entrepreneurs can be individuals, organizations, professions, or 
networks (Hardy & Maguire, 2008). These actors or groups create institutional change 
by first, dislodging existing practices, second, introducing new ones, and finally ensuring 
that the new practices become widely adopted and eventually taken for granted thereby 
re-institutionalizing the new institutional logics. Rhetoric plays a primary role in this 
process. As Battilana, Leca, and Boxenbaum (2009) argue, institutional entrepreneurs 
create rhetorical arguments that embody institutional logics and align themselves with 
the “the values and interests of potential allies” (p. 82) while Seo and Creed (2002) 
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identify “institutional contradictions and human praxis as the key mechanism linking 
institutional embeddedness and institutional change” (p. 223). Finally, as Lammers and 
Garcia (HB) note, the notion of institutional entrepreneurship helps explain embedded 
agency while balancing how actors can change institutions despite institutions limiting 
their actions and rationality.  
While institutional entrepreneurship helps understand how and why institutions 
change, an alternative perspective is that of institutional work. Institutional work 
suggests that institutions are constructed, reconstructed, and changed in an ongoing way 
rather than just in times of flux and through more individualized rhetors. For instance, 
Lawrence and Suddaby (2009) critique the institutional entrepreneurship perspective by 
stating that it oversimplifies “the rational and ‘heroic’ dimension…while ignoring the 
fact that all actors, even entrepreneurs, are embedded in an situationally defined context” 
(p. 5). Thus, the idea of institutional work accounts for the “awareness, skill, and 
reflexivity of individual and collective actors” (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006, p. 219). 
As Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca (2009) state, “institutional work highlights the more 
reflexive forms of action that are aimed at intentionally affecting institutions” (p. 191). 
The creation and dissemination of texts, narratives, definitions and other forms of 
discourse can also be seen as institutional work as actors engage in defining or 
constructing “rule systems that confer status or identity, define boundaries of 
membership or create status hierarchies within a filed” (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006, p. 
222). While institutional work is presented as an alternative to institutional 
entrepreneurship the two perspectives are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
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Institutional work can describe times of minor institutional change or support whereas in 
times of significant environmental upheaval or fissures within the institution institutional 
entrepreneurship might occur. 
While institutional entrepreneurs and institutional work describes the agents by 
which changes within an institutional logic are made, shifts within an institution’s 
environment also provides a resource in which this process is made more likely. Shifts in 
external environments have been found to be particularly conducive to changes in 
institutional logics as this opens up the possibility for new logics to emerge. These 
changes in institutional logics are primarily accomplished through rhetoric, whereby 
institutional entrepreneurs and/or organizational members through their institutional 
work help to symbolically define policy problems, suggest solutions, and demonstrate 
the legitimacy of new organizational processes as effectively handling challenges to the 
institution arising from their environment. In the case of the S&ED, external 
environmental considerations, such as the 2009 financial crisis and Obama’s taking 
office in 2009, and later Xi Jinping’s ascension to the Chinese presidency creates the 
situational elements supporting a major redefining of how the two countries were to 
interact. Theorizing the S&ED as an institution through which the U.S. and China 
engage in dialogue over issues of mutual concern helps us to understand the mechanisms 
by which the two countries (un)successfully socialize each other by defining the 
common problems and solutions to U.S.-China relations.  
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Potentiality of Cooperation: The S&ED’s Cautious Honeymoon Phase 
The officials’ rhetoric surrounding the 2009-2012 S&EDs is largely positive, but 
cautionary, focusing on the constitutive elements defining what the S&ED is, the 
potential for U.S.-China cooperation on economic coordination combatting the financial 
crisis, and less security related issues such as environmental cooperation to combat 
climate change, people-to-people exchanges, and nuclear nonproliferation. The focus is 
almost entirely on the how the two countries can and do successfully cooperate in the 
pursuit of “positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relations for the 21st century.” This 
guiding institutional logic is repeatedly cited by all four of the special representatives 
leading the economic and strategic track discussions, within their jointly signed 
documents in 2009 and 2010, and a continued, albeit declining referencing in 2011 and 
2012. The explicit reference to this logic is made most repeatedly in these first two 
years, with each official referencing the principle at least two times each in their opening 
and closing statements. While the two sides acknowledge that there are differences in 
perspectives, they do so obliquely without citing major conflicts between the two 
countries. In addition to consistent referencing of “positive, cooperative, and 
comprehensive relations,” the major economic and security topics revolve around issues 
the two countries can naturally agree are important to both countries. 
Economic Track Coordination 
With regards to economic issues, the focus during this stage is on policy 
coordination to combat the global financial crisis and the two countries apparent success 
in doing so. This success is used in turn to symbolize a change in U.S.-China relations, 
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affirming the S&ED and the work done by the two countries’ officials, as well as 
recognizing areas where both countries need to reform their domestic economies. For 
instance, at the 2009 S&ED, U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner argues, “Our 
joint response to the global financial crisis marks a turning point in our cooperation with 
China on global challenges.” His statement presumes that previously the two countries 
would not have been able to agree and cooperate on international issues. He continues to 
make his point, citing how “The actions taken by the United States and China made a 
substantial contribution to our collective success in blunting the force of the crisis and 
restoring confidence,” thus crediting their actions as effective and highlighting the limits 
of either country to individually address these challenges. Finally, he states how “And 
both countries have made clear our commitment to maintain strong policy response until 
the recovery is firmly in place. At this moment of crisis, we acted together.”  
This last statement highlights the extent to which the two countries have 
identified with each other, or from a Burkean perspective, become “consubstantial.” 
According to Burke (1950) identification occurs when two actors view their interests as 
joined, forming one individual locus of motives and thus become consubstantial. This 
consubstantiality allows the two to act together by having the same concepts, images, 
ideas and attitudes, providing a powerful persuasive force on how to act together. The 
severity of the 2009 financial crisis creates the backdrop upon which the two countries 
share common concerns, and as the figure below shows, following the 2009 S&ED the 
number of economic track outcomes during this period begins to take off. 
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Table 1. Economic Track Outcomes (Honeymoon period) 
 
Subject Area 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Strengthening Economic Policy Cooperation 3 11 8 6 
Promoting Open Trade and Investment 6 11 13 18 
Fostering Financial Stability and Reform 4 6 10 9 
Enhancing Global Cooperation and International Rules 6 5 - 6 
Strengthening the U.S.-China Economic Relationship 
through the S&ED 
- - - 3 
Total 19 33 31 42 
 
 The failure of international financial institutions in combatting the global 
financial crisis provided an opening for both countries to advance their interests 
regarding the support of international institutions. As the table above shows, the number 
of agreements regarding fostering financial stability and reform increased from 2009, 
2010, and 2011 with four, six, and ten outcomes in this category reported. For the U.S., 
it has been imperative that the Chinese leadership supports the current international 
architecture, while the Chinese believe their recent economic growth demands it gains a 
greater voice within these institutions. Both countries are able to achieve their goals, as 
the 2009 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Economic Track Joint Fact Sheet 
demonstrates. The Fact Sheet states that the two countries recognize that “The 
international financial institutions (IFIs) play an important role in ensuring sustainable 
global growth,” and the U.S. receives a commitment from the Chinese leadership that 
“the United States and China agree that to strengthen the effectiveness and legitimacy of 
the IFIs we must enhance their governance and ensure it fully reflects changes in the 
world economy.” Thus, China also receives a commitment from the U.S. to reform the 
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institutions, and “In this regard, emerging and developing economies, including China, 
should have greater voice and representation.” 
 The 2009 Joint Economic Fact Sheet continues to explain the rationale for these 
changes in governance structure, highlighting the common goal the two nations share, 
and thus detailing what actions should be taken. For instance, both countries make clear 
their willingness to work together to reform these institutions, with the Joint Fact Sheet 
reading that “The United States and China agree to work together to reform international 
financial institutions.” The reason for doing so, is “in order to ensure they are responsive 
to the needs of developing countries, and strengthen their capacity to prevent and 
respond to future crises.” And the means, is “through improving their governance 
structure, enhancing their financial capacity and strengthening policy surveillance in the 
IMF's areas of core competency.” Therefore, the U.S.’s interests are served in that China 
is not only committed to the international financial architecture, but that also these 
institutions are to become stronger, while China, through its commitment to these 
institutions acquires a larger voice within these institutions. 
 The financial crisis also provides a warrant by which both countries are able to 
define their expectations regarding how each country can strengthen their respective 
domestic economies. In this sense, cooperation between the two countries through the 
S&ED showcases how the forum grants voice to both countries, and thus not just a one-
way socializing force of U.S. economic values to China, but also Chinese values, such as 
savings, to the United States. This occurs during both Treasury Secretary Geithner’s 
statement at the 2009 S&ED and Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan’s. In their 
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addresses Geithner and Wang Qishan review areas where both the U.S. and China need 
to reform. On the U.S. side, they state action needs to be taken to increase savings and 
reduce debt whereas the Chinese need to spur consumption and reform their financial 
sector. These two actions complement each other and help prevent further economic and 
trade imbalances between the two nations. Importantly, the identification on both sides 
needing to reform these areas showcases how they share responsibility in this 
imbalanced trade relations while also signifying the interconnectivity of their economies. 
 The 2009 Joint Economic Track Fact Sheet also makes it clear that both sides are 
responsible for reforming their economies in ways that promote greater stability in U.S.-
China economic relations as well as global stability. For instance, the Fact Sheet reads 
that “The United States will pursue comprehensive reform of financial regulation and 
supervision to create a more stable financial system and to help prevent and contain 
potential future crises.” The specific means by which the U.S. needs to do so include: 
“Regulation and supervision will be strengthened to ensure that all financial 
firms that pose a significant risk to the financial system will be well regulated, 
major financial markets will be strong enough to withstand system-wide stress 
and the failure of large institutions, and the government has the tools it needs to 
respond rapidly and effectively when problems arise.” 
For the Chinese, they must “deepen its financial system reform and promote more 
efficient financial intermediation in support of domestic demand.” And some of the 
specific policies which China will do so is to: “promote interest rate liberalization and 
consumer finance; accelerate the allocation of QFII quotas to $30 billion; continue to 
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allow foreign-invested banks… to enjoy the same rights as domestic banks with regard 
to underwriting bonds in the inter-bank market.” Thus, while China may need to reform 
its economy, the U.S. also has its own problems and shoulders considerable 
responsibility for the financial crisis.  
 The success of the two countries in combatting the global financial crisis 
continues to play into their praising of the S&ED. It becomes a symbol the two sides call 
upon for continuing their momentum in cooperating on economic issues. For instance, 
Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan in 2010 states that, “the first round of the S&ED 
was successfully held in Washington, D.C. last year.” This success is attributed to the 
two sides “joint response to the international financial crisis, and promoting world 
economic recovery” and thus “played a positive role in enhancing our cooperation in 
various fields.” Likewise, U.S. Secretaries Geithner and Clinton comment that the 2010 
S&ED enjoyed the announcement of “some very positive findings and commitments of 
moving forward on our economic recovery efforts.” These efforts coalesce in both 
nations working towards promoting “sustainable, and balanced growth of the global 
economy.” Finally, as Vice Premier Wang Qishan in 2010 explains, by discussing the 
wide range of economic issues the two share in common and through their cooperation 
on international institutions, “This will enable us to further our cooperation to solidify 
the positive trends of our two economics, and promote strong, sustainable, and balanced 
growth of the global economy.” 
From these statements, the focus of the economic track rhetoric during this stage 
is the promotion of balanced and sustainable growth. These elements are directed 
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towards the global economy, which was in jeopardy given the fallout of the financial 
crisis due to its imbalanced and unsustainable economic policies. The economies of both 
countries were mutually threatened, requiring joint action, and was positively dealt with 
showcasing the S&ED’s effectiveness in bringing officials from both sides together. 
Strategic Track 
Like the discussion within the economic track, the strategic track dialogue also 
dealt with a common concern facing the U.S. and China, that of global climate change, 
and to a lesser extent nuclear proliferation within Iran and North Korea. Absent from 
their discussions are larger security policies that might breed uncertainty or even distrust 
from the two sides. When diverging viewpoints emerge specific issues in which this 
might be the case are not described in detail, rather they are more abstractly dealt with 
and used to justify greater adherence to the values of the S&ED. 
Climate change in particular played an especially important role in the 2009 
S&ED as it was one of the major outcomes reached with the signing of a MOU on 
climate change. Again, the emphasis is on the S&ED’s success in enabling this 
agreement to be reached, which in turn is used to signify how the two countries can 
cooperatively work together. As Vice Premier Dai Bingguo at the 2009 S&ED explains, 
“Climate change, energy, and the environment are important subjects covered by the 
China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogues.” As such, Dai explains how because of 
the S&ED’s principles and values, this important topic was approached “In the spirit of 
deepening mutual understanding, expanding common consensus, developing cooperation 
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and pursuing mutual benefit” which led “the two delegations” through “many rounds of 
consultations and arriv[ing] at agreement on the MOU.” 
Their joint statement following the conclusion of the 2009 S&ED describes why 
the two countries are committed to working together on climate policy. It reads: 
“The United States and China, being the world’s largest producers and 
consumers of energy, face common challenges and share common interests in 
combating global climate change, developing clean and efficient energy, 
protecting the environment and ensuring energy security. The two sides commit 
to respond vigorously through ambition[ous] domestic action and recognize that 
cooperation between the United States and China is critical to address these 
challenges.” 
From the joint statement, the two sides, like in the economic track discussions, recognize 
both of their roles in contributing to this global problem, and jointly identify their 
common interests in dealing with it. However, unlike the economic track discussions, 
specific policies to be taken are not listed. Instead, the 2009 MOU functions to make 
tangible the values and commitment by which the two countries will begin to exchange 
ideas and solutions they might later on enact. However, as these ideas are exchanged 
through the first few S&ED meetings, the number of agreements or outcomes listed in 
relation to climate change and energy policies increase from two to 13 to 21 at the 2010, 
2011, and 2012 S&EDs respectfully, as the table below shows. 
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Table 2. Outcomes of the Strategic Track Discussions (Honeymoon phase) 
 
Year 
2010 2011 2012 
Addressing 
Regional and 
Global Challenges 
  - 2 3 
Bilateral 
Cooperation 
Enhancing U.S.-China Bilateral 
Cooperation 
8 11 9 
Bilateral Dialogues and Consultations 11 16 15 
Promoting High-Level Exchanges - 1 1 
Cooperation on 
Climate Change, 
Energy, 
Environment, 
Science, Health, 
and Technology 
Cooperation on Climate Change and 
Energy 
2 13 21 
Cooperation on Environmental 
Protection 
Cooperation on Science, Technology, 
and Agriculture 
- - 
Cooperation on Health - - - 
Bilateral Dialogues on Energy, 
Environment, Science, and Technology   
- - - 
Cooperation 
Other: (Later 
Period) 
Sub-National Cooperation - - - 
Maritime Cooperation - - - 
Cooperation on Transportation - - - 
Other (Early 
Period)  
Documents to be Signed and/or 
Renewed 
5 4 - 
Breakout Sessions and Other Meetings - - 1 
Total   26 47 50 
 
 
 The table above listing the outcomes of the strategic track S&ED during this 
phase and the categorization of its outcomes reflect the strategic track’s emphasis on less 
security related matters and more so on environmental concerns, as well as the desire to 
increase coordination between the two through consultations and exchanges. Many of 
the specific outcomes reached call for continued cooperation, greater communication, or 
affirmation from both countries regarding the importance certain issues. However, while 
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progress looks to be being made, the actual specifics of those policies have yet to be 
materialized. For instance, taking a closer look at the 2010 Strategic Track Outcomes we 
see the majority of them coming from an agreement to “hold” new forums for 
discussion, not specific agreements on policy issues, as the table below listing the 
specific outcomes of the 2010 Strategic Track shows. 
Table 3. 2010 Strategic Track Outcomes (Truncated) 
1. Signed the Memorandum of Further Cooperation on Nuclear Safety 
2. Signed the U.S.-China Shale Gas Resource Task Force Work Plan 
3. Signed the Memorandum of Understanding on Implementation of the Framework for 
EcoPartnerships 
4. Signed the Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Bilateral Cooperation on Supply 
Chain Security and Facilitation. 
5. Renewed the Memorandum of Understanding for the Collaborative Program on Emerging 
and Re-emerging Infectious Diseases 
6. Welcome the progress made on implementing the U.S.-China Memorandum of 
Understanding to Enhance Cooperation on Climate Change, Energy, and Environment and the 
Ten Year Framework on Energy and Environment Cooperation, 
7. Under the Ten Year Framework on Energy and Environment Cooperation, are to continue 
their efforts to carry out specific cooperation in six priority areas: clean water, clean air, clean 
and efficient electricity, clean and efficient transportation, nature reserves and wetlands 
protection, and energy efficiency; 
8. Held the sixth meeting of the Ten Year Framework Joint Working Group before the second 
round of the S&ED, and are to hold the first U.S.-China Energy Efficiency Forum after the 
second round of the S&ED. 
9. Held a working meeting of the Clean Energy Research Center on May 25. 
10. Are to hold the Electric Vehicles Forum, the Fifth U.S.-China Energy Policy Dialogue, 
and the Tenth U.S.-China Oil and Gas Industry Forum in the second half of 2010; and 
reaffirmed the role of the Oil and Gas Industry Forum in promoting shale gas development in 
both countries. 
11. Are to hold the first ever U.S.-China Renewable Energy Forum, and Advanced Bio-fuels 
Forum on May 26 and 27, and start work on the U.S.-China Renewable Energy Partnership. 
12. Announced U.S. Trade and Development Agency grants to support cooperation between 
U.S. and Chinese enterprises and institutions on combined heat and power, aviation bio-fuels, 
and smart grid standards. 
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Table 3 Continued 
13. Reiterated that they are to strengthen AP1000 cooperation; promote cooperation on the 
nuclear safety technology and the intellectual property protection issue and following the 
U.S.-China nuclear technology transfer practice. 
14. Issued the U.S.-China Joint Statement on Energy Security Cooperation 
15. Are to enhance cooperation on preventing and combating illegal trafficking of nuclear and 
other related radioactive materials. 
16. Are to hold the third U.S.-China Bilateral Forum on Combating Illegal Logging and 
Associated Trade within this year. 
17. Are to continue working toward a successful construction of a Chinese garden at the 
National Arboretum in Washington, DC. 
18. Are to continue dialogue on human rights on the basis of equality and mutual respect; 
19. Are to cooperate to fight corruption, including bribery of public officials 
20. Are to hold the Eighth U.S.-China Counterterrorism Consultation within this year. 
21. Are to hold a new round of dialogues on security, arms control, and nonproliferation prior 
to next year's S&ED. 
22. Pledged to hold a new round of sub-dialogues on regional and international challenges: 
Policy-Planning, Africa, Latin America, East Asia, Middle East, South Asia, and Central Asia. 
23. Are to conduct dialogue and cooperation on UN peacekeeping operations including their 
reform. 
24. Announced that the U.S. Coast Guard and the Rescue and Salvage Bureau of the Ministry 
of Transport of the People's Republic of China will organize maritime search and rescue 
exchange and training programs in China. 
25. Talked broadly about development issues, and agreed to enhance communication and 
dialogue on these issues. 
26. Reaffirmed their support for the Copenhagen Accord; Reaffirmed their commitment to 
the November 2009 Memorandum of Cooperation to Build Capacity to Address Climate 
Change 
 
Nonetheless, more “strategic” oriented policies emerge in the addressing regional 
and global challenges category where the 2011 Joint Track Strategic Outcomes lists the 
two sides exchanging views and working together to promote stability in Afghanistan as 
well as North Korea and Iran’s nuclear program. At the 2010 S&ED, Secretary Hillary 
Clinton explains the strategic issues the two countries are discussing. She states that: 
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 “Now, beyond these two [Iran and North Korea’s nuclear programs] pressing 
challenges there are other shared security concerns that I look forward to 
discussing, including the fight against violent extremism in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, counter-piracy efforts, and deeper military-to-military cooperation.” 
She also lists less controversial issues such as climate and energy cooperation, 
education, health and development, women’s issues, and economic cooperation, thus 
emphasizing how these nonmilitary operations are still “strategic” considerations. 
Finally, few instances of differences are noted in the 2009, 2010, and 2011 
S&ED with the 2010 S&ED possessing more discussion on the possibility of diverging 
views. In doing so, the officials appear more cautionary regarding how these differences 
are to be addressed. The Chinese side in particular argues for greater respect to be given 
regarding their current level of development and different socio-cultural and political 
history. Nonetheless, the problems facing the two countries is recognized as needing 
commitment from both parties, and their statements showcase some optimism that the 
S&ED’s principles came help the two sides cooperate. 
For instance, in 2009, Secretary Clinton is the only one to even mention the 
possibility of difference, where she notes: “Now, our discussions in these few days are 
unlikely to solve the shared challenges we face.” However, she maintains faith in the 
S&ED, stating how it “can and should provide a framework for delivering real results to 
our people. We will not agree on every issue. But we will discuss them openly, as 
between friends and partners.” 
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 Chinese President Hu Jintao at the 2010 S&ED draws upon the S&ED’s dialogic 
values, but does so as a means to justify greater consideration to Chinese differences in 
viewpoints. In his address, he outlines the reasons for these differences without directly 
explaining what issues the two sides disagree on. Hu explains that: “admittedly, China 
and the United States differ in national condition, and it is only natural that the two sides 
may disagree on some issues.” From this he argues that, “What is important is to respect 
and accommodate each other’s core interests and major concerns, appropriately handle 
the sensitive issues and strengthen the foundation of mutual trust.” Chinese State 
Councilor Dai Bingguo reiterates these thoughts in his 2010 address but also affirms the 
cooperative relations the S&ED is meant to promote, specifically as the problems facing 
countries today requires joint efforts in addressing them: 
“We are faced in such a world with a rising multitude of global issues, with 
common challenges that no individual country or handful of countries can tackle 
alone. And with significant and thorny issues concerning the sustainable 
development of mankind, regardless of a difference in social systems and cultural 
traditions and (inaudible), no country—no major country in particular should 
(inaudible) things that have become outdated.” 
Finally, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton likewise notes that disagreement 
remains, cites two areas where this might be the case, and argues in support for the 
S&ED as a means to overcome these differences. She explains: 
“Now, as we have said many times, we do not agree on every issue. We don’t 
agree even sometimes on the perception of the issue. But that is partly what this 
 181 
 
dialogue is about. It is a place where we can discuss everything, as State 
Councilor Dai said, form Taiwan to universal human rights. And in the course of 
doing so, we are developing that positive, cooperative, and comprehensive 
understanding that leads to the relationship for the 21st century that both 
President Obama and President Hu Jintao put into motion when they agreed to do 
this dialogue.” 
 Taken together the first few years of the S&ED can be understood as a courting 
period where the two sides are beginning to address issues of clear mutual concern while 
avoiding more sensitive security related issues. The bulk of the rhetoric is epideictic in 
nature defining and anchoring the S&ED to the principles of positive, cooperative, and 
comprehensive relations, but also calling for greater adherence to these values. Turning 
to the specific issues discussed, in the economic track the focus is on continued 
coordination to stimulate, reform, and strengthen financial policies and institutions to 
further global economic growth with greater specifics as to what actions each side 
should take. On the security side, the focus is on climate and energy cooperation, setting 
up more fora to discuss and explore areas of mutual interests, as well as dealing with 
issues such as counterterrorism, and to a lesser extent coordinating policy on and Iran 
and North Korea’s nuclear programs. Both economic and strategic track officials cite 
their presidents’ call for developing “positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relations 
for the 21st century,” thus demonstrating their shared commitment to the S&ED’s 
institutional logic, but also highlighting the key role of each country’s presidents in 
defining the S&ED.  
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Combatting Distrust and the “New Model of Major Country Relations” 
By 2013 the range of issues being discussed at the S&ED had skyrocketed and 
with them was an exponential increase in the number of outcomes reached. Whereas the 
2010 S&ED’s strategic track listed 26 outcomes, the 2011 included 47, the 2013 listed 
91, and the 2014 listed 116. Outcomes from the economic track were more stable, 
although also increased, as the table below shows. 
Table 4. Outcomes Listed in Strategic and Economic Track (2009-2016) 
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Strategic Track - 26 47 50 91 116 127 120 
Economic Track 19 33 31 42 63 59 54 70 
 
The 2013 S&ED also marked a significant transition in the officials involved. 
U.S. President Obama entered his second term in office and replaced both his Secretaries 
of State and Treasury. On the Chinese side, Chinese President Xi ascended to the 
presidency. He also replaced one of his special representatives as Vice Premier Yang 
Jiechi stepped in for the former Vice Premier Wang Qishan. President Obama and Xi 
also met in the U.S. in 2013 where they announced their commitment to building a “new 
model of major country relations.” This concept began replacing the overtly cited 
principle of “positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relations” cited by the special 
representatives. However, this change was slow to take hold from both sides and its 
specific implications on the S&ED remained relatively unclear. Indeed, both sides 
continued to label their interactions as positive and call for more comprehensive 
discussion of issues for the purpose of expanding areas of cooperation. However, the 
“new model” concept becomes more important within the discussion of strategic issues. 
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In this case, whereas the first phase of the S&ED avoided deeper levels of discussion 
regarding harder security topics, the second and third phase takes these up more 
seriously. Therefore, while the institutional logic of the S&ED appeared to remain the 
same despite the new neologism defining the U.S.-China relationship, the “new model” 
concept introduces a phrase to coordinate activities within the strategic track. 
 The need for developing a “new model of major country relations” reflects the 
more contentious rhetoric surrounding the strategic track issues whereas the economic 
track remains more positive, with greater agreement on what issues the two sides should 
tackle although these topics change from the previous stage. While the complexity and 
interconnected nature of problems facing the two countries continues to be cited as a 
reason for greater cooperation, a new problem emerges within strategic oriented 
discourse: that of combatting distrust. This problem emerges shortly after the S&ED’s 
strategic track begins including greater discussion on security related issues including 
military-to-military relations, the establishment of the Strategic Security Dialogue 
(SSD), and regional and global challenges. Indeed, the focus on greater security related 
issues can be seen from the jump in outcomes listed in the Addressing Regional and 
Global Challenges category of the S&ED’s strategic track discussions whereby the 
combined outcomes listed from 2010 to 2012 totaled only five with the outcomes in this 
area from 2013, 2014, and 2015 including 15, 14, and 16 outcomes respectively.  
 
 
Combatting Distrust 
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While the two sides continue to legitimize the S&ED and its successes, the 2013, 
2014, and also the 2015 S&EDs saw a shift in its rhetoric with the repeated need for 
avoiding strategic distrust, combatting caricatures portraying U.S.-China relations 
negatively, defining relations as a mix of competition and cooperation, and sharp areas 
of disagreement. For instance, during the 2013 S&ED, where U.S. Vice President Biden 
gave the opening address, he clearly warns against voices negatively describing U.S.-
China relations. He states, “There are strong voices on both sides of the Pacific that talk 
about a relationship in terms of mistrust and suspicion.” He argues against these 
“voices” noting how, “Our relationship is subject to all kinds of caricatures. I’ve heard 
the U.S.-China relationship described as everything from the next Cold War to the new 
G-2.” According to Biden, these false portrayals are both inaccurate and also too 
simplistic. He continues to state, “And the truth is neither are accurate. Neither are 
accurate. The truth is more complicated.”  
Vice President Biden then goes on to describe the “truer” nature of this complex 
relationship, arguing that it contains both cooperative and competitive elements which 
are not detrimental to U.S.-China relations, but a positive aspect. He states, “Our 
relationship is and will continue to be, God willing, a mix of competition and 
cooperation.” He continues to argue that this competitive element is both natural and 
supportive of cooperation, before defining how the two sides can harness these forces to 
develop common solutions. Biden naturalizes this competition, stating, “And 
competition can be good for both of us and cooperation is essential. For two nations as 
large and influential as ours, it’s only natural that there be competition.” He proceeds to 
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define competitive relations through the metaphor of a “game” explaining, “And if the 
game is fair and healthy, political and economic competition can then marshal the best 
energies of both our societies.” His exhortation regarding the “if the game is fair and 
healthy” burdens the two sides to act in manner conducive to cooperation. As he states, 
“But this mix places added-an added burden on both of us. The relationship-a 
relationship like ours will work only if the leaders and citizens approach it with a sense 
of vision and a spirit of maturity.” Finally, Biden again reiterates that differences remain, 
but suggests these differences are manageable if the two sides honestly discuss them: 
“We will have our disagreements. We have them now. But if we are straightforward, 
clear, and predictable with one another, we can find solutions that work for both of us.” 
In this sense, the S&ED, as the primary forum through which U.S. and Chinese officials 
come together to discuss issues of mutual concern remains the solution to addressing the 
competitive elements of U.S.-China relations. 
Outsider opinions doubting whether the U.S. and China are really able to 
cooperate is also mentioned in Vice Premier Wang Yang and Secretary of State John 
Kerry’s 2014 addresses. Wang explains how these critics overly focus on the differences 
that remain instead of how the S&ED helps overcome them. He states, “Now, many 
people, they follow very closely on the differences between China and the United 
States.” However, according to Wang, “they have failed to see so many commonalities 
we share on important issues. The S&ED is a vibrant -- it is the constructive interaction 
between two countries with a different culture, system, and point of views.” 
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Secretary Kerry in his 2014 address more specifically and directly refutes the 
concerns by those arguing that U.S.-China relations are necessarily conflictual. He starts 
by recognizing the critiques, stating:  
Now, I want to emphasize -- I mentioned this last night in our conversations at 
dinner -- when I read some of the commentary about the United States and 
China, when I listen to some of the so-called experts, and they talk to us about 
our relationship, too many of them suggest that somehow the United States is 
trying to contain China, or that things that we choose to do in this region are 
directed at China.” 
Kerry then attempts to refute this perspective by acknowledging that China’s rise has a 
place within the international community, albeit one that supports U.S. goals of China 
becoming a “responsible stakeholder,” before trying to separate U.S. policy as more 
tactical, not strategic; that is, not strategic in the sense that it is a long-term policy that 
views China’s rise as in conflict with the U.S. First, he states:  
“Let me emphasize to you today the United States does not seek to contain 
China. We welcome the emergence of a peaceful, stable, prosperous China that 
contributes to the stability and the development of the region, and that chooses to 
play a responsible role in world affairs.” 
Second, he explains that “We may differ on one issue or another. But when we make 
that difference, do not interpret it as an overall strategy. It is a difference of a particular 
choice.”  
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Secretary of State John Kerry goes into greater detail to stress the U.S.’s strategy 
towards China as cooperative, not confrontational. In doing so, he explicitly recognizes 
the problem two nations face, explaining “It is not lost on any of us that throughout 
history there has been a pattern of strategic rivalry between rising and established 
powers.” Despite this, he affirms that “But I will say to you today that President Obama, 
nor any of us who have come here to represent our country, believe that that kind of 
rivalry is inevitable. It is not inevitable.” Instead, he argues that the officials representing 
each side have agency in shaping these relations, which, by their very presence at the 
S&ED showcases the decision they made to work together. Kerry continues by 
explaining: 
“It is a choice. And so, being here this morning with Vice Premier Wang and 
State Councilor Yang, and with my counterpart, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and 
with our ambassador, former Senator Max Baucus, I can tell you that we are 
determined to choose the path of peace and prosperity and cooperation and, yes, 
even competition, but not conflict.  
Thus, following Vice President Biden’s argument that competition can be good for U.S.-
China relations, Kerry separates “competition” being “good” as distinct from “conflict” 
being “bad.”  
Finally, Secretary of State Kerry at the 2014 S&ED ties the historical threat to 
U.S.-China cooperation to their goal of building a “new model of major country 
relations” which can benefit both countries. Kerry explains, 
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“When the United States and China work with each other, we both stand to gain 
a great deal. And that’s why we are committed to a new model of relations, of 
great country relationship, a mutually beneficial relationship in which we 
cooperate in areas of common interest and constructively manage the 
differences.” 
The “new model” concept explicitly attempts to break the historical pathology of great 
power conflict as both countries are admitting they are “major powers.” Its emphasis is 
on the strategic orientations of both countries, or long-term grand strategy elements, 
rather than particular policies designed to addressed immediate, tactical concerns.  
This focus on competition continues to play an increasingly significant role as 
the two countries repeatedly note the importance of win-win cooperation and avoiding 
win-lose situations that typically define great power politics, to which the “new model of 
major country relations” plays an important role in combatting. Whereas the pursuit of 
“positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relations” focused on identifying areas of 
common concern where the two sides could begin to cooperate, the “new model” 
concept adds greater emphasis to both sides working to combat misunderstanding and 
suspicion. As State Councilor Yang Jiechi at the 2014 S&ED explains, “The mission of 
this round of dialogue [2014 S&ED] is focusing on the theme of creating a new model of 
major country relationship.” According to Yang Jiechi, enactment of this theme requires 
the two side to continue “to have (inaudible) straightforward discussions on a number of 
major strategic issues of common interest” like the S&ED’s previous goal of promoting 
positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relations, but also “to actively explore 
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converging interests, reduce misunderstanding and suspicion, and expand consensus and 
cooperation, and to facilitate as many outcomes as possible so as to provide positive 
energy and a new impetus to our bilateral relations.” Yang Jiechi again at the 2014 
S&ED explains the S&ED’s new purpose as serving “an important platform for the two 
sides to build strategic consensus, avoid strategic misjudgment, and expand strategic 
cooperation.” The repetition of the word “strategic” plays well into Biden’s metaphor of 
a “game” which the U.S. and Chinese both compete and cooperate in playing, but also 
highlights Lieberthal and Jisi’s (2012) warning that “strategic distrust,” or the belief that 
each country’s long term interests are not cooperative in nature, but more furtive, 
threatens to derail meaningful, positive relations. 
Finally, Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang at the 2014 S&ED lays out how 
S&ED contributes to the production of “win-win” solutions. He highlights the need of 
both countries to develop trust if they are going to work together, stating “I want to 
stress that understanding and mutual trust are important preconditions for the two major 
countries of China and the United States to achieve win-win cooperation.” Like the 
rhetoric during the previous phase of the S&ED, communication is key to developing 
this trust, as Wang notes “Dialogue and communication are important means for the two 
countries to maintain friendship.” 
Emerging Differences within the Strategic Track 
While both countries appear to remain firm in their pursuit of dialogue as a 
means to prevent conflict, the 2013 S&ED marks a significant shift in the overt sharing 
of differences between the two nations. The strategic track leaders through their 2013 
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closing statements demonstrate a more acrimonious, albeit manageable relationship. 
Two issues that arise that put the “positive” relationship in doubt are recent scandals 
over cyber security and Edward Snowden. 
 Standing in for Secretary Kerry, Deputy Secretary Burns, argues how this new 
issue, that of cyber security, poses a unique problem the two need to address given the 
U.S. view that the Chinese leadership are not acting on this issue within the framework 
of the S&ED’s values. Burn’s first explains how the two sides have not yet reached a 
consensus on how to treat cyber security issues, stating “Cyber security is a critical new 
area where we need to reach a shared understanding of the rules of the road.” The reason 
being that, like other complicated, global issues the U.S. and China faces, cyber security 
also ties the two countries together: “And the reality is clear: The technological ties that 
bind us together also introduce a new challenge to our bilateral relationship.” Breaking 
from previous patterns of the statements made by U.S. and Chinese officials, Burn 
publicly calls out the Chinese. He states, “During our engagement this week, we 
underscored that the cyber-enabled theft of trade secrets, intellectual property, and 
confidential business information is unacceptable.” He continues to call out the Chinese 
with their handling of Edward Snowden’s flight out of Hong Kong: 
 “Of course, U.S.-China relations remain a work in progress. Our interests can 
differ, and so can our approaches. When we encounter differences or sensitive 
issues, we need to address them directly in consultation with one another. And 
that is why we were very disappointed with how the authorities in Beijing and 
Hong Kong handled the Snowden case, which undermined our effort to build the 
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trust needed to manage difficult issues. Over the past two days, we made clear 
that China’s handling of this case was not consistent with the spirit of 
Sunnylands or with the type of relationship—the new model—that we both seek 
to build.” 
From his statement, he cites the goals of the S&ED, that of building trust as well as clear 
communication/consultation, in addition to directly stating that the Chinese actions were 
done, as viewed by the United States, as working against the “new model” of 
relationship the two presidents had publicly committed to pursuing, using this agreement 
as a normative basis upon which to criticize Chinese actions. He concludes by noting 
one more area of consternation between the two nations, that of human rights. Burn 
shares how, “During the course of the dialogue, we also expressed our ongoing concerns 
about human rights in China, particularly recent instability in Tibetan and Uighur areas 
of China.” Here is an instance where the U.S. is citing “good” universal values which the 
Chinese should adopt. Burn explains why the U.S. is bringing up the issue, stating “The 
goal of this conversation is to emphasize the importance of human rights to the bilateral 
relationship. We firmly believe that respect for universal rights and fundamental 
freedoms with make China more peaceful, more prosperous, and ultimately more 
secure.” Thus, while human rights is a topic dear to the U.S., Burn tries to frame it was 
helpful towards China’s interests and development. 
 The Chinese side makes sure to respond to these accusations at the 2013 S&ED. 
Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi provides a justification of China’s cyber activities 
and human rights. In doing so, he suggests that norms regarding cyber activities should 
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be dealt with through international institutions: “The Chinese side pointed out that China 
is a victim of hacking attacks. China’s view is that the relevant international cyber rules 
should be developed by the UN to help uphold cyber security in all countries.” Here the 
Chinese turn the U.S.’s typical desire for strengthening the international architecture of 
global institutions. This move is likely designed to constrain U.S. powers as its cyber 
capabilities are more sophisticated that China’s. 
Delving into the sensitive issues of human rights, State Councilor Yang Jiechi 
explains the differences the two countries hold as being one of the issues the S&ED is 
designed to overcome. He also provides the justification shared in previous S&ED 
meetings of China being in a different development stage compared to the U.S. as well 
as having different historical, cultural, and social systems that make complete agreement 
on issues like human rights difficult to compare. Yang Jiechi begins by affirming the 
values of the S&ED, stating, “The two sides praised the important role of the S&ED in 
expanding cooperation and managing differences between China and the United States.” 
He then justifies the differences in opinion on human rights as arising from their 
different historical experiences: “As two major countries different in history, culture, 
social system, and development stage, China and the United States naturally do not 
always see eye-to-eye on every issue.” Most strikingly, he follows up by affirming the 
unilateral actions China will take in continuing implementation of China’s development 
policies: “The Chinese people will firmly go down the path they have chosen, and the 
prospects of China will be brighter and brighter. China will remain committed to the 
path of socialism with Chinese characteristics.” Finally, Yang Jiechi returns to the 
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dialogic values of the S&ED whereby interlocutors should respect others’ point of view, 
affirming that “We believe that all countries, including China and the United States, 
need to have their governments respect basic norms governing international relations and 
respect the choices made by people in other countries.” In this sense, Yang Jiechi is 
drawing upon U.S. values, as well as the liberal-institutional order’s belief in the 
sovereignty of people and states to make their own policy decisions. From this exchange, 
the Chinese leadership proves capable at utilizing international values and norms as 
appeals to legitimacy for their policies, thus contesting attempts at one-way flows of 
socialization. 
 As State Councilor Yang Jiechi continues his defense of Chinese actions at the 
2013 S&ED, he showcases that China is not merely a recipient of socializing pressures, 
but also an agent. Yang Jiechi argues that when passing judgement on issues like human 
rights, the U.S. itself is open to criticism. Making sure not to contradict the Chinese 
position, Dai first argues that the U.S. should be “objective” when looking at human 
rights issues, but that the Chinese stand willing to work with the U.S. based on principles 
of “mutual respect” and “non-intervention” in their internal affairs. These principles 
reflect the Chinese values that defined its foreign policy behavior prior to the S&ED, 
values that stood in conflict with the U.S.’s desire to induce China to take a more active 
role on the international stage. As Yang Jiechi explains,  
“We hope the U.S. side will view China’s economic and social development in 
an objective way, and we hope the United States will improve its own human 
rights situation on the basis of mutual respect and no intervention in each other’s 
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internal affairs. We stand ready to continue our human rights dialogue with the 
United States.” 
Lastly, with regards to China’s handling of Edward Snowden, reaffirms China’s 
actions and expresses his hope that the issue will not significantly disrupt U.S.-China 
relations as they continue to work through the S&ED to pursue their countries’ 
respective presidents and their affirmation of building a “new model of major country 
relations.” State Councilor Yang Jiechi begins by again drawing upon previous U.S. 
values of Chinese respect for the Hong Kong government’s special sovereignty, stating: 
“With regard to the Snowden case, the central government of China has always 
respected the Hong Kong SAR government’s handling of cases in accordance with law, 
and its approach is beyond reproach.” He then expresses his hope that despite these 
differences, the U.S. and China can continue working together through the S&ED. Dai 
explains,  
“I believe China and the United States have sufficient wisdom to tap the potential 
of cooperation between the two sides. We hope and believe the two sides have 
wisdom to manage well our differences. Most importantly, we should stay firmly 
committed to the cause charted by our presidents, follow the principles of mutual 
respect and win-win cooperation, and advance the building of a new model of 
major country relationship.” 
The examples provided above from the 2013 S&ED provide a cautionary tale of 
how differences between the two nations can disrupt the convergence of “positive” 
relations. Putnam and Jones’ (1982) study on conflict patterns in negotiations found that 
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conflict is likely to escalate when attack-defend positions evolve to attack-attack or 
defend-defend positions, like we just saw in the examples above. In the case of the 
S&ED, these conflict spirals threaten to unravel its central principle, and legitimates 
outside concerns that conflict between the two countries is likely. From an 
organizational rhetoric perspective, the S&ED is caught in a paradox whereby it is meant 
to allow the two sides to air their differences, but if they do so they undermine the 
organization. Examining this example from the approach of state socialization and 
institutional theory, this conflict leads to the deinstitutionalization of the S&ED in that 
the Chinese officials begin citing more earnestly their previous principles of “non-
interference” and “mutual respect,” introducing diverging values upon which it becomes 
more difficult for the U.S. and China to cooperate. In doing so, the effect of State 
Councilor Yang Jiechi’s rhetoric can be understood as a socializing force whereby 
Chinese resistance to U.S. critiques leads to a more conflict avoidant use of the S&ED if 
U.S. officials are willing to forgo agreements in this area in order to achieve more 
cooperative relations on less sensitive issues. 
Thus, in the rhetoric regarding the strategic track issues, we still see a clear 
defining of how the countries should grapple with global security concerns, especially 
those related to conflicting areas of interest. However, the emergence of the “new model 
of major country relations,” although not necessarily supplanting the overarching logic 
of the S&ED’s “positive, cooperative and comprehensive relations,” provides a much 
clearer orientation on how those strategic issues should be addressed. And yet that 
principle has not been fully articulated, or at least internalized as overt disputes are 
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publicly aired. In addition to the change in purpose, the issues of strategic concern have 
changed. The strategic track’s focus began with issues like climate change and nuclear 
nonproliferation. By the later years there is a real commitment to beginning to 
incorporate military-to-military relations and discussions on maritime issues, as well as 
external flare ups on sensitive issues like human rights, territorial claims in the South 
China Sea, and cyber espionage.  
Economic Track 
Whereas the strategic track issues are contentious, the economic track remains 
positive, moving onto new areas where the two countries can deepen mutually beneficial 
reforms. Four years since the global financial crisis, the 2013 economic track rhetoric 
begins moving towards more specific investment and trade related issues. As such, the 
U.S. and Chinese officials shift from crisis driven issues to making the case as to how 
the S&ED has succeeded in producing benefits for each country’s domestic populace. 
Furthermore, whereas the financial crisis created the ground upon which the two sides 
were able to come together, by the 2014 S&ED that foundation shifted towards China’s 
new five-year economic plan to which the U.S. credited as helping strengthen China’s 
economy and enabled better economic relations between the two.  
For instance, reflecting on the previous four S&EDs, U.S. Secretary of Treasury 
Jack Lew in his 2013 address notes the progress the two countries have made on a 
variety of issues pertinent to U.S.-China economic cooperation before providing specific 
examples of where the two countries have succeeded. He notes that, “over the past four 
years, we’ve made significant advances in deepening and strengthening our economic 
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relationship with China.” Areas that he cites as evident of this strengthening are issues 
such as U.S. exports to China doubling, and thus helping address the imbalance in trade, 
the RMB exchange rate appreciating in a more competitive manner, and China’s current 
account surplus falling. All of these issues are particularly important to the U.S., given 
Congresses’ frequent criticisms of unfair Chinese trading practices supposedly making 
U.S. goods less competitive with China’s. Lew makes this especially clear stating, 
“While today’s commitments do not resolve all of the concerns of either side, they do 
represent real progress, progress that will create new opportunities for U.S. workers and 
companies in an expanding Chinese market.” 
 Vice Premier Wang Yang’s comments in 2013 reflect Lew’s as well as signaling 
China’s increasing commitment to support the international financial structure. After 
overviewing the pledges made by the U.S. to increase investment and savings as well as 
U.S. pledges to treat Chinese SOEs fairly, he explains that:  
 “The two sides pledged to strengthen coordination and cooperation within the 
framework of the G-20 and APEC, among others…[and] push forward the 
reform of international financial institutions, encourage multilateral development 
banks to raise lending capacity, and work for global economic recovery and 
growth.” 
Likewise in 2014, Wang Yang notes both sides are committed to “strengthen 
cooperation within the G20 framework and advance international financial governance 
reform.” He also lists specific economic areas the two sides agreed to work towards such 
as reforming the IMF quota, fossil fuel subsidies, the Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S. 
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foreign investment reviews, Export Control Reforms, evaluation and approval for LNG 
exports, shadow banking, OTC derivatives, cross-border oversight and accounting 
standards, and Foreign Account Tax Compliance. This long list of specific policy areas 
demonstrates that significant cooperation on global and bilateral economic and finance 
issues has been reached between the two, and the specificity of these actions showcases 
the deepening commitment  
 Secretary of Treasury Jack Lew in 2014 likewise overviews the specific 
commitments each country has made in pursuit of promoting sustainable, balanced 
global growth, this being the central theme to the economic track discussions during the 
first phase of S&ED meetings, but ties this not to the global financial crisis, but to 
China’s reform agenda reflected in its new five-year economic plan. Lew praises China’s 
reform plan, stating, “Consistent with your reform agenda, China committed to reducing 
intervention as conditions permit, and China is making preparations to adopt greater 
transparency, including on foreign exchange, which will accelerate the move to a more 
market-based exchange rate,” all issues the U.S. and China have in common given the 
U.S.’s push for a greater market based Chinese economy. Lew continues by explaining, 
“These commitments will assist China in its reforms and will help level the playing field. 
They also reflect the increasingly important role China plays in the global economy.” 
The inclusion and recognition of China’s reform agenda is also cited in the 2014 
Economic Track Joint Outcomes statement, stating, “The two countries further 
recognized that there is significant potential for continued progress in U.S.-China 
economic relations, especially as China fully implements the comprehensive economic 
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agenda announced at the Third Plenum of the 18th CPC Central Committee.” This 
progress will lead to “new impetus for economic cooperation between the two countries” 
because at the S&ED “participants discussed new strategies for practical cooperation and 
for continuing to deliver concrete progress that is to benefit the citizens of both 
countries, our neighbors, and the world.”  
 Thus, the rhetoric employed on the economic front provides a continuity in 
purpose in developing the deepening of bilateral cooperation to pursue global, 
sustainable development between the two countries and internationally, but shifts to 
more specific policy issues and continued reforms which allow for new avenues for 
cooperation. In this sense, it is only the topics that are discussed that have changed. 
Whereas the world was in a direr strait when grappling with the global financial crisis, 
years later that major challenge dissipated and led the two countries to productively 
address other important concerns in their economic relations.  
Reflection and Maturation 
From 2014-2016 the S&ED had consistently produced over 100 outcomes each 
year within the strategic track as well as experiencing a substantial increase in the 
number of plenary sessions held during each annual meeting. By the 2016 S&ED, 
officials were warmly touting the personal relationships they had created with their 
counterparts, and the 2016 S&ED marked the end of another era in U.S.-China elections, 
as President Obama, then having served in office during the entirety of the S&ED would 
be ending his presidency. With the increasing number of high-level coordination as well 
as grass roots ties between officials, business leaders, and the two countries’ populace 
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through numerous exchange programs, the number of issues and their specificity become 
increasingly pronounced. Likewise, the length of the officials addresses increase is size 
and specificity, both within the strategic and economic tracks. Whereas the strategic 
track had focused on lower hanging fruits for cooperation, such as climate change and 
nuclear nonproliferation, by the end of the 2016 S&ED there was substantive exchanges 
of military-to-military contacts and greater discussion on developments in the South 
China Sea and Asia Pacific. On the economic front, the first half of the S&ED meetings 
tended to focus on ensuring the health of the global economy whereas the second half 
enjoyed specific policy coordination on stepping up bilateral investment and trade as 
well as strong Chinese commitments to uphold and take greater part in the international 
financial architecture which continued into the final phase. Thus, the later years of the 
S&ED reflected a maturing of issues and past efforts to expand U.S.-China cooperation, 
to which the statements made by officials began to take a reflective tone of what they 
had accomplished. 
Reflecting and Affirming Cooperative Relations 
U.S. Vice President Joe Biden’s opening remarks at the 2015 S&ED best 
encapsulates the maturation of U.S.-China relations under the S&ED. His address draws 
upon the influential 2005 speech by Robert Zoellick who had called upon China to 
become a “responsible stakeholder” within the international community. Zoellick’s 
remarks at that time were particularly impactful because they demanded that China take 
an active role in maintaining the neoliberal international architecture, to which many 
chastised the Chinese leadership as shirking their duties as an emergent global power. 
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This rhetoric of a “responsible stakeholder” was adopted by U.S. officials as well as 
academics primarily in criticizing China’s lack of participation. However, Vice President 
Biden uses the term to showcase and praise where U.S.-China relations have come, 
expressing his recognition and gratitude of China’s engagement demonstrated through 
the outcomes of the S&ED. He starts by citing Xi Jinping:  
“Four years ago in Beijing, then-Vice President Xi observed, “If one is to have a 
full view of the scenery, one needs to cast his eyes to the far horizon.” Well, 
that’s what we need to be doing here today – cast our eyes to the far horizon. 
And we need to be honest and direct about where we’ve been, what lies on the 
horizon for the relationship that will in many ways define the 21st century for the 
remainder of the world. 
He then reflects on China’s previous engagement prior to the S&ED, citing Robert 
Zoellick’s standard of a “responsible stakeholders” to positively conclude that China is, 
today, indeed that. Biden nots that: 
 “It’s been ten years since then-Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick called 
on China to become what he referred to as a responsible stakeholder. He said all 
nations conduct diplomacy to promote their national interest. Responsible 
stakeholders go further; they recognize that the international system sustains their 
peaceful prosperity, so they work to sustain that system. And under President Xi, 
as China’s interests and capabilities have grown increasingly global, China has 
indeed taken some important steps in that direction.” 
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Vice President Biden provides numerous examples, from curbing Iranian and North 
Korean nuclear activities, climate change, market reform, UN efforts to combat 
terrorism, Ebola, and UN peace keeping operations. He then continues by focusing on 
the need to uphold and revise the “rule-based order” of the 20th century, citing areas like 
the environmental and labor standards as well as the IMF that need to reflect the “world 
as it is, not as it was.” Thus, Biden is affirming China’s role in the world as well as 
making continued space for China to take a part of. In this vein he also cites new areas 
where rules have not yet been written, such as “cyber space and outer space” inviting 
China to take a part in developing these new norms.  
 In his 2015 remarks, Vice Premier Wang Yang similarly reflects on the past. He 
notes that: “In the past seven years, the S&ED has grown broader and stronger, 
acquiring a richer agenda and better format, and producing more fruitful results.” His 
evidence is that, “the two rounds of economic dialogue have been held by the current 
governments, yielding over 170 outcomes in various fields. Substantive progress has 
been made on major issues, including BIT negotiation, climate change, and ITA 
expansion.” The result is an “injection” of “positive energy to China-U.S. relations and 
common development of the world.” But these successes, according to Wang Yang, are 
“not just an expectation for the future, but also a summary of the past.” Thus, Wang 
creates a narrative of cooperative relations whereby the work done through the S&ED 
symbolizes the extent to which the bilateral relationship as a whole is cooperative. From 
the past he affirms the value of the S&ED: “More importantly, the dialogue mechanism 
itself shows the commitment of both governments to work together for win-win results.” 
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Wang explains how the S&ED functions to produce better relations, stating: “it [S&ED] 
is conducive to boosting the confidence of people and companies of the two countries in 
developing closer cooperation and exchanges.” He provides examples of this primarily 
by noting the interconnectedness of U.S.-China relations: 
“Today more than 10,000 Chinese and Americans travel across the Pacific every 
day, and the number keeps growing at a double-digit rate. Two-way trade has 
exceeded U.S. $550 billion, and China has become one of the fastest-growing 
export markets for the United States. U.S. exports to China have helped to create 
nearly 1 million jobs in the U.S. Accumulated mutual investment topped U.S. 
$120 billion. And Chinese businesses have so far made investment in 44 states of 
America, with total investment reaching U.S. $46 billion and creating 80,000 
jobs for America, and the numbers are still growing.” 
All of this reflects the depth and breadth of the outcomes of the S&EDs.  
Vice Premier Wang Yang further stresses the depth of U.S.-China relations, 
noting “With such convergence of the two countries’ interests, which has gone beyond 
many people’s imagination, neither of us could afford the cost of noncooperation or even 
all-out confrontation.” The citing of “all-out confrontation” rebukes those who 
previously doubted whether the U.S. and China could peacefully coexistence because of 
the threat rising powers pose to status quo powers while the “convergence of interests” 
further emphasizes the shared view of the world to which the leadership on both sides 
had developed. Finally, Wang credits the S&ED’s dialogic component as enabling this 
convergence, stating: “Our high-level, multidimensional dialogue is a testament to the 
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greater maturity of relations between our two nations. Dialogue helps us understand each 
other’s thinking and get to the crux of how to make cooperation work and better handle 
differences.” 
Maturation of Personal Ties 
During the 2016 S&ED, officials from both sides continue reflecting on the 
results achieved by the past S&EDs, while also adding a personal note on the 
relationships they have developed with their counterparts. For instance, Secretary of 
Treasury Jack Lew states, “As co-chairs of this event for the past three years, Vice 
Premier Wang and I have worked closely to help strengthen our economic ties, and in 
the process have developed a close, personal working relationship.” He further flatters 
Wang Yang, stating “It’s been a true pleasure to serve alongside such a constructive 
counterpart.” Lew then argues how this close relationship is testament to how they were 
able to overcome differences out of a “shared respect” and common goal of aiding their 
domestic constituents. He explains,  
“While at times we have different perspectives, and we do not always choose the 
same approach, we’ve always been able to make progress, because our work 
together is guided by shared respect, and a shared belief that it’s vital to create 
tangible results for the citizens of our two countries.” 
Secretary Lew then continues to credit the S&ED as helping forge these common ties. 
He affirms the S&ED’s purpose in promoting “positive, cooperative, and 
comprehensive” through its bringing together officials from across the two governments 
which led to their “Working closely together has enabled us to better understand our 
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differences and to identify areas where we can expand cooperation, where common 
ground on compatible interests can be found.” The last part of his statement appears to 
reflect the lessons learned from the middle phase of the dialogues in that “where 
common ground” could be found they cooperated, but tougher issues suggesting 
common ground did not exist they were unable to overcome. Nonetheless, Lew states 
that “Equally important, our interactions have built a strong foundation so we’re better 
able to narrow our differences and make progress even on the more difficult issues 
where we disagree,” thus suggesting the S&ED is still useful in providing a conflict 
management function for these more intractable issues. 
Like Treasury Secretary Lew’s mentioning of close personal ties, Secretary of 
State John Kerry concludes his final 2016 statement by focusing on the relationships he 
has made with the Chinese leadership. He starts with general salutations stating, “I 
personally thank you for your hospitality, for your commitment to more productive ties, 
and I thank you for the four years, three and a half years, that I’ve been able to serve as 
Secretary,” before more specific ones, directing his comments to his Chinese 
counterpart: 
You and I have, like Jack Lew and the vice premier, we’ve become friends. 
You’ve been to my home. We’ve spent a lot of time together. We’ve dined at 
Mount Vernon. We have talked about every issue under the sun, and I believe, in 
these two days, we’ve helped to advance the relationship and to reduce some of 
the tensions between us. Thank you.” 
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And, like the U.S. delegation, the Chinese special representatives thank them for their 
friendship. At the 2016 S&ED, Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi reflects on how the 
two countries reached all these outcomes and thanks his counterparts for work: 
“over the past three years, I had the honor of joining Vice Premier Wang Yang in 
co-chairing four rounds of S&ED with Secretary Kerry and Secretary Lew. Vice 
Premier Wang Yang and I have established a very sound working relationship 
and a personal friendship with Secretary Lew and Secretary Kerry. In each round 
of the dialogue, we have covered a wide range of topics. Although we did not 
and are unlikely to agree on everything, we have always been working for the 
same objective.” 
Maturation of Handling Differences 
The maturity in relations amongst the officials at the S&ED is also shown in their 
handling of diverging interests. While 2015 and 2016 S&EDs also witnessed overt 
divergences made public during the official addresses, the members couched these as 
part of the S&ED’s process of discussing and managing differences, thus reflecting a 
more nuanced view of handling these problems rather than an “attack-defend” or 
“attack-attack” pattern. For instance, in his 2015 remarks Secretary of State John Kerry 
briefly mentions ongoing areas disagreement including cyber space, human rights, 
China’s proposed law inhibiting NGOs in China, as well as the South China Sea. He 
starts by describing the “frankness” of their discussions as reflective of a strong 
relationship: “As expected, our dialogue over the last two and a half days included a 
very frank discussion of some issues on which we have not always seen eye to eye, and 
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that is, frankly, a sign of a mature and good working relationship.” He lists those areas 
and states the U.S.’s interest in addressing the problems, but concludes with how the two 
sides have agreed in part to work together. Kerry explains: 
“For example, we continued our conversations on cyber security and on cyber 
theft. And the United States is deeply concerned about cyber incursions that have 
raised security questions and, frankly, harmed American businesses. We believe 
very strongly that the United States and China should be working together to 
develop and implement a shared understanding of appropriate state behavior in 
cyber space, and I’m pleased to say that China agreed that we must work together 
to complete a code of conduct regarding cyber activities.” 
Unlike the more contention 2013 S&ED, the statement here suggests the two sides have 
begun to find ways to commonly perceive or at least manage issues in cyber space.  
Secretary Kerry also makes sure to mention the U.S. commitment to human 
rights stating, “I also reaffirmed that the United States will continue to stand up for 
universal human rights and freedoms that all people desire and should enjoy. These 
rights and freedoms are vital to stability and prosperity.” Thus, he doesn’t explicitly 
chastise Chinese human rights abuses, but rather is content with making sure that people 
know the U.S. continues to “affirm” its position, not force it upon China. 
Continuing with noting areas of disagreement, Secretary Kerry at the 2015 
S&ED states that he has raised concerns on China’s new NGO law, explaining why the 
U.S. is in support of NGOs operating freely in China: 
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“I raised our concerns regarding the pending legislation in China that might 
seriously undermine the ability of nongovernmental organizations and civil 
society to continue work that is critical to everything from protecting the 
environment to advancing rule of law to deepening cultural and academic ties 
between our countries. And many of our universities and many of our NGOs that 
are engaged in charitable activity rely on their ability to be able to do that work, 
and I believe we opened up a window of opportunity to be able to work together 
to resolve those issues. No great country, whether China or the United States, can 
seek at once to be more integrated with the outside world while inhibiting the 
flow of ideas and information from other places.” 
Again, Secretary Kerry’s remarks are more tepid than those during the 2013 S&ED as 
well as optimistic in that he stresses the positive ways the two have “opened up a 
window” to work through the detrimental implications of the law. In this sense, Kerry is 
still respecting China’s sovereignty and is committed to finding solutions to work around 
the issues as it implicates the efforts of the S&ED. 
On another contentious issue, that of disputed territorial claims in the South 
China Sea, Secretary Kerry at the 2015 S&ED notes the U.S. position, while somewhat 
affirming China’s. The U.S.’s concern on the issue is that of freedom of navigation, as 
Kerry makes clear by stating, “While the United States does not take sides on the 
questions of sovereignty that underline territorial disputes in the area, we do have a 
strong national interest in freedom of navigation and overflight as well as peaceful 
resolution of disputes.” His affirmation of the U.S.’s refusal to take a side is a reflection 
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of the Chinese position whereby they prefer to manage the dispute bilaterally without 
U.S. influence undermining their bargaining power. His defining of what is and is not 
within the U.S.’s “strong national interest” demonstrates to some extent how the two 
sides are coming to separate areas where they find wiggle room to cooperate as well as 
the bright lines where they might not. Taken together, Secretary Kerry’s more careful 
description of U.S. and Chinese positions on sensitive issues demonstrates how China 
has been able to some extent socialize U.S. statements from taking a less harsh and 
conflicting tone in addition to showing how the two sides are becoming to understand 
the other’s core interests. 
 Indeed, turning to how the Chinese side discusses these issues, further support is 
lent to how the Chinese have, through the S&ED, socialized the U.S. to recognize their 
vital concerns while to a lesser extent also managed to understand and respect U.S. 
concerns. Whereas Secretary of State Kerry’s remarks demonstrated a shift in tone from 
the 2013 S&ED, the Chinese remarks are more declarative, while still welcoming U.S. 
cooperation on the issues. State Councilor Yang Jiechi at the 2015 S&ED presents the 
Chinese position regarding human rights, maritime issues, cyber security, and its NGO 
law, and the state of affairs in the Pacific more broadly. He begins with human rights 
stating that: “China reaffirmed its principled positions on Taiwan, Tibet-related, 
maritime, and cyber security, and stressed the need for the U.S. to respect and 
accommodate the interests and concerns of China and handle differences and sensitive 
issues with caution.” However, he also repeats the Chinese statement made back in 2013 
that China remains “ready for human rights dialogue with the United States,” suggesting 
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that the Chinese side recognizes the importance for U.S. officials to at least be seen 
discussing the issue with China. 
With regards to sovereignty claims in the South China Sea, Yang Jiechi again 
“reaffirms” the Chinese position while also suggesting they can accommodate U.S. 
concerns on freedom of navigation. He states, “China reaffirmed its firm determination 
to safeguard territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, as well as 
continued commitment to seeking peaceful solutions to the relevant disputes through 
dialogue and negotiation with those directly concerned.” He then makes sure to 
explicitly recognize the U.S.’s position on the issues, stating “Navigation freedom in the 
South China Sea is guaranteed; we do believe that there will not be any issue or problem 
with navigation freedom in the future” as well as stating how “We hope that the U.S. can 
be impartial and objective to serve peace and stability in this region.” 
 State Councilor Yang Jiechi’s statements at the 2015 S&ED regarding cyber 
issues follows the same pattern. First, he reaffirms the Chinese position, stating “China 
affirmed its firm position – firm opposition and crackdown on all forms of cyber 
hacking” as well as noting that nonetheless they will work with the U.S. on the issues, 
explaining that China remains ready “for cooperation with the U.S. on cyber security on 
the basis of mutual respect and equality and mutual benefit.” Again, the citing of 
“mutual respect, equality, and benefit,” reflective of China’s foreign policy concepts 
prior to the S&ED, suggests the Chinese are still hesitant to work with the U.S. on the 
issue, and Yang’s following comment suggests the two countries remain somewhat at 
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odds: “China urged the U.S. to respect facts, work together with China to improve the 
cyber relations between the two countries.” 
With regards to differences in view regarding China’s NGO law, Yang Jiechi at 
the 2015 S&ED again starts by defending the Chinese position before affirming U.S. 
concerns regarding its impact of furthering people-to-people exchanges as part of the 
S&ED. He explains that “the Chinese side pointed out that the relevant legislation is an 
important step of China to advance the rule of law” and that the decision to pursue “The 
legislation is made in the light of China’s national conditions with reference to the 
experience of other countries after soliciting opinions from various quarters.” Yang 
“hope[s] that the U.S. side will respect that. We believe that to further encourage people-
to-people exchanges and exchanges in other areas serves the fundamental interests of the 
two peoples. China will stay committed to further expanding people-to-people and other 
exchanges,” thus alleviating the concern stated by Secretary Kerry on the issue.  
The rhetoric of the later year S&EDs demonstrated how the S&ED had matured 
in three ways. First, with the affirmation of positive relations whereby numerous 
outcomes in both the economic and strategic track were coming into fruition and 
subsequently listed off by U.S. and Chinese officials as demonstration both of the 
S&ED’s effectiveness, but also with the U.S. affirming that China had become a 
“responsible stakeholder,” the main critique levied against China by the U.S. and thus 
the goal of the U.S.’s engagement of China. Second, this phase included the maturation 
of personal ties amongst U.S. and Chinese officials which was credited as having 
occurred because the S&ED provided a platform in which this could take place as well 
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as leading to successful management of difficult issues. Finally, this phase included a 
maturation of how the two sides discussed conflicting issues between the two countries. 
In discussion of these topics, U.S. officials in particular changed their rhetoric to that of 
a more conciliatory tone recognizing China’s interests while still affirming U.S. policy 
positions whereas Chinese leaders maintained their ground but not only remained open 
to U.S. concerns but tried to directly address them. As such, this final phase suggest the 
two sides were able to better come together and expressed greater understanding of their 
respective core interests.   
Conclusion 
In this chapter I sought to highlight the shifts within the institutional rhetoric of 
the S&ED. I identified three phases in which these shifts occurred. First, a cautious 
honeymoon phase where the pursuit of “positive, cooperative, and comprehensive 
relations” was frequently cited and called upon to describe the purpose of the S&ED’s 
meeting. Within the economic track the global financial crisis was cited as the major 
concern facing the two and laid the groundwork for mutual recognition by both parties 
regarding policies they each had to take to support global growth as well as their 
commitment to revise and strengthen international financial institutions. Within the 
strategic track, the focus was on addressing issues with less of a security related focus, 
such as climate change, and setting the stage for greater discussions to occur in exploring 
possible areas for cooperation. The second phase, saw the introduction of a “new model 
of major country relations” which brought about a focus on the two sides could combat 
distrust from enveloping their relations. As such, greater consideration to more security 
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related issues arose, albeit with commentary taking a more conflict-oriented tone. Within 
the economic track discussions, continued cooperation was identified with a shift away 
from the implications of the global financial crisis to new areas where the two could 
reform and address concerns from their economic relations salient to their domestic 
audiences. The continued ability to work together on these economic interests provided 
an enduring foundation which the two countries throughout the years built upon. Finally, 
the third phase was one of maturation and praise. Here U.S. and Chinese officials 
reflected upon their eight years of engagement, cited the numerous areas where the two 
had built more cooperative relations, with the U.S. declaring China had become a 
“responsible stakeholder.” Personal ties and the strong relations forged through the 
S&ED were credited in aiding in the effort of finding areas to cooperate, and discussions 
on more sensitive, security related issues took a more nuanced tone whereby U.S. 
officials no longer publicly critiqued China’s policies on issues like human rights and 
cyber security, but recognized Chinese positions with Chinese officials somewhat 
similarly reaffirming their positions, but acknowledging U.S. concerns. From all of this, 
one can see that the S&ED is a dynamic institutional arrangement promoting positive 
relations between the two, but also able to enlarge the range of discussions in a more 
serious manner. 
In terms of how this chapter informs our understanding of institutional rhetoric 
and state socialization, it showcases the dynamic role of communication whereby both 
nations’ presidents and diplomats advance arguments reaffirming and transforming their 
rationales for taking up cooperative relations, the problems they are to tackle, and the 
 214 
 
means by which they attempt to persuade or identify common interests. From an 
institutional entrepreneurship standpoint, the decision by the two presidents to focus on 
building a “new model of major country relations” dramatically changed the extent to 
which the two began talking about important security related topics. While not taking 
part directly in the discussions of the S&ED, President Obama and Xi’s directive to 
implement the “new model” concept was cited by their special representatives and taken 
up in earnest focusing on issues such as strategic distrust, the concern regarding conflict 
in U.S.-China relations due to the historical problem of great power war, and 
reemphasizing their commitment to pursue issues of mutual concern. 
From an institutional work perspective, one can see the ongoing work by which 
the special representatives both affirmed and challenged the institutional logic of 
“positive, cooperative, and comprehensive, relations” in that this goal and the values 
inherent in the S&EDs enactment of it included constant affirmation, legitimation, and 
transformation to address the changing circumstances the two countries faced. The 
financial crisis in particular provided a means by which the two sides, evident by their 
statements, came together to identify common problems and common cause to 
strengthen the international financial architecture and include China in these institutions. 
This set in motion an enduring basis by which the two sides, after weathering the initial 
impact of the crisis, began deepening their reforms and bilateral trade. Within the 
strategic track discussions, the officials’ institutional work is more clearly seen as they 
possessed the awareness and reflexivity to reframe issues where the two sides disagreed. 
Their continued praise of the S&ED and the importance of the bilateral relationship 
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conferred equal status to each other, but also elevated both countries’ importance on 
global issues by mythologizing to some extent their ability to lead and effect change on a 
global scale as well as the alternative to failed cooperation, that being great power 
rivalry.  
In this sense, much of the “work” of diplomacy is completed and sustained 
through the special representatives’ consistent problem and solution definition and 
rhetorical implementation and exhortations to live up to the values of the S&ED, holding 
each accountable and signaling to their respective bureaucracies, citizenry, and the 
international community that the U.S. and China can, should, and will cooperate 
together. Presidential rhetorical analyses would have likely left these issues uncovered, 
and instead focused on the presidents’ definition of cooperative relations, leaving us 
without a clear picture as to how their visions are carried out. 
Turning to the literature on state socialization and the implications from the 
institutional rhetoric of the S&ED, both its entrepreneurship and work, this chapter 
demonstrated how norms become defined and enacted. From Pu’s (2012) vantage, 
claims to legitimacy are important not just on a broad discursive level informing states 
what “proper” international behavior is, but also the values upon which action is taken. 
These claims to legitimacy are in flux, requiring their affirmation as well enabling 
challenges to them by specific rhetorical agents, not just states. The S&ED shows how 
Pu (2012) is correct in that socialization is a two-way process, as Chinese officials were 
able to limit direct U.S. critiques to Chinese policy from the second to third phase of the 
S&ED and U.S. officials won support for Chinese affirmation and commitment to the 
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international financial architecture. However, it enlarges our perspective on what 
legitimate norms are debated from the more narrow, albeit important, views on 
legitimacy as wrapped in definitions of world order to include defining what actions are 
appropriate within bilateral relations as defined with regards to U.S.-China relationship 
in particular. Hence, the ways in which U.S. and Chinese officials defined their relations 
is likely different from how the U.S. defines it relations to smaller countries unable to 
significantly threaten its security. In this, even Acharya’s (2004) study examining how 
international norms are reframed in ways congruent to local values ignores how equal 
partners, as is the case regarding how the S&ED defines the U.S. and China, come to 
conceptualize the unique norms guiding U.S.-China relations, such as the “new model of 
major country relations,” which comes about to address a specific problem facing only 
their relationship, that of major power conflict. Finally, the state-centric view of 
socialization fails to account for the personal relations U.S. and Chinese officials come 
to hold through the S&ED. In this case, identities and interests become more malleable 
through interpersonal communication which provides the opportunity for trust to be built 
aiding in the diffusion of norms guiding state behavior. 
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CHAPTER VI  
S&ED’S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AS IMAGE MANANAGEMENT AND VALUE 
ADVOCACY 
 
Each year, with much pomp and circumstance, U.S. and Chinese officials 
ceremoniously meet at the Strategic and Economic Dialogue to have their pictures taken 
standing together, praise their frank and candid discussions, give speeches laying out 
their goals, vision, and outcomes of the S&ED, while also making sure to publish a 
variety of documents detailing the extent of their engagement and their public 
commitments made to address issues of global concern. And yet, the substance of the 
agreements made take place behind doors either through discussions amongst higher-
ranking officials at the S&ED or negotiated throughout the year by the relevant 
departments, planning sessions, or breakout groups; this begs the question, why then 
devote so much energy to publicize the S&ED? This chapter, as well as the next, chapter 
7, answers this question by arguing that the S&ED serves an important public diplomacy 
function. 
In this chapter, I argue that an important element of state socialization includes 
public diplomacy efforts. The three models of state socialization reviewed in chapter 2 
hint at these efforts, but fail to adequately describe the means by which they occur, 
constrained by their state-centric viewpoint as well as emphasis on defining the 
conditions in which these actions are more likely to take place rather than the 
argumentative strategies to support them. For instance, Johnston (2008) identifies states’ 
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desire for a positive image which he argues led China to sign on to the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty, symbolizing China’s adherence to global norms and an attempt to 
provide a more positive image of the country. Additionally, in attempting to showcase 
how states are persuaded by other states and international norms, Johnston (2008) 
inadvertently demonstrates the importance of domestic support, arguing that Chinese 
domestic discourse within their media shifted towards support of greater Chinese 
engagement with multilateral institutions, taking this as a sign that China’s leadership 
was persuaded to deepen its multilateral engagement. Similarly, Acharya (2004) argues 
that socialization is more effective when regional, subnational, and local actors frame 
global norms in ways aligning with local values, and Pu (2012) argued that developing 
countries can challenge the legitimacy of global norms through their discourse. Taken 
together, these three models point to the importance of public diplomacy without 
offering much theorization as to how international institutions rhetorically engage 
domestic and international stakeholders. As such, a more serious exploration of the 
S&ED’s public diplomacy efforts and organizational rhetoric can elucidate the 
communicative strategies in which we can come to see the S&ED’s public statements as 
primarily oriented to external stakeholders and the strategies in which they do so. 
Whereas the previous two chapters focused on the interactions amongst 
government officials and the establishment of its institutional logic guiding those 
interactions, in this chapter I argue that the dialogue mechanism publicizes and makes 
visible positive, cooperative U.S.-China relations in meaningful ways by establishing its 
organizational identity, image, and reputation management rhetoric as well as its value 
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advocacy. This image management rhetoric and values advocacy reduces stakeholders’ 
uncertainty, connects the S&ED’s values to those held by their constituents, 
demonstrates the S&ED’s goals as serving the international community, and affirms the 
importance of U.S.-China cooperation on solving global issues. It also deflects criticism 
by providing the standards to measure its outcomes and provides the value premises 
which rhetors draw upon to persuade their organizational members and stakeholders all 
for garnering greater support for the S&ED’s mission. From the perspective of 
discursive public diplomacy, the S&ED’s organizational rhetoric brings together global 
publics as well as government officials to discuss what issues are should be addressed 
and the values inherent in U.S.-China relations. Finally, approaching the analysis of the 
diplomatic speech from the perspective of organizational rhetoric and public diplomacy 
provides a more useful model upon which to make sense of diplomatic rhetoric beyond 
its purely ceremonial purposes and presidential addresses. Thus, to understand the 
impact of the very public nature of the S&ED, this chapter addresses the following 
research questions: 
RQ1: What strategies of public diplomacy does the S&ED utilize and how do these 
strategies implicate the S&ED’s stated goals? 
Public Diplomacy and the S&ED 
Public diplomacy is best understood as an alternative to government-to-
government engagement, by which states, associations of states, and nonstate actors 
directly communicate and engage citizenry of various target nations (Gregory, 2008). 
The field of public diplomacy encompasses a variety of academic disciplines, and as 
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such renewed interest in public diplomacy has resulted in vibrant discussion regarding 
questions over definitions, approaches, and time scales. Within this debate common 
themes have emerged such as the move from monologic to dialogic communication 
(Cowen & Arsenault, 2008), international communication networks and global 
governance creating a new public sphere (Castells, 2008), the connection of soft power 
to public diplomacy (Nye, 2008; Hayden, 2014), branding (van Ham, 2008; Wang, 
2006), international exchanges (Snow, 2008), and discursive public diplomacy 
(Proedrou & Frangonkolopoulos, 2012).  
All of these approaches have helped advance the significance of political actors 
and their influences on their respective audiences. They are tied together by the shared 
concern of new media technologies leading to greater participation, or at least access to 
information, regarding diplomatic practice. The result is greater pressure on diplomats to 
communicate their purposes and actions to legitimize their policies and gain public 
support. As Gregory (2008), in his review of public diplomacy as a field of study 
explains,  
“Public diplomacy can be viewed as a political instrument…describe[ing] ways 
and means by which states, associations of states, and nonstate actors understand 
cultures, attitudes, and behaviors; build and manage relationships; and influence 
opinion and actions to advance their interests and values. It is used by political 
actors to understand the consequences of policy choices, set public agendas, 
influence discourse in civil society, and build consent for strategies that require 
trade-offs among costs, risks, and benefits.” (p. 276) 
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Gregory’s (2008) description of public diplomacy shows that the issues public 
diplomacy addresses, as well as the tools to influence them, are manifold and essential to 
the practice of 21st century diplomacy. It also provides an entry point for examining the 
communicative means by which states socialize each other and, more importantly, 
garner support for these norms from domestic and international audiences. Thus, 
including elements of public diplomacy provides an important piece to the puzzle of how 
states induce others to adhere to common values and norms.  
In the case of the S&ED, U.S. and Chinese leaders are aware of the importance 
of publicizing their relations with officials utilizing a range of public diplomacy tools to 
engage in nearly every facet of public diplomacy mentioned above. Analysis of the 
corpus of publicly released documents show at least three ways the S&ED utilizes public 
diplomacy practices: first, a top-down approach whereby the S&ED members 
rhetorically define its organizational identity and manage its image as an embodiment of 
cooperative and effectual relations for relevant stakeholders; a second, top-down 
approach where officials at the S&ED engage in value advocacy and discursive public 
diplomacy; and a third, bottom-up approach by building network ties among relevant 
stakeholders as well as enhancing cultural, scientific, academic, and business exchanges 
as an alternative means to compel cooperative relations between the U.S. and China. 
This chapter examines the first two top-down strategies of the S&ED’s organizational 
rhetoric whereas the third is discussed in the next chapter. 
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Top Down Public Diplomacy Strategies of the S&ED: Identity, Image, and 
Reputation 
Globalization and the technological revolution of international communication 
technologies have brought people together like never before demanding a clearer 
articulation of governments’ foreign policies and strategies of diplomatic engagement. 
This is especially true in the case of the S&ED which represents not only a diplomatic 
innovation with regards to its institutional structure, but also as a specific policy of U.S.-
China engagement. As discussed in Chapter 4, institutions must derive their legitimacy 
from their external environments. For those participating in the S&ED they must assuage 
local and global audiences on its effectiveness as well as managing external shocks 
arising from the geopolitical landscape. Officials at the S&ED thus engage in a variety 
of top-down public diplomacy strategies designed to affirm its organizational identity, 
image, and reputation as well as strategies of value advocacy and discursive public 
diplomacy to legitimize the S&ED’s ongoing existence, its contribution to advancing the 
interests of U.S. and Chinese domestic audiences as well as global audiences, and the 
norms in which the two countries will uphold. 
Critiques of public diplomacy’s atheoretical nature and overall efficacy stems in 
part from the use of its manifold tools absent some larger, strategic policy purpose. 
Approaching the S&ED’s public diplomacy functions from the perspective of 
organizational image management rhetoric provides a more comprehensive picture to 
make sense of how officials taking part in the S&ED attempt to define the institution’s 
goals and adhere its values to those of its stakeholders. Three concepts from 
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organizational rhetoric help clarify the top-down public diplomacy strategies S&ED 
officials engage in: organizational identity, image, and reputation. First, organizational 
identity is defined as expressing an organization’s “‘central, enduring, and distinctive’ 
character” (Conrad, 2011, p. 171). This identity encompasses an organization’s past, 
present, and future while providing stability and predictability for its stakeholders. 
According to Conrad (2011), stable, predictable organizational identities help 
stakeholders in two ways: first, it allows stakeholders to connect their personal identities 
to that of the organization’s identity. Second, it provides a frame of reference by which 
stakeholders can make sense of an organization’s actions and rhetoric.  
Second, Conrad (2011) defines organizational image as “the impressions about 
an organization that operate in a particular rhetorical situation” (p. 173). Organizational 
rhetors engage in image management by legitimizing the organization’s image through 
forging of symbolic links to the dominant values of culture and sub-cultures from which 
each its audiences are drawn, as well as recreating the organization’s own identity. These 
images, portrayed during certain rhetorical situations should be congruent with the 
organization’s overall identity, but tend to highlight some elements of that identity while 
de-emphasizing others as the situation demands.  
Finally, Conrad (2011) defines organizational reputation as “composed of 
memories – the symbolic recreations of relevant past experiences that audiences bring 
with them to their encounters with the organization and its rhetoric” (p. 174). Conrad 
(2011) explains that these memories are not literal histories, but are stored below 
conscious awareness and moderated by complex interpretive processes which can be 
 224 
 
activated by image management rhetoric. Thus, taken together, we see that 
organizational identity is projected into the future, organizational images are enacted in 
the present, and organizational reputation is drawn from the past. Officials at the S&ED 
utilize all three of these tools to communicate with domestic and international audiences 
to demonstrate what values, issues, and success the S&ED is designed to manage.  
Organizational Identity of the S&ED 
 Officials at the S&ED provide a consistent appraisal of the S&ED’s distinctive 
character. The uniqueness of the S&ED comes from its focus on long-term and 
overarching issues of strategic concern, the bringing together of numerous U.S.-Chinese 
officials to discuss a wide range of issues, and its commitment to dialogue as a means to 
promote cooperation.  
First, officials define the S&ED’s distinct identity by describing the uniqueness 
of the dialogue mechanism due to the nature of issues it addresses, that is the pursuit of 
“strategic” and “long-term” issues. During the 2010 S&ED, Chinese State Councilor Dai 
Bingguo calls the S&ED “a pioneering undertaking in state-to-state relations.” His 
reason for this is the S&ED’s gathering of U.S. and Chinese officials “for candid and in-
depth dialogues on strategic, long-term, and over-arching issues in China-U.S. 
relations.” At the 2009 S&ED, U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner explains how 
the economic track is achieving this long-term approach. First, he notes the centrality of 
the S&ED in developing U.S.-China relations, stating: “President Obama and President 
Hu have expressed a desire to place the S&ED framework at the center of our bilateral 
relationship.” He then explains what this means for the economic track dialogues. He 
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notes, “We are succeeding in the Economic Track by laying a stable foundation for 
cooperation on our long-term objectives and the achievement of concrete, meaningful 
progress on those objectives along the way.”  
At the 2013 and 2014 S&ED, Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang continues to 
emphasize the characteristics of the S&ED as stressing a strategic, long-term approach to 
managing U.S.-China relations. In 2013, Wang Yang first highlights what makes the 
U.S.-China relationship unique, then affirms the importance of the S&ED as a “unique 
platform” for managing U.S.-China relations, before claiming that the long-term, 
strategic approach the S&ED takes is the reason for effective U.S.-China relations. He 
states: 
 “China-U.S. relationship is one of the most important bilateral relations in the 
world. The S&ED, jointly initiated by our two presidents in 2009, has served as 
an important platform for the two countries to enhance mutual trust, expand 
cooperation, and manage differences. Over the past four years, the two sides have 
had close communication and candid discussions on issues of long-term strategic 
and overarching importance. Well, this has enabled the (inaudible) of China-U.S. 
relationship to always forge ahead in the right direction against the surging 
waves and changes in a political-international, political, and economic 
landscape.” 
Again in 2014, Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang describes the characteristics which the 
S&ED embodies. He states that: 
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“The dialogue is a full embodiment of the expectations and requirements made 
by President Xi Jinping in his speech at the opening ceremony of the S&ED. 
That is, proceeding from reality, taking a long-term view, engaging in in-depth 
communication, meeting each other halfways, respecting each other, expanding 
common ground, showing – resolving differences, equality, mutual benefit, and 
deepening cooperation.” 
Finally, for one more example from the U.S. side in the later years of the S&ED, U.S. 
Secretary of State John Kerry at the 2014 S&ED explains the characteristics of the 
dialogue mechanism by describing how it should be used. He states, “We should use the 
S&ED to demonstrate to the world that even in a relationship as complex as ours we 
remain determined to ensure that cooperation defines the overall relationship.” To do 
this, Kerry calls for building the relationship “around common challenges, mutual 
responsibilities, and shared interests, even while we candidly address our differences” by 
remaining committed to “building a long-term partnership based on mutual interests and 
mutual respect.” 
 These examples show how officials are attuned to explicitly making clear what 
defines the S&ED as unique and important. Furthermore, it orients how stakeholders can 
understand what type of outcomes the S&ED will result in. The focus on strategic, long-
term issues defines the larger geopolitical goals of the S&ED as addressing underlying 
issues challenging U.S.-China relations as well as an attempt to expand larger issues of 
cooperation. It manages expectations in two ways; first, by suggesting that outsiders 
deflect their attention from smaller issues of disagreement to taking a wider view of the 
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overall relationship. Second, the long-term time scale also sets a standard regarding the 
time-scale by which one might judge whether the S&ED is delivering results, calling 
upon critics to wait and see how the relationship develops over time, rather than hone in 
on immediate results. At the 2015 S&ED, Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi 
symbolizes this perspective by sharing a Chinese proverb calling on people to “stand 
high” when judging U.S.-China relations. He jokingly notes that this is hard because 
“Maybe there aren’t as many skyscrapers in Washington as those in New York, but here 
in Washington, D.C. we still can stand high and look far… Because our two countries 
are countries with major influence in the world.” 
Second, the S&ED’s identity is firmly rooted in its bringing together of 
numerous U.S.-Chinese officials for the purpose of discussing a wide range of issues. 
This aspect represents the unique characteristic of the organizational structure of the 
S&ED, and is praised nearly every year by officials. For instance, at the 2009 S&ED, 
U.S. Treasury Secretary Geithner explains the S&ED’s unique character as “breaking 
new ground” because of its “breadth” and “unprecedented cooperation.” Likewise, U.S. 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton states calls the 2009 S&ED “unprecedented” because 
of the size of the S&ED gathering of high-ranking officials. She states, “What has taken 
place over the past two days is unprecedented in U.S.-China relations. The meetings we 
have just concluded represent the largest gathering ever of top leaders from our two 
countries. The range of issues covered was unparalleled.”  
U.S. Vice President Biden at the 2011 S&ED continues to stress this aspect, and 
flat out provides a rationale to S&ED participants as to why they are even there at the 
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S&ED. He explains that “We want to build a relationship across the entire spectrum of 
our governments. That’s why we’ve asked all of you to come together for these 
dialogues.” U.S. Treasury Secretary Lew at the 2013 S&ED further emphasizes the 
organizational rationale of bringing officials together. First, he reaffirms the S&ED’s 
image as vital, stating: “The Strategic and Economic Dialogue is critical to generating 
practical cooperation on issues across our relationship and a place where we can make 
real progress.” The reason the S&ED is able to uniquely do so, is, in Lew’s words is 
because “This dialogue brings together key decision makers from both of our countries 
to address the critical issues that we face.” 
 These themes are not just repeated by U.S. officials, but by Chinese officials as 
well. Even though Hillary Clinton called the 2009 S&ED “unprecedented” because of 
the number of officials participating, the dialogue mechanism continues to break that 
record. Turning to the final two S&EDs, Chinese Vice Premier Liu Yandong calls the 
2015 S&ED “unprecedented” due to the number of officials from the both sides present 
and uses that to symbolically affirm the importance of the S&ED as well as representing 
U.S.-China relations more broadly. He states, “Representatives from both sides are 
gathered together, and the scale is unprecedented. We have 13 ministers and 40 vice 
minister-level officials from the Chinese side. And that shows both sides take very 
seriously our bilateral relations.” 
The S&ED’s identity is measured more than just by bringing officials together, 
but also by the wide range of issues discussed and outcomes made. In 2016, Chinese 
Vice Premier Wang Yang explains what the S&ED is and how it represents more than 
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just an organizational apparatus but also a representation of U.S.-China relations. He 
states, “The S&ED is a high-level, all-encompassing dialogue mechanism that our two 
countries have established. It is a symbol of the maturity of bilateral relations and it 
serves the interests of both of our countries and beyond.” He provides evidence of this, 
stressing the characteristic of the S&ED’s broad, and growing agenda: “Thanks to the 
concerted efforts, the dialogue agenda keeps expanding with more deliverables coming 
out year by year.” And continues by noting not only the larger number of outcomes 
produced during the past S&EDs, but also making sure to emphasize that these are 
valuable outcomes: “The last seven economic dialogues produced 469 outcomes. Among 
them, over 250 outcomes were achieved in the last three economic dialogues by this 
government, and many of them are really meaningful outcomes.” 
These examples demonstrate the distinct organizational design of the S&ED and 
its effectiveness. The consistent appraisal of the S&ED’s unique structure signals to 
stakeholders that the U.S. and China are making progress in working together as new 
precedents are made and individual leaders continue to make the effort to travel and 
meet with their counterparts. Thus, the S&ED is portrayed as exceptional, perhaps a 
necessary image in that it is designed to address an exceptional problem of avoiding 
great power rivalries. Furthermore, the increase in outcomes and range of issues taken up 
provides the frame of reference for stakeholders to make sense of U.S.-China 
cooperation. It shows stability in that ever more issues are brought up for discussion and 
outcomes continue to increase. On a more symbolic level, the efforts of the S&ED begin 
to represent the larger U.S.-China relationship as a manageable and cooperative one. 
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 Third, officials ascribe the values inherent to the S&ED’s identity as those 
grounded in dialogue. While typical organizations recognize the importance of 
organizational identity, to which values and value advocacy is a central component, in 
the case of the S&ED, establishing shared values is particularly important, but also 
difficult as you have two governments not only from vastly different socio-political 
cultures, but also from different strategic, security cultures derived from China’s identity 
as an emerging power and the U.S. and the status-quo power. Nonetheless, for people to 
reach agreement on deliberative issues, to which the S&ED through the agreements it 
signs engages in, there must be some consensus on values (Olbrecht-Tyteca).  
Thus, the final distinguishing characteristic of the S&ED’s organizational identity, that 
of dialogue, is of upmost importance. U.S. and Chinese officials epideictically affirm 
this value not only to define the S&ED, but then also as a guiding principle of their 
bilaterally relationship. 
 From the onset of the S&ED, dialogue is central feature upon which the two 
sides ground the S&ED’s purpose and use it to reframe the bilateral relationship in 
general as cooperative. The qualities of dialogue include the value of exchanging ideas 
and enhancing communication, building trust, understanding one another’s interests, and 
discovering new areas for cooperative relations. For instance, as Chinese State Councilor 
Dai Bingguo at the 2009 S&ED explains, “Both sides recognized that the Dialogue 
offers a unique forum to promote understanding, expand common ground, reduce 
differences, enhance mutual trust, and step up cooperation.” According to Dai, dialogue 
achieves this by allowing the two sides to have “candid” and “in-depth exchange of 
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views” and focus on “long-term and overarching issues” concerning the bilateral 
relationship. He continues to emphasize the unique nature of the S&ED in promoting the 
values of dialogue. He notes in 2010 that, “For the strategic dialogue we have had over 
100 hours of dialogue. And this mechanism, I am afraid, is one of the most special 
mechanisms, if…not the most unique mechanism in the world.” Dai continues in 2010 to 
explain how the value and practice of dialogue enables cooperative relations between the 
U.S. and China which is a unique component of the S&ED. He states:  
“I believe that the strategic and economic dialogue should be an important and 
effective bridge promoting communication, understanding, and trust between 
China and the United States, and should contribute to the beauty of a positive, 
cooperative, and a comprehensive China-U.S. partnership. This should be the 
unique function and value of our dialogue mechanism.” 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at the 2009 and 2012 S&ED likewise affirms 
the establishment of the S&D as creating a new approach for managing U.S.-China 
relations on the basis of dialogue. According the Clinton, “This dialogue has established 
a new pattern of cooperation between our governments and a forum for discussion.” She 
continues in 2012 to describe the S&ED’s dialogic role in enhancing cooperation. She 
states that the S&ED is “our premier forum for building trust and promoting resilience in 
our relationship” and that both sides are committed to further engage in dialogue in order 
to “institutionaliz[e] the mechanism of cooperation so that the comprehensive 
engagement that we have pioneered together under the leadership of our two presidents 
does not slow or reverse.” 
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The value of dialogue is continued to be referenced by both sides throughout the 
later S&EDs as well. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry in 2015 and 2016 explains how 
dialogue reflects the S&ED and the larger bilateral relationship as it seeks to both build 
areas of common concern while also ameliorating differences. He states in 2015 that: 
“The dialogue that we’ve engaged in here over the course of the last two days 
and one night really reflects a joint U.S.-China commitment to cooperate in areas 
of common interest and to seek constructive solutions where we have 
differences.” 
And again in 2016, Kerry states: 
“The S&ED is one of the best opportunities that we have to discuss our 
differences and to seek creative ways to narrow them or to eliminate them 
altogether…that is how we can fulfill our mutual duty as the world’s two largest 
economies – nations with very high global expectations and responsibilities.” 
Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang likewise in 2015 affirms the importance of 
dialogue as helping build understanding. He explains how “Increasing understanding is 
an important precondition for willing cooperation between the two major countries of 
China and the United States, and dialogue and communication is an important way 
leading to friendly relations between the two countries.” He connects these values to the 
S&ED, concluding: “The success of the dialogue is yet another testimony to the maturity 
of our major country relations and it also shows that the S&ED is an indispensable 
platform for China-U.S. cooperation.” Vice Premier Wang Yang perhaps best 
exemplifies how the S&ED’s identity is tied together to values of dialogue which also 
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comes to represent the bilateral relationship as a whole in his 2014 statement, Wang 
Yang states:  
“Dialogue has already become a symbol for this new model of major country 
relations. Dialogue is an effective way to improve the global (inaudible) 
structure. Here I want to borrow a few words from Ambassador Baucus during 
his recent speech. He said that, ‘The S&ED is our premier forum in talking 
through tough issues. Its main purpose is to bring coherence and predictability to 
our discussions on all issues in the bilateral relationship. Over the past five years, 
the S&ED has helped to (inaudible) our discussions with China's leaders. And it 
also helped build toward strategic trust.’” 
Therefore, the S&ED’s identity is tied to its uniqueness as a diplomatic tool to 
discuss long-term strategic issues, bring together a multitude of officials to discuss a 
range of issues, and values in which these leaders discuss these issues is the principle of 
dialogue. This consistent identity comes to represent not only the S&ED, but also as a 
reflection on the U.S.-China relations as a whole. The annual meetings, publishing of 
increasing outcomes, and at times, bland diplomatic rhetoric may appear to be 
perfunctory, and yet it importantly provides the predictability for stakeholders. The 
importance of this is to signal to domestic and international stakeholders that the two 
countries, through the S&ED, are not only able to cooperate, but also have a desire to 
treat each other with respect and listen to their opposing views.  
The implication of the S&ED’s identity rhetoric, is that the two countries are able 
to manage their relationship and thus, will not walk down the path of great power 
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conflict which has plagued geopolitical relations throughout history. To combat this 
historical problem, the S&ED is argued to be exceptional. Whereas great power conflict 
emerges from diverging national interests, the S&ED showcases its ability to align those 
interests, bringing together numerous officials, discussing a large range of issues, and 
practicing dialogue whereby the two countries listen and explore areas of commonality. 
Uncertainty and distrust becomes a breeding ground for great power conflict, to which 
the S&ED provides predictability and continuity through steadily increasing outcomes 
reached, core issues discussed yearly, and arguing to outsiders to judge the S&ED from 
a long-term view. Perceptions drive conflicting relations as much as material 
considerations. The S&ED’s identity manages our perceptions of U.S.-China relations 
coming to embody the relationship as a whole, signaling that the countries can and are 
cooperating together. This repeated perception of the S&ED’s success is vital in 
combatting those doubting cooperative relations or even predicting the breakout of 
conflict. It minimizes the extent to which outside audiences have access to negative 
images of conflict between the two by introducing many more positive symbols of 
cooperative relations, and thus creating momentum for greater commitment by both 
sides’ leaders and stakeholders to uphold and pursue positive relations. 
Organizational Image 
The S&ED wields its identity for persuasive purposes on specific topics of 
discussion. This implementation of its identity can be understood within the framework 
of organizational image management. Officials throughout the S&ED engage in variety 
of organizational image management to adapt the S&ED’s identity to specific audiences. 
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According to Conrad (2011) organizational image rhetoric differs from that of 
organizational identity due to “the impressions about an organization that operate in a 
particular rhetorical situation” (p. 173). In the case of the S&ED, its multiple breakout or 
plenary sessions stresses different issues and stakeholders. Because organizational 
images should reflect the organization’s identity, but highlight certain aspects as 
required by the situation, officials emphasize these aspects of the S&ED’s identity to 
demonstrate how it addresses these more specific, issue related topics. Many of the 
examples in chapters four, five, and this chapter so far have demonstrated this in the 
economic and strategic tracks, but we can also see how image management rhetoric 
plays out in more specific breakout sessions like on climate and people-to-people 
exchanges. First, I briefly highlight how the S&ED utilizes its image in these two major 
track discussions before going into greater depth on the climate and people-to-people 
exchanges.  
Image management rhetoric: Economic and strategic track discussions. The 
image portrayed in the economic track discussions tend to focus on the complementary 
elements of economic interests between the two economies, with a focus on achieving 
“win-win” results and deepening economic ties. Dialogue is the means by which the two 
countries discover the areas where this can be achieved, and in doing so, the two 
countries become more closely intertwined, helping fend off larger conflict between the 
two nations. Specific outcomes ranging from bilateral investment treaties, currency 
exchanges, trade, saving and consumption levels, intellectual property, and more, are 
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cited to show how the S&ED is managing relations in a manner that provides tangible 
benefits to both counties’ citizenry by demonstrating where progress is being made. 
On the strategic track, the image rhetoric focuses more on combatting distrust 
and building understanding. Again, enhanced communication and greater high-level 
exchanges across the range of government is described as the means to do this on the 
basis of mutual respect, equality, win-win solutions, frank and open discussions, etc. 
Examples cited to showcase an image of success for strategic track include consultation 
on nuclear proliferation, like in the case of Iran and North Korea, coordination on 
regional hotspots in the Middle East as well as Afghanistan, and later on in the 
development of military-to-military relations and cyber security. These issues 
demonstrate continual progress and discussion between U.S. and Chinese leaders, 
suggesting that the two are able to at least manage or keep at bay conflictual relations, 
thus avoiding major power conflict, as well as a maturity in their relations as they 
discuss these stickier, security related issues. Thus, within the strategic and economic 
track discussions, the S&ED’s image is relatively consistent, stressing common values 
and aspects of its identity, albeit emphasizing different aspects as they pertain to more 
economic or security related issues. To more clearly showcase how the S&EDs image is 
used in more specific rhetorical situations, one can turn to the issue-specific breakout 
sessions, such as climate change and the Consultation of People Exchange. 
Image management rhetoric: Climate change. The promotion of the S&ED’s 
image is clear within the breakout sessions on climate and energy at the 2015 and 2016 
S&EDs. For instance, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry at the 2015 S&ED’s 
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Celebration of Energy and Environment Cooperation Panel explains how the two sides 
through the S&ED have succeeded in working together. He states, “we are working, 
frankly, extremely effectively together beyond, I think, either side’s initial expectations.” 
To demonstrate this, he cites how before the S&ED, the U.S. and China had frequently 
been on opposing sides of the debate on climate change. First, he draws upon his 
personal experience working on climate issues since the 1990s, noting how he had “the 
privilege of being one of the members of the Senate who went in a delegation to Rio for 
the original Earth Summit at which we had a voluntary agreement that people entered 
into regarding glowering greenhouse gas emissions.” 
Secretary Kerry then describes the conflictual nature of the U.S. and Chinese 
positions on climate during that time: “between 1992 and today, there have been many, 
many conferences of the parties all over the world… China and the United States were 
just of the opposite side of the ledger. We were knocking heads together rather than 
cooperating.” Kerry then explains this all changed, noting how the two engaged in 
dialogic practices like listening to each other as well as showing how the S&ED helped 
to narrow differences in this area for the pursuit of cooperation. 
“That changed in 2013 with China’s willingness to open up and listen and 
engage, and my counterpart, State Councilor Yang Jiechi, received us on my first 
trip to China and we created a working group. And the working group then went 
to work over the next year trying to pull together…to narrow differences and see 
where we could cooperate.” 
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Finally, he shows how within the context of climate and energy issues, the two sides 
have produced results, another key aspect of the S&ED: “So today it is significant that 
we have a list of initiatives on which we are cooperating.” 
 At the same 2015 S&ED break out session on climate and energy, Chinese State 
Councilor Yang Jiechi describes the positive cooperation the two sides have engaged in. 
He notes, like Kerry, “our cooperation in tackling climate change has also impressed 
many people.” While they have already “impressed” people with the level of cooperation 
on climate issues, Yang Jiechi calls for the climate and energy outcomes to “play a 
bigger role” in both U.S.-China relations as well as in fighting global climate change. To 
do so exhorts the two sides “work more closely” on the issues, as well as engaging in 
“long-term cooperation, and to do that we need to have a long-term perspective,” again 
utilizing terms that describe the S&ED in general, but applied to the climate and energy 
breakout session in particular.  
 Turning to the 2016 S&ED, officials engage in positive image management 
rhetoric on issues of climate change. U.S. Secretary of State Kerry at the 2016 S&ED’s 
Joint Session on Climate Change Remarks highlights the uniqueness of the S&ED in 
promoting U.S.-China cooperation on climate issues, expressing how both sides have 
known all along that they had the capacity to cooperate, which results in increasing 
bilateral cooperation. Kerry states, “I think we’ve known that we have an ability to 
achieve what no other two nations have the ability to achieve, and we’ve known that 
from the beginning. So as a result, each year, our bilateral cooperation has increased.” 
This “achieving what no other two nations” can be read as the U.S. and China’s ability 
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as status quo and rising powers to work together. Kerry goes on to credit the cooperative 
elements of the S&ED as the cause for this agreement, stating “it was thanks to this 
cooperation that we were able to go to Paris and be able to pass the agreement that took 
place in Paris.” Finally, he calls for broadening this cooperation as well as taking a long-
term view, again two aspects of the S&ED’s identity: “we discussed ways that broaden 
and institutionalize our bilateral relationship on climate change, recognizing, as we both 
do, that this is a long-term investment for our people and for the people on the planet.” 
 Vice Premier Wang Yang, during the same 2016 Joint Session on Climate 
Change Remarks highlights the dialogic principles of the S&ED as helping reach 
agreement on climate change issues. Wang Yang explains that, “The Chinese and 
American representatives had in-depth and candid discussions on the next steps of the 
Paris agreement and the bilateral cooperation. They came to a lot of common 
understanding and produced positive outcomes.” From this, he states that “This meeting 
is quite successful and is a good way to start the S&ED this year.” He continues to 
explain the importance of the agreements reached between the two countries on climate 
change, expressing how it supports the S&ED’s efforts to build a new model of major 
country relations, 
“climate change cooperation has become a bright spot in our efforts to build a 
new model of major country relationship.” And he uses much of the same 
language that describes how the S&ED attempts to bring the U.S. and China 
together, stating: “We will continue with the spirit of cooperation of the Paris 
conference, work for effective implementation of the agreement, constructively 
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participate in the follow-up negotiations, deepen mutual trust, build consensus, 
prevent the implementation of the agreement from going awry.” 
 The two examples provided above demonstrate how the S&ED members apply 
the same language and purpose of the S&ED in promoting positive, cooperative relations 
as well as a new model of major country relations within the specific context of climate 
change. The agreements made on climate change are credited as arising from the 
S&ED’s principle of dialogue. They are also used to symbolize greater cooperation and 
success not just in the area of climate change, but also as a reflection of the dialogue 
mechanism. Finally, these agreements are not an end in and of themselves, but calls for 
further broadening, deepening, and pursuing of more areas for continued cooperation. 
Image management: People-to-People exchange. Another use of image 
management is evident in the description of the S&ED’s Consultation on People-to-
People Exchanges. Within this context, the S&ED’s identity is tied to the promotion of 
understanding, but deemphasizes the role of government-to-government discussions and 
stresses the importance of people-to-people diplomacy. U.S. Secretary of State Kerry 
during the 2016 S&ED at the Consultation on People-to-People Exchange session states 
that the 2016 CPE represents the “seventh version of the consultation on the people-to-
people exchange. It is a terrific baby of seven years, and she is growing very, very well.” 
He cites the importance of educational, cultural, scientific, and sport exchanges, noting 
that “There’s been a lot of really great work done by our delegations…And I’d like just 
say to everybody this is the best of diplomacy. This is what diplomacy is all about. This 
is how you really change things.” The focus on changing the relationship aligns with the 
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S&ED’s overall goal of avoiding typical, great power rivalries, to which the CPE helps 
actualize by promoting trust and understanding not among high-ranking officials, but 
bringing together people from both countries’ citizenry. 
 For instance, Kerry, after reviewing the number of students studying in China 
and the U.S., explains how these exchanges serve the purpose of the S&ED in promoting 
mutual understanding for the purpose of enhancing cooperation. He states that students 
“are sampling each other’s cultures and gaining a very personal appreciation of the 
potential for cooperation between the United States and China.” He details why this 
sampling of cultures is important, notably in order to gain understanding and promote 
trust, values the S&ED ascribes to promote: 
“And that is enormously important news because it’s human nature to gear the 
unknown. And for many years, as we know, people built up barriers between us. 
It is a welcome fact that education and knowledge that comes with it are the 
greatest builders that there are of confidence and trust” 
The importance of building trust again highlights the looming challenge facing U.S.-
China relations, that of strategic distrust, or the belief that both countries’ long term 
goals are in opposition to each other’s, leading to great power rivalry. The S&ED’s 
image in this case is shown consistently as addressing this problem, but approaching it 
not through government-to-government relations, but people-to-people. 
Secretary Kerry then suggests, as the S&ED’s identity does so too, that more 
outcomes should be reached to further deepen these relationships. Kerry states: “we need 
to find as many joint projects as we can to move forward in a variety of fields covering 
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each of the six pillars we’re already working around.” He then moves into these areas 
where they two countries can promote more exchanges, specifically in the field of 
health. Kerry notes that, “the vice premier and I were engaged in a deep conversation 
about how we can grow this [doctor exchanges]. And one of the things that we 
committed to grow is our engagement in building health capacity and engagement in the 
health sector.” The referencing of his “deep conversation” with his Chinese counterpart 
further supports the dialogic ideals of the S&ED, demonstrating that these conversations 
take place and are resulting in new ideas being tested, shared, and then acted upon. As 
the 2016 CPE Fact Sheet explains, mutual understanding is the primary goal of the 
S&ED’s CPE functions: “The active involvement of civil society and academia in U.S.-
China exchanges promotes mutual understanding through collaboration and inquiry.” 
 Finally, the use of the S&ED’s CPE supports the dialogue mechanism’s 
organizational identity, as seen by a statement by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry 
regarding the growth on Confucius Institutes in the U.S. Here Kerry provides a local 
image drawing upon Chinese culture. Kerry first praises the growth in Chinese 
Confucius Institutes as another means by promoting cultural exchange, before explaining 
that, “Among the many examples of Confucius’ wisdoms is his statement that: ‘In order 
to establish oneself, one should try to establish others; and that in order to enlarge 
oneself, one should try to enlarge others.” This statement represents the goals of the 
S&ED, that is, of mutual cooperation and benefit for both the U.S. and China, to which 
Kerry makes explicit, stating: “That’s the best definition that I’ve heard of a win-win 
proposition. And that is precisely the kind of thinking that I hope will guide relations 
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between the American and Chinese peoples for generations to come.” Thus, the S&ED’s 
image is adapted to directly speak to the context specific audience, that of Chinese 
citizens and leaders by framing its values as congruent with Chinese culture. 
 These examples demonstrate the image of the S&ED is being used in a slightly 
different way to conform to the rhetorical situation in which it is being presented, that is, 
the Consultation of People Exchanges. While it emphasizes the people-to-people 
element of U.S.-China cooperation, it nonetheless still draws upon the S&ED’s 
organizational identity as promoting understanding, enacting dialogue, deriving more 
outcomes, and pursuing win-win relations. Finally, U.S. Secretary of State Kerry clearly 
embodies Conrad’s (2011) definition of organizational image rhetoric as forging 
symbolic links to the audience’s cultural beliefs with his use of the quote from 
Confucius which he appropriates as justifying the S&ED’s pursuit of positive relations 
with China. 
 Taken together, the image management rhetoric of officials at the S&ED affirms 
the organization’s identity as uniquely capable of producing results by bringing people 
together to discuss a range of issues through dialogic consideration of one another’s 
perspectives in context specific ways. The diplomatic speech of U.S. and Chinese 
officials, though repetitive, consistently affirms a worldview whereby the two sides 
cooperate together by providing the terminologies to describe and view these relations as 
well as introducing a wide range of evidence testifying to their success. This creates 
numerous tangible symbols of positive relations which audiences are privy to further 
supporting the countries pursuit of positive relations. 
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Organizational Reputation 
 Rather than making sense of the world in rational fashion, human beings instead 
make sense of their environments through narratives (Fisher). The public addresses 
made by U.S. and Chinese officials taking part in the S&ED repeatedly provide stories 
to their audinces weaving in past instances of U.S.-China cooperation to those taking 
place during the dialogues, serving as another rhetorical device upon which they scaffold 
positive U.S.-China relations. From Conrad’s (2011) perspective, this can be understood 
as the process of symbolically recreating past experiences and bringing them into their 
encounters with the S&ED. These stories largely take two forms: first, legitimizing the 
outcomes and progress of previous S&ED meetings; and second, tying the S&ED to 
historical instances of U.S.-China cooperation. Thus, the S&ED’s identity and purpose 
are further supported as producing change as well as continuity in positive U.S.-China 
relations. 
Narratives of past, present, and future success of the S&ED. U.S. and 
Chinese officials draw upon past S&ED meetings to legitimize the effects of the S&ED 
in producing both specific results as well as developing cooperative relations. These 
narratives help chart the success of the previous S&EDs and project them to the current 
S&ED meetings as well as suggesting future success. This is already clearly seen by the 
2011 S&ED, where U.S. Secretary of State Clinton explains how: “Dear colleagues, the 
past and the present have proven, and the future will prove, that nothing can hold back 
the trend of China-U.S. cooperation.” She continues by tying the “confidence” of 
officials taking part in the S&ED to the “aspirations of our two people,” by stating: “Our 
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confidence comes from the broad, common interests between our two countries, the 
shared aspiration of our two peoples, as well as from historical and philosophical 
reflections.” This shared aspiration will help the S&ED “implement the important 
agreement reached between our two presidents, and deepen our cooperation in 
economic, trade, investment, financial infrastructure, and other fields in an all-around 
way.” Clinton’s statement thus rhetorically invites the public to participate in this 
narrative of positive U.S.-China relations ascribing them a role as further helping serve 
the presidents’ overarching vision.  
 The next year at the 2012 S&ED, U.S. Treasury Secretary Geithner similarly 
demonstrates the positive trajectory of U.S.-China relations, but does so by 
acknowledging the difficulties it has overcome, He begins by citing President Obama 
and explains, “In 2009, at the outset of our first S&ED, President Obama said: ‘I have no 
illusion that the United States and China will agree on every issue, nor see the world the 
same way.’” And yet, despite these differences, Geithner argues that this “only makes 
dialogue more important—so that we can know each other better, and communicate our 
concerns with candor.” He continues by using a metaphor of “investment”—apt 
considering his position as Treasury Secretary—explaining that because of the 
presidents’ commitment to dialogue and officials practicing of it through the past three 
years of S&ED meetings the outcomes reached reflect both presidents’ “very substantial 
and important investment” which is, according to Geithner, led to “The specific areas of 
progress I have just reviewed [being] the result of that investment.” Finally, Geithner 
explains that this investment will continue to pay dividends in that the future will 
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likewise “reflect our commitment to continue to work closely with China.” Geithner’s 
narrative thus highlights the presidents as the major characters facing diverging views 
that through their directives help achieve consensus on important issues. 
A more extended example of narrative tying past S&EDs to the present can be 
found with Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang’s 2015 address. He notes, “In the past 
seven years, the S&ED has grown broader and stronger, acquiring a richer agenda and 
better format, and producing more fruitful results.” Wang Yang goes into specifics 
regarding the economic track dialogues, where he explains that the previous two rounds 
of economic dialogue held by the current team’s special representatives, yielded “over 
170 outcomes in various fields. Substantive progress has been made on major issues, 
including BIT negotiation, climate change, and ITA expansion, injecting positive energy 
to China-U.S. relations and common development of the world.” While these represent 
the recent present, he focuses on the future growth of these agreements, stating: “Some 
outcomes may seem insignificant at this stage, but once nurtured by the fountain of 
opportunity, these seedlings will grow into large fields.”  
Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang continues his narratives of past, present, and 
future, explaining how these successes of the S&ED mark “not just an expectation for 
the future, but also a summary of the past.” From the past he affirms the value of the 
S&ED: “More importantly, the dialogue mechanism itself shows the commitment of 
both governments to work together for win-win results,” and explains how the S&ED 
functions to produce better relations, stating: “it [S&ED] is conducive to boosting the 
confidence of people and companies of the two countries in developing closer 
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cooperation and exchanges.” He then provides specific examples of this like the number 
of Chinese and Americans traveling across the Pacific, the level of trade between the two 
countries, as well as the role of bilateral exports and investments creating tens of 
thousands of jobs for Americans. From all of this he concludes that,  
“With such convergence of the two countries’ interests, which has gone beyond 
many people’s imagination, neither of us could afford the cost of noncooperation 
or even all-out confrontation. Our high-level, multidimensional dialogue is a 
testament to the greater maturity of relations between our two nations. Dialogue 
helps us understand each other’s thinking and get to the crux of how to make 
cooperation work and better handle differences.” 
Vice Premier Wang Yang’s narrative legitimizes the S&ED’s identity regarding the level 
of outcomes it has produced, its impact on people’s lives, and the dialogic values it 
enshrines. As the past and present suggest, the S&ED is a story of successful bilateral 
relations. 
 These narrative themes are most repeated during the latter, more reflective stage 
of the S&ED in its final few years, in part because there is more to look back upon. For 
instance, Chinese President Xi Jinping at the 2016 S&ED invokes the image of hard 
work, noting that, “Hard work pays off and our efforts over the past three years have 
come to fruition” before then specifying how the “consultative efforts” between the two 
countries have led to cooperation on a variety of levels, including “bilateral, regional, 
and global levels.” Xi provides examples of this in that “We witnessed record highs in 
trade and two-way investment, enjoyed closer people-to-people and subnational 
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exchanges, and made new headway in cooperation in cyberspace, law enforcement, and 
military-to-military exchanges.” 
 In addition to legitimizing the success of the S&ED, interestingly these narratives 
are also used to suggest greater progress and continued commitment by those involved in 
the dialogue mechanism. For instance, U.S. Secretary of State Kerry at the 2014 S&ED 
explains that “the importance of this dialogue that we are having these two days really 
couldn’t be any clearer” evident by what “we have achieved over the course of the last 
five years.” He projects the narrative of the S&ED into the future by stating, “And, 
despite our differences, our two nations have the ability to find common ground.” 
However, he ends by calling for greater commitment to build upon the foundation 
already laid: “That is the foundation on which we need to build decades of prosperity in 
the future, and also build the possibilities of stability and peace at the same time.” The 
very idea of “laying a foundation” demands one builds something upon it. As such, it 
calls upon U.S. and Chinese officials to remain committed to pursuing their efforts, 
noting that their past work has been done with the expectation of future growth.  
The metaphor of the S&ED as laying a foundation is most frequently invoked 
during the earlier S&EDs, however, it continues to be used throughout the S&ED 
meetings. For instance, at the 2009 S&ED, U.S. Secretary of State Clinton argued that 
the “result” of the 2009 S&ED is “that we have laid the foundation for a positive, 
cooperative and comprehensive relationship for the 21st century.” Again at the 2010 
S&ED she states, “We know that this gathering, in and of itself, is a foundation for 
ongoing cooperation that to take place every day at every level of our government.” 
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Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo echoes Clinton’s 2009 remarks, almost verbatim, 
during his statement in 2009; “We look forward to continuing our discussions today as 
we lay the foundation for a positive, cooperative and comprehensive economic 
relationship between our two nations.” The word “foundation” is also used throughout 
the S&EDs as a platform for building trust, expanding state-to-state relations, and 
continued cooperation.  
 Narrative logics are an important sensemaking tool for those to understand what 
the S&ED is about, especially in promoting a narrative of success to deflect criticisms 
regarding its effectiveness, as well as those involved. The consistent narrative of the 
S&ED’s continued work, through the idea of having laid the foundation for greater 
growth in relations demonstrates how narratives also impact those involved in 
discussions of the S&ED. Regardless, the invocation of these narratives reflect the 
reputation of the S&ED by recreating positive, past experiences while suggesting that 
the future holds the same. While this form of narrative might be less poetic, perhaps 
even bureaucratic in the sense that it is focused on retelling the number of outcomes the 
S&ED has produced, U.S. and Chinese officials also present a second narrative form by 
placing the S&ED within a historical context of larger patterns of U.S.-China 
cooperation. 
Narratives of past U.S.-China relations. U.S. and Chinese officials draw upon 
narratives reflecting their broader history of cooperation as well as lessons from 
historical great power conflict to affirm the S&ED. For instance, during his first meeting 
at the S&ED in 2013, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry opens his remarks by citing the 
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history of U.S.-China cooperation over the past decades. He notes that “I had the 
privilege of sitting with the State councilor in the Diaoyutai Guesthouse, right in the very 
room where Henry Kissinger received an invitation for President Nixon to visit with 
Mao Zedong.” He ties that historic meeting to the present and future, by noting “And I 
think it is fair to say that since then there’s been a remarkable journey between our 
countries…but we still have a lots of steps we can take together.” He continues to do so 
with a personal anecdote justifying the need and success of the S&ED: 
“When I first went to China in the early 1990s as a senator, that cooperation 
simply didn’t exist. But today, thanks to initiatives like this dialogue, we know 
that is possible, but not only possible but absolutely essential that if we’re going 
to meet the global challenges facing both of our countries we need to find ways 
to cooperate together more effectively.” 
After continuing to review the larger history of U.S.-China cooperation, he 
focuses more specifically on the S&ED, again reiterating how the dialogue mechanism 
has been successful and continues to help advance U.S.-China cooperation. He notes 
how “The first Strategic and Economic Dialogue was really a landmark event,” even 
calling it a “new chapter” in U.S.-China relations. This new chapter has “with each 
passing year, we have been able to build on this dialogue and we now, I think, made it 
into the key mechanism for managing cooperation and competition between our 
countries.” Finally he affirms that “that this dialogue is important to our ability to be 
able to manage conflict, even as we have differences between us.” Thus, Kerry’s 
narrative places the S&ED into the larger context of U.S.-China relations whereby 
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cooperation existed—during Kissinger-Nixon meeting, appeared to wane—his 
experience as a Senator in the 1990s, and is growing and especially important for today. 
Secretary of State Kerry again, in 2014, provides a historical narrative of U.S.-
China relations. He states, “I wanted to thank all of you today for the privilege for all of 
us to be able to be here to not just have this strategic dialogue, but also to celebrate the 
35 (inaudible) years of diplomatic relations between the United States and China.” He 
continues his narrative of the history of U.S.-China relations, citing the “historic 
handshake” between U.S. President Richard Nixon and Chinese President Mao Zedong:  
“Back in 1972 it was a handshake between two leaders that was the leading edge 
of America’s engagement with China. Two hands, two leaders met across the 
great divide. Today, it’s in all of our hands to be able to realize the full promise 
of our partnership.” 
Here Kerry showcases the change in relations whereby previously it was measured just 
by the two presidents’ handshake, to now including many hands, a reference to the new 
approach which the S&ED takes in bringing together numerous officials to discuss a 
range of topics.  
 The Chinese side also provide a couple of historical narratives at the 2015 
S&ED. Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi, like Kerry mentions the historic opening of 
relations between the U.S. and China, but before he does so, goes even farther back in 
history, noting how 2015 also marks “the 70th anniversary of the founding of the United 
Nations.” With this in mind, Yang Jiechi pledges China’s commitment to upholding the 
international architecture set up following WWII. He states, “We hope that we can work 
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together to uphold the outcome of victory of the Second World War, continue to follow 
norms governing international relations with the UN charter at its core.” Yang Jiechi 
then turns to the history of U.S.-China relations, stating “China and the United States 
opened the door to diplomatic engagement in 1972. Despite ups and downs in our 
bilateral relations, this relationship has followed the right track in general, and both 
countries have benefited from this relationship.” Yang Jiechi’s reflection thus matches 
Secretary Kerry’s, noting the ebbs and flows of cooperation between the two countries. 
Yang then continued by focusing positively on the continued benefits cooperation 
between the two nations will have. His point is that “Areas of cooperation far outnumber 
the areas of competition,” to which he ties to areas of cooperation under the S&ED, such 
as water conservancy projects, cooperation in Africa, and scientific and technology 
exchanges. Yang Jiechi even agrees with U.S. officials in the importance “to protect 
intellectual property rights. In this regard, we stand ready for closer cooperation with the 
U.S.” Again, this narrative legitimizes the efficacy of the S&ED, which, over time has 
resulted in China’s commitment to international institutions as well as producing 
multiple outcomes. 
 Sticking within the context of 2015 S&ED, Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang 
also provides lessons derived from history in his narrative on why the S&ED is 
important. He goes farther back yet, citing the “Thucydides trap,” a concept reflecting 
the inevitable conflict between a rising, emergent power in ancient Athens and the status 
quo power, ancient Sparta. He warns,  
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“Some people believe that the Thucydides trap between major countries is 
insurmountable. Some even want China and the United States to confront each 
other. In any case, decision-makers of both countries must always remember that 
confrontation is a negative sum game in which both sides will pay heavy prices 
and the world will suffer too.” 
Wang Yang offers a solution to avoiding the negative outcomes of the Thucydides trap, 
that being dialogue, which the S&ED provides. He cautions, “Talking to each other does 
not create win-win all the time, but both sides will lose in a case of confrontation.” Thus, 
in dealing with that, the U.S. and China must utilize the S&ED: “Our dialogue 
mechanism may not be perfect, but it is an indispensable platform for the two countries 
to increase mutual trust, deepen cooperation, and manage differences.”  
Later in Vice Premier Wang Yang’s 2015 remarks he continues to cite lessons 
from history, tying the problem of great power confrontation to the purpose of the S&ED 
in overcoming this challenge. He explains that, “History teaches us that China and the 
United States must not follow the old path of confrontation and conflict between major 
countries.” His solution is to uphold the patterns of dialogue reflective in the S&ED in 
its pursuit if building a “new model of major country relations.” Wang Yang states:  
“Building a new model of major country relations is an effort to explore a new 
path towards peaceful coexistence. This path may not be smooth and the journey 
could be bumpy, but as a great Chinese writer said: “Originally there is no path – 
but as people walk down the same track and again, a path appears.” I’m 
convinced that we are on the right track.” 
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Thus, historical narratives are used to support the overarching goal of U.S.-China 
cooperation through the S&ED to create a new means by which two great powers can 
cooperate. Wang’s narratives demonstrate to both officials present at the S&ED and 
those observing it that the characters in this story, those being the U.S. and China, are up 
against history. However, making sure that this story does not end tragically, in that the 
characters meet their demise from challenging history’s determinism, Wang and Kerry 
showcase their reflection on the problems they face and stress the positive ways to two 
countries have worked in the past, are working in the present, and will continue to do so 
into the future.  
The examples provided above reflect two narrative strategies through which U.S. 
and Chinese officials affirm the S&ED’s organizational reputation to their global 
audiences. The first, calls up examples of how the S&ED has progressed in reaching 
agreements, thus proving its legitimacy in delivering on actionable areas of cooperative 
relations. The second, draws up shared historical and cultural elements upon which the 
S&ED is placed, again as successful, but more importantly as both a continuation and a 
new creation of U.S.-China relations. It is a continuation in the sense that cooperation 
between the two countries is not altogether a new phenomenon; the Nixon-Mao meeting 
ushered in a transformative shift in the geopolitical landscape with the U.S. and China 
jointly aligning against the Soviet Union. It is a new creation in the sense that both 
country’s leadership recognize historical forces pushing rising and status quo powers to 
conflict and share the means to the public by which the S&ED’s design is to overcome 
these headwinds through its principles of dialogue exercised by its officials on long-
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term, strategic issues. As such, the S&ED’s reputation is tied to its ability to deliver on 
this.  
This section analyzed the organizational rhetoric of the S&ED’s identity, image, 
and reputation management. From this framework, we can understand how the 
diplomatic rhetoric made during the S&ED provides the symbolic means through which 
its domestic and international audiences are to make sense of its functions. First, it 
provides a frame of reference upon which to judge its effectiveness, turning to long-term 
issues defining the larger geopolitical goals of the S&ED thus managing expectations by 
deflecting attention from smaller issues of disagreement to its continued ability to 
deliver specific results. It provides consistency and certainty in the S&ED’s unique 
ability to bring together officials from both countries to dialogically address major issues 
in the relations. Second, the S&ED’s identity is supported through its image 
management rhetoric in more context specific issues and audiences serving to foster 
adherence between the S&ED’s identity to its audiences. Finally, it describes a 
worldview whereby cooperation between the U.S. and China through the S&ED has 
occurred previously and can be expected to do so in the future. The S&ED’s past success 
and lessons from history affirm the dialogue mechanism’s important work and its ability 
to deliver a change in relations capable of overcoming conflictual ones. Thus, this 
section showcased how U.S. and Chinese officials promote a positive organizational 
identity of the S&ED. However, more than just making apparent the S&ED’s success, 
we can also see how the rhetoric employed during the S&ED attempts to connect itself 
to larger values of effective government relations through its value advocacy. 
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Top Down Strategies of the S&ED: Value Advocacy and Discursive Public 
Diplomacy 
 Providing stakeholders a stable, predictable image of U.S.-China relations as a 
function of the S&ED is important enough when discussing the nature of international 
relations. International relations scholars often describe the international environment as 
anarchical, with high-uncertainty and high risk. Indeed, Measrchimer’s (2014) theory 
delineating the tragedy of great power politics is based on this, to which he suggests 
great powers must engage in major conflict. Combatting this is the very purpose of the 
S&ED, and thus also its goals in publicizing its efforts. In the words of Chinese Vice 
Premier Wang at the 2009 S&ED, the bilateral mechanism helps “signal to the world 
that China and the United States would join hands...and work together for better future 
of China-U.S. relations.” However, a second implication can be drawn from the 
organizational rhetoric literature on values advocacy and its tie in to discursive public 
diplomacy. 
 Bostdorff and Vibbert (1994) argue that organizations routinely engage in value 
advocacy, and provide a model presenting with three means by which they do so: image 
enhancement, deflection of criticism, and establishing premises that can be used in later 
discourse. Organizations using value advocacy to enhance their organizational image 
thereby assert control over their public image as well as the public’s evaluative 
perceptions of the organizations activities encouraging publics to act in certain ways. 
Organizations thus engage in values advocacy by associating their “products, services, or 
way of doing business as worthwhile societal goals” and discuss the philanthropic 
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activities they are involved in (p.147). This explication of organizational value advocacy 
reflects, in part, the purposes of discursive public diplomacy; however, their focus on 
organizations as the primary agent in managing their audience falls short of the two-way, 
dialogic emphasis and its importance argued by the recent literature on public 
diplomacy. 
Critiquing the public diplomacy literature on exchange programs and public 
relations, Proedrou and Frangonkolopoulos (2012) call for public diplomacy scholars to 
elevate the field of study to that of discursive public diplomacy. First, they argue that the 
focus on cultural and educational exchanges not only narrows the role of public 
diplomacy but have frequently been ineffectual. This emphasis on making foreign 
individuals carriers of ideas, worldviews, and norms that are friendly to the campaigning 
state, although important, is “both limiting as well as misleading.” (p. 732). For instance, 
educational exchanges and cultural promotion have not succeeded in creating a friendly 
global environment by selling images through commercials (Melissen, 2005) or dealing 
with larger issues such as winning nations over in support of international trade policies, 
or promotion of a common rule-based international order (Proedrou & 
Frangonkolopoulos, 2012). While these are limitations of exchange programs, they note 
that this is “not to downgrade the benefits stemming from cultural activities, nor to 
advocate their termination. The point is that those are efforts alone are inadequate and 
there is urgent need for public diplomacy to work on a broadened thematic agenda that 
does not leave out any of the paramount global issues” (p. 733).  
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Second, Proedrou and Frangonkolopoulos (2012) critique other public diplomacy 
attempts related to PR efforts to sell brands or coin mottos to move foreign audiences as 
also problematic as they fail to leave space for discursive interaction creating lasting 
relationships. While the new public diplomacy claims to be moving away from 
monological communication, mass audiences are undeniably moved by images, slogans, 
and mottos (Sproule, 1988). And yet, PR campaigns designed to address short term 
policy support fails to engage audiences in developing lasting relationships and thus 
lacks this discursive process (Leanard, Stead, & Smewing, 2002) by which people are 
persuaded in the longer term to share and identify with the values and benefits of such 
policies. Thus, according to Proedrou and Frangonkolopoulos, “the aim here is to contest 
the orthodoxy of organizing public diplomacy campaigns around specific, powerful 
messages that allow little space for dialogue, or raise the paramount importance of 
dialogue, and to examine how public diplomacy can become substantially discursive” 
(734). 
Proedrou and Frangonkolopoulos (2012) further argue that to understand how 
certain meanings come into being we must attune to the discursive aspect of 
communication and the organizations that advocate for them. “The goal of public 
diplomacy should be to explain fully one’s policies and show how they contribute to the 
delivery of global public goods” (734). This requires the building of mutually beneficial 
relationships with internal and foreign publics with regards to issues ranging from peace 
and security to human rights, international law, and sustainable development. As such, 
Proedrou and Frangonkolopoulos call for a strategic shift in public diplomacy by 
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reorienting the thematic focus of public diplomacy away from predominant issues of 
culture, education, and identity to larger, global threats common and relevant for all 
parts of the global population. 
 The practice of discursive public diplomacy, according to Proedrou and 
Frangonkolopoulos (2012), suggests we look at the sphere of knowledge, ideas and 
discourse. This sphere is the global realm of the mind, where information and power are 
increasingly intertwined. State and non-state actors then advance and debate ideas, 
values, norms, and arguments taking into account the interests and preferences of the 
wider society. This process includes attempts by governments to persuade foreign 
audiences as well as aligning their policies to internal publics by identifying, analyzing, 
and synthesizing public opinion and then disseminating polices and their critiques in 
order to formulate convincing arguments through persuasive counter-arguments. Thus, 
“public diplomacy then can create hubs for discussion, argumentation, counter-
argumentation, and feedback” (p. 737). Finally, this process results in public diplomacy 
becoming reflexive in understanding the shortcomings and deficiencies of one’s own 
policies. 
While elevating public diplomacy to operate on the discursive level supports the 
ideals of the new public diplomacy in its efforts to become truly dialogic, issues of 
power and access challenge the extent to which only issues of the largest, global 
concerns are shared and debated by all. Proedrou and Frangonkolopoulos’ (2012) 
perspective rests on the extent to which we have a global civil society. Norris and 
Inglehart (2009) have challenged this perspective by demonstrating how firewalls exist, 
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including technology, culture, and educational levels, inhibiting and complicating the 
influence of globalization and international communication to changes in societal and 
political values. Issues of power and questions of international agenda setting similarly 
push back against the idea of freely debated and equally participated global public 
sphere. Furthermore, Proedrou and Frangonkolopoulos, while trying to broaden public 
diplomacy focus their attention on the engagement in larger debates of global 
significance. This paradoxically limits public diplomacy to only issues of global concern 
thereby ignoring attempts to debate or resolve local issues or regional relationship 
development between global publics.  
 The S&ED engages in a sort of discursive public diplomacy as well as 
organizational value advocacy. These two perspectives are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive, and indeed when looking at the organizational rhetoric of the S&ED, 
integrating the two can help better make sense of its messaging. The annual S&ED 
meetings sets the agenda for U.S.-China relations, constituting itself as serving domestic 
and global publics as well suggesting the value upon which to judge international 
relations to be that of dialogue, encompassing respect for differing national conditions 
and its focus on mutual beneficial issues. Officials at the S&ED make sure to engage 
their counterparts, domestic, and global audiences by explaining what issues the S&ED 
is to address, as well as what publics it attempts to benefit. Nonetheless, it is the high-
ranking government officials that are defining these issues, not global publics. Because 
of this, Bostdorff and Vibbert’s (1994) perspective is still relevant to understanding the 
value advocacy the S&ED engages in, especially in their controlling of the S&ED’s 
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image regarding how audiences should evaluate it as well as associating its “products,” 
that of tangible outcomes benefiting local and global publics. 
Image Enhancement Rhetoric of the S&ED 
Officials participating in the S&ED definitely describe the organization’s image 
by defining how to measure U.S.-China cooperation as well as how its efforts help their 
domestic publics and the global public. In doing so, the measurement of the S&ED is the 
extent to which cooperation and dialogue leads to tangible benefits for U.S., Chinese, 
and world citizens. As U.S. Secretary of State Clinton shares in the 2010 S&ED, “Our 
job, moving forward, is to translate that common interest into common action and, in 
turn, to translate that action into results that improve the lives of our people, and 
contribute to global progress.” She continues in 2010 to cite the S&ED’s values of 
dialogue as needing to yield tangible results: 
“The success of the U.S.-China relationship will ultimately be measured by the 
results we deliver to our people. Do our dialogues and our collaborations produce 
changes that people see in their daily lives, and that contribute to global progress 
or not? That is both our challenge and our responsibility.” 
At the 2013 S&ED, Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang explains the measure of 
the S&ED as the “job” it is supposed to work at which is again, tangible benefits. He 
shares, “Our job, in this forum of the S&ED, is to turn the important agreement between 
the two presidents into tangible outcomes and add substance to this new model of major 
country relationship so as to bring benefits to the people of the two countries and the 
world around.” The need to produce outcomes affecting people’s lives is also noted in 
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the 2016 S&ED by U.S. Treasury Secretary Jack Lew. He explains that “the test by 
which we should judge the value of the S&ED” is whether they have created “conditions 
that help people achieve their aspirations, including by expanding economic 
opportunities through our bilateral relationship.” Thus, the “product” or “service” the 
S&ED provides are specific outcomes and these products are argued to help each 
country’s publics. 
 Finally, in addition to outcomes affecting people’s lives, U.S. Secretary of State 
Kerry in 2015 defines the “truest measure” as that of building friendships between the 
two countries. He states: 
 “as President Xi said, we have different systems, different culture, different 
history. We acknowledge that. We respect that. But the value of our ties is most 
clearly respected and reflected in outside-of-government meeting rooms – in 
busy work places, academic settings, scientific laboratories, music halls, athletic 
fields, and in the freedom of daily communication between our people, which 
President Xi referred to, and the numbers of people who are going back and forth 
between our countries. That is where the health and security of our future 
relationship will find its truest measure, and that is where the most telling of our 
official policies is ultimately going to be played out.” 
Thus, another product the S&ED provides is creating the networks and opportunities for 
those outside of the U.S. and Chinese government to collaborate and advance their own 
professional interests. Thus, officials’ rhetoric at the S&ED makes an argument that the 
organization is “good” and does not represent a G2 type arrangement carving out spheres 
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of influence or developing policies advantageous to only to the two nations involved, nor 
is it just a means by which elite officials only advance their own interests, but ultimately 
its people’s.  
 This definition of the S&ED’s measure of success takes another form by 
mythologizing U.S.-China cooperation as heroically capable of creating world peace and 
development. From this, we get the picture of the S&ED benefiting the U.S., China, and 
the world because of the very importance of U.S.-China relations to global stability and 
prosperity. Throughout the S&EDs, officials make sure to stress the importance of the 
bilateral relationship, connecting its success as directly tied to the S&ED. For instance, 
at the 2010 S&ED, Chinese President Hu Jintao explains how the S&ED’s purpose of 
building positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relations helps serve U.S., Chinese, 
and global interests. He announces that “to build a positive, cooperative, and 
comprehensive China-U.S. relationship for the 21st century is in the fundamental interest 
of our two countries and two peoples. It also meets the need to promote world peace and 
development.” Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo likewise in 2010 notes the 
importance of the S&ED in serving U.S., Chinese, and global interests: “We believe that 
the China-U.S. relationships is critical to both countries and the whole world.” At the 
2011 and 2013 S&ED, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden notes the need of U.S.-China 
cooperation to solve global issues due to their size and influence in world affairs. In 
2011, Biden states, “And for many of the world’s pressing challenges, it’s a simple fact, 
that when the United States and China are not at the table, the solution to the problem is 
less possible than when we are at the table,” and in 2013, “mechanisms like the Strategic 
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and Economic Dialogue play an important role in managing our complex relationship. If 
together we get it right, we can leave behind a much better future for our children and 
for their children, and quite frankly, for the world.” 
The S&ED’s principle value of dialogue is cited as helping the world achieve 
peace. At the 2013 S&ED, Vice Premier Wang Yang explains: 
For us, candid dialogue and sincere cooperation remains the right direction. We 
need to raise our strategic, mutual trust to new heights through dialogue, and trust 
starts with communication and exchanges. The more communication exchanges 
we have, the less misunderstanding and disagreement. We also need to forge new 
consensus on upholding world peace and development through dialogue.”  
U.S. Secretary of State Kerry at the 2014 S&ED, likewise states: “When the 
opportunities for a positive, open, and constructive relationship between the United 
States and China grow, the possibilities for peace and prosperity in the world grow even 
more.” Again, at the 2015 S&ED, Chinese Vice Premier Liu Yandong explains how the 
S&ED creates the values upon which benefits will accrue for the U.S., China, and the 
world: “the role of the S&ED and CPE to promote mutual trust and cooperation between 
the two countries and to ensure that the bilateral ties will bring benefits to people of the 
two countries and people of the entire world.”  
One more example from the 2016 S&ED comes from Chinese President Xi 
Jinping. He lists a range of issues upon which the two sides can cooperate and 
communicate on. In doing so, again he affirms the positive image of the S&ED and its 
products’ benefits for the world. Xi calls on the U.S. and China to “deepen the exchange 
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in the cooperation in climate change development, cyber issues, counterterrorism, 
nonproliferation, military-to-military relations, and law enforcement” by enhancing and 
“step[ping] up communication and coordination on major international and regional 
issues, as well as issues of global significance.” The purpose, in Xi’s words is so that 
“we could bring more real benefits to our people and provide more public goods for 
greater peace, stability, and the prosperity of the world.” 
Value Advocacy of the S&ED: Deflecting Criticism and Value Premises 
The second importance of organization’s value advocacy attempts is that of 
deflecting criticism of the organization. Scholars and academics have criticized the 
S&ED, questioning its efficacy in addressing major concerns in U.S.-China relations. 
Members of the S&ED themselves have cited this, like U.S. Vice President Biden at the 
2013 S&ED, where he notes “There are strong voices on both sides of the Pacific that 
talk about a relationship in terms of mistrust and suspicion…I’ve heard the U.S.-China 
relationship described as everything from the next Cold War to the new G-2.” According 
to Bostdorff and Vibbert (1994) values advocacy helps deflect these criticism by 
providing the organization with credibility and as well as tying it to societal virtues, 
which is a central component of discursive public diplomacy. From Castells’ (2009) 
theorization of communication power, this aspect of the S&ED can be seen as 
constituting a network of relations by programming the terms of the goals assigned and 
the ensuring the cooperation of different networks by sharing common goals. The 
credibility of the S&ED comes from both its ability to produce outcomes, which the 
section on its organizational reputation demonstrated, as well as the noble values of 
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dialogue, characterized by cooperation, mutual trust and benefit, which the section 
discussing the S&ED’s identity covered. Thus, as the examples provided throughout this 
chapter have already demonstrated these values are used to benefit not just the U.S. and 
Chinese governments, or even their own domestic audiences, but also the world, 
reflected in the importance of the U.S.-China relations. The rather measured values 
incorporating dialogue are, self-evidently fair. After all, who could argue against win-
win solutions to pressing global problems?  
The affirmation of listening to each side helps prevent one country from calling 
foul, but makes forcing the two countries to deal with sensitive issues difficult. With the 
case of the S&ED, its value advocacy and institutional discourse provides premises that 
are frequently called upon to deflect criticism both to external audiences and themselves. 
The fact that the S&ED as an organization does not have one “corporate head,” but two, 
that is the Chinese and the U.S. president, results in a blurring of Bostdorff and Vibbert’s 
(1994) final two steps of value advocacy, those being deflection of criticism and setting 
up values premises. Indeed, the value premises play an important role in deflecting 
internal and external criticism of those involved with the S&ED and the S&ED’s ability 
to produce converging interests. Thus, the final purpose of value advocacy, that of 
establishing value premises, occurs concurrently with the second within the S&ED 
rhetoric, which I turn to next. 
 The final function of value advocacy is that of setting up values as premises 
through which organizations can call upon in later discourse. Bostdorff and Vibbert 
(1994) explain, value premises functions as warrants which allow corporate 
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communicators to later draw upon them to gain audience acceptance of a specific claim. 
It lays the groundwork for contentious policy arguments. While Bostdorff and Vibbert 
(1994) are focusing on corporate value advocacy, in the case of the S&ED, value 
advocacy plays an important role in deflecting conflict and criticism amongst U.S. and 
Chinese officials at the S&ED in areas where they disagree. 
The value of dialogue, articulated during the first S&ED in 2009, is later used to 
justify to external audiences why disagreements remain. For instance, at the 2010 
S&ED, U.S. Secretary of State Clinton uses dialogue as a justification as to why 
disagreements remain between the U.S. and China. She states, “Now, as we have said 
many times, we do not agree on every issue. We don’t agree even sometimes on the 
perception of the issue. But that is partly what this dialogue is about.” She continues by 
listing two issues the U.S. deeply believes in, that of human rights and Taiwan. “It [the 
S&ED] is a place where we can discuss everything, as State Councilor Dai Bingguo 
said, from Taiwan to universal human rights.” Thus, while the U.S. delegation is unable 
to make good on issues important to its domestic audience, the S&ED’s stated value of 
working through dialogue helps to show that progress is still made because the two are at 
least talking about this issue.  
 Again, at the 2011 S&ED, U.S. Vice President Biden notes that agreement on 
every issue is not something to worry about because the S&ED is still able to find other 
areas of agreement as it allows the two sides to enhance communication, understanding, 
trust, and confidence. He explains that, “Our goal -- our goal, in part, is to enhance the 
communication and understanding that we believe, and I believe you believe, will build 
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trust and confidence.” To do so, he states, “We have to be honest with each other. We 
are not going to agree on everything; we will clearly find areas where there will still be 
disagreement.” Biden further minimizes the areas of disagreement by stressing how 
finding new areas of agreement is what really matters. He states:   
“But as we work to advance our respective national interest, we have to move on 
what we seek in common, find the common ground…But only by discussing a 
diverse range of topics, including sensitive ones, can we help mitigate the risk of 
misperception and miscalculation.” 
Like Biden, Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang at the 2015 S&ED clearly communicates 
the value of dialogue as a positive means to understand why disagreements remain. He 
notes, “On some issues, perhaps, consensus still eludes us.” Despite this, the practice of 
dialogue helps manage these differences. Wang Yang explains “However, talking to 
each other could help pave the way to finding a solution, or at least help keep our 
differences under control.” He then specifically addresses public expectations of the 
S&ED, stating: “Although dialogue may fall short of expectation, and sometimes 
nothing much is achieved, leaving everybody unhappy, yet it would always be more 
preferable than confrontation.” Here again, we see that the officials at the S&ED are 
cognizant of external audiences’ expectations and use the value of dialogue to manage 
them. 
Incumbent within the value of dialogue is respect for the other’s experiences. In 
the case of the S&ED, we can Chinese President Hu Jintao at the 2010 S&ED utilizing 
this aspect of dialogue in naturalizing differences, citing how the two countries come 
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from different socio-political and cultural upbringings. Hu explains that “admittedly, 
China and the United States differ in national condition” thus, “it is only natural that the 
two sides may disagree on some issues.” Instead of focusing on these differences, Hu 
goes on to state what is “important,” citing the values of dialogue such as respecting and 
accommodating the other: “What is important is to respect and accommodate each 
others’ core interests and major concerns, appropriately handle the sensitive issues and 
strengthen the foundation of mutual trust.” 
Likewise, Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang at the 2014 S&ED explains that the 
two countries differ “in terms of national conditions and systems” which “means our 
interests may diverge.” Despite these differences, nonetheless he signals to outsiders that 
“However, each year our two big countries, our two sides, get together and discuss the 
cross-cutting long-term and strategic issues.” Thus, we can the organizational rhetoric of 
the officials at the S&ED attempting to describe to their domestic and international 
audiences how to make sense of their continued differences. These differences are not to 
be cited as evidence of long-term disagreement or the inability of the two countries to 
work together, but instead a practice of dialogue. As Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang 
in 2014 states: 
“many people, they follow very closely on the differences between China and the 
United States, and they have failed to see so many commonalities we share on 
important issues. The S&ED is a vibrant -- it is the constructive interaction 
between two countries with a different culture, system, and point of views.” 
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This premise of different socio-political and cultural histories is used later by the 
Chinese to justify Chinese state action areas of conflict, such as during the 2013 S&ED 
where U.S. and Chinese officials critique and defend each other’s actions on issues of 
human rights and the handling of the Edward Snowden affair. 
Value advocacy is used by U.S. and Chinese officials not just to gain their 
external audiences’ acceptance of remaining differences in U.S.-China relations, but also 
as a means to hold their counterparts accountable. At the 2013 S&ED significant 
frictions arose between the U.S. and Chinese delegation due to cybersecurity issues and 
the Chinese allowance of former U.S. NSA worker, Edward Snowden’s flying out of 
Hong Kong and U.S. concerns over Chinese human rights.  
For instance, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Max Baucus first cites the S&ED’s 
dialogue value when addressing differences, stating “When we encounter differences or 
sensitive issues, we need to address them directly in consultation with one another.” 
With respect to this, he explains “And that is why we were very disappointed with how 
the authorities in Beijing and Hong Kong handled the Snowden case, which undermined 
our effort to build the trust needed to manage difficult issues.” Thus, the U.S. is arguing 
that China acted inappropriately, that is not living up to the values and goals of the 
S&ED. He continues this by stating “Over the past two days, we made clear that China’s 
handling of this case was not consistent with the spirit of Sunnylands or with the type of 
relationship—the new model—that we both seek to build.” He continues utilizing the 
S&ED’s values as the premise to chastise Chinese human rights practices. 
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U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Max Baucus explains that over the two days of 
the 2013 S&ED, the U.S. had raised concerns about human rights in China before 
justifying U.S. criticisms as legitimate given the cooperative values the S&ED is meant 
to establish. He states, “we also expressed our ongoing concerns about human rights in 
China, particularly recent instability in Tibetan and Uighur areas of China.” According 
to Baucus, “The goal of this conversation is to emphasize the importance of human 
rights to the bilateral relationship. We firmly believe that respect for universal rights and 
fundamental freedoms with make China more peaceful, more prosperous, and ultimately 
more secure.” More than just making China prosperous though, Chinese human rights 
actions fail to live up to the “cooperative partnership” of U.S.-China relations in general, 
and enhancing ties between the two people in particular. Baucus states:  
“As we seek to foster a cooperative partnership between our two nations, we 
must also continue to build ties not only between governments but also between 
our peoples. Our growing people-to-people contacts may be the most 
consequential and enduring legacy of our diplomacy.” 
Thus, the Chinese are in violation of the principle values of the S&ED. However, they 
also utilize previous value warrants to justify their actions.  
 At the same 2013 S&ED, the Chinese side makes sure to respond to the U.S. 
accusations of failing to live up to the values enshrined within the S&ED. Chinese State 
Councilor Yang Jiechi provides a justification of China’s actions by noting that China is 
in a different development stage compared to the U.S. as well as having different 
historical, cultural, and social systems that make complete agreement on issues like 
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human rights difficult to compare, both issues laid forth in previous S&ED meetings. 
First, Yang Jiechi upholds the values of the S&ED, stating how the Chinese and U.S. 
both “praised the important role of the S&ED in expanding cooperation and managing 
differences between China and the United States.” He then explains, “As two major 
countries different in history, culture, social system, and development stage, China and 
the United States naturally do not always see eye-to-eye on every issue.”  He calls upon 
global norms whereby “all countries, including China and the United States, need to 
have their governments respect basic norms governing international relations and respect 
the choices made by people in other countries.” Part of dialogue is thus respecting the 
other, to which Yang Jiechi calls upon the U.S. to be “objective” in its criticism. Yang 
Jiechi states, 
“We hope the U.S. side will view China’s economic and social development in 
an objective way, and we hope the United States will improve its own human 
rights situation on the basis of mutual respect and no intervention in each other’s 
internal affairs.” 
 Yang Jiechi then notes that the Chinese are still willing to engage the U.S. in dialogue 
on this issue: “We stand ready to continue our human rights dialogue with the United 
States.” 
 Chinese State Yang Jiechi also cites previous value premises in his defense of 
China’s handling of the Snowden affair. First, Yang Jiechi defends China’s actions, 
stating “With regard to the Snowden case, the central government of China has always 
respected the Hong Kong SAR government’s handling of cases in accordance with law, 
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and its approach is beyond reproach.” He then explains that, despite differences in 
opinion on this issue, the purpose of the S&ED and its value of dialogue is to overcome 
these differences. Yang Jiechi states, “I believe China and the United States have 
sufficient wisdom to tap the potential of cooperation between the two sides. We hope 
and believe the two sides have wisdom to manage well our differences.” Finally, he 
responds to U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Baucus’s charge that China is not living up to 
the “model of great power relations.” Yang Jiechi calls on the U.S. representatives to 
“Most importantly, we should stay firmly committed to the cause charted by our 
presidents, follow the principles of mutual respect and win-win cooperation, and 
advance the building of a new model of major country relationship.” 
 Finally, another clear instance of value advocacy can be seen at the 2016 
S&ED’s Consultation of People Exchanges regarding the Chinese government’s 
introduction of a new NGO law. The example provides a mixed, albeit overall positive 
demonstration on how the two dialogically discuss differences. At the CPE plenary, U.S. 
Secretary of State John Kerry calls upon the value of dialogue to express, “I have to say 
that there are a couple of things that still concern us. And in the spirit of the candor 
which brings this dialogue together, I want to just underscore…the view of the United 
States.” Kerry goes on to explain the importance of exchanges as a means for U.S. and 
Chinese citizens to “communicate, to compete, to study, to share experiences in a 
genuine, balanced, and transparent way” without interference from the two countries 
governments. For the U.S., Kerry explains that “in both countries, nongovernmental 
organizations need to be free to help propose, organize, engage, and arrange events that 
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enhance mutual understanding between our countries.” And so, he and his Chinese 
counterpart “talked about this very openly a little while ago and Madam Liu [Chinese 
Vice Premier Liu Yandong] made guarantees to us that the new law regarding NGOs 
will not unduly infringe on the activities of nonprofit organizations that have a presence 
in China.” Thus, clearly the two are demonstrating the role of communication in 
discovering each other’s viewpoints on the issue, align with the principles of dialogue. 
He continues by positively noting that  
“And I appreciate the conversation we had, and I am confident that when this 
new statute is implemented, it is going to be implemented in the good spirit of 
the CPE in a way that makes it easier-not harder-for our people and institutions 
to collaborate.” 
Thus, a possible area of contention is both discussed and justified within the principles 
of the S&ED, that is dialogue, and instead of attacking each other, the two sides appear 
to come to some understanding on the issue, representing the effectiveness of dialogue 
on an issue that was more hotly debated in previous S&ED meetings. 
Value Advocacy as Discursive Public Diplomacy 
The S&ED clearly uses value advocacy in the ways Bostdorff and Vibbert (1994) 
explain as well as a means to engage in what Proedrou and Frangonkolopoulos (2012) 
call discursive public diplomacy. The S&ED invokes its image as one of dialogic 
communication between the U.S. and Chinese officials to deflect criticism from its 
inability to resolve sensitive issues, noting that that is what dialogue is, in part about, 
discovering and acknowledging differences in opinion. This deflection helps manage 
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pressures from both countries’ domestic constituencies wondering why the U.S. cannot 
immediately oblige China to respect human rights in a manner deemed appropriate to 
U.S. audiences, or in the Chinese case, fears that the U.S. is compelling China to 
concede on sensitive issues or not respecting China’s sovereignty. Value advocacy also 
enables officials to critique each other for not living up to the stated principles of the 
S&ED. Both of these aspects, as well as the public speeches affirming the values and 
unique identity of the S&ED thus helps to raise the issues of mutual concern and ensure 
both sides understand the value premises upon which to make agreements. This helps to 
accomplish Proedrou and Frangonkolopoulos’ (2012) explanation of discursive public 
diplomacy as seeking to align governments’ policies internally, that is making sure their 
citizenry and government apparatuses understanding how the two countries are wanting 
to engage each other. It also helps align the S&ED’s rhetoric internally between U.S. and 
Chinese officials through their consistent description of the values and goals of the 
S&ED. 
 Finally, the S&ED’s use of dialogue provides the feedback mechanism Proedrou 
and Frangonkolopoulos’ (2012) discursive public diplomacy calls for. This feedback 
helps promote the dialogic ideal of reflection. Indeed, both sides continually note the 
difficulties of their mission. These difficulties they face require them to always examine 
how they have been successful, as well as where they fall short. In doing, U.S. Secretary 
of State Clinton at the 2010 S&ED explains, “Both sides must, therefore, [must] make 
better use of the S&EDs as an overarching framework for the examination of long-term 
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and strategic issues, and take forward steps to advance the sound development of China-
U.S. economic relations.” Or, as U.S. Secretary of State Kerry shared at the 2015 S&ED: 
“As diplomats, we all know that it is always very easy to just repeat the past 
statements of others rather than try to address the hard questions and resolve 
areas of tension. But the reason our leaders initiated this dialogue is because of 
the incredible potential for further growth and cooperation between China and 
the United States. Sustained growth, however, requires a willingness to 
constantly ask ourselves whether or not there is more that we could do or there’s 
something we could do differently, to ask ourselves whether obstacles to 
progress can be overcome, or fresh opportunities – with a little more daring – that 
we might be able to explore them together.” 
The S&ED’s top-down public diplomacy strategies help define and explain to 
themselves as well as their citizens and the people of the world how they should 
understand what the S&ED attempts to accomplish reflecting its identity, proves in 
specific contexts how it does this through its image and values, and demonstrates that it 
has been successful through its reputation. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to demonstrate that the S&ED is more than just another 
diplomatic tool for greater engagement between U.S. and Chinese government officials.  
Rather, the S&ED helps brand the bilateral relationship as a cooperative one while 
simultaneously building substantive network ties between the two nations’ citizenry. The 
very labeling of the relationship throughout the 2009-2012 S&ED as “positive, 
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cooperative, and comprehensive relations for the 21st century” and later during the 2013-
2016 S&ED as a “new model of major country relations for the 21st century” imbues the 
S&ED with a recurrent buzzword or tagline ostensibly as a means to establish a 
competitive advantage in geopolitical relations where the two sides recognize each 
other’s importance in 21st century world politics as well their ability to cooperate on 
major international issues. Important in construction of this organizational brand is the 
S&ED’s image management rhetoric encompassing its identity, image, and reputation, 
as well as value advocacy. Our conceptualization of geopolitical relations and the 
socialization process by which norms are established ignore this primary communicative 
function of international diplomacy. The legitimacy of the international order and the 
institutions that constitute it are predicated on the ability to establish network ties by 
which governments and publics program the value warrants which make coordination, 
discussion, and solution formation possible. This chapter demonstrated one means in 
which this occurs through the analysis of the S&ED’s public diplomacy rhetoric. 
 The analysis within this chapter enriches our understanding of state socialization 
in a few important ways. First, drawing upon the notion of discursive public diplomacy 
officials rhetorically aid in the diffusion of norms by explaining the S&ED’s purpose as 
that of addressing global and local problems through dialogue. Whereas Acharya’s 
(2004) model of socialization focused primarily on how norms become reframed in 
congruent ways to local, regional values, it doesn’t account for how these practices are 
impacted by demands from global publics requiring joint action to solve the complicated 
issues plaguing the world. Acharya’s perspective is thus more elite oriented, whereas the 
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S&ED’s organizational identity attempts to garner global and local support through its 
insistence that the dialogue mechanism enables U.S.-China cooperation on global issues 
and produces the benefits on these issues, like on climate change. Furthermore, the 
analysis of the S&ED’s organizational rhetoric highlights its sensemaking function 
beyond establishing congruency of values to include the narrative elements in which key 
characters, or actors, are faced with problems and then act together to overcome these 
challenges.      
However, the discursive public diplomacy approach is flawed in that it 
overemphasizes the role of a global civil society capable of solving jointly identified 
problems. Instead, government agencies are the ones with the resources to address these 
issues and come to define the values and topics of discussion. In the case of the S&ED, it 
purports to both address global challenges, but also bilateral ones unique to U.S.-China 
cooperation. 
Organizational identity, image, and reputation management rhetoric provides an 
alternative mode through which we can understand how states can socialize each other. 
It does so by directing our attention to the organizational messages used to connect 
stakeholders with a consistent frame of reference to judge the S&ED’s purpose, the 
unique values upon which it coordinates its activities, and legitimizes its success by 
highlighting the outcomes reached suggesting cooperative relations will continue, thus 
providing the symbolic means through which its domestic and international audiences 
are to make sense of its functions. By reducing uncertainty, increasing predictability, and 
establishing the dialogue mechanism’s efficacy, it communicatively constitutes the 
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conditions by which officials and stakeholders can more easily come together to 
overcome doubts regarding the direction of U.S.-China relations. Thus, the S&ED wins 
over its audiences, both internal and external, by painting a worldview whereby 
cooperation between the U.S. and China through the S&ED has occurred previously and 
can be expected to do so in the future.  
 Finally, turning to the value advocacy of the S&ED, we can see the specific 
argumentative strategies international organizations and their members utilize to actively 
promote a positive image of themselves and the institution beyond simply conforming to 
international treaties. In this case, not only do officials draw upon extant international 
values to create support for the S&ED, but also in turn utilize these values as premises to 
justify changes in policy or behavior. Thus, norms are enacted rhetorically through 
argumentation, not just the discursive constitution of static identities which leads one to 
accept a specific course of action unmindfully. Here again, one can see how rhetors are 
active agents in persuading others as to what “appropriate” international behavior is. 
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CHAPTER VII 
S&ED’S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AS NETWORKING POWER 
 
In addition to bringing together of high ranking U.S. and Chinese officials, the 
Strategic and Economic Dialogue also actively attempts to build a greater network of ties 
amongst its citizenry. As the 2009 joint statement establishing the S&ED explains, the 
U.S. and China “welcome further exchanges between the national legislatures, local 
authorities, academics, young people and other sectors.” Indeed, as the later years of the 
S&ED demonstrate, the dialogue mechanism does more than just “welcome” these 
network ties; it aggressively pursues them by publicly praising and justifying these ties 
as an alternative means to build positive relations. Beyond its symbolic affirmation of 
the importance of these network ties, it also places significant material force to its 
pursuit of exchanges by constructing a variety of programs bringing together local 
officials, scientists, students, health professional and more. In other words, one of the 
major material outcomes of the S&ED is the creation of an extensive network of 
important government officials from both sides, further enhancing the network power 
articulated by Castells (2009) as a key element of “communication power.” 
Public diplomacy scholars have long identified the important nature of people-to-
people contacts, but the literature on state socialization, primarily due to its state-centric 
focus, has ignored this valuable resource establishing public support for common values 
and norms. For instance, while Pu (2012) argued that the legitimacy of global norms is 
contested and influenced by developing countries’ rhetoric, the intended audience is not 
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states’ citizenry but other state governments or international society at large. While the 
previous chapter focused on the top-down organizational messages supporting the 
S&ED’s identity, image, and reputation and value advocacy from officials engaged in 
the dialogue mechanism, this chapter demonstrates a second, bottom-up approach, by 
which cooperative U.S.-China relations are being built in support of the institution’s 
goals. As such, I argue that the S&ED has been successful in building network ties 
among relevant stakeholders as well as enhancing cultural, scientific, academic, and 
business exchanges as an alternative means to further induce cooperative relations 
between the U.S. and China by inviting those audiences to coordinate their local 
activities in support of the S&ED’s goals. This element introduces another function of 
international diplomacy and state socialization that is both organizational and 
communicative in nature as it creates the audiences which the rhetoric of the S&ED then 
attempts to persuade. 
Indeed, since its inception, the S&ED has been effective in helping increase the 
number of exchanges between the U.S. and China on a variety of areas. As Chinese Vice 
Premier Liu Yandong at the 2016 S&ED states, the S&ED’s Consultation of People 
Exchange has “altogether reached over 400 outcomes and agreements covering the seven 
main areas of education, science and technology, culture, sports, health, youth, and 
women.” In addition to the sheer number of outcomes, the CPE’s success can be 
measured by the number of people participating in those exchanges. U.S. Secretary of 
State Kerry during the 2016 CPE plenary shares, “At the very first CPE, we mentioned 
and established the goal of enabling 100,000 Americans to study in China over a four-
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year period. Well, we’ve already achieved that goal.” In fact, he explains that the 
number of U.S. students studying Mandarin is “10 times what it was only 10 years ago.” 
Now the target is, in Kerry’s words, even more “ambitious,” with the goal being “to 
have 1 million Americans studying Mandarin by the year 2020.” This increase in U.S. 
students is not just a U.S. phenomenon, to which Kerry states: “There are 300,000 young 
Chinese doing academic work in the United States today. That is a fivefold increase in 
just 10 years.” More than just students, the S&ED has established professional ties 
amongst the countries doctors, scientists, writers, musicians, filmmakers, sports, cities, 
states and provinces, and more. Thus, this chapter examines how the dialogue 
mechanism publicizes and makes visible positive, cooperative U.S.-China relations 
through its creation of relational networks. As such, I ask the following research 
question: 
RQ2: To what extent does the S&ED create communication power through the 
constitution of relational networks? 
Bottom-up Strategies of the S&ED: Constitution of Relationships and Networks 
In case the S&ED fails to make real changes in high-ranking officials’ views on 
U.S.-China relations, the dialogue mechanism hedges its bets by taking a second 
approach to building positive, cooperation relationships, that of relational public 
diplomacy and network ties. This process of relationship and network building showcase 
a bottom-up strategy of the S&ED as a way to further stabilize U.S.-China relations over 
the long-term in a few ways. First, it builds understanding amongst U.S. and Chinese 
people who will then, hopefully, help support positive U.S.-China ties, or at least blunt 
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public pressure during times of crisis calling for more confrontational policies. Second, 
it builds stakeholder relations from the business, scientific, and educational 
communities, all of which will help maintain positive pressure for continued deepening 
of relations between the two countries. Third, it creates forums by which S&ED officials 
can engage in discussions regarding the importance of certain issues with relevant 
stakeholders, most notably on climate change and business. Finally, it helps publicize the 
efforts of the S&ED, aligning its interests with stakeholders outside of the institution 
working on the ground who are needed to help implement its policies, as well as 
showcasing the S&ED’s work as producing concrete results and instilling the S&ED’s 
values within these relational networks.  
One of the recurrent tools in the public diplomacy kit is that of exchanges, 
whether cultural, educational, or scientific. Scott-Smith (2008) explains that while many 
forms of public diplomacy deal with the presentation of an image or information, 
exchange programs mark an interesting case due to its “human factor” (p. 50). This 
factor centers on the engagement with the personality and psychology of its participants. 
He argues for exchange program’s value as falling to their uniqueness in helping those 
involved gain new knowledge and skills unavailable locally, helping those participating 
in exchanges absorb and appreciate a new cultural environment, producing first-hand 
experience, which is more valuable than reliance on second-hand information, as well as 
including prestige for those being invited and obtaining access to people or institutions 
that would have been inaccessible via more formal routes. According to Scott-Smith   
public diplomacy exchange programs can: a) have long-lasting effects if they are well 
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managed and well timed and impacts a country domestically by those returning from 
exchange programs serving as opinion leaders; b) serve as a neutral space for a form of 
“cultural brokerage,” with those working in a similar field by linking of individuals and 
institutions to work together; c) help force cross-border contacts that lead to subtle, yet, 
important shifts in identity and self-conception (Pool, 1965); and, d) help previously 
fixed political and/or cultural allegiances not wholly abandoned but become more 
flexible (Lapidus, 1980). 
Proedrou and Frangonkolopoulos (2012) both affirm the importance of exchange 
programs, but also critiques them as narrowing the range of public diplomacy efforts.  
They explain that the emphasis on making foreign individuals carriers of ideas, 
worldviews, and norms that are friendly to the campaigning state, although important, is 
“both limiting as well as misleading.” (p. 732). For instance, educational exchanges and 
cultural promotion have not succeeded in creating a friendly global environment by 
selling images through commercials (Melissen, 2005) or dealing with larger issues such 
as winning nations over in support of international trade policies, or promotion of a 
common rule-based international order (Proedrou & Frangonkolopoulos, 2012). While 
these are limitations of exchange programs, Proedrou and Frangonkolopoulos make sure 
to state that their critique is “not to downgrade the benefits stemming from cultural 
activities, nor to advocate their termination” (p. 733). But instead, demonstrate that those 
“efforts alone are inadequate and there is urgent need for public diplomacy to work on a 
broadened thematic agenda that does not leave out any of the paramount global issues” 
(p. 733).  
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Answering in part Proedrou and Frangonkolopoulos’ call for a more discursive 
public diplomacy, Zaharna, Arsenault, and Fisher (2014) argue for a shift in public 
diplomacy practice to focus on “how to build relationships and transform them into more 
elaborate network structures through public communication” (p. 8). They argue that 
communities communicate through a range of networks and through these networks 
individuals develop their shared meanings through genuine collaboration. Thus, 
according to Zahara et al. (2014) relational strategies make up a core imperative for 
public diplomacy practice.  
 The ability and importance of building of relational and network public 
diplomacy ties arises from the world’s increased technological understanding and 
willingness to collaborate on global problems (Zaharna et al., 2014). From this, public 
diplomacy strategies can create a foundation for increased knowledge and collaboration 
by centering its efforts on dialogue, engagement, and networking among diplomats and 
other government actors. The characteristics of this type of public diplomacy include 
listening, engaging, finding mutual interests, and confidence building measures as well 
as a focus on efforts that “works with, not controls or even necessarily leads, others” (p. 
222). Here the importance of organizational rhetoric comes into play in that focuses on 
how issues of hierarchy and control in organizations functions to persuade their 
members to coordinate and voluntarily act towards the organization’s goal or mission 
(Cheney & McMillan, 1990). 
 As the discussion of the S&ED’s public diplomacy strategies so far have shown, 
the dialogue mechanism incorporates many of these values listed by both Proedrou and 
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Frangonkolopoulos (2012) as well as Zaharna, et. al (2014). The S&ED’s principle value 
is that of dialogue, including the listening, engaging, and search for mutual interests that 
Zaharna et. al characterize their approach to public diplomacy as encapsulating. Indeed, 
the S&ED’s identity is wrapped in building network ties by bringing together a range of 
government officials to cut across a variety of issues. And like Proedrou and 
Frangonkolopoulos’ (2012) discursive public diplomacy the S&ED attempts to address 
issues of global importance by providing a forum for dialogic communication between 
the U.S. and China. However, what has not yet been discussed is the S&ED’s support in 
building greater ties among the countries’ populaces and to what effect these ties have 
on promoting positive U.S.-China relations. Consideration of the S&ED’s public 
diplomacy outreach and its effects in supporting the dialogue mechanism’s goals can be 
more clearly understood by approaching it from Castells’ (2009) theory of 
communication power. 
Networked relations provide an alternative means by which we can understand 
state socialization and the specific means by which identities, norms, and interests 
converge. Castells’ (2009) description of communication power in particular is useful. 
For Castells, power arises from relationships, not from individual’s attributes. He defines 
power as “the relational capacity that enables a social actor to influence asymmetrically 
the decisions of other social actor(s) in ways that favor the empowered actor’s will, 
interest and values.” He identifies four types of power: networking power, network 
power, networked power, and network making power. First, networking power “refers to 
the power of the actors and organizations included in the networks that constitute the 
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core of the global network society over human collectives or individuals who are not 
included in these global networks.” Basically, one benefits from being connected within 
a network; the larger the network, the larger the power. Networking power works by 
either including or excluding individuals in the network, and as such includes 
gatekeeping power; however, that power is reduced because of mass self-
communication.  
 The second form of power is network power. According to Castells, network 
power is the power of the network’s standards over its components/nodes. Standards are 
required for a network to exist. Without standards, the network wouldn’t be able to 
socially coordinate between multiple networked actors. Here, power does not lie with 
exclusion but through imposition of rules on those within the network. Tying this the 
socialization literature on state behavior, these rules can be understood as the norms by 
which appropriate state behavior is defined. Castells notes that negotiation over these 
rules can exist, but once adopted the rules are compelling for all nodes.  
The third form of power is networked power. According to Castells, networked 
power is how the network defines the power relationships within itself. Put differently, 
networked power lies in certain nodes having power over other nodes within the 
network. This power or arrangement is defined by the network to meet its programmed 
goals. The final form of power is network making power. According to Castells, network 
making power, or the ability to exercise control over others, rests on two basic 
mechanism: “(1) the ability to constitute network(s), and to program/reprogram the 
network(s) in terms of the goals assigned to the network; and (2) the ability to connect 
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and ensure the cooperation of different networks by sharing common goals and 
combining resources while fending off competition from other networks by setting 
strategic cooperation.” This form of power is the most import in Castells’ theory. He 
explains that the first type of power comes from programing while the second type of 
power comes from switching. Taken together, network programmers and switchers hold 
the power in a network society. Thus, consideration of Castells’ (2009) theory of 
communication power suggests the S&ED functions as a network in bringing about 
positive U.S.-China relations.  
 The S&ED explicitly supports the building of relational network ties between the 
two countries’ citizenry. It symbolically affirms the need for greater people-to-people 
exchanges, including educational, cultural, and professional. More than just symbolically 
affirming this, the S&ED also provides material force to the creation of relational 
network ties by establishing extensive exchange programs such as its Consultation on 
People Exchanges and its Ecopartnership program, as well as a variety of lower level 
confidence building measures and inclusion of the business community. Before delving 
into these exchange programs, I first showcase the logic expressed by U.S. and Chinese 
officials at the S&EDs warranting their existence. 
People Power: A Second Lever for Enhancing U.S.-China Relations 
Officials at the S&ED continuously praise the importance of relational 
diplomacy. Throughout the years, they call upon the role of “normal” people in 
promoting stable U.S.-China relations. At the 2010 S&ED, Chinese President Hu Jintao 
provides both a rationale for people-to-people contacts as well as explaining their 
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importance. He states, “We should deepen mutual understanding and friendship between 
our peoples. This provides an enduring driving force and broad foundation for the 
growth of state-to-state relations. China and the United States will establish a mechanism 
of people-to-people exchange.” One can see that these people-to-people contacts thus 
creates a second lever, in addition to discussions between high-ranking officials, to 
accomplish the goal of more cooperative U.S.-China relations. These people-to-people 
contacts function the same as discussions between high-ranking officials in that the 
purpose is to reduce misunderstanding that might lead to great power rivalry between the 
U.S. and China, but also Hu’s comments suggest the ties are even more valuable in that 
they create an “enduring” force bringing the two countries together. This highlights an 
important, but neglected aspect of geopolitical relations, that being state interests not 
purely being constituted by states themselves, but by their people’s interests, identities, 
and culture. Reflecting on the close relations the U.S. has with Great Britain, the values 
and common cultural backgrounds the two nations’ populace share is a valuable resource 
aiding in their mutual perception of shared interest, which while currently the U.S. and 
China do not hold, through the enhancement of exchanges are attempting to build. 
Like President Hu’s 2010 comments, U.S. officials at the 2010 and 2013 S&EDs 
call for the extension of U.S.-China cooperation to extend beyond their high-level 
interactions at the S&ED. As U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2010 states:  
“Our U.S.-China relationship must extend beyond the halls of government to our 
homes, our businesses, and our schools. And these exchanges really offer the 
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opportunity for people to connect and collaborate, and they remind us of how 
much we have in common.” 
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry in 2013 echoes these comments, stating: 
“As we seek to foster a cooperative partnership between our two nations, we 
must also continue to build ties not only between governments but also between 
our peoples. Our growing people-to-people contacts may be the most 
consequential and enduring legacy of our diplomacy.” 
Here, the officials at the S&ED affirm the institution’s goal of bringing together their 
countries’ populace as a means to promote its goals of building positive relations. The 
S&ED provides the institutional support, resources, and authority that enables these 
interactions to occur, but relinquishes direct control over these cultural, educational, 
scientific, and professional exchanges relying on their people to voluntarily engage in 
these activities, which in turn will hopefully reveal greater avenues for cooperation and 
collaboration. This, in turn, creates new stakeholder groups that not only have interests 
in seeing continued cooperation occur, but also develops a common frame of reference 
to view the S&ED’s “important” work to continue. Thus, part of building cooperative 
U.S.-China relations comes from the ability of the two to bring together their citizens. 
 More examples of this logic of people-to-people ties can be seen in Chinese State 
Councilor Yang Jiechi’s statements at the 2013 S&ED. He notes that while the “two 
sides believe that the China-U.S. relationship has reached a new starting point and that 
each has a stake in the other’s success,” they also both agree “to continue to work 
actively to promote the building of a new model of major country relationship in the all-
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around way.” This “all-around way” includes the use of people-to-people diplomacy. He 
continues, “The two sides welcome and support the participation by people from all 
walks of life in both countries in this worthy cause. The two sides agreed to strengthen 
high-level exchanges and dialogue and consultation at various levels.” Thus, Yang Jiechi 
invites the U.S. and Chinese people to participate in the “new model” of U.S.-China 
relations, again providing the symbolic expression upon which their people come to 
view their experiences working with each other. Furthermore, Yang Jiechi provides a 
symbolic representation of this friendship, citing the agreement between the U.S. and 
China to host a traditional Chinese Garden in Washington D.C. Yang Jiechi, in 2013, 
explains that  
“Through the joint efforts of both sides, the amazing project of the China Garden 
in Washington has made a lot of progress. We hope that through our concerted 
efforts in the near future, the China Garden will appear on the horizon of this city 
and become a brand new and important symbol of friendship and exchanges 
between the Chinese and American people.” 
Whereas Yang Jiechi’s previous statement explained how the government officials 
taking part in the S&ED believed their relations marked a “new starting point” in the 
bilateral relationship, he connects those beliefs to this example of cultural diplomacy 
whereby U.S. citizens will interpret the Chinese Garden as likewise becoming a “brand 
new” symbol of friendship. 
Chinese Vice Premier Liu Yandong continues to tie the goal of the S&ED’s 
establishing of a “new model of major country relations” to that of people-to-people 
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diplomacy in his 2015 address. Liu explains that this effort requires not only the “efforts 
from politicians and diplomats, but more importantly, understanding and support from 
our people, especially those at the grassroot level.” As such, he encourages the building 
of more platforms for people-to-people exchanges. Liu Yandong states,  
“We are looking forward to working together with the U.S. side to build more 
platforms for mutual understanding of our two peoples and create conditions for 
mutual learning between civilizations from East and West, so that hundred 
millions of students, scientists, artists, and people from different walks of life, 
including our women and young people, to feel and share the joy of exchanges 
and harvests so that this new model of major country relations of China and the 
United States will have greater warmth, resilience, depth, and breadth.” 
Finally, U.S. Secretary of State Kerry at the 2015 S&ED calls for greater people-
to-people exchanges as one of the means to continue the momentum of positive U.S.-
China relations. He notes that, “Contacts between our citizens in the arenas of business, 
science, technology, athletics, and the empowerment of women work best when they are 
fully reciprocal and unfettered.” He continues by acknowledging that “These contacts 
can take many forms – from technical workshops, sports competitions, to online 
conversations and the travel of students back and forth across the Pacific” He even calls 
this an example of “retail diplomacy”, which he states is “some of the most important 
diplomacy that we can do” because “It’s how we forge a comprehensive partnership out 
of smaller friendships.” 
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Thus, officials symbolically affirm and explain why relational diplomacy 
between its citizens is important. It provides another means to forge “small friendships” 
which help stabilize relations between the U.S. and China at the “grassroot” level. 
Officials call on the S&ED’s efforts to extend beyond just their discussions on the 
government level and necessarily include those in all walks of life, from health, 
education, and culture, to sports and climate change. In doing so, the S&ED broadens its 
base of stakeholders desiring positive relations and relinquishes some control over how 
these diplomatic practices unfold, but still establishes the frame upon which their people 
should view their interactions with each other, that of participating in the building of 
“positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relations” as well as a “new model of major 
country relations.” Beyond simply stating these desires to include their populace in U.S.-
China diplomacy, how has the S&ED made good on building these ties? In the next 
section, I provide an overview on the areas in which the S&ED has created the strongest 
base of network relations. 
Networked Relations Beyond the S&ED 
 The largest and clearest change in the S&ED from its beginnings in 2009 to its 
maturity in 2016 is the inclusion of more, and more plenary and exchange sessions. The 
area of climate change and energy cooperation is probably the best example of this, 
where in addition to discussing the topic at the security track dialogue it is also 
addressed in the establishment of EcoPartnerships, Climate Change and Clean Energy 
Dialogue, Climate-Smart and Low-Carbon Summit, Protection and Conservation of the 
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Ocean session, and the Wildlife and Trafficking session, all of which took place at the 
2016 S&ED.  
Networked Ties: EcoPartnerships 
The 2016 S&ED EcoPartnership Fact Sheet explains how the S&ED brings experts 
and innovators from the U.S. and China together. It reads: “The State Department-
sponsored EcoPartnerships program brings together experts and innovators from U.S. 
and Chinese cities, companies, universities, and NGOs to work together, exchange best 
practices, and find solutions to challenges related to environmental protection, clean 
energy, and climate change.” The Fact Sheet explains what it has accomplished since its 
establishment leading up to the 2009 S&ED, reading, “Since its inception in 2008, the 
program has facilitated 30 partnerships that serve as models for the tangible results that 
can be achieved through sub-national cooperation.” Examples of the partnerships 
announced at the 2016 S&ED include: 
• Boeing and the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China will work together to 
demonstrate how to fuel aircraft with waste oil and enhance operating practices 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
• Columbia University and Baotou Steel Group will capture iron and steel slag 
waste and recycle it for use in other industrial processes, preventing dangerous 
emissions. 
• The University of Kentucky and Jiangsu Wisdom Engineering and Technology 
Company will work to reduce air pollution and sequester CO2 through more 
cost-effective methods in energy intensive industries. 
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• Ramboll Environ, IMACC and the Suzhou State Environmental Protection Hi-
tech Industrial Park Development Company will continuously monitor air 
pollution near chemical industrial parks and publish the data to help protect 
vulnerable populations. 
• Sea Turtles 911 and Hainan Normal University will track sea turtle migration, 
help restore habitats, and foster community involvement in sea turtle protection. 
• Wilson Solarpower and the Shenzhen Enesoon Science & Technology Company 
will pilot an innovative solar thermal power collector to demonstrate 
performance and cost improvements over traditional technologies. 
Thus, there are variety of issues covered as well as a variety of U.S. and Chinese 
corporations and educational institutions that take part in these. 
The 2016 Fact Sheet continues to explain the function the EcoPartnerships are 
meant to serve, as well as their value. With regards to their function, the 2016 
EcoPartnership Factsheet states: 
EcoPartnerships encourage environmental action at the sub-national level, 
mobilizing private sector investment and leveraging capital to pursue joint 
projects. The program relies on strong cooperation between a Secretariat of 
subject matter experts, offering technical support on behalf of the U.S. and 
Chinese governments, and the self-financed U.S. and Chinese EcoPartners. Each 
dollar of U.S. government investment is magnified through the efforts of the 
partners. 
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This description makes sure to not only explain the role of the private sector, but also 
clearly notes the increase in investment from government dollars, an attempt to mollify 
criticisms of either countries’ tax dollars going to serve the other country’s interests over 
their domestic ones. 
 The 2016 EcoPartnership Factsheet makes explicit the value of the program. It 
states: “The value of the EcoPartnerships program is the peer-to-peer collaboration at the 
partner level between U.S. and Chinese entities. EcoPartners pilot their concepts within 
three years and share key findings with peers who can replicate and build upon their 
successes.” Here again is the focus on developing collaboration among U.S. and Chinese 
companies and educational institutions. 
 Finally, in addition to the awarding of the six new EcoPartnerships, U.S. and 
Chinese officials provide public addresses discussing the importance of building these 
networked ties within the field of environmental cooperation. As Chinese Vice Premier 
Yang at the 2016 EcoParternership signing ceremony explains, “The China-U.S. 
EcoPartnerships is a key content of China-U.S. climate change cooperation. Since its 
implementation over the last seven years, it has achieved fruitful results and benefited 
many sides.” His statement clearly places the importance of the EcoPartnerships within 
the larger context of how the U.S. and China are cooperating, and legitimizes the 
program by noting its “fruitful results” as well as the “benefits to both sides.”  
Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi provides further clarity as to the 
EcoPartnerships’ value, noting who benefits from this program as well as stressing the 
cooperative relations it promotes between the U.S. and China. He states: “The Earth is 
 297 
 
mankind’s common home. China and the U.S. have great potential in terms of 
cooperation in the field of eco and green development, and there is a great space of 
cooperation in this respect.” Yang Jiechi further notes the timescale upon which this 
cooperation will continue benefiting U.S. and Chinese generations to come: “Such 
cooperation is thanks to the present generation, but its benefit will last for ages.” He cites 
the Chinese willingness to work with their American partners, “We are willing to work 
in cooperation with the U.S. to earnestly implement the agreements of the two 
presidents” as well as continuing to expand the cooperation. And, finally, Yang Jiechi 
states that the two sides will continue to “innovate modalities of cooperation, expand 
areas of cooperation so that such cooperation can more – and benefit the peoples of the 
two countries and all people in a better way.” Thus, Yang Jiechi orients those present at 
the EcoParternership, as well as those participating in its activities, to view the project as 
not just serving the goals of combatting climate change, but as a larger symbol of 
common interest between the U.S. and China, the S&ED’s social value in solving a 
global problem, and calls for ever increasing ways in which ties are further created.   
 U.S. Secretary of State Kerry at the same 2016 S&ED EcoPartnership signing 
ceremony affirms the importance of the EcoPartnership program in building ties between 
the countries private sector and civil society. In detailing the problem of climate change, 
he expresses that the solution “I believe, will not be decided by government – though it 
could be, but it won’t be under the circumstances – it will be decided by the private 
sector.” Thus, the two nation’s private sectors must come together, to which the S&ED 
through its EcoPartnership program helps to do. Again, this invites participation from 
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outside the two countries’ government apparatuses to include the private sector. Kerry 
further induces this participation by ingratiating those taking part, stating:  
“So our EcoPartners are helping us to harness tremendous energy and ingenuity 
of civil society. And they are inspiring the brightest minds to focus on climate, 
on clean energy, on the environment, on sharing best practices, on fostering 
innovation, and on ultimately making progress towards a sustainable future.” 
Thus, the EcoPartnership program provides a clear example in which the S&ED helps 
build ties between civil society and private corporations in the U.S. and China. These 
ties are used to solve a shared problem by the U.S. and China, that of global climate 
change. It also provides a material example of how the countries are cooperating, and 
thus helps sustain momentum of positive, cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-China 
relations. 
Networked Ties: Local government fighting climate change. The U.S.-China 
Climate-Smart/Low-Carbon Cities Summit provides another clear example of how the 
two countries are establishing networked relations among their populace. The Climate-
Smart/Low-Carbon Summit was launched during the 2015 S&ED. Its purpose is to bring 
together officials from cities, states, and provinces to coordinate their policies on climate 
change. It has been successful in this endeavor, as the 2016 S&ED’s Climate-
Smart/Low-Carbon Cities Summit included participation of leaders from 47 Chinese 
cities and provinces and 17 U.S. cities, counties, and states.  
The Summit serves not just as a forum to bring these officials together, but also 
for advocating the importance of climate change to U.S. and Chinese officials. As such, 
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it serves as an instance of discursive public diplomacy whereby issues of pressing global 
concern are jointly discussed. For instance, U.S. Secretary of State Kerry at the 2016 
Climate-Smart/Low-Carbon Cities summit extensively discusses the problem of climate 
change. Kerry explains that just to be “very clear to all of you… climate change is 
without any question unlike anything that we have ever faced before. It’s a different kind 
of challenge, and it’s different from anything we’ve faced as individual nations or as one 
planet.” He stresses the recent increase in global temperatures, highlights the impact of 
climate change on cities as well as their role as the largest producers of carbon, and 
suggests the solution is more cooperation among the two countries’ mayors. He 
addresses the mayors and governors in attendance, stressing, “So as we work, all of us 
together, to implement and move beyond the Paris agreement, our cooperation is more 
important than ever.” Kerry explains that this cooperation, although in part derived from 
the leadership of government officials participating in the S&ED, will not solve the 
problem. Instead he argues that, “And it is not government that ultimately is going to 
provide us with the solution…It’s the private sector that recognizing the largest market 
in all of human history is going to invest and move the world to this low-carbon 
possibility.” Kerry ends by calling on the city, state, and province officials in attendance, 
noting that the solution to climate change will, 
“profoundly depend on each and every one of you leaving here, going back to 
your communities, and carrying this call for action to every citizen you can 
reach. Because in the end, this is in your hands, in our hands, and I look forward 
to working with all of you to get the job done.” 
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Kerry’s statements demonstrate the need for grassroots cooperation, not just reliance on 
the top-down decrees of those high-ranking officials at the S&ED; again, Kerry’s 
statements can be seen as inviting and ingratiating a new set of stakeholders essential for 
enacting the organizational goals established by the S&ED.  
 Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi follows Kerry’s statements at the 2016 
summit and echoes the importance of climate change and its impact on U.S. and Chinese 
cities, as well as connecting the high-level discussions taking place at the S&ED to the 
efforts of building greater ties amongst cities, states, and provinces. He explains, “Let 
me tell you, during the last two days we have had the Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
and we had the high-level cultural exchange consultation, we have been very 
successful.” From this success he calls upon the officials present to work together in 
helping implement the Paris Agreement made between the U.S. and China. He also 
stresses the cooperative nature of U.S.-China relations which, combined with the two 
countries’ expertise, expertise shared by those officials enacting policy on the local 
level, can help combat climate change. Yang Jiechi states, “So China and the United 
States, with the complementary nature of our research abilities and our expertise in 
different fields, there should be a marriage of our expertise.” Yang Jiechi continues to 
call for a continued “meeting of the minds” through the summit, stating: “There will be a 
further meeting of the minds to make sure that the smart cities will be the startups, the 
smart cities will climb to the summit, to make sure that there will be a broad horizon 
opening up for the younger generations.” Thus, Yang Jiechi’s argument is that both 
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countries have been successful in working together and have the capabilities to solve a 
common issue that is of local importance, that is, faced by both countries’ cities.  
 As one can see, the U.S.-China Climate-Smart/Low-Carbon Cities Summit 
represents not just a form of relational-network building public diplomacy, but also a 
form of discursive public diplomacy as its functions to align the internal agreements 
made by high-ranking officials to that of their domestic level officials. It serves as a 
forum to discuss an issue of global concern, that of global climate change, and helps 
achieve cooperation by building the relational networks needed to ensure local level buy 
in and exchange of best practices.  
Networked Ties: Exchanges  
While cooperation on climate and energy related issues is one of the most prolific 
forms of bottom-up public diplomacy, the S&ED also engages in typical public 
diplomacy related efforts such as cultural and educational exchanges. These programs 
are specifically argued by U.S. and Chinese officials as embodying the principles and 
organizational identity of the S&ED as well as serving the S&ED’s goal of creating 
positive U.S.-China relations by reducing misunderstanding and building trust. The 
continued success in setting up these exchanges is further cited as evidence of the 
S&ED’s success, legitimizing its functions, and comes to represent positive U.S.-China 
relations as a whole. Furthermore, it is another instance of constituting new stakeholder 
groups that will support the S&ED’s mission and invites participation by both countries’ 
citizenry to take part. The S&ED’s attempts to build people-to-people exchanges is best 
showcased in its 100,000 Strong Initiative and Consultation on People-to-People 
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Exchanges (CPE), as well as more creatively the CEO Roundtable forums that take place 
at the annual S&ED meetings. The CPE was established at the second S&ED taking 
place in 2010, and under the its auspices U.S. and Chinese officials set up the 100,000 
Strong Initiative. The CEO Roundtable was set up as part of the very first, 2009 S&ED 
meeting and continued to take place during most of the other S&ED meetings. 
Network ties: 100,000 strong initiative. According to U.S. Secretary of State 
Clinton at the 2011 S&ED, the 100,000 Strong Initiative provides funds to help increase 
the number of students studying in each country. She describes the rationale for the 
project noting that it “is an essential building block to a more solid foundation of a 
relationship going forward.” It does so by helping to “enhance understanding between 
our countries, but not just between our governments, between our people.” The Initiative 
demonstrates the connection between the S&ED officials and civil society, as the private 
sectors raises many of its funds. As the 2011 Fact Sheet covering the initiative explains, 
the two counties are “cooperating closely to achieve the goals of the 100,000 Strong 
Initiative: to increase dramatically the number, and diversify the composition, of 
American students studying in China as a means to enhance people-to-people ties 
between our two nations.”  
The 2011 Fact Sheet demonstrates how the S&ED has helped commit substantial 
funds to make sure students are able to afford to study and learn in each country. Much 
of this money has come from a variety of sources including the private sector. For 
instance, the Fact Sheet states that “At the CPE, Secretary Clinton and State Councilor 
Liu Yandong announced an additional 10,000 Chinese scholarships and new pledges 
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from the U.S. private sector.” The committee was co-chaired by Mayor Richard Daley of 
Chicago and former Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska. Both serve “a critical role 
advising on the promotion and implementation of the 100,000 Strong Initiative in the 
private sector, and is comprised of China experts and leaders in the business, academic, 
and non-profit worlds.” Examples of the developments taking place at the 2011 meeting 
include:   
• Launch of “Project Pengyou”: In support of the Initiative and with seed funding 
from the Ford Foundation, Golden Bridges Foundation has launched a new 
online platform to connect Americans that lived and studied in China.  
• Launch of “Zinch Study in China”: Zinch, a private U.S. information 
management company with operations in China, has launched an independent 
website for American students looking to study in China.  
• Travel Grants through the U.S.-China Education Trust (USCET): USCET has 
announced that it received an additional $100,000 grant in support of the 
Initiative from Van Eck Global. This is the second grant that USCET has 
received from Van Eck Global to support student travel to China. 
• Expansion of Teach for China: Teach for China has independently received 
$450,000 in new funding from Swire Trust to support the organization’s work in 
low-income Chinese schools in support of the Initiative. 
• Designation of White House Fellows as 100,000 Strong ambassadors: This year’s 
class of White House Fellows will travel to China in May 2011, where they will 
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serve as ambassadors for the Initiative by promoting people-to-people ties 
between the United States and China.  
Reflecting on the progress of the 100,000 Strong Initiative, U.S. Secretary of 
State Kerry explains at the 2016 CPE that, “we mentioned and established the goal of 
enabling 100,000 Americans to study in China over a four-year period. Well, we’ve 
already achieved that goal.” After achieving that target, Kerry explains now, “our two 
presidents embraced an even more promising ambitious goal to have 1 million 
Americans studying Mandarin by the year 2020.” Thus, the 100,000 Strong Initiative 
demonstrates not just the S&EDs commitment to educational exchanges, but also the 
money and private sector collaborations to make it possible. However, this initiative is 
just one aspect of the S&ED’s exchange programs under the larger CPE. 
Network ties: Consultation on People-to-People Exchanges. The CPE was 
established during the 2010 S&ED. According to the 2016 CPE Fact Sheet, The CPE is 
designed to “deepen ties between the citizens of the United States and the People’s 
Republic of China” in the seven areas of culture, education, science and technology, 
sports, women’s issues, and health. The 2016 CPE Fact Sheet explains how the program 
has achieved “much of its success” as due to: 
“dynamism and commitment of the many American non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) such as universities, museums, foundations, advocacy 
groups, cultural institutions, and sports groups that are engaged in a broad 
spectrum of exchange programs in partnership with Chinese organizations and 
the many Chinese citizens active in promoting people-to-people ties.” 
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The CPE can be understood as an example of relational-networked public diplomacy 
through its logic of incorporating civil society and academia as a means to produce 
greater understanding between the U.S. and China. As the 2016 CPE Fact Sheet 
explains, “The active involvement of civil society and academia in U.S.-China 
exchanges promotes mutual understanding through collaboration and inquiry.” 
 As the table below showcases, there are numerous outcomes in which the two 
countries are engaging civil society actors in promoting U.S.-China relations. Each of 
the seven areas is described as helping promote U.S.-China relations. For instance, 
cultural exchanges help “provide the foundation for people-to-people engagement.” 
Educational exchanges are cited as “helping to strengthen our bilateral relationship”.  
Science and technology is an “important and dynamic area in the bilateral relationship” 
is tied historically the back to 1979, and through its “the United States and China are 
using a variety of tools to enhance public dialogue on science between our two societies, 
educate the public on the role of science in society, and explore issues of interest to 
young scientists.” Exchanges on sports is likewise explained to be tied back historically 
to helping thaw U.S.-China relations with the use of “ping pong diplomacy” as well 
helping the two countries to use “sports as a bridge to connect our citizens. Women’s 
issues is cited as bringing “together women leaders of both countries to discuss and 
tackle issues of mutual concern.” And finally, health improves U.S.-China relations by 
building upon their efforts to “increase collaboration and share best practices in 
education and workforce development.” 
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Table 5. 2016 CPE Fact Sheet Outcomes 
Culture: Cultural exchanges provide the foundation for people-to-people engagement between the 
United States and China. The Cultural Pillar is committed to expanding outreach efforts to young and 
underserved audiences through the performing and visual arts, supporting work that conserves and 
protects our cultural heritage, and fostering cooperation among cultural institutions, representatives, and 
scholars. 
 Exchanges: The U.S. Department of State is continuing to reach out to women, youth, 
ethnic minorities, and persons with disabilities by hosting exchanges through programs 
such as the American Film Showcase, American Music Abroad and the International 
Writing Program at the University of Iowa, as well as through cultural performances and 
exhibitions sponsored by the U.S. Mission at Chinese cultural and educational 
institutions. Such performances and exhibitions are designed to introduce Chinese 
audiences to American performers and entertainment genres, American history and 
values, and the U.S.-China relationship. 
American Arts Incubator: This new exchange program in Wuhan, China in spring 
2016 integrated technology with art, teaching youth to create virtually augmented 
realities, and included micro-grants in support of projects proposed by teams of young 
participants to explore Wuhan’s history, environment, and urban development. 
Continued Cooperation with the Private Sector: People-to-people programs continue 
to thrive among our private sector partners. This year, the United States highlighted the 
work of such CPE private sector participants as the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the 
Peabody Essex Museum, the University of Southern California’s School of Cinematic 
Arts, Ping Pong Productions, and the Smithsonian Institution’s Freer Sackler Galleries. 
Education: The robust educational links between the United States and China are helping to strengthen 
our bilateral relationship. China sends the greatest number of international students to the United States, 
and the United States provides the second largest group of international students to China. Cooperation 
between our educational institutions continues to expand, helping to generate the knowledge we need to 
solve global challenges. 
 Support for Language Learning: Under the Education Pillar, we discussed our support 
for Chinese and English language learning and its importance as a foundation for 
broadening people-to-people cooperation across all aspects of our relationship. We 
welcomed the efforts of the 1 Million Strong Initiative, which aims to have one million 
Americans learning Mandarin by 2020. The 100,000 Strong Foundation is leading this 
effort with support from the Ford Foundation and partners such as Schwarzman Scholars 
and the Asia Society. The organization is rebranding itself as The U.S.-China Strong 
Foundation to reflect its evolving mission to include both language learning and study 
abroad. In support of English for All, we are working with the Peace Corps and our 
Chinese partners to strengthen English language teaching and learning in China for 
thousands of teachers and millions of students through the efforts of Friendship 
Volunteers, U.S. Department of State English Language Fellows, and Fulbright Foreign 
Language Teaching Assistants. 
Fulbright Program: We have agreed to expand our joint recruitment for Fulbright 
Visiting Researchers by opening access for participation to faculty from all Chinese 
universities in all geographic areas. We will also pilot recruitment from high school 
teachers in Beijing for Fulbright Foreign Language Teaching Assistants in the United 
States. Beginning in 2017, we will support intensive English language study for 
incoming Chinese Fulbrighters from outside the major cities to expand the pool of those 
who can participate in our programs and facilitate study in the United States. 
Increasing Study Abroad: We are working to ensure that our exchange programs fully 
represent the rich diversity of our respective societies. The U.S.-sponsored Gilman 
Scholarship provides opportunities for hundreds of U.S. students to study in China each 
year who might not otherwise have been able to go abroad, and we welcomed Airbnb’s 
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announcement of its support. Also, with the support of the Chinese government, a 
network of U.S. Historically Black Colleges and Universities and Chinese universities 
has significantly increased both the number of institutions and the number of students 
who have participated in short and long-term exchanges over the past year. 
Developing Young Leaders: Focusing on students, the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for 
Global Policy announced the launch of its Young Ambassadors Program which will 
serve as an umbrella for the Center’s support of the next generation of leaders. Also, the 
Schwarzman Scholars program will welcome its inaugural class of 109 students this fall 
to Tsinghua University. 
University Collaboration: University collaboration across all fields is helping to 
generate the knowledge needed to solve global challenges, including climate change, 
sustainability, and the environment. U.S. and Chinese universities are engaged with their 
counterparts to advance human progress in areas of common endeavor. The U.S. will 
continue to support American Cultural Centers’ programming which brings together 
Chinese and American universities to share American culture and values with Chinese 
audiences. 
Science and Technology: Collaboration in science and technology is an important and dynamic area in 
the bilateral relationship, dating back to the 1979 U.S.-China Science and Technology Cooperation 
Agreement. Through the Science and Technology Pillar, the United States and China are using a variety 
of tools to enhance public dialogue on science between our two societies, educate the public on the role 
of science in society, and explore issues of interest to young scientists. 
 2016 Young Scientist Forum in Beijing: The Young Scientist Forum (YSF) in Beijing 
is a valuable tool for building relationships between young scientists from the United 
States and China. This will be our 10th YSF in Beijing. 
2016 Young Scientist Forum in Washington, D.C.: The 2016 YSF in Washington will 
focus on how scientists can leverage the participation of citizen scientists to address 
chronic environmental health issues. In particular, early career scientists will explore 
how public data collection and analysis, as well as transparent, robust risk 
communication, underpin meaningful strategies for reducing hazardous chemicals in air, 
water, and soil. This will be our 11th YSF in Washington. 
Sports: More than 40 years after our two countries thawed relations using “ping pong diplomacy,” 
U.S.-China sports diplomacy has become both broader and deeper. In the Sports Pillar, through 
seminars, athlete exchanges, and joint competitions, our two countries are using sports as a bridge to 
connect our citizens. 
 Private Sector Collaboration: The National Basketball Association (NBA) and the 
Chinese Basketball Association continue to cooperate through athletic exchanges, 
training, and mentoring opportunities, while Major League Baseball (MLB), the National 
Hockey League (NHL), and Under Armour, among others, advance opportunities for 
further collaboration in China. 
Sports Seminar: Sports United and the Chinese General Administration of Sports will 
organize the 3rd annual U.S.-China Sports Seminar in Beijing, China following this 
year’s CPE. The theme is “Sport and Athletes: Performance Innovation in Health, 
Fitness, Practice, and Theory.” 
Disability Sports: The Special Olympics, U.S. Olympic Committee, U.S. Paralympic 
Committee, and the Chinese Disabled Persons Federation will again participate this year 
to highlight people-to-people exchanges and efforts to increase inclusion among all 
aspiring athletes. 
Athlete Exchanges: More than a dozen sports leagues and federations from both China 
and the United States came together for various competitions and athlete exchanges. 
Women’s Issues:[1] Launched in 2011, the U.S.-China Women’s Leadership Exchange and Dialogue 
(“WE-LEAD”), led by the State Department’s Office of Global Women’s Issues (S/GWI) and the All 
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China Women’s Federation (ACWF), brings together women leaders of both countries to discuss and 
tackle issues of mutual concern. They decided on the following activities: 
 Raising Awareness on Domestic Violence: The Secretary's Office of Global Women's 
Issues (S/GWI) and the All-China Women's Federation will cooperate on the advocacy 
and publicity of Anti-Domestic Violence Law of the People's Republic of China in 
American companies operating in China in order to increase awareness of the law. 
WE-LEAD: The Secretary's Office of Global Women's Issues (S/GWI) and the All-
China Women's Federation will co-host the Ninth Women's Leadership Exchange and 
Dialogue (WE-LEAD) during the 2017 U.S.-China Consultation on People-to-People 
Exchanges hosted in Washington. 
Third Country Cooperation: The Secretary's Office of Global Women's Issues 
(S/GWI) and the All-China Women's Federation will conduct substantive consultations 
and design a project to improve women’s entrepreneurship in a country in the Pacific.  
Health: Since the first Health Pillar dialogue took place last year, participants have strengthened and 
expanded cooperation in the area of non-communicable diseases. This year, they built upon their 
efforts, committing to increase collaboration and share best practices in education and workforce 
development. 
 Cardiac Care Collaboration: The American Heart Association and the Chinese Society 
of Cardiology will collaborate, develop, and implement a quality improvement program 
focused on improving the System of Care for the patient experiencing an ST-Elevation 
Myocardial Infarction, (STEMI) in China, the deadliest form of heart attack. The 
American Heart Association works with the Ministry of Science and Technology on 
health science discovery and the China Social Assistance Foundation on CPR training 
for the general public. 
Breast Cancer Prevention: Goldman Sachs and the All China Women’s Federation will 
continue to promote breast cancer and cervical cancer awareness and enhance capacity at 
the provincial level with support from the National Health and Family Planning 
Commission of China and the Department of Health and Human Services of United 
States. 
Promoting Exchange: The National Health and Family Planning Commission of China 
and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services will support the organization of 
the 6th U.S.-China Health Summit in September 2016 in Xi’an China. 
Professional Development: The China Medical Board and Peking Union Medical 
College Hospital will jointly organize the 2nd Annual Residency Education Conference 
to train the next generation of Chinese clinical education leaders in September 2016. 
 
 U.S. and Chinese officials frame the CPE as one of the most important means by 
which the two countries are able to promote U.S.-China cooperation. For instance, 
Chinese Vice Premier Liu Yandong at the 2015 S&ED cites Chinese President Xi, 
noting: 
“He [Xi] expressed a hope that the two teams will keep up the good work to take 
full advantage of the role of the S&ED and CPE to promote mutual trust and 
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cooperation between the two countries and to ensure that the bilateral ties will 
bring benefits to people of the two countries and people of the entire world.” 
Thus, the CPE helps advance the S&ED’s dialogic goals as well as helping ensure the 
dialogue mechanism produces tangible benefits to their people. Liu Yandong also makes 
sure to legitimize the S&ED’s CPE mechanism as successful. She explains that since the 
CPE was established in 2010 it has helped build greater ties between the two countries’ 
business leaders as well as continuing to increase the range of issues it covers: 
“Ladies and gentlemen, dear friends, the Consultation on People-to-People 
Exchange together with political mutual trust and business ties are intertwined 
and reinforcing each other. They form the three major pillars of China-U.S. 
relations. Since 2010 when the CPE mechanism was established, China and the 
United States have held five rounds of consultations and achieved nearly 300 
concrete deliverables.” 
According to Liu Yandong, this process of building networked relations has helped bring 
together “multiple stakeholders” and in doing so “shortening the distance between 
people of our two countries and increased mutual trust and friendship.” Thus, the 
expansion of these ties and the CPE mechanism has its own “unique charm and 
important role and has forcefully promoted steady and sound growth of China-U.S. 
relations.”  
Vice Premier Liu Yandong continues by affirming the globalized context of 
U.S.-China relations by stating that “in today’s world we’re living in a global village and 
countries have become a community of common destiny and intertwined interests.” This 
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provides the rationale for “the building of the new model of major country relations.” In 
line with the goals of the CPE, this process includes not just government officials, but 
grassroots engagement. Liu Yandong states that in building the new model of relations, 
the two sides require not only the “efforts from politicians and diplomats, but more 
importantly, understanding and support from our people, especially those at the grassroot 
level.” She ends her remarks, stating: 
 “We are looking forward to working together with the U.S. side to build more 
platforms for mutual understanding of our two peoples and create conditions for 
mutual learning between civilizations from East and West, so that hundred 
millions of students, scientists, artists, and people from different walks of life, 
including our women and young people, to feel and share the joy of exchanges 
and harvests so that this new model of major country relations of China and the 
United States will have greater warmth, resilience, depth, and breadth.” 
 U.S. Secretary of State Kerry, also affirms how the CPE helps advance the 
mission of the S&ED. In his 2016 remarks at the CPE session, he calls the efforts of the 
CPE as the “best of diplomacy. This is what diplomacy is all about. This is how you 
really change things.” Kerry goes on to note the number of students studying in each 
country as part of the 100,000 Strong initiative. The value of these exchanges, according 
to Kerry, is that it allows people to sample “each other’s cultures and gaining a very 
personal appreciation of the potential for cooperation between the United States and 
China.” This “sampling” helps to alleviate fear and thus produce better understanding. 
Like Chinese Vice Premier Liu Yandong, Kerry also cites ping pong diplomacy to 
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connect the past to their future commitments to promote positive U.S.-Chinese relations. 
Finally, he sums up what the CPE allows people to accomplish. He states, “It’s a chance 
for citizens in both of our countries to communicate, to compete, to study, to share 
experiences in a genuine, balanced, and transparent way.” 
Network ties: CEO Roundtable. As the two largest economies in the world, the 
U.S. and China have substantive trade ties. These economic relations are one of the most 
optimistic reasons why continued U.S.-China relations might endure. After all, money 
talks, and money has significant political influence. As long as there is more money to 
be made by cooperating on trade and economic issues, both countries’ business sectors 
will maintain a positive force in promoting U.S.-China cooperation. Furthermore, at the 
heart of the U.S.-China relationship has been friction within its trade relationship. The 
U.S. Congress’s consistent politicizing of China’s currency evaluation, at times calling 
on the President and Treasury Department to label China as a currency manipulated, as 
well as the anti-China rhetoric that occurs during U.S. presidential campaigns, 
introduces recurring negative symbols of China within U.S. discourse affecting U.S. 
public opinion towards the U.S.’s China policy. Thus, business leaders become an 
important stakeholder that can help support positive U.S.-China ties. Officials at the 
S&ED recognize this and have made sure to bring together business leaders from each 
side as part of the dialogue mechanism. 
 Since the inaugural 2009 S&ED, CEOs and other business leaders have been 
invited to take part in the dialogues through dinners and roundtables hosted by S&ED 
officials. At the 2009 S&ED’s U.S.-China Business Council Dinner, U.S. Secretary of 
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State Clinton explains why this is so. Clinton explains that, as part of the dialogue 
process “we are enlisting the full range of talent within our governments to tackle 
problems that spill over not just borders and oceans, but also traditional bureaucratic 
boundaries, which are sometimes the hardest to overcome.” She notes that this process 
helps to lay the foundation for “positive, cooperative, and comprehensive” U.S.-China 
relations, and that: 
“Just as no nation today can solve the challenges we face alone, neither can 
government work in isolation. The issues are just are too varied and complex for 
that. So engaging the expertise, the experience, and the energy of those outside 
government – including the private sector, and all of you here tonight – is vital to 
our future progress.” 
Importantly, these comments are being made specifically to the business leaders present 
at the dinner, and thus, from these statements, Clinton is both explaining what the S&ED 
is designed to do as well as inviting the business community to help aid its purpose. 
 U.S. Secretary of State Clinton continues to explain the value of bringing 
together the two countries’ business communities at her 2009 dinner remarks. First, she 
continues to invite their participation in the S&ED’s efforts, stating: “We want the 
entrepreneurs and the innovators in both of our countries to know that we’re behind their 
dreams and their efforts” and that “We want people who are working to solve problems 
in research labs and on the front lines of innovation to know that we’re looking to 
support their efforts.” She then provides the rationale of how these efforts tie into the 
S&ED’s goals explaining, “we think public-private partnerships are a centerpiece of the 
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important work that we are doing to build understanding and create new avenues of 
cooperation.” This quotation shows again the importance of building ties outside of 
government to include the private sector while informing and reaffirming the S&ED’s 
identity. 
 Also during her dinner remarks at the 2009 S&ED, U.S. Secretary of State 
Clinton makes sure to signal the U.S.-China commitment to building cooperative 
relations. She states, 
“we feel very strongly that this partnership between China and the United States 
for the 21st century needs to be manifest in visible ways. Secretary 
Geithner…announced some very positive findings and commitments of moving 
forward on our economic recovery efforts. State Councilor Dai and I discussed, 
literally, every part of the world and have a very good understanding of how we 
can continue to work together.” 
Through these comments, Clinton is making sure to demonstrate to the business 
community that U.S.-China cooperation is possible because the S&ED has led to 
specific results as well as promoting understanding between the countries, evident by her 
and Chinese State Councilor Dai’s discussion on every part of the world. 
 Clinton continues to not just stress the current 2009 S&ED’s success, but project 
its future success as well as tying it to the past, providing a consistent reference point by 
which business leaders can understand the nature of the bilateral relationship. She 
explains how she and State Councilor Dai had a very “relaxing social dinner” and are 
“getting to know each other better.” As such, this dialogue is “all about the future.” 
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Tying it to the past, she notes that the S&ED is “part of a new beginning,” but also “the 
culmination of a process begun decades ago, when Dr. Kissinger was instrumental in 
opening the door to the possibility that then came into fruition years, ten years, later of 
normalized relations.” She concludes by stating, “we are grateful that he is here with us 
tonight as we continue to work toward something that he saw on the horizon and 
convinced others that it was possible to see and move toward a stronger U.S.-China 
relationship.”  
 Jumping to the later years of the S&ED, we can still see many of the sentiments 
reflected in U.S. Secretary of State Clinton’s 2009 remarks. For instance, at the 2014 
S&ED CEO Roundtable, Chinse Vice Premier Wang Qishan expresses the importance 
the S&ED officials attach to the business community, the role it plays in promoting the 
goals of the S&ED, and officials’ willingness and desire to hear from the business 
community. First, Wang Qishan demonstrates the importance the S&ED officials hold 
towards the business community tying the relationship to the past. He states that,  
“all of the four special representatives are here, and we also have the leading 
figures from important ministries and agencies of China, and I think this shows – 
the presence of them shows how much importance our two governments attach to 
our business relationship.”  
Wang Qishan explains the importance of the business community through its support of 
economic relations between the two countries. He cites how “The businesses also drive 
our cooperation,” and credits them for the growth in U.S.-China economic relations: 
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And business is a backbone of China-U.S. economic relationship. Over the past 
35 years, our bilateral trade increased by over 200 times. It was up from U.S. 
$2.45 billion in 1979 to $520 billion in 2013. Bilateral investment, which was 
hardly in existence, grew to U.S. $100 billion last year. So without your hard 
work, there would not have been such big progress in our bilateral economic 
relationship and trade. 
More than just trade and investment, Wang Qishan expresses how business leaders’ 
promote the S&ED’s goal of creating understanding and friendship:  
“Trade and investment between our businesses’ leaders – businesses not only 
brings goods and jobs to us, but also mutual understanding and friendship among 
our peoples. Over the past 35 years, we have been expanding the areas of our 
cooperation and have seen a big increase in our people-to-people exchanges, and 
we ought to thank our enterprises for their hard work.” 
Wang Qishan also ties business leaders’ efforts to the S&ED’s goal of promoting a “new 
model of major country relationship.” He states, “the business is also the pillars for our 
new model of major-country relationship, which is an unprecedented and innovative 
endeavor.” 
 Finally, Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang at the 2014 S&ED CEO Roundtable 
expresses the dialogic principles of the S&ED through officials’ willingness and desire 
to listen and receive feedback from the business community. He states, “I’ll be looking 
forward to the remarks from all the business leaders as well as your insights” as well as 
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looking “forward to the active support and participation of people from all sectors,” and 
finally:  
“I believe that the government departments from those countries will attach great 
importance to your views and your comments, and we will try our best to include 
them into the agenda of S&ED so as to remove the obstacles for cooperation 
between our two – between the companies of the two sides and create a better 
development environment for all of you.” 
 At the same 2014 CEO Roundtable, U.S. Treasury Secretary Lew expresses the 
importance of the business community it helping advance the S&ED’s goals, calls for 
greater participation, and welcomes their input. Lew begins by citing how important the 
CEO Roundtables have been: “we all know, we’re in the middle of our sixth U.S.-China 
Strategic and Economic Dialogue, and over the past five years, this has really become a 
foundation of our economic engagement.” He continues to note the importance of not 
just dialogue between government officials, but also dialogue between people-to-people, 
of which the CEO Roundtable represents. He explains, “I think that the dialogue itself is 
the government-to-government engagement. But what’s really driving a lot of what we 
do economically is the people-to-people engagement that goes on in the business world.” 
He further credits the business community as really the ones who have made the U.S.-
China relationship strong. Lew states,  
“I think it’s important to remember that before we had diplomatic relations, we 
did have commercial relations. They were small, and as the State Councilor 
noted, they’ve grown tremendously over the last 35 years. But it began with 
 317 
 
relationships in commerce and grew into government-to-government 
relationships.” 
To continue this growth, Lew explains how “strengthening the commercial relationship 
remains an important task ahead of us.” In doing so the two countries are able to create 
“economic growth and jobs in our two countries, and it’s a way to help drive the global 
economy forward.” Again, he praises the business community in helping produce 
benefits for the U.S., China, and its bilateral relations. Lew says, “You, the business 
leaders, are the strongest champions of the robust, fair and expanding U.S.-Chinese 
relationship.” He then goes into details explaining the economic issues the S&ED is 
addressing, the positive developments and growth in U.S.-China economic relations as 
well as their specific benefits the U.S. and Chinese economy and workers, before once 
again praising the business leaders’ role in enhancing U.S.-China relations and 
expressing his desire to hear their input on how to continue to improve the economic 
relationship. Lew states: 
And that’s where each of you, the business leaders here this morning, comes in. 
Each of your firms plays a pivotal role in helping to propel the U.S.-China 
relationship forward. And with that, I look forward to hearing your comments 
this morning about the successes you’ve had in the collaboration, and 
importantly, the challenges you face where we, as government officials, can 
perhaps play a role to help make things easier on both sides. 
These examples from the 2009 and 2014 S&ED Roundtable demonstrate another means 
by which the U.S. and China engage in a form of public diplomacy that brings together 
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government leadership with the private sector. It serves to constitute network ties not 
only between the S&ED officials and the private sector by providing information 
regarding the S&ED’s priorities and creates a forum for discussing the agenda and 
developments of the S&EDs policies, but also helps create ties between U.S. and 
Chinese firms.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I argue that the S&ED has been successful in building network 
ties among relevant stakeholders as well as enhancing cultural, scientific, academic, and 
business exchanges as an alternative means to further induce cooperative relations 
between the U.S. and China. This element introduces another function of international 
diplomacy and state socialization that is both organizational and communicative in 
nature as it creates the audiences which the rhetoric of the S&ED then attempts to 
persuade. Thus, the success of the S&ED in promoting its goal of developing positive 
and cooperative U.S.-China relations can be seen as creating networked relations which 
provide an alternative means by which we can understand state socialization and the 
specific mechanisms by which identities, norms, and interests converge.  
From Castells’ (2009) perspective, the S&ED creates networking power by 
including a large number of state officials and agencies from both nations, as 
demonstrated from the previous chapters, but also expands this network to include civil 
society and individuals from both nations. In this case, the S&ED enlarges the network 
and garners greater capacity to enact its policies, and through relational and discursive 
public diplomacy efforts serves to importantly enhance the organization’s networking 
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power by inviting these participants to discuss and identify areas of common concern 
and the benefits of working within the network. However, more than just including more 
members, officials taking part in the S&ED make sure to enhance its network power by 
clearly articulating the S&ED’s identity, values, and goals, or in Castells’ terms 
“standards or rules,” by which civil society actors are to make sense of their actions and 
support. Thus, those working to combat climate change, individuals taking part in 
exchange programs, or business leaders from both sides are to make sense of their 
actions as contributing to the building of “positive, cooperative, and comprehensive 
relations” or the “new model of major country relations” through mutual benefit and 
understanding.  
This defining of their actions ties into Castells’ third form of communication 
power, that being networked power and questions of authority within the network. In this 
case, the S&ED’s power relations exist on two planes. First, it defines U.S. and Chinese 
state interests as equal, as seen from its emphasis on dialogic relations and as enacted by 
the officials’ rhetoric describing the S&EDs values. Second, the S&ED both invites and 
controls civil society actors to participate in the S&ED’s mission, but defines their 
actions within the S&ED’s organizational goals. These elements further highlight 
Castells’ (2009) final form of power, network making power, demonstrating the S&ED’s 
ability to create a network of stakeholders across the two nations, ensuring they share 
common goals and have the resources, both financial and state-sanctioned, by which 
they are able to come together. Indeed, the growth in public outreach programs and 
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plenary sessions demonstrates the enormous network making power the S&ED 
possesses.  
 The impact of the S&EDs network making power is most evident in its desire to 
combat climate change, an issue that had previously been extremely difficult to reach 
consensus on policy specifics given the two countries’ different levels of economic 
modernization. And yet, through the work of the S&ED, the two nations proudly 
announced their agreement on the Paris Accords and continued to coordinate the actual 
implementation of its policies by making sure local city, state, and provincial leaders 
understood the values behind it and means to enact it. Like with climate change, U.S.-
Chinese economic relations had been touted as continually improving, largely moving 
past criticisms of each other’s trade policies. Here again, the S&ED’s inclusion of 
business leaders through its CEO roundtables and officials consistent messaging 
regarding both countries’ leadership in promoting consistent, cooperative U.S.-China 
relations can likely be identified as an important element of this. These two issues 
provided continued positive momentum for U.S.-China relations, and importantly helped 
legitimize the S&ED by creating numerous, tangible outcomes by which external 
stakeholders could see the S&ED’s effectiveness in solving pressing issues. 
 The effectiveness of relational and discursive public diplomacy through the 
constitution of networked relations can be further seen when comparing it to security 
related topics and the military relationship in particular. As chapter 5 showed the first 
few S&EDs largely avoided serious discussion on military-to-military relations, and later 
on this resulted in more avert criticism by officials regarding their counterparts’ actions 
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related to these issues. Absent from this chapter was discussion of how these ties 
matured reflective of the S&ED’s exclusion of incorporating the public in understanding 
these issues. While this shouldn’t be unexpected given the sensitive nature of security 
related issues, it nonetheless highlights a shortcoming in the S&ED’s ability to promote 
trust within the defense community. Nonetheless, as the S&ED began creating greater 
network ties between the two countries’ security apparatuses, like the establishment of 
the Security Dialogue as well as more consistent confidence building measures and 
military exchanges in the later years of the S&ED, the contentious rhetoric on these 
topics at the S&ED began to decline. While it is difficult to conclude with certainty that 
these ties themselves created the shift in rhetoric without more specific analysis of them, 
it still suggests the power of establishing network ties as a means to coordinate activities 
for cooperative purposes. 
 The S&ED’s inclusion of civil society and specific calling upon individual U.S. 
and Chinese citizens to take part in the S&ED’s organizational goals thus represents a 
second lever by which positive relations are created. By explicitly inviting individuals to 
take part in promoting cooperative relations between the two nations, S&ED officials are 
empowering their domestic constituencies with a larger sense of purpose, albeit one 
defined by the government officials coordinating the S&ED. This serves as a means to 
help those participating in the exchanges to understand their actions are servicing 
positive-U.S. China relations. While the specific impacts regarding the effectiveness of 
cultural, educational, and professional exchanges is not exactly clear, especially as to 
whether that translates to shifts in public opinion, they nonetheless create the capacity 
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for a deeper understanding and appreciation of one another’s culture, language, etc. 
From a rhetorical perspective, this might be seen as placing the audience in an affective 
state more suitable to persuasion by officials regarding the benefits of U.S.-China 
relations as they personally have taken part and sampled the other’s culture. Regardless 
of the benefits of exchanges within individual’s psychology, their inclusion in 
combination with other material manifestations of them, like in the Chinese classical 
garden in the U.S., introduces into each country’s domestic discourse greater symbols of 
appreciation and support for the other’s culture, granting authority and elevating each 
nation’s cultural heritage. 
Taken together, this chapter showcased how the organizational rhetoric of the 
S&ED functions as discursive and relational public diplomacy through its building of 
network ties extending beyond government-to-government relations. In doing so, the 
S&ED creates multiple forums for the discussion of key issues that it attempts to 
address, such as climate change and economic relations. These forums create stakeholder 
networks enhancing the personal and civil society ties leveraged for the S&ED’s larger 
mission, and thus helps officials align the internal agreements made by high-ranking 
officials to that of their domestic populace and local officials absent of discussions 
taking part in the behind the doors diplomacy at the S&ED. This provides the 
organizational opportunity whereby S&ED officials legitimize the organization’s values 
and outcomes by praising the S&ED’s efforts in serving the public good, its promotion 
of trust and understanding, and the making tangible the benefits of the S&ED’s efforts to 
local governments and people. Officials ingratiate and invite participation from civil 
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society and the business community as well as provide a reference point by which 
stakeholders come to see continued cooperation as both possible and consistently 
occurring. As such, the S&ED is not just diplomatic summitry, but more nuanced, 
personalized and networked diplomacy. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This dissertation argued for a communication centered approach for 
understanding geopolitical relations through the analysis of the U.S.-China Strategic and 
Economic Dialogues. Approaching the S&ED from an organizational rhetoric 
perspective highlighted the manifold ways that not just states, but also diplomats and 
civil society come together in creating a vision for positive relations and enact those 
visions in tangible ways aiding in the socialization process of states and diffusion of 
norms. It stresses the symbolic means whereby states, their leaders, and publics come to 
coordinate their activities and the implications by which their rhetorical messages define 
that reality in both promoting cooperative relations while also controlling the publics’ 
perception of doing so. This perspective can be seen as a counterweight to the state-
centric view of international relations examining how states socialize each other in that 
the perspective used throughout this dissertation highlights how individual diplomats are 
attempting to resist and transform the international structure’s pull towards conflictual 
relation. It thus stresses individual’s agency by focusing on diplomats’ rhetorical 
arguments and organizational activities in attempting to promote a sense of common 
interest. Indeed, the difficulties of doing so are clear, as seen by the S&ED officials’ 
constant reaffirmation and definition of the values upon which this community of 
interests is sustained. While their statements appear repetitive or at times lacking in 
creativity, it nonetheless serves an important function in reducing uncertainty and 
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promoting continuity, thus representing a new means by which we can understand the 
purpose diplomatic rhetoric. 
While the S&ED is a unique institutional structure, evident by the extent to 
which it incorporates numerous officials across government bureaucracies, the amount 
of time and range of issues discussed, and its incorporation of domestic publics and civil 
society within the two countries, it nonetheless serves similar purposes as other 
international institutions; that is, it provides an organizational means through which rules 
are laid out to better ensure cooperative gains for those involved and functions to 
constitute a community by which these values are upheld and to some extent enforced. 
Thus, while the analysis provided throughout this dissertation primarily helps us to 
understand how the S&ED in particular attempts to forge cooperative relations between 
the U.S. and China in creative ways, these mechanisms still provide us with a greater 
understanding as to how states socialize each other, the nature and purpose of diplomatic 
speech, and the primary role rhetorical argumentation plays in the institutionalization 
and institutional change process.  
This project has helped broaden our understanding of communication theory in 
part through its application to a complicated international relationship. It calls forth 
communication scholars to turn their attention to understanding how states influence 
each other in ways international relations scholars might have missed. Indeed, 
communication scholars can likely broaden and sharpen their own theories of 
institutional change, international communication, rhetoric, conflict studies, etc through 
their application and examination of state behavior largely defined. As such, this 
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dissertation pushes our understanding of organizational communication and rhetoric as 
strategic, persuasive attempts utilized by states and their diplomatic representatives to 
advance their own interests for cooperative purposes, providing a news lens upon which 
we can do so. In this final chapter, I first briefly summarize the conclusions from the 
four analysis chapters before examining the implications this communication centered 
perspective of international relations provides for theories of state socialization, public 
diplomacy, and diplomatic speech. 
Narrative Trajectory of Chapters 
This dissertation provided four chapters of analysis. In the first two analysis 
chapters, Chapters 4 and 5, I focused on the institutional implications of the S&ED, 
identifying the institutional logic by which the two sides rhetorically defined and 
coordinated their organizational activities, the shifts in this logic, and the implications 
institutional theory has for better understanding state socialization and the institutional 
rhetoric underpinning the process of institutionalization and change. Chapters 6 and 7 
turned towards the external organizational messages, suggesting two top-down strategies 
of organizational image management and value advocacy rhetoric servicing the mission 
of the S&ED as well as identifying a bottom-up strategy through the inclusion of civil 
society and the setting up of greater network ties among the two nations’ populace. 
These two chapters conceptualized the external organizational rhetoric as a form of 
public diplomacy servicing the larger, strategic purpose of the S&ED. Taken together 
these four chapters first showcased the internal organizational goals of the S&ED and 
then moved to examine its external organizational rhetoric as a means to further its 
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organizational mission. In both cases, U.S. and Chinese officials’ rhetoric can be seen as 
converging in purpose and consistently engaging in persuasive arguments as to why and 
how the two countries should come together to cooperate. 
Thus, in chapter four I first established what the primary institutional logic in 
which the S&ED coordinates the strategic and economic track as well as the other, 
numerous plenary sessions taking place under the auspices of the S&ED. In this sense, 
the S&ED’s institutional logic sets the stage and defines the motives for action. I argued 
that the S&ED’s institutional logic was defined by the two countries’ presidents’ desire 
to promote “positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relations for the 21st century,” 
which provided the terminology by which the two sides would describe their 
relationship, the problems they faced and the solutions to overcome them, as well as the 
processes by which they are to be discussed. Thus, the S&ED can be seen as an 
institutionalized arrangement following Tolbert and Zucker’s (1996) model of 
institutionalization whereby emergent behaviors specific to a problem are appraised for 
their pragmatic functionality, leading to a social consensus emerging over the value of 
the particular social arrangement, and the arrangement adopted taking on a more 
normative base regarded as an appropriate response enacted over time. 
U.S. and Chinese officials argued that the S&ED’s primary purpose was 
enactment of their presidents’ desire for “positive, cooperative, and comprehensive 
relations for the 21st century,” guiding the behavior of its members, as well as providing 
the values upon which the two socialize each other. Officials argumentatively 
legitimated the S&ED’s purpose as serving a unique function in helping address the 
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complicated issues that come to define 21st century geopolitical relations. In doing so, 
they consistently engage in formulating rhetorical narratives making sense of their work 
through the S&ED, clear arguments justifying the S&ED’s need, and epideictically 
creating a common world view that forms the basis for their collaboration. These 
overlapping problems require that the two parties engage in dialogue, enhance 
communication and coordination, seek out greater common ground, and translate those 
common interests into tangible outcomes. Thus, the special representatives’ rhetorical 
messages, while drawing upon the larger discourse of cooperation embedded in the 
S&ED, nonetheless are active rhetorical agents needing to state the case as to what the 
S&ED is about and why it is succeeding.  
This logic implicates the S&ED officials in finding ever increasing areas of 
cooperation, which they do nearly every year, both broadening and deepening the extent 
of the cooperative relations. However, by pursuing “positive” relations, the S&ED 
becomes a conflict-avoidant forum whereby conflict on sensitive issues is assumed to be 
expected, and in turn is deemphasized by stressing new areas where the two might begin 
to cooperate. The S&ED appears successful in normalizing this type of cooperative 
interaction as not only do we see a convergence in the language used to define it, but 
also as individual members from both sides claim to hold personal trust or belief in the 
S&ED’s ability to do so.  
After identifying the stability within the institutional rhetoric of the S&ED, I then 
in chapter 5, turned to the shifts within the institutional rhetoric of the S&ED, 
identifying three phases in which these shifts occurred. First, was a cautious honeymoon 
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phase where the pursuit of “positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relations” was 
frequently cited and called upon to describe the purpose of the S&ED’s meeting. The 
economic track discussions focused on the global financial crisis providing a common 
base by which the two coordinated and cooperated their economic policies, whereas the 
strategic track addressed less security related issues and instead focused on combatting 
climate change and creating additional fora for further discussion and identification of 
issues of common concern. The second phase saw the introduction of a “new model of 
major country relations” which brought about a focus on how the two sides could 
combat distrust from enveloping their relations, with greater consideration to more 
security related issues, albeit with commentary taking a more conflict-oriented tone. The 
economic track discussions continued to cooperatively define the two countries’ 
interests, but shifted away from the implications of the global financial crisis to new 
areas where the two could reform their domestic economies and address concerns arising 
from their bilateral economic relations salient to their domestic audiences. The third 
phase was one of maturation and praise where U.S. and Chinese officials reflected upon 
their eight years of engagement, cited the numerous areas where the two had built more 
cooperative relations, with the U.S. declaring China had become a “responsible 
stakeholder.” Personal ties and the strong relations forged through the S&ED were 
credited in aiding in the effort of finding areas to cooperate, and discussions on more 
sensitive, security related issues took a more nuanced tone whereby U.S. officials no 
longer publicly critiqued China’s policies on issues like human rights and cyber security, 
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but recognized Chinese positions with Chinese officials somewhat similarly reaffirming 
their positions, but acknowledging U.S. concerns. 
The shifts in the institutional rhetoric of the S&ED showcased the dynamic role 
of communication whereby both nations’ presidents and diplomats advance arguments 
reaffirming and transforming their rationales for taking up cooperative relations, the 
problems they are to tackle, and the means by which they attempt to persuade or identify 
common interests. The two presidents’ represented the institutional entrepreneurs with 
the resources to shift the discussion to include the “new model of major country 
relations” which dramatically changed the extent to which the two began talking about 
important security related topics as well as combatting strategic distrust. The diplomatic 
officials represented the institutional workers responsible enacting, affirming, 
legitimatizing, and transforming the S&ED’s pursuit of positive, cooperative relations to 
the changing circumstances the two countries faced. Their continued praise of the S&ED 
and the importance of the bilateral relationship conferred equal status to each other, but 
also elevated both countries’ importance on global issues by mythologizing to some 
extent their ability to lead and effect change on a global scale as well as the alternative to 
failed cooperation, that being great power rivalry. Taken together, much of the “work” 
of diplomacy can be seen as completed and sustained through the special 
representatives’ consistent problem and solution definition and rhetorical 
implementation and exhortations to live up to the values of the S&ED, holding each 
accountable and signaling to their respective bureaucracies, citizenry, and the 
international community that the U.S. and China can, should, and will cooperate together 
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demonstrating how norms become defined and enacted. Thus, theories of international 
relations taking a state-centric view of socialization fail to account for the personal 
relations U.S. and Chinese officials come to hold through the S&ED whereby identities 
and interests become more malleable through interpersonal communication which 
provides the opportunity for trust to be built aiding in the diffusion of norms guiding 
state behavior.  
Whereas chapters four and five focused on the institutional logics guiding U.S. 
and Chinese officials’ activities, in chapters five and six I turned to the external 
organizational rhetoric employed to justify and define U.S.-Chinese relations and build 
network ties in support of these activities through the S&ED’s organizational identity, 
image, and reputation management rhetoric and values advocacy. First, officials 
described the unique identity of the S&ED in ways congruent to its institutional logic, 
but did so as a means by which domestic and international audiences could make sense 
of its functions. Officials provided a frame of reference to judge the S&ED’s 
effectiveness, turning to long-term issues defining the larger geopolitical goals of the 
S&ED managing expectations of the organization by deflecting attention away from 
smaller issues of disagreement to its continued ability to deliver specific results to 
domestic and international constituents as well as providing consistency and certainty in 
the S&ED’s unique ability to bring together officials from both countries to dialogically 
address major issues in the bilateral relationship. Second, the S&ED’s identity was 
supported through its image management rhetoric in more context specific issues and 
audiences serving to foster adherence between the S&ED’s identity to its audiences 
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highlighting again the rhetorical element of diplomatic speech. Finally, the 
organizational reputation management rhetoric described a worldview whereby 
cooperation between the U.S. and China through the S&ED had occurred previously and 
could be expected to do so in the future which also signaled how the S&ED’s past 
success would help combat historical problems of great power conflict, thereby 
affirming the dialogue mechanism’s important work and its ability to deliver a change in 
relations capable of overcoming conflictual ones.  
Turning to the S&ED’s value advocacy, chapter 6 demonstrated how officials 
explained the S&ED’s purpose as one aiding in addressing global and local problems 
through dialogue. As such, officials made clear how the S&ED’s “products” or 
“services” held global and local value benefiting the lives of their domestic 
constituencies and global citizens, enhancing its organizational image. Furthermore, 
officials’ rhetoric helped external audiences understand the values inherent within the 
S&ED, values argued to be both legitimate and appropriate, ie dialogue, legitimizing the 
means by which cooperation between two major powers would take place. Finally, the 
values of dialogue were used to blunt criticism of the S&ED’s shortcomings and 
establish premises upon which officials could draw upon to justify differences remaining 
between the two nations, specifically in the respecting of their core interests. Taken 
together, chapter 6 demonstrated how the discursive public diplomacy approach is 
flawed in that it overemphasizes the role of a global civil society capable of solving 
jointly identified problems whereby instead, the analysis in chapter 6 demonstrated that 
government agencies are the ones with the resources to address these issues and define 
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the values and topics of discussion. Thus, organizational identity, image, and reputation 
management rhetoric provides an alternative mode through which we can understand 
how states socialize each other by directing our attention to the organizational messages 
used to connect stakeholders with a consistent frame of reference to judge the S&ED’s 
purpose, the unique values upon which it coordinates its activities, and legitimizes its 
success by highlighting the outcomes reached suggesting cooperative relations will 
continue, thus providing the symbolic means through which its domestic and 
international audiences are to make sense of its functions.  
Finally, after identifying the top-down strategies by which the S&ED promoted 
its image, in chapter 7 I examined the bottom-up strategies of relational network 
diplomacy whereby the S&ED both invites civil society to participate in the S&ED’s 
mission as well as setting up the networks by which they can discuss issues of mutual 
importance. As such, I argued that the S&ED has been successful in building network 
ties among relevant stakeholders as well as enhancing cultural, scientific, academic, and 
business exchanges as an alternative means to further induce cooperative relations 
between the U.S. and China, providing a second lever by which positive relations are 
created. By explicitly inviting individuals to take part in promoting cooperative relations 
between the two nations, S&ED officials empowered their domestic constituencies with 
a larger sense of purpose, albeit one defined by the government officials coordinating the 
S&ED. This served as a means to help those participating in the exchanges to understand 
their actions as servicing positive U.S.-China relations, creating the capacity for a deeper 
understanding and appreciation of one another’s culture, constituting new stakeholder 
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audiences amendable to the S&ED’s mission, and introducing into each country’s 
domestic discourse symbols of appreciation and support for the other’s culture. 
From Castells’ (2008) theory of communication power, I argued in chapter 7 that 
the S&ED created networking power by including a large number of state officials and 
agencies from both nations and expanded this network to include civil society and 
individuals from both nations. Thus, the S&ED’s enlargement of the network garners 
greater capacity to enact its policies, and through relational and discursive public 
diplomacy efforts, serves to importantly enhance the organization’s networking power 
by inviting these participants to discuss and identify areas of common concern and the 
benefits of working within the network. Officials taking part in the S&ED made sure to 
enhance its network power by clearly articulating the S&ED’s identity, values, and 
goals, or in Castells’ terms “standards or rules,” by which civil society actors were to 
make sense of their actions and support. This defining of their actions represented 
Castells’ third form of communication power, that being networked power and questions 
of authority within the network whereby the S&ED’s power relations defined U.S. and 
Chinese state interests as equal, while the inclusion of civil society actors to participate 
in the S&ED’s mission both elevated their roles in U.S.-China relations and 
subordinated their efforts by defining their actions within the S&ED’s organizational 
goals. These elements contributed to Castells’ (2008) final form of power, network 
making power, by demonstrating the S&ED’s ability to create a network of stakeholders 
across the two nations, ensuring they share common goals and have the resources, both 
financial and state-sanctioned, by which they are able to come together. The impact of 
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the S&EDs network making power was most evident in its desire to combat climate 
change and promote stronger business ties between the two countries. These two issues 
provided positive momentum for U.S.-China relations, and importantly helped legitimize 
the S&ED by creating numerous, tangible outcomes by which external stakeholders 
could see the S&ED’s effectiveness in solving pressing issues.  
 Taken together, chapter 7 showcased how the organizational rhetoric of the 
S&ED functions as discursive and relational public diplomacy through its building of 
network ties extending beyond government-to-government relations. In doing so, the 
S&ED created multiple forums for the discussion of key issues it attempts to address 
creating stakeholder networks enhancing the personal and civil society ties leveraged for 
the S&ED’s larger mission, and thus helped officials align the internal agreements made 
by high-ranking officials to that of their domestic populace and local officials absent of 
discussions taking part in the behind the doors diplomacy at the S&ED. The creation of 
these networks provided the organizational opportunity whereby S&ED officials 
legitimized the organization’s values and outcomes by praising the S&ED’s efforts in 
serving the public good, its promotion of trust and understanding, and the making 
tangible the benefits of the S&ED’s efforts to local governments and people. 
Implications on the Communicative Elements of the S&ED to Theories of State 
Socialization 
International relations scholars within the liberal-institutional and constructivist 
traditions contend that states can socialize each other through noncoercive means by 
shifting the perception of their identities, interests, and norms. While recognizing that 
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communication plays a role in this process, whether by the desire for a positive image, 
the ability to persuade, claims to legitimacy, or through the alignment of global values 
and norms to local ones, the theorization of this process by taking a state-centric 
perspective limits the extent to which specific communication mechanisms actually 
impact the taking hold and sustainment of such norms and socializing practices. For 
instance, the liberal-institutionalists’s argument that states conscious of common 
interests and values create a society bound by common rules working towards promoting 
common institutions (Bull, 1977) is problematic because it begins with this assumption 
of commonality without demonstrating how this community of interests emerges or 
attempts to explain this process by overly rational-choice models suggesting that 
economic and security outputs are maximized by cooperative elements. Indeed, any 
community, whether regional, national, or international, requires its calling into being 
and sustainment regarding the values and rules for its continued existence.  
The constructivists recognize that shared ideas, perceptions, and beliefs provide 
our social world structure, order, and stability (Wendt, 1999) but treat these issues in 
relatively thin models of communication, whereby states simply mimic others’ 
behaviors, sign onto agreements or choose to participate in organizations to attract 
approval from other states, or identify the conditions by which persuasion is more likely 
(Johnston, 2008). While this demonstrates that state identities do change, it nonetheless 
presents them as monolithic conglomerations ignoring to a large extent the 
individualized means through which government officials or coalitions begin to shape 
and/or challenge these identities. Acharya’s (2004) theory of socialization hints at the 
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importance of these individual actors in creating support for the convergence of norms, 
but again treats these norms as more static once taken root. 
Thus, throughout this dissertation I sought to enhance our understanding of the 
specific communicative techniques by which norms converge and mutual interests are 
internalized by identifying some of the communicative means in which this occurs 
within organizations and through diplomats’ outwardly directed diplomatic speech. This 
perspective highlights the organizational elements that more or less successfully 
coordinate individual actors’ pursuit of the larger organization’s goal and the means by 
which it garners public support for these activities. Thus, analysis of the S&ED from this 
orientation adds to our understanding of state socialization in a few key ways. 
First, the analysis of the S&ED from an institutional theory perspective 
demonstrated how identities become wrapped up symbolically through the institutional 
logics that guide organizational members’ values, identities, and norms and materially 
through the organization’s structure and outcomes. Importantly, this points to two 
pathways whereby state socialization eventually occurs. First, individual members’ 
beliefs begin to change through their participation in the organization. Second, the 
organization itself and the institutional logic that begin to define its activities are shaped, 
reaffirmed, and enacted by its members. These two processes taken together then begin 
to form the “state’s” interests and identity. Importantly, while these identities begin to 
become taken-for-granted, they nonetheless are subject to revision and are not altogether 
static as individuals have agency to rewrite or incorporate new aspects as the external 
environment demands as well as reflective of the organizational members’ strategic 
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intents. Thus, individuals are conscious, reflective agents that consistently engage in 
rhetorically affirming or changing the organization, and yet at the same time are 
constrained by the antecedent rhetorics that come to define the organization’s functions.   
In this sense, U.S. and Chinese officials internalized cooperative relations 
through their adherence of the S&ED’s institutional logic of “positive, cooperative, and 
comprehensive relations for the 21st century” and the value of dialogic communication 
as the means to do so. The two countries’ presidents play an important role in defining 
the S&ED’s identity and institutional logic, upon which then the special representative 
enact these principles through converging definitions of the problems the two countries 
face and the solution to those problems being the S&ED’s institutional logic. As such, 
the special representatives engage in constant rhetorical definition of a common world 
view in which U.S.-China cooperation is needed and enacted. The epideictic creation 
and affirmation of this common world view plays an essential role in laying the 
groundwork upon which deliberative practices can occur, and without establishing a 
consensus on both the issues to be addressed as well as the principles by which to judge 
the efficacy of such decisions, cooperation cannot occur.  
Evidence of the S&ED’s internalization of its values to its members can be seen 
through their common argumentative warrants employed by U.S. and Chinese officials, 
supporting Johnston’s (2008) view of persuasion, but going further by identifying how 
both sides are attempting to persuade their counterparts to live up to these values. Thus, 
the ongoing problem-solution definition demonstrates a constant enactment of 
persuasion regarding both short term and long-term co-orientation of interests. 
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Furthermore, the demonstration of the S&ED’s success persuasively affirms to each side 
how living up to the S&ED’s logic creates results, legitimizing the institution as a 
workable means to increase cooperative relations and thus in turn leading to the social 
consensus and adoption of cooperative norms. Therefore, whereas the adoption of norms 
is the end goal, socialization becomes the communicative process of argumentation 
leading to convergences in rhetorical definitions of world views. 
Further evidence to the importance of converging world views comes from 
comparison of what issues have been most successfully discussed and what areas remain 
underdeveloped. The successful areas come from the shared recognition of the threat of 
global climate change and cooperation on economic issues. In both cases, officials at the 
S&ED identify the importance of these two issues, explain how cooperation between the 
U.S. and China can solve these issues, and describe the value to which cooperation leads 
to benefits to both their domestic constituencies and global publics. As such, numerous 
outcomes have been reached in these areas as well multiple partnerships among civil 
society actors addressing these issues. In contrast, on security related topics, an 
overarching agreement on the threats posing both nations is less clear and more 
ambiguously defined. Therefore, while more confidence building measures and security 
dialogues have been set up in the later years of the S&ED, the lack of epideictic rhetoric 
affirming this common world view and lack of praising specific areas where the two 
have come to cooperate on security issues beyond more narrow issues suggests an 
inability to successfully deliberate on these topics. Instead, focus is directed away from 
these issues with officials calling upon external audiences to judge the effectiveness of 
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the S&ED by the number of outcomes reached in other areas, namely economic and 
environmental, as well as exchanges. Furthermore, the S&ED’s principles of dialogue 
serves to blunt criticism of the lack of more sensitive issues being resolved as well as a 
value premise by which officials defend their individual state interests at the expense of 
cooperation thus at the same time subverting and affirming the S&ED’s overarching 
goal of cooperative relations and dialogic exchanges of opinion. 
Second, not only do states and their individual officials socialize each other, but 
also socialize external audiences by arguing for the legitimacy of the norms and values 
being advocated. As Pu (2012) argued, developing countries challenge the legitimacy of 
global norms thus suggesting a two-way process of state socialization, not just a one-
way process whereby newcomers are brought in and taught how to behave within the 
norms of international society. Outside of proving this thesis, Pu (2012) doesn’t clearly 
identify the strategic means in which this occurs.  
Merging theories of discursive public diplomacy with those of organizational 
identity, image, reputation management rhetoric and value advocacy, demonstrates how 
officials at the S&ED attempt to legitimize its efforts as benefiting the world through the 
addressing of shared global concerns. The S&ED’s organizational rhetoric thus 
constitutes global and local stakeholders and connects these stakeholder identities to the 
values of the S&ED and its identity. The S&ED’s identity is referred to as unique, 
capable, and dialogic, creating “products” or “services” to benefit of domestic and 
international audiences, not just a real politic motive enhancing U.S. and Chinese power. 
In doing so, it connects its own values to those of the international community. Its 
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praising of the outcomes reached serve to legitimize its efforts and enhance its reputation 
through the creation of narratives tying past success to present, and thus suggesting 
continued future success. Thus, stakeholders both internal and external to the dialogue 
mechanism are provided with a sense of predictability and continuity in U.S.-China 
relations garnering further support for the S&ED’s effectiveness and curbing criticism 
for alternative means to be found in engaging or containing either country. Furthermore, 
this serves as a way for external audiences to make sense of the outcomes being reached 
by the S&ED, defining them as evidence as to the dialogue mechanisms contributing to 
“positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relations.” 
This organizational identity and value advocacy provides another mechanism by 
which states and their officials socialize each other as they persuade themselves and 
outsiders as to the success of the S&ED and confirm its identity and values to those 
engage in the mechanism as they themselves come to define it. This reflects in part 
Johnston’s (2008) definition of persuasion as a strategy of norm convergence as the 
individual statements made by officials reflect the S&ED’s values. Indeed, officials 
jointly draw upon these values to argue in defense of their country’s positions on 
sensitive issues such as human rights, cyber security, and territorial sovereignty in the 
South China Sea as well as using these them to call for changes in behavior and policies. 
Thus, this aspect offers a richer perspective on how persuasion is used to socialize states 
and their pursuit of positive social images. 
 Finally, the organizational rhetoric of the S&ED highlights the power of 
organizations as coming to define the issues of relevancy to their publics and the values 
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upon which they are to be decided and enacted. Here, officials mythologize the power of 
U.S.-China cooperation in solving global issues affirming their own nations prestige and 
hierarchy within the international community. In doing so, it reaffirms and empowers 
their cooperative agenda as decided by their government leadership and brings in 
external stakeholders outside of the bilateral relationship to participate in its agenda. One 
of the important issues the S&ED is addressing is its combatting of great power conflict 
to which officials argue that the S&ED’s values and identity help combat. The consistent 
repetition of these values and introduction of narratives to help outsides and insiders 
make sense of the larger picture of U.S.-China engagement helps to enhance the S&ED’s 
image as a force for “good” or global stability and peace, reducing uncertainty and thus 
risk that might derail cooperative relations towards more conflictual ones. Taking 
Castells’ (2008) view on communication power, socialization can also be understood as 
creating network power. This perspective can better highlight the means by which 
individuals, organizations, and publics come to adopt certain norms through their 
inclusion in the network. As analysis of the S&ED demonstrated, officials were able to 
transmit the “standards/rules” as defined by the S&ED’s identity and purpose to 
stakeholders by creating these networks by providing the resources and government 
authority bringing them together, enlarging the network.  
Implications to Public Diplomacy 
 Academic and policy makers’ interest in public diplomacy stems from the 
recognition that global and local publics are increasingly knowledgeable and active in 
shaping foreign policy. How they do so is still relatively unclear, with measurement of 
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attitudinal change and consistent application of theoretical models to multiple case 
studies missing (Gilboa, 2008). Furthermore, public diplomacy’s emphasis on relational 
networks and discursive public diplomacy tend to overstate the power of individuals to 
come together themselves and set the policy agenda as well as value standards by which 
global publics can solve pressing issues. As an alternative, this dissertation suggests that 
organizations possess the greater power, resources, and authority by which action can be 
taken. This doesn’t necessarily down play the influence of global and domestic publics, 
but rather emphasizes how their inclusion is needed in support of larger organizational 
goals.  
Therefore, from the analysis of the S&ED’s organizational rhetoric, I present an 
alternative model of public diplomacy whereby government organizations and 
institutions produce messages and create networks for the purpose of coordinating their 
larger policy goals with the interests of the public. Within this model governments both 
influence their stakeholder publics but are also constrained to some extent by these 
publics. First, organizations are constrained by publics in that they need their support for 
policies, specifically in order to gain legitimacy. In the case of the S&ED, its legitimacy 
is premised in part upon its ability to adhere to common values and shared global 
concerns. Thus, much of the diplomatic rhetoric of the S&ED comes from making 
claims that it serves the interests of the globe and the interests of the U.S. and Chinese 
domestic publics in combatting topics of climate change and promoting fair, stable, and 
mutually beneficial economic relations. The value of dialogue and cooperative relations 
is easily understood as a just standard whereby both countries’ interests can be met and 
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internalized by domestic and global audiences. After all, “win-win” cooperation suggests 
no one loses and everyone benefits. Furthermore, organizations such as the S&ED must 
prove themselves capable in addressing the topics and applying the values which they 
purport to embody. In this case, the S&ED’s mythologizing of U.S.-China cooperation 
as needed and sufficient in combatting global problems as well as the constant 
demonstration of the outcomes it has reached proves its effectiveness. Taken together, 
the S&ED’s public diplomacy rhetoric attempts to connect with stakeholders by 
portraying itself as both legitimate and capable in making the publics’ lives better. 
Second, while individuals constrain the organization, the means by which they 
understand what issues are pressing and what values are effective in addressing these 
topics becomes largely defined and directed by the organization’s rhetorical construction 
of these elements. The S&ED’s programming and network making functions highlights 
the extent to which it can create and bring together sympathetic stakeholders to enact its 
policies. Furthermore, the meetings between high ranking U.S. and Chinese officials 
behind closed doors set the agenda and then share progress on these issues to the public. 
They provide slogans such as “positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relations for the 
21st century” and the “new model of major country relations” to help the public make 
sense of what the two countries are working towards, introduce narratives of cooperative 
relations to provide a larger frame of reference of its function, and utilize value advocacy 
to blunt criticism where they fall short. All of these elements help maintain support for 
the organization’s goals and benefiting its mission.   
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Taking a perspective of public diplomacy from an organizational rhetorical 
standpoint helps place consideration of these strategies in a larger strategic framework 
rather than a narrower tactical approach of enhancing public opinion. While discursive 
public diplomacy rightly calls forth the power of ideas and policy debates as important 
means by which we cooperate on issues pressing to the globe, the means by which 
solutions are actually implemented are not necessarily in their entirety from civil society 
but still rely on the power of organizations and states which define the issues, provide 
the symbols by which we understand them, and set up the forums that make discussion 
possible. In the case of the S&ED, when attempting to measure the impact of exchange 
programs, we can see these efforts are not an end in themselves, but rather another 
symbolic means to promote the overarching goal of the S&ED’s mission to produce 
positive U.S.-China relations. Scholars should analyze and critique public diplomacy 
efforts as to how it achieves an organization or country’s strategic policy goals by 
inducing publics to cooperate and coordinate their activities in service to the 
organization, how these public diplomacy efforts serve as a socialization force for 
defining global norms, and through both inviting individuals to participate in 
government policy while also constraining how they make sense of their involvement. In 
doing so, we can truly elevate public diplomacy by granting it a more serious role in how 
foreign policy is enacted while recognizing the power dimensions that constrain it. 
Rhetoric of Diplomacy 
 Beyond analysis of presidential rhetoric and foreign policy summitry, 
rhetoricians have largely ignored the importance of diplomatic speech. Part of this may 
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be its bland, and at times, unimaginative dimension. Nonetheless, as analysis of the 
S&ED demonstrated, individual diplomats serve an important role in enacting and 
sustaining larger foreign policy visions defined by their presidents. Indeed, as 
international relations theories suggest, communication plays a vital role in creating the 
community of interests by which states come together to cooperate. In this dissertation, I 
attempted to demonstrate the value of analyzing diplomatic rhetoric as a way to 
understand how officials persuade each other and their external audiences. 
 Officials are constantly engaged in persuasive attempts to define their relations, 
world view, and the terminologies that guide their actions. Perhaps the most important 
element of the S&ED’s diplomatic speech comes from its epideictic nature defining 
values and common world view that makes possible U.S.-China relations. Because these 
officials come from different cultures and political histories, the need for establishing 
common values is particularly acute. They attempt to overcome this by drawing upon 
narratives of past cooperative relations as well as larger historical lessons such as great 
power rivalry and its detrimental impact in addition to creating their own vision of 
cooperative relations based on their mantra of “positive, cooperative, and comprehensive 
relations for the 21st century” and the “new model of major country relations.” These 
elements serve as the organizational and rhetorical terminologies they come to use to 
define their actions and exhort their counterparts to live up to. 
 Another important element of diplomatic speech is the development of consistent 
and predictable means by which they describe the problems they jointly face and their 
solutions. In this sense, argumentation or the citing of evidence and warrants upon which 
 347 
 
claims are made eidetically establishes their common world view through identification 
of enemies, or in more so in the case of the S&ED threats to the U.S.-China relationship 
such as the Thucydides’ trap and strategic distrust, as well as the value claims upon 
which the desirability of an action can be measured. Thus, the value of dialogue 
becomes an important resource to define and justify each country’s action. Indeed, the 
repetitive problem-solution discourse of the S&ED, its constant affirmation of dialogue, 
and consistent praise of the S&ED’s unique ability to promote positive U.S.-China 
relations might appear to be unimportant, but from the perspective of needing to build a 
common community of interest, one can see it plays a vital role in sustaining the 
bilateral partnership. 
 Unfortunately, the large body of data analyzed in this dissertation prevented 
greater identification and appreciation of more nuanced and artful rhetorical elements 
within the diplomatic rhetoric embodied in the S&ED. Nonetheless, rhetoricians should 
be encouraged to expand their interest beyond presidential rhetoric to explore how 
diplomats craft effective appeals and constitute the audiences, identities, and values upon 
which international cooperation takes root. 
Conclusions and Future Implications of the S&ED 
 The 2016 S&ED marked the end of era whereby U.S. President Barack Obama 
ended his eight years in office, all of which occurred during the eight years of the 
S&ED’s existence. Turning to whether the S&ED continues and the extent of its future 
growth, one must be cautiously optimistic. The S&ED has appeared to have stabilized 
U.S.-China relations and resulted in a greater interconnection between the two countries’ 
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economic and diplomatic ties. However, the reliance of the S&ED on arguing for its 
ability to produce outcomes and epideictically affirm a common sense of purpose could 
be in jeopardy giving the new U.S. President Donald Trump. His overly mercurial and 
caustic rhetoric threatens to overwhelm the more measured, consistent tone officials at 
the S&ED have used, which I have argued serves an important means to continued 
cooperative relations. For instance, on the campaign trail he threatened to label China a 
currency manipulator and expressed his willingness to engage in a trade war with China 
by leveling tariffs. Once reaching the Oval Office, President Trump broke with 
precedent by directly talking to Taiwan’s President on the phone, thus serving to 
legitimize the Taiwanese President’s authority as a sovereign ruler of an independent 
and thus violating the principles of the “one-China” policy, which has been the 
cornerstone of U.S.-China relations reaching back to Nixon’s opening to China. This 
stands in contrast the S&ED’s efforts to foster greater understanding and predictability 
in the relationship so that problems are less likely to flare or become misunderstood.  
Furthermore, the areas where the S&ED has claimed the most success, those 
being in climate change and economic cooperation are two topics in particular President 
Trump has taken a new approach towards. If he is able to dramatically change the U.S.’s 
policy on these issues, the consistency and predictability upon which the S&ED has 
promoted will be significantly undermined. Furthermore, as discussion on sensitive 
issues like Taiwan or the South China Sea showcased, bombastic criticism by the U.S. 
towards China’s position on these issues can result in a deinstitutionalization of the 
S&ED’s values. As the literature on institutional change argues, institutions are not static 
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entities. Thus, the continuation of the S&ED cannot be presumed and if its legitimacy is 
challenged, might lead to its discontinuation all together. This might be the greatest test 
as to the extent to which the S&ED has created enduring changes and internalization of 
its values within its members through which stability in U.S.-China relations may endure 
in face of President Trump’s rhetorical headwinds.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
TEXTS UNDER ANALYSIS 
 
Text under analysis: State Department Documents 
2009 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
-07/28/09  Closing Remarks for U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue;  Secretary of 
State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Bureau of Public Affairs; Eisenhower Executive Office 
Building; Washington, DC 
-07/28/09  Joint Press Availability With Secretary of the Treasury Timothy 
Geithner;  Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton; Eisenhower Executive Office 
Building; Washington, DC 
-07/28/09  Joint Press Release on the First Round of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue; Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Spokesman; Washington, DC 
-07/28/09  Memorandum of Understanding on Enhancing Cooperation on Climate Change, 
Energy and the Environment; Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Spokesman; Washington, 
DC 
-07/28/09  Remarks at Dinner Hosted by the U.S.-China Business Council and National 
Committee on U.S.-China Relations;  Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton; Ritz-Carlton 
Hotel; Washington, DC 
-07/28/09  Signing Ceremony for the U.S.-China Memorandum of Understanding to Enhance 
Cooperation in Climate Change, Energy, and the Environment;  Secretary of State Hillary 
Rodham Clinton; Treaty Room; Washington, DC 
-07/28/09  Strategic Track Discussion Session II;  Secretary of State Hillary Rodham 
Clinton; Washington, DC 
-07/27/09  A New Strategic and Economic Dialogue with China;  Secretary of State Hillary 
Rodham Clinton; Op-Ed; The Wall Street Journal 
-07/27/09  Remarks at Plenary Session of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue;  Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton; Washington, DC 
-07/27/09  Special Background Briefing on U.S. - China Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue; Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Spokesman; Washington, DC 
-07/25/09  Strategic and Economic Dialogue Press Schedule; Bureau of Public Affairs, Office 
of the Spokesman; Washington, DC 
2010 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
-05/25/10  Concluding Joint Statements at the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue;  Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton; Great Hall of the People; Beijing, China 
-05/25/10  Remarks at the Closing of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue;  Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton; Great Hall of the People; Beijing, China 
-05/25/10  U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 2010 Outcomes of the Strategic 
Track; Office of the Spokesman; Washington, DC 
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-05/23/10  Strategic and Economic Dialogue Opening Session (Complete Remarks);  Secretary 
of State Hillary Rodham Clinton; Great Hall of the People; Beijing, China 
-05/23/10  Strategic and Economic Dialogue Opening Session (Secretary Only);  Secretary of 
State Hillary Rodham Clinton; Great Hall of the People; Beijing, China 
-05/19/10  Briefing on the Upcoming U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue;  Assistant 
Secretary Kurt M. Campbell, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Washington, DC 
-05/19/10  U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue;  Assistant Secretary Kurt M. 
Campbell, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Washington, DC 
-05/18/10  Special Briefing on the Upcoming U.S.-China Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue; Office of the Spokesman; Washington, DC 
2011 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
-05/11/11  Interview With Hu Shuli and Huang Shan of Caixin Media Company;  Secretary of 
State Hillary Rodham Clinton; Washington, DC 
-05/11/11  Secretary Clinton Supports Expansion of U.S.-China EcoPartnerships 
Program; Office of the Spokesman; Washington, DC Also available in Chinese 
-05/10/11  Advisory Committee on the 100,000 Strong Initiative; Office of the 
Spokesman; Washington, DC Also available in Chinese 
-05/10/11  Interview With Anthony Yuen of Phoenix TV;  Secretary of State Hillary Rodham 
Clinton; Washington, DC 
-05/10/11  Remarks at U.S.-China EcoPartnerships Signing Ceremony;  Secretary of State 
Hillary Rodham Clinton; Treaty Room; Washington, DC Also available in Chinese 
-05/10/11  Remarks at the Conclusion of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue With 
China;  Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton; Sidney R. Yates Auditorium, Department of 
the Interior; Washington, DC Also available in Arabic 
-05/10/11  Remarks at the Inaugural Meeting of the Advisory Committee for the 100,000 
Strong Initiative;  Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton; The Loy Henderson 
Auditorium; Washington, DC Also available in Chinese 
-05/10/11  Secretary Clinton Meets Participants in Inaugural Women-LEAD Event; Office of 
the Spokesman; Washington, DC 
-05/10/11  Secretary Clinton Meets with Participants in Inaugural Women-LEAD Event; Office 
of the Spokesman; Washington, DC Also available in Chinese 
-05/10/11  U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 2011 Outcomes of the Strategic 
Track; Office of the Spokesman; Washington, DC Also available in Chinese 
-05/09/11   Photos: 2011 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) 
-05/09/11  Remarks at Banquet for Vice Premier Wang, State Councilor Dai and the Chinese 
delegation;  Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton; Washington, DC 
-05/09/11  Remarks at U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Strategic Track Plenary 
Session One;  Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton; Loy Henderson 
Auditorium; Washington, DC Also available in Arabic 
-05/09/11  Remarks at the Opening Session of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue;  Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton; Sidney R. Yates 
Auditorium; Department of the Interior, Washington, DC Also available inChinese 
-05/09/11  Secretary Clinton To Praise Announcement of Six New U.S.-China EcoPartnerships 
on May 10; Office of the Spokesman; Washington, DC 
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-05/09/11  Senior Administration Officials on the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue; Teleconference Briefing; Washington, DC 
-05/08/11  Presents Jeffrey Bader With the Secretary's Distinguished Service 
Award;  Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton; Blair House; Washington, DC 
-05/05/11  2011 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) Media Coverage 
Opportunities; Office of the Spokesman; Washington, DC 
-05/05/11  Briefing on the Upcoming U.S.-China S&ED;  Assistant Secretary Kurt M. Campbell, 
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Washington, DC 
-05/04/11  Upcoming U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED); Washington, DC 
2012 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
-05/17/12  United States-China Cooperation in Afghanistan; Office of the 
Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
-05/04/12  Joint Statement on the 4th Round of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue; Office of the Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
-05/04/12  Joint Statement on the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Outcomes of 
the Strategic Track; Office of the Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
-05/04/12  Remarks at the Strategic and Economic Dialogue U.S. Press Conference;  Secretary 
of State Hillary Rodham Clinton; JW Marriott; Beijing, China 
-05/04/12  Strategic Track Plenary Session of the Strategic and Economic 
Dialogues;  Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton; Diaoyutai; Beijing, China 
-05/04/12  Strategic and Economic Dialogue Joint Press Statement;  Secretary of State Hillary 
Rodham Clinton; Diaoyutai; Beijing, China 
-05/04/12  The U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, Rounds I-IV Strategic Track 
Outcomes; Office of the Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
-05/03/12  Remarks at U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Opening 
Session;  Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton; Diaoyutai Villa 17; Beijing, China 
2013 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
-07/12/13  U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Outcomes of the Strategic 
Track; Office of the Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
-07/12/13  U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue V Strategic Track Select 
Outcomes; Office of the Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
-07/11/13  Remarks With Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi at the EcoPartnership Signing 
Event; Deputy Secretary of State William J. Burns; Benjamin Franklin Room; Washington, DC 
-07/11/13  Remarks With Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi at the Strategic Track Plenary 
Session; Deputy Secretary of State William J. Burns; Loy Henderson; Washington, DC 
-07/11/13  Remarks at Press Availability; Deputy Secretary of State William J. Burns; U.S. 
Department of Treasury, Cash Room; Washington, DC 
-07/11/13  Senior Administration Officials On the First Day of the Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue and U.S.-China Relations; Office of the Spokesperson; Via 
Teleconference; Washington, DC 
-07/11/13  The U.S.-China Closing Statements for U.S.-China Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue; Deputy Secretary of State William J. Burns; U.S. Department of Treasury, Cash 
Room; Washington, DC 
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-07/10/13  2013 Strategic and Economic Dialogue Press Schedule - UPDATED; Office of the 
Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
-07/10/13   Photos: U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Joint Opening Session 
-07/10/13  The U.S.-China EcoPartnerships Program; Office of the 
Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
-07/10/13  U.S.-China Climate Change Working Group Fact Sheet; Office of the 
Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
-07/10/13  U.S.-China EcoPartnerships Event; Office of the Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
-07/10/13  U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Joint Opening Session;  Secretary of 
State John Kerry; Dean Acheson Auditorium; Washington, DC 
-07/09/13  2013 Strategic and Economic Dialogue Press Schedule; Office of the 
Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
-07/08/13  Background Briefing on the Upcoming Strategic and Economic Dialogue and U.S.-
China Relations; Via Teleconference; Washington, DC 
2014 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
-07/15/14  Report of the U.S.-China Climate Change Working Group to the 6th Round of the 
Strategic and Economic Dialogue; Office of the Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
-07/14/14  U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Outcomes of the Strategic 
Track; Office of the Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
-07/10/14  Joint U.S.-China Press Statements at the Conclusion of the Strategic & Economic 
Dialogue;  Secretary of State John Kerry; Great Hall of the People; Beijing, China 
-07/10/14  Press Availability in Beijing, China;  Secretary of State John Kerry; Beijing, China 
-07/10/14  Remarks With Chinese President Xi Jinping;  Secretary of State John Kerry; Great 
Hall of the People; Beijing, China 
-07/10/14  Remarks at EcoPartnerships Signing Ceremony;  Secretary of State John 
Kerry; Great Hall of the People; Beijing, China 
-07/10/14  Remarks at Opening of CEO Roundtable;  Secretary of State John Kerry; Diayuotai 
State Guesthouse; Beijing, China 
-07/10/14  Remarks at Strategic Track Plenary Session;  Secretary of State John 
Kerry; Diaoyutai State Guesthouse; Beijing, China 
-07/10/14  Six Inducted into U.S.-China EcoPartnerships Program; Office of the 
Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
-07/10/14  U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue VI Strategic Track Select 
Outcomes; Office of the Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
-07/09/14  Key Achievements of U.S.-China Climate Change Cooperation Under the Strategic 
and Economic Dialogue; Office of the Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
-07/09/14  Remarks at Combating Wildlife Trafficking Event;  Secretary of State John 
Kerry; Diaoyutai State Guesthouse; Beijing, China 
-07/09/14  Remarks at the Beginning of the Strategic Track Session 1 on Bilateral 
Cooperation;  Secretary of State John Kerry; Diaoyutai State Guesthouse; Beijing, China 
-07/09/14  Remarks at the Sixth Round of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue;  Secretary of State John Kerry; Diaoyutai State Guesthouse; Beijing, China 
-07/09/14  Remarks at the Top of the Joint Session on Climate Change and Clean 
Energy;  Secretary of State John Kerry; Diaoyutai State Guest House; Beijing, China 
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-07/09/14  Remarks at the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue;  Special Envoy for 
Climate Change Todd D. Stern; Beijing, China 
-07/09/14  Senior State Department Officials on the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue; Beijing, China 
-07/08/14  Senior State Department and Treasury Officials on the U.S.-China Strategic and 
Economic Dialogue; Beijing, China 
-07/07/14  Background Briefing on the Strategic and Economic Dialogue; En Route to Beijing, 
China 
-06/30/14  Interview With Wang Guan of CCTV;  Secretary of State John Kerry; Washington, 
DC 
-06/30/14  U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue to be Held in Beijing, China, on July 9-
10, 2014; Office of the Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
2015 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
-06/24/15  Closing Remarks at the Strategic Track Oceans Meeting;  Secretary of State John 
Kerry; Washington, DC 
-06/24/15  Joint Statement: Sixth U.S.-China High-Level Consultation on People-to-People 
Exchange; Office of the Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
-06/24/15  Remarks at Roundtable With U.S. and Chinese CEOs;  Deputy Secretary of State 
Antony J. Blinken; Blair House, Washington, DC 
-06/24/15  The Strategic & Economic Dialogue / Consultation on People-to-People 
Exchange;  Deputy Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken; Remarks at Plenary 
Session; Washington, DC 
-06/24/15  The Strategic & Economic Dialogue / Consultation on People-to-People Exchange 
Closing Statements;  Secretary of State John Kerry; Ben Franklin Room; Washington, DC 
-06/24/15  The Strategic & Economic Dialogue / Consultation on People-to-People Exchange 
Joint Press Availability;  Secretary of State John Kerry; Ben Franklin Room; Washington, DC 
-06/24/15  The United States and China: Protecting and Conserving the Ocean; Office of the 
Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
-06/24/15  U.S.-China Climate Cooperation; Office of the Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
-06/24/15  U.S.-China Consultation on People-to-People Exchange (CPE); Office of the 
Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
-06/24/15  U.S.-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue Outcomes of the Strategic Track; Office 
of the Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
-06/24/15  U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue VII Strategic Track Select 
Outcomes; Office of the Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
-06/24/15  United States and China Highlight Cooperation on Combating Wildlife Trafficking 
at the 7th U.S.-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue; Office of the 
Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
-06/24/15  United States and China Strengthen Climate Change Cooperation; Office of the 
Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
-06/23/15  Background Briefing on the U.S.-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue; Via 
Teleconference; Washington, DC 
-06/23/15   Photos: 2015 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
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-06/23/15  Remarks at the 2015 U.S.-China Women's Leadership Exchange and 
Dialogue;  Ambassador-at-Large for Global Women's Issues Catherine M. Russell; U.S. 
Department of State; Washington, DC 
-06/23/15  The U.S.-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue / Consultation on People-to-People 
Exchange;  Secretary of State John Kerry; Dean Acheson Auditorium; Washington, DC 
-06/23/15  The Strategic & Economic Dialogue / Consultation on People-to-People Exchange 
-- Remarks at the Joint Banquet;  Secretary of State John Kerry; Ben Franklin 
Room; Washington, DC 
-06/23/15  The Strategic and Economic Dialogue / Consultation on People-to-People 
Exchange -- U.S.-China Consultation on CPE Women's Leadership Exchange and Dialogue 
Event;  Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources Heather 
Higginbottom; George Marshall Center; Washington, DC 
-06/23/15  U.S.-China Development Cooperation; Office of the Spokesperson; Washington, 
DC 
-06/23/15  U.S.-China EcoPartnerships Program; Office of the Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
-06/23/15  U.S.-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue / Act on Climate: Celebration of Energy 
and Environment Cooperation Panel;  Secretary of State John Kerry; Dean Acheson 
Auditorium; Washington, DC 
-06/22/15  Background Briefing on the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue; Office of 
the Spokesperson; via Teleconference 
-06/22/15  UPDATED: 2015 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue and Consultation on 
People-to-People Exchange Media Schedule; Office of the Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
-06/20/15  Additional Press Events During the 2015 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue and Consultation on People-to-People Exchange; Office of the 
Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
-06/19/15  2015 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue and Consultation on People-to-
People Exchange Media Schedule; Office of the Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
-06/18/15  Preview of the Seventh U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue;  Assistant 
Secretary Daniel R. Russel, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Washington, DC 
2016 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
06/15/16 Second U.S.-China Climate-Smart / Low-Carbon Cities Summit; Office of the 
Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
06/08/16 Climate Change and Clean Energy at the 2016 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue; Office of the Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
06/08/16 The United States and China Build on Paris Agreement and Strengthen Climate 
Change Cooperation; Office of the Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
06/08/16 The United States and China: Protecting and Conserving the Ocean; Office of the 
Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
06/08/16 United States and China Discuss Challenges of Civil Aviation at the 8th U.S.-China 
Strategic & Economic Dialogue; Office of the Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
06/08/16 United States and China Discuss Wildlife Trafficking and Ivory Ban at the Eighth 
U.S.-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue; Office of the Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
06/07/16 Consultation on People-to-People Exchange Plenary Session;  Secretary of State 
John Kerry; National Museum; Beijing, China 
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06/07/16 Press Availability in Beijing, China;  Secretary of State John Kerry; The 
Westin; Beijing, China 
06/07/16 Remarks at the CEO Roundtable;  Secretary of State John Kerry; Diaoyutai State 
Guesthouse; Beijing, China 
06/07/16 Remarks at the Meeting With Chinese President Xi Jinping;  Secretary of State John 
Kerry; Great Hall of the People; Beijing, China 
06/07/16 Remarks at the S-Track Plenary;  Secretary of State John Kerry; Diaoyutai State 
Guesthouse; Beijing, China 
06/07/16 U.S.-China Climate-Smart/Low-Carbon Cities Summit;  Secretary of State John 
Kerry; Beijing International Hotel; Beijing, China 
06/07/16 U.S.-China Consultation on People-to-People Exchange; Office of the 
Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
06/07/16 U.S.-China Press Statements;  Secretary of State John Kerry; Great Hall of the 
People; Beijing, China 
06/07/16 U.S.-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue Outcomes of the Strategic Track; Office 
of the Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
06/07/16 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue VIII Strategic Track Select 
Outcomes; Office of the Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
06/06/16 Remarks Before the Small Session 1: Bilateral Issues;  Secretary of State John 
Kerry; Diaoyutai State Guesthouse; Beijing, China 
06/06/16 Remarks at the EcoPartnerships Event;  Secretary of State John Kerry; Diaoyutai 
State Guesthouse; Beijing, China 
06/06/16 S&ED Joint Session on Climate Change Remarks;  Secretary of State John 
Kerry; Diaoyutai State Guesthouse; Beijing, China 
06/06/16 S&ED Opening Session Remarks;  Secretary of State John Kerry; Diaoyutai State 
Guesthouse; Beijing, China 
06/06/16 U.S.-China EcoPartnerships Program; Office of the Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
06/05/16 6th U.S.-China Strategic Security Dialogue; Office of the 
Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
06/03/16 Under Secretary Novelli Travels to China and Cambodia; Office of the 
Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
06/02/16 Deputy Secretary Antony Blinken's Travel to Beijing June 5-6, 2016; Office of the 
Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
05/31/16 Interview With Bingru Wang of Phoenix TV;  Secretary of State John Kerry; Treaty 
Room; Washington, DC 
05/31/16 Previewing the Strategic and Economic Dialogue with China;  Under Secretary for 
Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment Catherine A. Novelli; Press Briefing 
Room; Washington, DC 
05/30/16 Secretary Kerry's Travel to France, Mongolia, China, United Arab Emirates, and 
Saudi Arabia;  Assistant Secretary and Department Spokesperson John Kirby, Bureau of 
Public Affairs; Washington, DC 
04/26/16 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue and U.S.-China Consultation on 
People-to-People Exchange To Be Held in Early June in Beijing, China; Office of the 
Spokesperson; Washington, DC 
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Text under analysis: Treasury Department Documents 
2009 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
7/28/2009 Joint Press Release on the First Round of the U.S.- China Strategic and 
Economic Dialogue 
7/28/2009 The First U.S.- China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Economic Track Joint 
Fact Sheet 
7/28/2009 Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner's Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
Closing Statement 
7/28/2009 U.S. Fact Sheet: First Cabinet-level Meeting of Economic Track of U.S.-China S 
& ED (pdf) 
7/28/2009 Fact Sheet: U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue  
7/28/2009 Timothy F. Geithner Economic Track Opening Session Statement 
7/27/2009 Op-Ed: A New Strategic and Economic Dialogue with China 
7/27/2009 Secretary Geithner S&ED Opening Ceremony Statement 
7/27/2009 Remarks by the President at the U.S.-China S & ED 
7/27/2009 Updated: Strategic and Economic Dialogue Press Schedule for Tuesday, July 28, 
2009 
7/26/2009 Updated: Strategic and Economic Dialogue Press Schedule 
7/24/2009 Strategic and Economic Dialogue Press Schedule 
7/13/2009 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue to be held July 27-28, 2009 in 
Washington, D.C. 
6/2/2009 Joint Statement by Secretary of the Treasury Geithner and Secretary of State 
Clinton 
6/1/2009 U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner Names Additions to Economic and 
Financial leadership Team for China 
5/31/2009 Speech by Secretary Geithner - The United States and China, Cooperating for 
Recovery and Growth 
4/1/2009 Joint Statement by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of the 
Treasury Tim Geithner on the Establishment of the U.S.-China Strategic and 
Economic Dialogue 
2010 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
6/10/2010 Timothy F. Geithner Testimony before the Senate Finance Committee 
5/27/2010 Fact Sheet: Second Meeting of the U.S. –China Strategic & Economic Dialogue 
Joint U.S.-China Economic Fact Sheet (pdf) 
5/25/2010 Strategic and Economic Dialogue Closing Statement Treasury Secretary Tim 
Geithner 
5/25/2010 Remarks at the Central Party School Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner 
5/25/2010 Fact Sheet: Second Meeting of the U.S.-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue 
U.S. Economic Track (pdf) 
5/24/2010 Economic Track Opening Session Statement Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner 
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5/24/2010 Strategic and Economic Dialogue Opening Ceremony Statement 
5/24/2010 Statement of President Barack Obama to the U.S.-China Strategic & Economic 
Dialogue 
4/8/2010 Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner and Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan 
4/8/2010 Readout of Secretary Geithner's Meeting with Vice Premier Wang Qishan 
4/3/2010 Geithner Statement On the Report to Congress on International Economic and 
Exchange Rate Policies 
10/14/2009 Secretary Geithner met with member of the Politburo 
10/1/2009 U.S.-China Relations: Maximizing the Effectiveness of the Strategic and 
Economic Dialogue 
9/10/2009 Executive Secretary And Senior Coordinator Loevinger before the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee 
2011 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
5/10/2011 Joint Closing Remarks for the Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
5/10/2011 The 2011 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue U.S. Fact Sheet – 
Economic Track 
5/10/2011 U.S.-China Comprehensive Framework for Promoting Strong, Sustainable and 
Balanced Growth and Economic Cooperation 
5/10/2011 Third Meeting of the U.S.-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue Joint U.S.-China 
Economic Track Fact Sheet 
5/9/2011 Remarks at Banquet for Vice Premier Wang, State Councilor Dai and the 
Chinese delegation by Secretary Geithner and Secretary Clinton 
5/9/2011 Remarks by Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner at the 2011 U.S.-China Strategic 
and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) Economic Track Opening Session 
5/9/2011 Remarks by Vice President Joe Biden to the Opening Session of the U.S.-China 
Strategic & Economic Dialogue 
5/9/2011 Remarks by Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner at the 2011 U.S.-China Strategic 
and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) Opening Session 
5/7/2011 Senior Coordinator for China Affairs and the Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
David Loevinger Previews the 2011 S&ED 
5/5/2011 Briefing on the Upcoming U.S.-China S&ED 
5/3/2011 Remarks by Secretary Tim Geithner at a Discussion on the Upcoming U.S.-
China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
4/25/2011 U.S.-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue to be Held May 9-10, 2011 in 
Washington, DC 
2012 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
5/4/2012 U.S. Fact Sheet - Economic Track of the Fourth Meeting of the U.S.-China 
Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) 
5/4/2012 Joint U.S.-China Economic Track Fact Sheet- Fourth Meeting of the U.S. China 
Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) 
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5/4/2012 Remarks by Secretary Geithner at the Close of the Fourth Strategic and 
Economic Dialogue (S&ED) 
5/3/2012 Remarks by Secretary Geithner at the Opening Ceremony of the 2012 Strategic 
and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) 
5/3/2012 Remarks by Secretary Geithner at the Economic Track Opening Session of the 
2012 Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) 
02/28/2012 Treasury Hosts U.S.-China Joint Economic Committee Deputies 
2013 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
7/12/2013 U.S. Fact Sheet – Economic Track Fifth Meeting of the U.S.-China Strategic and 
Economic Dialogue 
07/12/2013 Joint U.S.-China Economic Track Fact Sheet of the Fifth Meeting of the U.S.-
China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
7/11/2013 Remarks of Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew at the Close of the Fifth U.S.-China 
Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
07/10/2013 Remarks of Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew at the Economic Track Opening 
Session of the 2013 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue  
7/10/2013 Remarks of Secretary Lew at the Opening Session of the 2013 U.S.-China 
Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
2014 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
7/11/2014 Sixth Meeting of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue U.S. Fact 
Sheet – Economic Track 
07/11/2014 U.S.-China Joint Fact Sheet Sixth Meeting of the Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue 
07/10/2014 Remarks of Secretary Lew at the Closing Press Conference of the U.S.-China 
2014 Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
07/10/2014 Remarks of U.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew at the CEO Roundtable of the 
2014 Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
07/09/2014 Remarks of Secretary Lew at the 2014 Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
Opening Session 
07/09/2014 Remarks of Secretary Lew at the 2014 Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
Economic Track Opening Session 
2015 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
06/25/2015 2016 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue U.S. Fact Sheet – Economic 
Track 
06/25/2015 2015 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Joint U.S.-China Fact Sheet – 
Economic Track 
06/24/2015 Remarks by Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew at the Closing Ceremony of the 
U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
06/24/2015 Remarks by Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew at U.S.-China Strategic and 
Economic Dialogue CEO Roundtable 
06/23/2015 Remarks by Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew at Economic Track Opening 
Session of U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
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2016 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
06/07/2016 2016 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue U.S. Fact Sheet – Economic 
Track 
06/07/2016 2016 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Joint U.S.-China Fact Sheet – 
Economic Track 
06/07/2016 Remarks by Treasury Secretary Lew at the 2016 U.S.-China Strategic and 
Economic Dialogue Closing Ceremony 
06/07/2016 Remarks by Treasury Secretary Lew at the 2016 U.S.-China Strategic and 
Economic Dialogue CEO Roundtable 
06/06/2016 Remarks by Treasury Secretary Lew at the 2016 U.S.-China Strategic and 
Economic Dialogue Joint Opening Session 
06/06/2016 Remarks by Treasury Secretary Lew at the 2016 U.S.-China Strategic and 
Economic Dialogue Session on Climate Change 
06/06/2016 Remarks by Treasury Secretary Lew at the 2016 U.S.-China Strategic and 
Economic Dialogue Economic Track Opening Session 
 
 
